

**Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network KATU**

**Report of the Workshop on the Israeli-  
Palestinian Civil Society Cooperative Activities.**

27-28 November 1999 in Helsinki, Finland

## **Foreword**

The Citizens' Security Council, KATU (in Finnish Kansalaisten turvallisuusneuvosto) was established in spring 1997 by more than 20 Finnish non-governmental organisations and research institutes in order to create a broad civic forum for conflict prevention and conflict resolution. KATU acts as a network combining the efforts of Finnish NGO's to prevent the outbreak and escalation of violent conflicts.

KATU organized together with Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF) from Tel Aviv and Palestinian Center for Peace (PCP) from Ramallah, a workshop on "The Israeli-Palestinian Civil Society Cooperative Activities" during the Finnish EU Presidency on 27-28 November 1999 in Helsinki, Finland.

Altogether more than 50 representatives from Israeli, Palestinian and European NGO's and research institutes as well as governments participated in the conference. The workshop brought together Israeli and Palestinian NGO's active in the field, as well as representatives from Donor Countries supporting such activities, to assess the effect of their work to date and to define strategies for the future. The results of this exercise will serve as a useful policy tool for donors and civil society actors alike. The conference covered an examination of past achievements, an analysis of past examples of cooperation and the devising of plans for future cooperation leading to, and following, the Permanent Status Agreement.

This book is the Final Report of the conference. The workshop discussed on various topics related to People-to-People activities. This report includes most of the speeches held in various sessions as well as reports from the working groups. We hope that this book proves useful for its readers.

KATU wants to thank both the ECF and PCP for their valuable help and assistance in planning and organizing the workshop, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for funding the workshop and the publication of this report.

Helsinki, March 2000

Anne Palm  
Secretary General  
KATU

## **Opening and welcome**

**Ms. Kirsti Lintonen, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland**

### OPENING ADDRESS

Mr. Chairman,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very happy to have this opportunity to be here today with you. It is indeed a pleasure to attend a seminar with such an exceptional composition of people.

The Middle East Peace Process has been a very long and complex one with some progress but also with many setbacks. Six years have now passed since the Madrid Declaration of Principles. Some of you were in the key roles there.

All Israelis and Palestinians have experienced in their daily lives the ups and downs of this process. The political decision-makers have had difficult decisions to make. However, at the heart of the process are the two peoples, the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Peace cannot be declared from above. Armies receive their orders to cease hostilities, borders are agreed and border controls ensure that there are no border violations between two friendly nations. However, if peace does not reach the minds of the people the borders will remain and peace can grow cold. In the long run, this kind of peace cannot be sustainable. Every little move the neighbour makes is watched with suspicion and interpreted accordingly. This can be the seed of a new conflict.

New decisions have been taken to end the vicious circle of violence in the Middle East. But you have done more than that. Former enemies face each other and open a dialogue. This takes a lot of courage and strength. During difficult times in the political process, hope has not been given up.

Part of this seminar will be devoted to the prospects for civil society in the Final Status negotiations by seeking ways in which civil society co-operation could support the Final Status agreement. The negotiations started at the beginning of this month and the timetable is very tight.

Political leaders must bear the responsibility for their decisions. However, the peace process is not a monopoly of the politicians. True peace starts in our minds and hearts. Politicians have a special responsibility and duty to involve the civil society at large.

During conflicts the enemy is often stereotyped in a way that makes it difficult to cross the resulting barrier of suspicion or fear. Tackling common problems or sharing professional experiences helps to pave the way to meet the people behind the barrier of stereotypes. People-to-people-activities can help academics, school children, parents, artists, doctors, media people and business people to meet and cross the barrier of suspicion. Your experiences can lead to new ways of exploring these shared activities. After all, when it comes down to the citizen's level, the question is about managing everyday life, about peaceful coexistence and about cohabitation.

The role of the media in both conflict situations and in reconciliation cannot be underestimated. Conflict-oriented media often feed old stereotypes, whereas objective media, committed to reconciliation and development have an opportunity and an indeed a responsibility to advance the cause of peace and justice.

Mr. Chairman,

Finland currently holds the Presidency of the European Union. During the Finnish Presidency the Middle East has been central to our agenda. The EU has offered its support to the governments of the region. It has also given financial support to strengthen their economies. Poverty and economic inequality are enemies of peace.

Finland is giving due attention to conflict prevention and resolution in the context of development co-operation. Preventive activities are key elements for any sustainable development. Conflict resolution at grassroots level is conducive to stable conditions that are imperative to investments and trade.

The representatives of the Citizens' Security Council, KATU, which has been organising this seminar on the Finnish side, have been active in this field.

In the framework of the Oslo Process, Norway took under their auspices the people-to-people co-ordination. The EU has consistently supported the people-to-people interaction and just a few days ago a new budget line for people-to-people-activities was established. The United States, Switzerland and many other countries have given their support for these activities.

In the light of the achievements so far and the tasks ahead, the initiators and organisers of this workshop have to be commended for their important work. I am convinced that the efforts today and tomorrow will add positively to the Middle East Peace Process.

I wish you all a successful and fruitful seminar.

Thank you.

## ***Session One: Reviewing Civil Society Cooperative Efforts to Date***

**Mr. Naseef Mu'alleem, PCPD**

### **Palestinian Israeli Civil Society Co-operative Activities**

Great importance is placed on research about the Palestinian Israeli relationships at all levels, including the individual, the governmental and the organizational levels. It is assumed that this research will contribute and help in narrowing the wide gap between the two people, a gap that was established over the long years of conflict. In order to put all questions in their proper place and to solve a number of problems related to the research, we have to answer a few questions:

Did the dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli individuals and groups begin after the Peace Process started in Madrid, or did it begin before that?

Was there any specific aim for these dialogues between Palestinians and Israelis, and did they develop towards that aim? In other words: do these dialogues and joint projects coincide under a well-studied strategy or do they express something without basis or aims?

Do the stages of ebbs and flows that characterise these dialogues signify a crisis between the people conducting the dialogue, or are they a reflection of the political crisis between Palestinian and Israeli political leaders? If so, can Palestinian and Israeli civil society organisations and leaders play a role in easing the tension between the two sides? Or is this easing of tensions due to political pressures from countries that are more powerful than the people in conflict?

Most directors of Palestinian and Israeli non-governmental organisations concentrate on the positive side of what they have achieved during different joint projects, but they do not refer to disadvantages of this dialogue or to the great retreat or failures that also resulted from joint projects. At the same time, we find that the Palestinians are cautious and tend to decrease the number of achievements and successes. The question here is whether the ordinary Palestinian citizen can clearly see, since he is not deeply involved in the details of these projects? Do these directors benefit in making these projects look attractive thus ensuring that the continued flow of funds to their organisations from different sources that are easily available?

Through the experience of the last decade, can we say that the co-operation between the Palestinian and Israeli non-governmental organisations was a success or a failure?

Or are there more accurate answers that generalise less, such as saying that there are some successful examples and there are failures? I believe that studying this issue will serve the aims that were put forth in such joint projects.

When we talk about the aims of the joint activities, we are wondering whether the aims are clear, and if so, who proposed these aims? Were these aims annexes of Oslo II Agreement, or were they put forward by the funders. Or, are they mentioned in the Declaration of Palestinian Independence of 1988, or are these aims bigger and more comprehensive and do they coincide with the International Human Rights Declaration and Geneva Convention?

If we suppose that the dialogue achieved these aims, and then it was affected by problems, then who is responsible for that? Do organisers, facilitators, co-ordinators, directors or political leaders play a role in this? Do these people represent one side, or do they represent both the Palestinian and Israeli sides?

When we talk about a ten year period, hundreds of joint projects, and dozens of participating organisations and millions of dollars, we should ask about the number of participants in this program which was called People-To-People? Is the number of participants tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands or are they a small group of individuals who regard these programs as a kind of a national duty. Are there even others who regard them as fun and recreation?

Since we are talking about the number of participants, we have to know the public opinion in Israel and Palestine. Did these projects support the public opinion on the Peace Process or did they enhance the public opposition towards the Peace Process?

The final and most important question is the one related to the position and behaviour of the Palestinian and Israeli governments. Is it true that there is governmental support and protection for such activities or is there a difference in positions towards these activities between the Palestinian and Israeli governments? And if there is no protection or support for these programs, what is the benefit of the signed agreements between the two sides that are supposed to support what they have agreed upon? **These and other questions need answers. As for me as an academic, I am trying to answer most of these questions through the help of those who have experienced People-To-People projects.**

To achieve this goal, I used different resources and conducted a number of meetings. My colleagues in the different Palestinian organisations had an important role in producing this paper, which I hope will contribute to the important discussion that we have long been waiting for. Before going through the main items, I will summarise the basic information that this paper is based on and which I regard as a reference.

I conducted 61 interviews and they are distributed as follows:

- 33 interviews with directors of Palestinian non-governmental organisations who have conducted People-to-People projects
- 13 interviews with activists in People-to-People Program
- 11 interviews with citizens who did not participate in People-to-people program
- 4 interviews with representatives of the Opposition

I asked all the above to fill in a questionnaire that contained 30 questions (reference # 1)

The following is a summary of the issues related to the Paper:

## 1            **The Concept and Aims of People-To-People**

There was an agreement among the people whom I met that the concept “people-to-people” does not coincide with the dialogue that took place before **the 1991 Madrid Conference**. Rather we should call those dialogues as Persons-to-Persons consisting of small groups of Palestinians with similar groups of Israelis. Most of the respondents assured that this dialogue began before the agreements, and it can be divided into five headings:

### A            *The Compulsory Dialogue*

This dialogue began in the Israeli jails between the Israeli executioner and the Palestinian. Most often the aim of this dialogue was to frustrate the Palestinian militant and make him collapse in front of the Israeli officer. Paradoxically the Palestinians used this dialogue as a chance to make the Israelis know the Palestinian will and determination.

### B            *Dialogue for the Daily Bread*

This dialogue was between the Israeli factory owner, or director and the Palestinian worker. The behaviour did not differ much from the relationship of the jail, where the Palestinian workman witnessed the power, strength and arrogance of the Israelis. The aim of the Palestinians was to keep their work and dignity. There are many incidents that took place in Tel-Aviv where the Palestinian workers engaged in strikes and left their work, due to the many insults by the factory owner.

### C            *The Dialogue of Friends*

This dialogue took place between the Palestinian leftists, especially the Communists, and the Israeli communists of Rakah Party (The Israeli Communist Party). The reason behind these dialogues was the common language of peace between the two sides especially since the Israeli Communist Party did and still does acknowledge the political rights of the Palestinians. The aim of this dialogue was to find out mechanisms to affect the political leaders, in order to sit for negotiations and look for solutions.

### D            *The Darkness Dialogue*

This dialogue began between the Palestinian political leaders and the Israeli progressive leaders. The aim of this dialogue was to find out mutual acknowledgement of rights. Most of this dialogue took place in Europe and in secret. Dr. Munther Dajani (the director of the Palestinian Centre for Regional Studies) said that these dialogues were duties given by the political leaders.

### E            *The dialogue of the civil society organisations*

This kind of dialogue was organised by the Palestinian and the Israeli non-governmental organisations, the aim of which was to get to know each other and to discuss issues that are of interest to both peoples. The dialogue was not conducted in secret but took place in Israel, Cyprus and France, where groups of academics, university students and journalists took part. Most of these initiatives came from the Israeli side.

As for the concepts and aims **since July 1994 to June 1996**, the concept was defined by 70% of those whom I interviewed as an extension of the work of political leaders. Their slogan was negotiations not confrontations, which means going into details and talking about the future and the successful techniques to achieve peace. During this stage, there was disagreement on the concept of peace. Most of the interviewees mentioned that the Israeli concept of peace during that stage was different from the Palestinian one. The Israelis see peace as security related to the free movement of goods and markets and issues related to normalisation. The Palestinian side, on the other hand always refer to the political dimension. The political position formed a strong front against which the credibility of Israeli organisations was measured. The Palestinian side was cautious towards the Israeli especially since most Israelis at that stage were supporters of the Labour government. The Palestinians regarded this government as a “carrot and stick government”.

I regard March 30<sup>th</sup>, 1993 as an important turning point in the Peace Process. This day witnessed the beginning of the closure on the Occupied Territories, where the organisations and the staff working in People-to-People projects faced great obstacles at all levels. They had difficulty in moving between the West Bank and Gaza on the one hand, and between Palestinian and Israel areas on the other hand. Mr. Rabin’s government was not easy on the dialogue activists. They were treated as terrorists in the time of complete closures. These activists faced a lot of pressure from the Palestinian public who looked at them in a suspicious way since they were supporting peace with those who caused their suffering and who blocked their freedom of movement.

This stage also witnessed acceleration from the Israeli side in depriving the Palestinians from freedom of movement. A number of Palestinian NGO directors and peace activists were given permits to enter with their cars to East Jerusalem and Israel, but after Mr. Rabin’s death, the government of Mr. Peres banned such permits, preventing any director from reaching East Jerusalem or Israel. This placed some obstacles in front of the dialogue and reached a low point, in spite of the international enthusiasm and support Mr. Peres enjoyed at that time.

#### *The Period between June 1996 to May 1999*

Netanyahu was in power during this time. In spite of the restrictions imposed by the government on the negotiations with the Palestinian side, and in spite of the continuation of building settlements and the violations of the agreements, the interviewees agreed that this government did not add any new obstacles. It was satisfied with the obstacles that were put forward by Mr. Peres. The interviewees also agreed that the later part of Netanyahu governance did not manifest any of those continuous closures that the Labour government imposed; Dr. Zakaria Al-Qaq, the Palestinian director of IPCRI said: “People to People activities decreased during the second half of the Israeli Likud government”.

As for People-to-People projects in that period, most of the interviewees said that this program had a new strength due to the following reasons:

- The Israeli peace movement doubled its activities after the fall of the Labour government, and this increase affected and activated People-to-People projects.
- The aim of activating People-to-People projects as mentioned by Mr. Muhammad Joudah, director of the Palestinian Peace Movement, is to preserve the Peace Process, lest the Palestinian and Israeli

people give up hope for peace. Strengthening People-to-People projects was a struggle against Netanyahu Government, which refused peace.

- There was an interest for the different funding organisations to support Palestinian Israeli joint activities.

## **2 Problems and Methods of Choices**

All of the interviewees assured that the issues that People-to-People projects address are different, and that most of the dialogue that took place between the two sides after Oslo differ from the dialogues that took place before. Half of those whom I met preferred to divide the time before Oslo into two parts. The first is before Madrid negotiations and the second after, where the political side affected the first dialogue. The Palestinian side was interested in discussing the questions of their rights, and to change the Israelis' distorted view that in their minds Palestinians are terrorists. They tried to prove that the Palestinian people represented by the PLO want a comprehensive, just peace and mutual recognition. Choosing the topic, was not an issue since the two sides knew that the dialogue was political. The encounters were initiated by both sides or by a third party.

The Madrid Conference played a major role in developing the dialogue and in redirecting it towards getting rid of the neutral mediator in most of the activities that were organised. This Conference helped the Palestinians and the Palestinian organisations to initiate dialogue with the Israelis. Mr. Sameer Seif, from the Friends School in Ramallah, who had participated in different activities with the Israelis, said that the Madrid Conference gave the Palestinian organisations the legitimacy to conduct a dialogue with the Israelis, or to continue the dialogue that had already begun.

The subjects of the dialogue did not develop much. They were mainly political including the Peace Process, and accusations from both sides of putting obstacles in front of the Peace Process. The question now is where were these activities conducted. In short, most of these activities were conducted in Israel or in Cyprus; with very few meetings held in the Occupied Territories, and then only in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem.

Concerning the obstacles of this stage, the interviewees said: "There were no military checkpoints. We could reach any area in Israel, and that was the reason for conducting meetings there. When asked why they were not conducted in the Occupied Territories, Mr. Hasan Bargouti, Executive Director of the Democracy Centre and Human Rights said: "Israel was not a stranger to the Palestinians. Between 1970 and 1993, about 700,000 Palestinians entered Israel. Palestine, the Occupied Territories, on the other hand was foreign to the Israelis, because the Israelis only entered it as soldiers carrying their guns to kill and not to make dialogue. They did not come to work or to visit their relatives as was the case for the Palestinians who entered Israel to visit their houses, relatives and to work.

The situation changed after the Oslo Accords and the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. The dialogue changed direction, although keeping the old goals. The new direction was related to new issues as to the work of journalism, women, democracy, the economic environment, the stereotype and, other somehow political issues. Most of the interviewees believe that most subjects that were suggested by the Israeli side that had an infinite number of advantages. For example, the Israelis had easy access to funding sources, and they could get direct funds before conducting any kind of agreement with their Palestinian counterparts. The Palestinians used to regard these projects as a field in which to strive to

achieve a real peace with the Israelis, and they played their role without interfering in the financial issues. I have a personal experience where through my work at the Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy, we conducted a workshop for three days at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem (26-27-28/11/1993). Twenty persons took part from each side. Unfortunately, we were not able to know the source and the volume of the funds. Although we had asked questions about the amounts of funds and who the funders were, we did not get any answer from the Israeli organisation who, to this day, has not paid the rest of the amount of 2000US\$.

*The third stage is after the Oslo Accord II* and after the arrival of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, Jericho and Area A. This stage extends to the beginning of the Netanyahu government. I can divide the opinion of the interviewees into three views:

- **The first group** said that the various issues were discussed away from the political dialogue. It began to normalise on the account of the Palestinians. The Israeli side was the stronger since they are more professional in fund raising and have a long experience in the dialogue with Palestinians since 1948. These interviewees saw the Palestinian side only as a tool for implementing the projects. The aim of the Israelis was to take advantage of this in order to justify the submitting of reports to the funding organisations, aimed at obtaining additional funds. This group of interviewees (among them Dr. Sa'ed Jaser one of the active facilitators in the programs that were conducted in the Russian) said that the outflow from the Gulf, the closure and economic siege, the increased unemployment and hunger, led to the fact that many Palestinians only got involved in these projects for the sake of surviving.
- **The second group** of the interviewees said that the Palestinians had the chance to affect the Israeli public opinion in order to change it as Mr. Akram Attalah said. Mr. Attalah works at FAFO and is one of the co-ordinators of People-to-People Program. He said that most of the Palestinian political parties call on influencing Israeli public opinion. Thus some Palestinians viewed these projects as a way to achieve this aim. This group says that some of these projects were being developed by Palestinians and Israelis and brought the funds together. Projects were conducted jointly, some of which were successful, and achieved many of the goals.
- **The third group** saw that the policy of Netanyahu and Peres, the use of the "stick" and the severe and continuous closure, led to a decrease in the joint projects. Their policy even paralysed these projects especially in the last three months that preceded the 1996 Israeli elections, where Palestinians were not allowed to enter Israel. What worsened this decrease is the approval of this policy by Peace Now and Israeli civil society organisations in order to support the Labour Party and Mr. Peres in the election. They believed that any military attack inside Israel against civilians would divert the voices of the Israeli voters towards supporting the Likud. But no attacks took place during that period and still the Labour Party lost!

People-to-People projects addressed various issues during Netanyahu's reign from June 1996 to May 1999. They included agricultural, environmental, training, democracy, youth and gender issues as well as educational and economical ones. Activities also included a political dialogue that was described by Dr. Dajani as a co-operation against the Likud government.

Concerning the choice of the subject, more than 90% of the persons whom I met assured that the Palestinians were able to contribute in choosing the subjects of the projects. These joint projects were

being implemented together and on equal basis, where owners of 3 hotels in Ramallah said that the volume of the Palestinian-Israeli activities reached a peak in the last year of Likud power in Israel. When I asked the interviewees about the reasons behind this increase in activities, they answered that that was due to the following reasons.

- Fafo organised the People-to-People work and the projects in order to be fair.
- The failures of Mr. Peres, the Labour Party, the Israeli Left and the Peace movements in the 1996 Elections. Thus, the Likud government left a space that was filled by Israeli NGOs supporting Peace.
- The experience that the Palestinians and Palestinian organisations have gained in dealing with these projects and building new bridges, not only with the different Israeli organisations but also with funding sources.
- There was a noticeable interest from funding organisations to support joint projects, particularly from Norway, the European Commission, the United States, the United Kingdom and Belgium and many other consulates and representatives of different countries. Non-governmental European and American funding organisations have also shown interest.

Another characteristic that distinguished the projects during this stage was their continuation and achievement of many successes, especially for those related to research. Mr. Abed Al-Rahman Al-Tamimi, the Director General of the Palestinian Hydrology Group, said: "We tried all kinds of activities but we found that the joint academic and technical work were the best and the most successful. Professionals and academics are more honest and more committed. The research projects achieved most success and results. Other activities that were conducted with non-academics, failed. The Israelis look for their own benefit and money, rather than for real peace.

### **3 The joint projects and public opinion**

Concerning a question related to the awareness of the Palestinians towards the joint projects and their awareness of the aims of People-to-People programs, most of those whom I interviewed said: "People-to-People projects did not reach the stage at which they could affect Palestinian public opinion, or achieve any general consensus on the aims of these programs". Ms. Nawal Stati, the Director of the Palestinian Cultural Centre, said: "The Palestinians look up to their political leaders and look for official agreements with Israelis". These agreements and their implementation create public opinion that either supports or opposes the Peace Process. Thus the agreements might support People-to-People projects and might get the Palestinians involved in the programs. This is probably true. I remember the demonstrations, peaceful actions and the celebrations when people carried olive branches during the days when they signed the Declaration of Principles. When the people heard the news, they went out on the streets to express their support for the Agreements. This reminds us of the speech by Dr. Haider Abed Al-Shafi in Madrid and the big celebration he received by in Gaza when he came back from Madrid; it was the biggest celebration in the history of Palestine.

Interviewees had different views about the effect of the joint projects on Palestinian public opinion, although they did not vary much. Mr. Abbas Milhem, the co co-ordinator of the joint Palestinian-Israeli projects at the PCPD, said: "First we have to get to know the role of the Palestinian organisation that is going to implement such projects. There are some organisations that receive public support while others are publicly isolated. This affects not only People-to-People projects but also other Palestinian

only projects. There are also other kinds of organisations whose voices we hear only on the day of their activity. These organisations exist on paper only. They, or more precisely the people behind them, reinforce the negative side of the joint projects and the organisations that work under clear aims. Unfortunately, there are some Israeli commercial organisations that take advantage of the Palestinian organisations in order to implement projects and submit reports".

I believe that what Mr. Milhem said is familiar to the people working in the organisations that are implementing the joint projects. Throughout the interviews, most of the respondents indicated that Palestinian public opinion looks suspiciously at joint projects.

In order to be fair, I will use figures and surveys that shed light on Fafu organisations which support joint projects.

During 1996 – 1999, Fafu funded 163 joint projects that were distributed as follows:

- Different projects for adults – 60 projects constituting 38.8% of all projects. Some of these projects are educational ones.
- Cultural projects - 21 projects constituting 12.8% of all projects.
- Environment projects - 16 projects constituting 9.8% of all projects.
- Media Projects - 8 projects constituting 4.9% of all projects.
- Twinning of schools - 12 projects constituting 7.3% of all projects.
- Twinning of schools and education - one project constituting of 0.06 percent.
- Youth projects - 40 projects constituting 24.5% of all projects.

The number of participants in these projects varied from 10 to 20 one from each side. If we assume that the average number of Palestinian participants was 15 in every project, we can assume that the number of participants in all the projects was  $163 \times 15 = 2445$ . This number constitutes 0.037% of the Palestinians people (6.5 million) and it constitutes 0.081% of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus the total is 0.163% of the Palestinian adults living in the West Bank and Gaza, a very small percentage that could not even double in numbers if we were to include the participation of all who took part in other joint projects supported by different sources.

If we scrutinise the previous numbers, we will reach the real reasons behind the weakness of the public opinion supporting the joint projects. An example is that 4.9% of these joint projects are in the area of media. I believe that the public opinion in both sides needs to be doubled and tripled. If we take another example, the twinning of schools, which reached 7.3%, while the projects of twinning and education only reached 0.6% and it is the most important, since education finds out, creates and contributes in finding out the new generation who should be different from our generation.

Undoubtedly public opinion is affected by the political situation and the scope of the Peace Process. The deterioration in the Peace Process is described by Ms. Nadia Naser from the Bridge Centre who said: "The deterioration of the Peace Process and the lack of Israel's commitment to the signed agreements made the Palestinian citizen lose faith in all things related to the Peace Process. So what about the joint projects that people already considered suspicious, even at the best times during the Peace Process?".

There is no doubt that the work of the facilitator and the facilitation process itself is important in the joint Palestinian-Israeli projects. Ms. Tagreed Tanus, a peace activist, believes that most of the projects and meetings that are conducted for the first time need professionals who excel in the facilitation process. She added that this process does not only mean controlling the discussions and giving each party freedom of expression. It also means creating a group of activities and games that serve the aims of the joint meetings. For example, Mr. Kareem Odeh feels that the first session is the most difficult. Each party tries to impose its own agendas and suggestions on to the other party, sometimes exceeding this in becoming rude and oppressive toward this other party.

Most of the people whom I met were basically unable to differentiate between the situation and the people. Thus, it is supposed that the co-ordinator is a creative person who could choose suitable activities, create a healthy atmosphere for the discussion and who could conduct ice-breaking sessions. The success of the facilitator in the first session will ensure the success of future sessions. His/her failure in the first session will cause the failure of later sessions. In order to achieve success, we need facilitators on both sides. We need professional facilitators who can be fair and neutral and who have strong personalities that qualify them to conduct this difficult role.

The question remains whether there are fair and professional facilitators. If there are, do they represent the two sides, or do they represent one side only?

It was obvious through my research that there is a difference between the effectiveness, professionalism and fairness of the facilitators who have played an effective role in preserving the Palestinian-Israeli joint projects.

As for the facilitation that took place before Madrid, they were in most cases conducted by a third party representing another country. The projects conducted between the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Agreements had Israeli facilitators. In the cases where a Palestinian facilitator was appointed, he/she did not play any role. This was described by Mr. Joudeh, the head of the Palestinian Peace Movement, who said: "They used to appoint a Palestinian to work as a facilitator just to fill a space, sometimes just for the continuation of the project, and at other times just for translation".

However after the Oslo Agreements and after the increased legitimacy of these projects due to the agreements conducted between the leaderships, the Palestinian side paid more attention to the issue of professionalism of the team supporting the People-to-People program. Many courses took place with the help of Palestinians of 1948 and some of the Israeli Jewish facilitators, in addition to the international efforts that conducted to training a large number of people. I do believe that the UNDP paid noticeable interest to this issue, as well as the Canadian Embassy in Tel-Aviv, which supported projects for the same reason. One of the organisations that played a major role in this is the Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy and the Bridge Centre from the Palestinian side and, Wahat-Al-Salam, Givat Haviva and the Adam Institute from the Israeli side.

Concerning the evaluation of the Israeli facilitator during this period, I have more than one answer. Some respondents answered that the Israeli facilitator used to conduct all the roles, from co-ordination, to giving lectures and facilitating. Because the Israeli facilitator conducted all these activities, he was accused by the Palestinians as being unfair in an indirect way. The Israeli facilitator would justify the

Israeli attitude and would show his disapproval of the Palestinian presentations. The other point of view is represented by Ms. Nadia Naser, Dr. Munther Dajani, and Ms. Yola Hadadeen and others who regarded the facilitation process as dependent on the person himself whether he/she was qualified or not. These people believe that the Palestinian facilitator was equal to the Israeli facilitator.

Evaluating the facilitation process under the Likud government until today, everyone felt assured that the Palestinian facilitator is now professional and equal to the Israeli facilitator. Mr. Fathi Subah from the Educational Development Centre said that the Palestinian facilitator became stronger than the Israeli facilitator. Mr. Akram Attalah from Fafo said: "In spite of the training of the Palestinian coordinator and facilitator, he/she needs practice and further education in order to reach the same level of professionalism as the Israeli facilitator".

When I asked about the reasons that made the Palestinian facilitator acceptable, the answers were as follows:

- The experience that the Palestinian facilitator went through and his educational background.
- The courses that the Palestinian facilitator attended and benefited from.
- The desire and enthusiasm in learning and challenging.
- The Palestinian side was stronger during the Likud government and was dictating what it wanted to the Israeli side.
- The awareness of the Palestinian side of the importance of professionalism in a Palestinian facilitator's work.

## **5 The Participants**

The second Article of the Sixth Annex of Oslo Accord II did not give any privileges to any sector or party. However, this Article made it clear that both Palestinians and Israelis with all their sectors and parties should be considered. The Annex assured the importance of working with public opinion to affect it towards supporting the Peace Process. Did the joint projects achieve this aim? Did these projects work with all the social parties, and did this program affect the Peace Process positively and in a noticeable manner?

I believe that the answer to this question is restricted to the period that was after Oslo, especially since the dialogue and the meetings that took place before Oslo did not aim for extensive participation. At that time, there were no agreements and there were no parties asking for public support. The period between July 1994 and June 1996 as A. Hatab (an activist) said: "This period witnessed large participation from different sectors, including the youth - especially school and university students - in addition to a noticeable number of politicians, journalists and teachers. The participation of academics and university teachers was very limited, since they had a conservative position towards these joint projects. The workers, farmers, old people and the other vocational people who represent the majority, did not participate at all. I think that the participation of the students, schoolteachers, politicians and journalists reflects the fact that most of the projects in that period were conducted in English. Few of these projects were translated. Others were conducted in Russian, especially the ones that took place through the Bridge Peace Centre and PCPD.

Finally between June 1996 and today, the interviewees assured that the academics became more involved with an increase in the participation of Palestinian woman in the joint projects. Projects with women evolved, since women face problems, restrictions, and violations of their rights both in Palestine and in Israel. The participation of the politicians decreased during this period. I think that this is due to the obstacles imposed by the Likud government that stalled the Peace process. During this period participating sectors included culture, education, environment, journalism and youth. "The media sector that was supposed to contribute to the public opinion retreated. The retreat in the Peace Process led to the retreat of the joint projects related to media", said Mr. Aziz a Palestinian journalist. For example in 1999 out of the 36 projects submitted to People-to-People program under Fafo Supervision, there wasn't any projects aimed at the Media, while there were 3 environmental projects and more than 20 youth projects.

The question here is: is this the kind of participation that the Agreement wanted, or is it the participation of a dwarf in front of the ambitious Oslo Agreement and People-to-People projects? This question was answered by almost everyone. The answers were similar in looking at these project with doubt and suspicion. The Palestinian street and the Palestinian public opinion also looked onto these projects suspiciously. Mr. Hasan Bargouti, the Director of the Democracy and Workers Rights Centre and who participated in many different joint projects said: "The Palestinians have the right to be suspicious towards these projects. The projects should be conducted after the reconciliation and not now. They should be conducted after the Final Agreements, when the Palestinian and the Israeli leaders will need the support of the public. The situation now is different; there are no final agreements, and the Israeli still do not respect the agreements. Thus, the Palestinian people have the right to be suspicious about such projects".

Concerning the local public opinion towards these projects throughout the different stages, everyone thought that the opinion towards these projects had not changed. What did change when the Labour government came into power, was the addition of the word "Normalisation". Whoever was working on these projects was accused of being for normalisation. My question is why is this unacceptable, when sooner or later there will be normalisation? The answers were as follows: our people will not accept normalisation before Palestinian legal rights are completely recognised. This will be represented by the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with control over all lands that were occupied in 1967. "We will not have normalisation before the historical conciliation between the two peoples", said a member of the Palestinian opposition.

## **6 Evaluation**

I believe that the evaluation process of the joint projects is not less important than the process of putting forward the aims and the implementation process. I believe that there should be two kinds of evaluation. The first should be a joint evaluation including both sides. This should take place by the end of each session or activity, where the administrators, co-ordinators and participants should take part. The other evaluation should be conducted by each party alone, where the aims are not announced. During the period that preceded the Peace Process, there was no joint evaluation. Each party had its announced aims and some other unannounced ones. The dialogue was considered to be the "meeting of the enemies", thus each side used to conduct the evaluation by itself.

There were some forms of evaluation during the period of the Peace Process in Madrid until June 1996, except that it was the Israeli side that was more interested, contributing more and more professionals to the evaluation process. One of the free lands facilitators, Mr. Hussein Sawalha said, "most of these projects were implemented by the Israeli side, where the Israelis proposed the projects, got the funds and then looked for a Palestinian partner. The Israeli side submitted reports to the funders, and they conducted the evaluations and the reporting. Thus the Israeli side insisted on the evaluation process". As for Palestinian evaluations, they were described by Ms. Nadia Naser as measured by, "how much can we allow the Israelis to hear our voice, so that peace is not to be imposed from above? We had to contribute to changing Israeli public opinion because any positive change enhances real peace".

The evaluation process was more precise during the period between June 1996 until today. The evaluation process depends on the strength and the activity of the Palestinian organisations. There is no Israeli organisation or funder that can prevent any side from evaluating projects. The majority of the interviewees believe that evaluation is taking place according to the scientific methods that compares the results with the aims. They believe that the Palestinian side is participating in the evaluation process on an equal basis with the Israelis. Others said that the Palestinians are being excluded from the evaluation process. Mr. Nafez Abu Eda, the co-ordinator of the International Palestinian Friendship Club Association for Children (IPFAC) said: "We work with Shofal Organisation where Shofal prepares babysitters for the Khan Younis areas. Thus, the Shofal team evaluates the project themselves, and we evaluate it alone. The final evaluation written by Shofal is written after looking at our own evaluation.

Finally, I believe that the evaluation process needs information. Whenever there is information and whenever the evaluation is more precise, it will help in the future. One important information that should be available to both sides is the budget of the project. Incomplete information about the budget causes inaccurate evaluations. Dr. Dajani in his comments on the joint projects of the Palestinian Centre for Regional Studies and Peres Centre for Peace, said: "we do not know anything about the budget of the project". Mr. Fathi Subah from the Educational Development Centre said: "the problem is that the budget of the project is in the account of the Israeli partner. We do not know anything about it, but they give us the amount of the vouchers and expenses that we pay".

The evaluation of the project is related to the qualification of the people in charge of implementation. Throughout the evaluation workshop conducted in Ramallah on July the 19<sup>th</sup>, 1997, which evaluated the People to People projects, the importance of developing the administrative capacities of the Palestinian side was agreed upon. However these recommendations were not taken into account. This workshop was attended by representatives of the Palestinian and Israeli organisations and concluded with an important recommendation; to conduct training courses in order to raise the professional level of the Palestinian staff working in People-to-People projects.

## 7 Recommendations

I asked all the interviewees on their recommendations for People-To-People program and for **Helsinki Workshop**. The following are the recommendations submitted by the interviewees:

- As expected, the main recommendation was for the new Israeli government to respect the agreements and to commit to the Peace Process. It should also implement all the agreement since the Israeli governmental attitude affects the Palestinian public opinion.
- There should be a clear people-to-people strategy and each side should be committed to and work through this strategy which could be called “The Grand Strategy.”
- Palestinian NGO leaders emphasised the importance of real People to People programs especially those which aim at enhancing peace and justice for the two peoples. They also confirmed the importance of getting rid of those programs, which aim at giving an impression that the peace process is moving in its accurate and proper track.
- There should be simultaneous translation throughout the sessions, where each side uses its own language. When we use our mother tongue, each participant can talk freely and express himself/herself in a much better way. Having translation means involving more sectors that are usually deprived from participating because they do not speak English.
- The funder should ask the organisations to conduct their activities in both Israel and Palestine, thus allowing the Israelis to get to know the Palestinians. The Israelis do not know the Palestinians although they live close by. In addition, Palestinians have the right to allow the Israeli partner to get to know the people in order to change the negative impression that they get from their government and schools. The activities should be conducted in both countries, ensuring the involvement of a larger number of people. Both sides will benefit financially. Each side has the right to spend 50% of the budget in each country.
- The third party or the funding organisation should be fair and neutral. This requires the following:
  - The funders should accept the proposals that are submitted by the two partners and not by one organisation that represents one side alone.
  - The funder should conduct the negotiations with the representatives of both organisations and not with representatives of one organisation alone.
  - The funder has to inform both organisations about the approval of the project. Commonly, the Israeli organisation contacts the Palestinian organisation and informs them of the approval.
  - The funder has to visit both organisations during the implementation instead of one at the expense of the other. Usually the funders visit the project while it is being conducted in Israel.
  - After the agreement on the budget, the funder has to transfer the funds to the two organisations in separate accounts, where each part will receive its own funds for the project.
  - The funder should ask for one final report to be submitted by both organisations, or they should ask for two separate reports.
- Most of the interviewees recommended that the Palestinian organisations must work inside Palestinian society on the issues related to the Peace Process and the future of Peace in the area. The Israeli organisations must do the same thing, especially since Israeli public opinion is still

refusing to acknowledge the right of Palestinians to live in an independent state. These kinds of activities are not an alternative to the joint projects but are complementary.

- There should be one reference to the Palestinian side and through this reference we should determine the priorities and the organisations that have the capacity to implement these projects. The presence of such a reference will prevent misuse by those who look to profit from these projects. This reference will also prevent Israeli organisations from getting funds and then looking for Palestinian partners.
- Producing a newspaper, or a monthly newsletter that discusses these kinds of joint projects. We have to concentrate on using the media in order to discuss the negative and positive sides of these projects.
- Political organisations should provide the support for such projects.
- We should exert pressure on the Israeli government in order to get the programs recognised. This pressure should help provide the facilities to the project participants, instead of participants having to fight for these, as is the case now.
- To develop special programs for Palestinians to train the activists and the people implementing these projects.
- To determine the joint projects that serve the political dimension and the negotiations of the final status. The Palestinian and the Israeli organisations have to work for peace and justice. This calls for a large number of programs that have to attract the people in order to accept them. These programs should aim to present the successful solutions to the public of those issues that will be negotiated in the final status. These issues include Jerusalem, refugees, borders, water, and settlements.
- Increasing the number of projects related to academic and technical work

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2. Abdulrahman Tamimi, Palestinian Hydrology Group – Jerusalem
3. Adel Yahya, Palestinian Association for Cultural Exchange – Ramallah

4. Akram Attalah, People to People (FAFO), Jerusalem.
5. Ayman Rabi, Eco-Peace Middle East Environment- Jerusalem
6. Fathi Subuh, Education Development Centre, Gaza.
7. Gassan Abdullah, Centre for Applied Research in Education – Ramallah
8. Gassan Al-Khatib, Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, Jerusalem.
9. Hassan Barghuti, Democracy & Workers Rights Centre – Ramallah
10. Husein Sawalha, Care & Learning Centre – Jenin
11. Kareem Odeh, Youth Union- Yulkarm
12. Muhamad Judeh, Palestinian Peace Movement – Tulkarm
13. Munther Dajani, Palestinian Centre for Regional Studies, Ramallah.
14. Nafith Abu Edeh, Association for Children I.P.F.C. Khan Yunis
15. Nawal Stati, Child Cultural Centre, Jenin
16. Nadia Nasser, Al-Jiser, Jerusalem
17. Pnina Issa, PCPD – Jerusalem
18. Rawdah Bassir, Palestinian Federation for Women Action Committee, Nablus
19. Saed Jasser, PARC, Ramallah
20. Saqer Salaymeh, Al-Jawal Theatre, Jerusalem
21. Sameer Seif, Friends School – Ramallah
22. Yola Hadadin, Palestinian Peace centre – Ramallah
23. Zakaria Al-Quaq, IPCRI – Jerusalem.

## **II- People-To-People Activists:**

1. Abbas Milhem, project co-ordinator, facilitator, PCPD – Jerusalem
2. Abdel Kareem Odeh, activists, Palestinian Youth Union, Tulkarm
3. Bassem Thabet, Peace activist, Ramallah
4. Elias Khury, peace activist – Ramallah
5. Hatab Abdulrahman, Peace activist, Ramallah
6. Haytham Aziz, Peace activist, Ramallah
7. Hilda Issa, peace activist, facilitator – Jerusalem
8. Imad Jaber, Peace activist, Ramallah
9. Jamal Alian, Ministry of Education, Ramallah
10. Manal Radi, facilitator – Nablus
11. Sufiean Allan, teacher of English language, facilitator – Jerusalem
12. Samah Barghuti, teacher, peace activist – Jerusalem
13. Taghreed Tanus, secretary, activists – Ramallah

## **III- Ordinary Citizens: -**

1. Ahmad Allan , worker – Al-Ram
2. Bassim Kamil, unemployed, Ramallah
3. Fatima Edi, a secretary – Ramallah
4. Hazim Abdulhadi – a taxi driver – Jerusalem
5. Lucy Hadweh, executive secretary – Bethlehem
6. Majid Humeid, accountant – Nablus
7. Naser Suleiman, doctor – Birzeit
8. Naeem Issa, a farmer – BirZeit

9. Osama Dawoud, journalist – Jerusalem
10. Sameh Hadweh, accountant – Hebron
11. Hiyam Diebes - Jenin

\* \* \* \* \*

**Mr. Lee Perlman & Mr. Raviv Schwartz**

## **Israeli perspective, experience and conclusions**

### **A Preliminary Stocktaking of Israeli Organizations Engaged in Palestinian-Israeli People-to-People Activity**

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## INTRODUCTION

### *Goals of Presentation*

In this presentation, we will examine how Israeli organizations partaking in Palestinian-Israeli people to people activity (heretofore referred to as ‘P2P’) view the many dimensions of this activity. This includes the rationale for engaging in it (‘why?’), the many individuals and institutional actors involved (‘who?’), the structural aspects of and methods employed in these activities (‘how?’), and the nature and/or substance of these very activities (‘what?’). After a review of our research strategy, we shall share some insights, which emerge from the data we collected, which may roughly be grouped under the headings: Significance, Difficulties and Complexities.

Finally, we shall pose what we believe are the three major questions prompted by our research. Ultimately, it is our hope that the findings presented herein stimulate discussion and thought which result in the enhancement of that which brings us together this morning - from each of our distinct points of reference: practitioners/activists, funders and researchers alike. Indeed, both the authors of this paper embody differing epistemological perspectives (i.e. field based and academic) and we trust that our presentation will be informed by the richness of both. While our research efforts are not divorced from theory and most definitely adhere to the standards imposed by any serious social/organizational research endeavor, we are mindful that this work is ultimately intended to serve and improve the P2P field. Therefore, we will hopefully avoid the “frustration” of some of those engaged in academic research, who, upon examining their findings, might lament: “This is fine in practice, but it’ll never work in theory”.

### **Research Methodology**

Our presentation consists of the major findings of research conducted over the past two months on twelve Israeli organizations engaged in Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people activity. Our aim was to gauge both the substantive and structural dimensions of this field of activity in an attempt to provide a “snapshot” of the current state of affairs in this arena, as well as to identify some of the significant changes that have occurred during the past few years. Our goal then is not so much to provide “answers” per se, but to frame the issues we examined in a cogent and empirically grounded fashion so as to stimulate informed questions and perhaps offer the conceptual and methodological contours of future research efforts. It must be stressed that our research represents the attempt to explore the breadth of the organizational environment in Israel engaged in P2P, rather than its depth. In this sense, we are more concerned with the “forest” of P2P, rather than any particular “tree” or substantive area. For the treatment of a specific “tree”, we refer you to the presentation by Tamara Barnea and Munira Kleibo, which treats the issue of P2P in the realm of health.

### Tools

***Initial organizational mapping*** - An organizational mapping was prepared intended to depict the breadth and diversity of non-governmental organizations in Israel engaged in P2P projects. It was compiled through consultations with practitioners in the field and through a review of the relevant organizational and academic literature. It is however in no way an exhaustive list of organizations operating in this field. We then attempted to identify the primary, salient types of organizations listed based on their spheres of activity and organizational outputs. The categories that emerged through this inductive process were as follows: *Policy Development*, *Service Providers*, and *Classic Peace Groups*.

In an attempt to further elucidate these categories, we distinguish among them on the basis of their respective Source of Legitimacy, Populations Targeted, Overarching Goal, and Typical Project (See Appendix A). It is our conviction that these categories give ample expression to the diversity of this organizational environment. At the same time, they are not mutually exclusive; some of the organizations may, simultaneously or at various times, be classified under two or even all three. The **organizational mapping** depicted (see Appendix B) should therefore be viewed more as a heuristic device than a precise classification of organizations in the field.

**Structured sample** - We constructed a structured or “purposive” sample of 12 organizations to be studied in greater depth through semi-structured interviews. This sample consists of the following organizations: Adam Institute; CRB Foundation; ECF (Economic Cooperation Foundation); Givat Haviva; Parents’ Circle; International Center for Peace in the Middle East (ICPME); Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI ); School for Peace (at Neve Shalom); Peres Center for Peace; PIES (Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Secretariat); Peace Now; Rapprochement. It should be noted that this is neither a representative nor a random sample, but rather one that assigns equal weight to each of the three categories of organizations in our mapping, irrespective of their relative size, budget or output. The generalizations or propositions we put forth in this presentation therefore reflect a bias towards depicting the organizational diversity of this field rather than the behavior of its dominant actors.

**Interviews** - The questionnaire, or more accurately - the **semi-structured interview guide** (See Appendix C) used in our interviews with organizational respondents was divided into four parts. The first sought to gather information about the **substantive aspects** of each organization’s P2P repertoire, or more specifically: “How do they interpret P2P in the first place” and “how does this inform the content of their projects”? The second part addressed their programs’ **structural elements** such as populations targeted, and the many ingredients of project implementation, e.g. personnel, venue, and mechanics (such as language). The third part was designed to examine the (internal organizational and external environmental) **processes involved in conceiving of, planning and implementing a particular P2P project**. For this part, the organizational respondent was asked to provide a detailed “case study”, as it were, of a particular project he/she thought was instructive and/or emblematic of the organization. These project case studies also afforded an insight into the changes over time that were brought to bear on the project in particular, and on the organization in general. The fourth and last portion of interview guide was an attempt of a slightly more quantitative nature to gauge the **nature and extent of cooperation** between each organization and others comprising the larger network of P2P organizations. Patterns of inter-organizational cooperation vary in form and intensity running the gamut of: a) sustained institutional cooperation; b) subcontracting or outsourcing; c) cross membership/cross fertilization of ideas, programs and or staff; d) information sharing and attending events.

## **Limitations**

As stated at the outset, the research presented here is intended to direct attention to what we feel are some salient features of the P2P environment in Israel today. To reiterate, the sample upon which our findings are based is not representative in the traditional sense. It is certain that the organizational categories that guided our data collection and analysis are but one prism through which to look at this field. Despite these reservations, we are hopeful that our presentation will contribute to the level and the clarity of the ensuing discussions. Moreover, we hope that the classification scheme, its conceptual

underpinnings, and the research tools employed herein may be helpful in future efforts to study this phenomenon.

## GENERAL THEMES THAT EMERGE FROM THE RESEARCH

### Significance of P2P

The significance and impact of P2P from an Israeli perspective stems from three major elements:

1. Its ability to **shape or reframe perceptions** of “what can be” both among participants, organizers and the wider public.
2. It **taps into a myriad of motivations and needs** of the populations and individuals who take part.
3. Its **flexibility**, conceptually and in the field i.e. P2P can serve a vast array of separate and integrated objectives for a given organization and within a given project.

**Shaping or re-framing perceptions** is expressed through various means. As we all know, the mere fact that activities take place has symbolic and tangible significance, most notably during very turbulent periods when relations between the peoples are anything but conducive for such activity. As the Chairperson of KATU Sirpa Pietikäinen has noted, P2P may be understood as ‘creating ripples on the lake’. However these ripples are clearly of a different quality when the lake is (or at least is perceived to be) frozen? While listening to interviewees’ descriptions of the processes involved in the conceiving, planning and implementation of projects, the ‘minefields’ of obstacles and calculations underscores the perseverance and endurance that is required on the part of those undertaking these efforts.

Joint projects, and more specifically jointly run organizations, serve as a ‘crystal ball’ that give the parties and their respective societies, a glimpse of how relations between the peoples might look in the future. This has been referred to as a “prefigurative” mode of organizational activity and behavior. In this sense, the project partners or jointly run organizations not only attempt to practice symmetry and mutual respect in their programming and functioning, but also model it to the outside world.

P2P programs target many types of **motivations and orientations of Israelis** and may therefore induce a variety of populations and individuals to participate and, in so doing, simultaneously accomplish a multiplicity of objectives. We found that without exception, all of the organizations studied embody a personal and/or social orientation to their programming. Perhaps this reflects what a Palestinian colleague of ours refers to as the need on the part of many Israelis to ‘sleep better at night’. More than half the organizations in our sample incorporate a political orientation and slightly fewer an economic one. Professional motivations play an important factor in Israeli P2P activities as well.

These varying motivations and orientations are reflected in a wide array of organizations, representing a significant, or at least potentially significant, force within Israeli society. Conscious of the self-selecting nature of P2P recruitment patterns in the past, most of the organizations studied deliberately sought to recruit populations existing at the periphery – geographic and socio-demographic. This is typically referred to as “outreach”. Outreach connotes an attempt to broaden the base of support for the peace process to include population sub-groups that do not typically identify with the peace camp.

## ***Difficulties of P2P***

The difficulties of P2P from an Israeli perspective stem from five major elements:

**1 Built-in constant negotiation between partners** on P2P projects on every level and in every dimension. Palestinians have their own aims, Israelis have theirs and the two sides come together to identify and create additional shared aims. This proves particularly difficult when negotiating these divergent agendas at the many levels of a given project i.e. heads of organizations, project directors, coordinators, and facilitators and of course participants. This, coupled with the partners' differing cultural cues and backgrounds, necessarily makes for a demanding on-going process of working together. On the programmatic level, co-facilitation is a vivid expression of the need for on-going negotiation between the partners.

**2 Flexibility and diversity**, mentioned above, as strength of P2P clearly constitutes a difficulty as well. Paradoxically, P2P's very flexibility may serve to create a set of expectations (conceptually and in the context of a specific project) that it is ultimately incapable of fulfilling. The diversity of P2P was evinced in the responses to one of the questions in our interview guide. When asked if they possessed a blueprint for the future relations between the parties, 3 organizations answered "yes", 4 were ambiguous and 5 answered "no". Although most of the implicit and explicit underpinnings of P2P relate to Permanent Status issues, the organizations we studied seemed much more preoccupied with process (creating personal and institutional relations) than delimiting a specific prescription for these relations. We suspect that in this regard, the Israeli organizations differ considerably from their Palestinian counterparts.

**3 Deciding on whom to work with** - There are many objective difficulties and a degree of ambivalence in working with youth (primarily elementary through high school). Most organizations acknowledge its importance, due to its perceived effect on future generations, but claim that budgetary and logistic considerations make it very difficult to pursue. Furthermore, work with youth is sometimes associated with short-term programming, a tendency resisted by many of the organizations. This is substantiated by the finding indicating a clear preference for long-term projects: Long-term = 8; Short-term = 2; Combination = 2. A few of the organizations suggested a disparity of sorts between the requisites of certain funders and the internal, philosophical preferences of the organization.

**4 P2P in the region** – Paradoxically, it may very well be more difficult, for a host of reasons, to implement P2P activities in the region than to do so abroad. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the organizations surveyed choose to conduct P2P activity locally. Many groups combined the use of venues deemed "neutral" with an alternating "home-court" policy (activities on both sides). Needless to say, the organizations with campuses (School for Peace, Givat Haviva) tend to conduct activity on site, but even here the importance of alternating "home-courts" is recognized. A single organization conducted most of its major activities abroad and another held a special training session abroad. While this practice of geographically distancing P2P efforts from the conflict locale might have been a strategy popular in the pre-Oslo era, this is clearly no longer the case.

**5 P2P Reflects rather than re-frames realities** - Our 1<sup>st</sup> category ("Significance") described P2P as having the potential to shape and reframe perceptions. On the other hand, P2P necessarily encounters conceptual difficulties because it must cope with, and in some ways indeed mirrors, the reality in which it is being conducted. Because P2P is not conducted in a vacuum, a detached 'fantasy island' posture is

simply untenable. This inevitable feature of P2P presents difficulties at virtually every level of activity including the nature of relations between partners and the choice of content and methodology of a given project. All this prompts the fundamental question of how may we both reflect and reframe reality at the same time?

## Complexities

### 1 Orientation to P2P

When examining the respondents' subjective notions of just what it is they engaged in, we discover a **multiplicity of interpretations of P2P** with a concomitant degree of diversity in their aims and criteria/factors that motivate the organizations' project choice. More specifically, we detected a distinction among P2P orientations which may be characterized as: **expressive** (i.e. intended to bring about a change in the relational or psycho-social dynamic among those taking part in the activity); **instrumental** (cooperation for the purpose of pursuing tangible objectives); and a combination thereof. Interestingly, organizations in the *service provision* category all exhibited an "expressive" orientation, whereas those in the *classic peace group* category, and to a slightly lesser extent the *policy development* organizations, demonstrated a preference for the "instrumental". As for the primary substantive focus of the organizations studied, half (6) cite "education" as their primary sphere of activity. These are chiefly the *service providers* and the *classic peace groups*. Those in *policy development* appear to have slightly more diversified ("integrated" or "comprehensive") project repertoire.

### 2 Outreach to New Populations via New Institutional Actors

Examples of organizations that have traditionally worked on the nexus between Jewish and Arab Israelis (e.g. School for Peace, Givat Haviva) and have moved into the Palestinian-Israeli P2P context are evident. It probably comes as little surprise that these organizations have entered the fray of Palestinian-Israel P2P, though it was reported that this new direction was not necessarily a smooth one. Indeed, their substantive focus, their expertise or activity repertoire and their identification with the peace camp ostensibly made them eminently qualified and natural practitioners of this new form of P2P. Less intuitive however, was the entry into the field of Israeli organizations/institutions, which exhibited no prior identification with (or even support for) a process of reconciliation with the Palestinian people. These organizations which have expanded their constituent purview to include Palestinian-Israeli P2P include organizations such as JDC, Melitz, Yakar, etc. that are explicitly Jewish, Zionist and/or linked to Diaspora Jewish communities. We would argue that this represents what may be considered a form of "outreach" on an organizational or institutional level whereby new populations or constituents may be tapped through a variety of organizations linked to them in a more direct or organic way than those traditionally involved in this field. This analysis of "outreach" then, shifts our focus from the level of participant/constituent to that of agent of P2P.

### 3 Professionalization of the P2P Field

An analysis of the preparation of those facilitating or implementing the P2P activity points to a field that is far from "professionalized" in the normative sense. It is largely paid staff that is saddled with the task of facilitating/implementing the activity, yet most of the organizations have not equipped their

staff with a formal, systematic (or by any means uniform) training. What does appear to exist among these practitioners is an ever-growing body of accumulated knowledge and a palpable kinship/collegiality (albeit existing alongside friendly competition).

#### 4 Convergence

A general trend at the macro-level of P2P activity in Israel may be observed that could be described as “convergence”. Accordingly, organizations with different histories, practices, and approaches with respect to P2P are adopting multiple/eclectic approaches and over time becoming slightly less distinguishable from one another. This depiction of the field should be qualified with an additional observation. In the various “case studies” of specific projects, organizations are seen to undertake projects that may, on the surface, appear to be a radical departure from their mission or substantive field of activity. We would suggest however, based on the organizations we investigated that instead they rely on an existing internal expertise or “service technology”. Alternatively, they may utilize existing resources (primarily human) from networks within which they’re imbedded in order to introduce/implement a new project. Hence, while the organizations do appear to be expanding their action focus to incorporate different modes of activity or new target populations (or both) – and in this sense increasingly resemble one another – this is usually done within the context of a pre-existing knowledge/skill base and/or social network.

#### QUESTIONS TOWARDS THE FUTURE

The notion of P2P in Israel appears to have evolved over time. Israeli organizations tend to view P2P as almost an exclusively post-Oslo phenomenon. The relations between Palestinians and Israelis prior to that were characterized as either “restricted to the roadblocks” or “a complete lack of familiarity and ignorance”. There is a general concurrence that immediately following the Oslo accords, which provided P2P with an official structure and impetus, there was a flurry of projects. However, this enthusiasm was viewed as having waned during the ensuing years, due among other reasons, to the curtailing of funding.

5 of the groups studied were established after Oslo, 3 of which were founded during the last three years. The others (one of which has been in operation since 1963) were all established before 1990, however of these, 3 undertook P2P only following the Oslo agreements. The *Intifada* seems to have been a stimulus or catalyst for certain organizations to engage in P2P activity. *Policy development* organizations tend to be newer, whereas the *service providers* are the most veteran. Some of the latter have been on the scene for a number of years and made the adaptation or transition to P2P in recent years. That *policy development* organizations are the youngest perhaps suggests that they are very much Oslo-inspired and focused.

While the following three questions with which we’ll conclude relate specifically to the Israeli context, it is clear to us that any answers provided need to take into serious consideration the impact on our Palestinian partners and friends.

- 1 **Managing and Tapping into the Power of P2P** - We note in our research that approximately 8,350 individuals took part in the P2P projects conducted by these 12 organizations over the past year. Assuming this number might even be double, the question is still begged whether or

not P2P activity at large has the potential to impact those who do not directly participate therein. If it does indeed have the power to influence these other population sub-groups (primarily through the media), how then may Israeli NGOs partaking in P2P more effectively tap into its power?

- 2 **Outreach: From Theory to Practice** - On the ground, how may we most effectively reach and engage participants/populations who may be skeptical or outright hostile to the possibilities for reconciliation? In light of the overall difficulty in simply bringing people together, how do we as Israeli NGOs successfully negotiate the inherent tension between appealing to an Israeli sense of collective self-interest on the one hand and an empathic posture towards our Palestinian partners on the other? Is it desirable and feasible to examine how our Palestinian partners might help us in doing outreach and/or how we might help them similarly? If so, how might this be done?
- 3 **Strategic Cooperation and Synergy** - We have observed that a fair degree of cooperation exists among the organizations, though it often appears to be sporadic and idiosyncratic. In view of the much touted need for “synergy” whereby the whole exceeds the sum of its parts, might it be worthwhile to consider creating a strategic form of cooperation in which the diverse talents, skills, knowledge etc. of the many P2P actors will be combined and coordinated in order achieve more and to function more effectively?

## Conclusion

Next week in the Torah portion, we meet Joseph the abandoned brother and great interpreter of dreams who has become the Viceroy of Egypt under Pharaoh. His brothers (who do not recognize him) are overcome with guilt as he demands the blood of their youngest brother and eventually takes Simeon from them and bounds him before their eyes. At this point, it is written:

*“...and they knew not that Joseph understood them for the **Melitz** (interpreter) was between them”*  
(Genesis Chapter 43:23)

We have tried to be a *Melitz* of sorts for you today, to offer and facilitate the discovery of interpretations about these issues and their meanings. Unlike Joseph, we have not provided any solutions. But just as Joseph in the same chapter recognized his brothers (“...and Joseph recalled the dreams that he dreams about them”), in this unexpected turn of events, the interpreter in the service of others was reminded that he himself was a dreamer. In our presentation of the findings of our research, we have sought not only to be skilled interpreters, but also to give expression to our dreams for our shared future and for that of our children.

## Appendix A

### Rationale for Organizational Classification Scheme

Type of Organization	Source of Legitimacy	Populations Targeted	Overarching Goal	Typical Project
<b>Policy Development</b>	Accessibility to decision makers/privileged location within a social, political, cultural milieu; a particular expertise	Decision makers and opinion shapers at various echelons	Assist politicians and negotiators in overcoming obstacles to achieve peace; Develop strategic interventions at the institutional level	Position papers, research; Devising and/or executing programs with or through other institutions
<b>Service Providers</b>	Expertise or skill: Commitment to quality of service and to clients	A wide variety of populations (grassroots and elites) usually through mediating institutions or organizations	Mutual education of Israelis & Palestinians; Capacity building in a variety of fields, e.g. education, health	Educational program administered to both populations jointly
<b>Classic Peace Groups</b>	Affirms the agency or sovereignty of everyday citizen to try to influence or take control of issues that effect their lives; a quintessential expression of civil society	Grassroots - ordinary citizens, directly and through the media	Changing public opinion and forging a sense of solidarity between Israelis and Palestinians	Ongoing dialogue group to forge solidarity; working with media to advance P2P and the peace process at large

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## Appendix B

### *Preliminary Mapping of Israeli Non-governmental Organizations Engaged in People-to-People Projects*

Policy Development	Service provision (i.e. educational)	Classic peace groups (Advocacy/protest)
ECF*	Givat Haviva*	Peace Now*
Peres Center for Peace*	School for Peace (Neve Shalom)*	Bat Shalom
CRB Foundation*	Adam Institute*	Rapprochement*
	Ulpan Akiva	Council for Peace & Security
	Melitz	Int. Ctr. for Peace in the M.E.*
IPCRI*		Parents' Circle*
JDC-Israel		Gush Shalom
Truman Center - Hebrew U.		Netivot Shalom
PIES*		Rabbis for Human Rights
Jew/Arab Econ. Dev.		Solidarity committees
Van Leer Institute		Palestine-Israel Journal
Steinmetz Center - TAU		
PRIME		
	MECA	
	Interns for Peace	
	Shatil	
	Bet Hageffen	
	Yakar	
	Ossim Shalom	
	B'Tzelem	
	Kerem Shalom	
	Physicians for Human Rights	
	"Windows"	
	Assoc. for Civil Rights	

\* Selected for study

**Policy Development** - Organizations whose *primary aim* is to influence the shapers of policy by virtue of a particular expertise they have developed. Typically, this is expressed through research, the proliferation of publications and sustained interaction with senior government officials and technocrats. It may also take the form of devising a particular project and strategically targeting another institution(s) to assist in its implementation.

**Service Provision** - Organizations whose *primary aim* is to provide some type of service to a variety of constituents/clients. The most common form of service provided is in the fields of formal and informal education, but this may also include social welfare, medical and legal services as well.

**Classic Peace Groups** - Organizations whose *primary aim* is to protest a particular government/military policy and to generate public support for its positions through demonstrations, public symposia, and the use of the mass media in the communication of its message.

## Appendix C

### ***Interview Guide for Israeli Organizations Engaged in People-to-People Projects***

Proposed by Raviv Schwartz & Lee Perlman

#### **A. INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION**

1. Name of organization \_\_\_\_\_
2. Person Interviewed \_\_\_\_\_
3. Date of Interview \_\_\_\_\_
4. When did organization undertake P2P? (Year) \_\_\_\_\_

#### **B. SUBSTANCE OF PROGRAMMING**

5. Ask for respondent to define P2P as he/she understands it. Do they translate that term into Hebrew? If so, how?
6. What is the rationale of P2P as he/she understands it (i.e. what problem or problems does it seek to address and what are the objectives it seeks to achieve?).
7. Does the organization possess a blueprint/vision of future relations between parties?
8. Is their P2P orientation geared toward some form of joint action/project/cooperation or is it more geared toward pure dialogue activity?
9. If the P2P activity is more action-oriented, what is the specific sphere(s) of cooperation i.e. educational, health, social welfare, economic development, cultural, etc.
10. Please describe the processes by which the organization decides on the type of project undertaken. Is there a fixed procedure for its adoption? Describe some of the factors that influence this decision. (Perhaps it would be helpful here to have the respondent describe in detail the processes by which a single project is formulated, planned and implemented - a case study, as it were.)

## C. STRUCTURE OF PROGRAMMING

### Participants:

11. What is the national/ethnic/religious background of participants in organization's P2P programming (i.e.. Israelis & Palestinians/Israeli Arabs & Jews/Jews and Jews/Palestinians & Arab Israelis)? Why?
12. How would these participants be classified according to age (i.e. youth, college students, adults etc.)? Why?
13. Would the participants be characterized as representing social "elites" or grassroots? Why?
14. What is the socio-economic (class) background of most of the participants?
15. How and why are the target audiences of the organization's programs/projects selected? Is the selection of participants based on individual eligibility or is it a more universal or inclusive procedure?
16. How many P2P projects have been conducted this past year?
17. How many participants participated in these projects (per encounter and annually)?
18. Would these P2P projects be characterized as short term or long term ?

### Facilitators/Coordinators:

19. Are those who facilitate or coordinate P2P activity on behalf of organization members of or affiliated with the organization or are they contracted/recruited from outside the organization?
20. Are these facilitators/coordinators provided with any kind of special training for this purpose?
21. What is the national/ethnic/religious background of these facilitators/coordinators (i.e..Israelis & Palestinians/Israeli Arabs & Jews/Jews and Jews/Palestinians & Israelis)?
22. Is the facilitation/coordination performed by members of one or both nationalities?
23. Are the facilitators/coordinators primarily men or women? Does the organization attach any significance to their gender?
24. Where is the P2P activity conducted? Is it in a "neutral" venue, a single uni-national setting, or alternating uni-national venues?
25. In which language is the P2P activity conducted (Hebrew, Arabic, English or a mixture thereof)?

### Evaluation

26. Are the organization's overall goals/vision evaluated and or adapted periodically in light of changes in the social, political, cultural environment? If so, how is this done?

27. Is any evaluation of organization's P2P activity conducted? If so, how is this conducted, i.e. is it performed internally, by an external professional/agency or some combination thereof? How often is this done?

**D. FAMILIARITY WITH OTHER P2P ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR WORK (INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION)**

*(Show attached list of P2P organizations to respondent.)*

28. Are you familiar with the organization?

29. Are you familiar with at least two individuals involved in the organization?

30. Is there any kind of institutional cooperation with the organization? If so, please provide an example.

<b>Name of Organization</b>	<b>Q. 28</b>	<b>Q. 29</b>	<b>Q. 30</b>
Adam Institute			
Assoc. for Civil Rights			
B'Tzelem			
Bat Shalom			
Beit Shmuel			
Bet Hageffen			
Council for Peace & Security			
CRB Foundation			
ECF			
Givat Haviva			
Gush Shalom			
Int'l Center for Peace in ME			
Interns for Peace			
IPCRI			
Jew/Arab Econ. Dev.			
Joint - Israel (JDC)			
Kerem Shalom			
M'chuyavut			
Mashav (Foreign Ministry)			
MECA			
Melitz			
Netivot Shalom			
School for Peace (Neve Shalom)			
Ossim Shalom			
Parents' Circle			
Peace Now			
Peres Center for Peace			
Physicians for Human Rights			

PIES			
Rabbis for Human Rights			
Rapprochement			
Shatil			
Solidarity committees			
Steinmetz Center - TAU			
Truman Center - Hebrew U.			
Ulpan Akiva			
Yakar			

**Acknowledgments**

We wish to thank the individuals representing the organizations we surveyed for the time and the insights they shared with us. Their assistance was absolutely indispensable. The responses they provided were not only instructive, but also clearly infused by their passion and commitment to the field of Palestinian-Israeli people-to-people activity. Our respective institutions (Melitz and Ben Gurion University) were supportive of this project and we are particularly grateful to the directors and staff of ECF who provided us with the conceptual and material support for this research project. Lastly, we wish to thank our Finnish hosts at the Foreign Ministry and at KATU for their efforts in putting together this important workshop.

Lee Perlman

Raviv Schwartz

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**Ms. Tamara Barnea and Ms. Mounira Qleibo**

## **Study on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in the Health Field 1994-1998**

### **Executive Summary of Research Findings**

#### **Study Background**

A study conducted by JDC-Brookdale, JDC-Israel and Al Quds University reveals strong support for cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli health professionals. The study itself is a partnership, aimed at seeing the whole picture as opposed to the piecemeal view, which had been available until now. Its goals were to promote mutual learning from past experience and explore the potential for the future. The findings were presented at a seminar held on 18 October 1999 in Jerusalem, sponsored by the People-to-People program (facilitated by Norway). The research is based on interviews with 112 Palestinians and Israelis who worked on cooperative projects (policy makers and heads of organizations, project directors and team members). The United States Institute of Peace, the Rich Foundation (Switzerland) and the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philantropies (ACBP) sponsored the research.

Following are some of the study's major findings:

#### **Scope of activities**

- Despite the political fluctuations in the years 1994-98, Palestinian and Israeli health professionals worked together and developed 148 cooperative projects bringing together 68 organizations and an estimated 4.000 people. The projects, in a wide range of fields and topics, included training (46% of the projects), research (23%), service development and provision (19%), policy planning (5%) and others (7%).
- The main players are the non-governmental organizations (76% of the organizations), which include service-orientated organizations, universities and organizations oriented to cooperation and human rights. The experience of those involved in this cooperation has been positive for most participants and there is a strong interest in continuing and expanding it.

#### **Motivation to cooperate**

- Participants in the projects from both communities are highly motivated to cooperate professionally. The major driving force for the Palestinian respondents (60%) is improving professional skills and developing infrastructure. A significant group of Israelis (46%) and Palestinians (40%) are motivated to cooperate due to a desire to contribute to the resolution of the conflict.
- The individuals and organizations involved in health cooperation have a high level of commitment and continued working together even during the tensest periods of relations overcoming delays in the projects due to the political situation.

### **Hindering factors**

- The major factors identified by both Israelis and Palestinians as most hindering the cooperation were political and financial constraints and not interpersonal relations.

### **Funding of projects**

- The major source of funding for these projects is international (government, public agencies and foundations) which is supplemented by small local funding sources. In 60% of the projects the Palestinian partners receive more than 50% of the funds.

### **Changing attitudes**

- Working on a cooperative project can change attitudes toward mutual co-existence. 47% of the Palestinian and 34% of the Israeli interviewees reported being positively affected by working on the project.

### **Satisfaction**

- 97% of the Israeli and 82% of the Palestinian interviewees were satisfied or highly satisfied with their cooperative projects and they indicated that even a higher percentage of their boards were satisfied.

### **Interest in continued cooperation**

- 99% of the Israeli and 88% of the Palestinian respondents expressed an interest in continuing to work on cooperative projects. In addition, 70% of the Israelis and 87% of the Palestinians reported that they know of others who would be interested in participating in cooperative projects.

### **Publicity**


- The cooperative projects are selectively publicized. The main target audience is professional. 80% of all interviewees said their projects are publicized within their organizations. 72% of the Palestinian and 53% of the Israeli interviewees said their projects had been publicized externally through professional conferences and publications. Almost half of the interviewees indicated that their projects were publicized to the general public.

### **Unique role of health professionals**

- 85% of the interviewees view health professionals as having an important role in promoting mutual co-existence. They are able to come together on the basis of professional and humanitarian commitments that supersede political barriers.

The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed in this document are of the research team and do not necessarily reflect the views of the project sponsors.

**Distribution of Israeli-Palestinian Cooperative Projects  
in the Health Field 1994-98 by Primary Type of Activity**



Selected Indicators of Interest in Cooperation

Israeli	Indicators	Palestinian
97%	satisfied with participation in cooperative activities	82%
93%	board of directors satisfied	90%
99%	interested in continuing cooperative activities	88%
63%	know others who are interested but gave up	52%
70%	have friends who are interested in cooperation	87%

## ***Session Two: A Donor Perspective***

**Mr. Jon Hanssen-Bauer, Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Oslo**

### **The Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Program: The Fafo Model of People-to-People**

Chairman, dear participants and friends,

Before I start my intervention I would like to commend the Government of Finland for taking the initiative for, and for sponsoring, this workshop as part of the Finnish presidency of the European Union. In my view, to sum up experience and to consult on new venues, are both highly pertinent at this conjunction of the peace process of the Middle East. I would thank the organisers and promoters, the Palestine Center for Peace and the Economic Co-operation Foundation, for inviting me to give this address to the audience. Lastly, I would like to praise the KATU for their facilitation and the warm way they extend the well-known Finnish hospitality and make all the participants feel at home and at ease. I am looking forward to seeing if the planned sauna can be a more extensively used model for further actions.

Chairman,

With your permission I would like to start my address by commenting on the title given to my intervention. With all due respect, I think it would be a mistake by Fafo to take the credit for the model of the Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Program. The initiative came back in 1994 from Mr. Uri Savir, with keen support by Mr. Abu Ala. I remember well when Uri Savir, in his capacity as Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, invited Fafo to his office to air his preliminary thoughts on the need for such a program.

His idea was simple and challenging: **Peace is agreed among statesmen, but only built by the peoples.** He told that before he built his friendship with the Palestinian negotiators in Oslo, he had not really met any Palestinian. The two people only met in situations that nurtured hatred and fear, and to build peace implied to change profoundly the exchanges and interactions among them – on a large scale.

Mr. Savir also consulted with his friend Jan Egeland, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, and our Middle East Co-ordinator Mona Juul, and invited Norway to take part. Then started a series of consultations. Abu Ala mobilised Dr. Hasan Abu-Libdeh, now President of the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics. He also convinced President Arafat. Uri Savir mobilised the head of the Autonomy Division in his Ministry, Mr. Ilan Baruch. Shimon Peres convinced Mr. Charles Bronfman to provide support through his Keren Karev, the CRB Foundation. This brought Janed Aviad on the team. Ambassador Mona Juul soon became a key person on the Norwegian side. The model was developed by, and should be credited to, this group of persons, *at least*. The concept of People-to-People, or, in this case rather *Nation-to-Nation*, was formulated into a joint position that was inserted into the Oslo II agreement, the Interim Agreement of September 1995. The title also gives an unfair picture of the role of Fafo today. The P2P Program is implemented by the two Parties that have full

control, and the day to day work is executed by each party's planning group, i.e. the CRB Foundation (Yaffa Sidon) and the Palestinian Center for Peace (Yolla Hadadeen). The Israeli share of the program is financed by private funds, made available by the CRB Foundation. Lastly, Norway is not only funding the P2P Program, but also a series of other people-to-people initiatives, like the ECF, the Palestinian Center for Peace, the Shimon Peres Center for Peace etc.

Chairman,

I am spending time on this note for the historical records to make three points. First, *the Palestinian-Israeli People-to-People Program is not, and was not designed to be limited to a civil society initiative*. But, that it is executed on a daily basis by NGO's is intentional, as we wanted room for independence from the Authorities.

Second, *to make peace – and to overcome a century of hostilities and half a century of conflict between the two peoples – implies inducing profound social, cultural, political and economic changes in the two societies*. I probably state the obvious, but to expect large outcomes of the People-to-people activities of today, is to do the entrepreneurs of People to People a great injustice.

Third, in order to make substantive moves towards peace that is both real and accepted by the peoples, *we need a multilevel approach that is systematic, comprehensive and diverse*. This is really a warning to ourselves, the donors, to be clear about what we want to achieve by supporting grass-root movements or civil society initiatives.

I would like to turn to a brief description of the conceptual thinking behind our Program. The initial model of the Palestinian-Israeli People-to-People Program was to build a broad *coalition for change* between the authorities of different kinds on both sides, and associations, groups, voluntary workers, congregations and whatever constituency that would be interested within each society. A basic idea was to create arenas for encounters that should be structured to foster equality in interactions. Another was to systematically map and try and remove barriers for such interaction. A third was to stimulate public debate around issues of importance for the future of the two peoples.

By way of an example, we discussed the need for systematic public opinion polls to catch the reaction of people and present it to politicians – not necessarily to confront, but rather to guide. As one Palestinian participant framed it: we needed to put democracy to work. A Palestinian to Palestinian Program was for instance envisaged to do civic information programs. On the Palestinian side we translated the Interim Agreement and distributed it among others to the Palestinian police.

We imported some ideas from organisational change thinking and how change can be orchestrated. For instance, we started discussions on what would be relevant fields or domains of the societies, or areas where there are high interdependencies and a lot to gain from co-operation or problem areas of kinds that could not be solved without concerted action on both sides. Such domains would have a set of stakeholders that could be identified and mobilised. They would then need meeting points or encounters that could help them develop common views and perceptions to align their further actions. Such meeting points are called “referent organisations” in the literature, but we invented the term “hub” to illustrate the centrality of a meeting point for a network of stakeholders, without inducing a thinking of structured co-ordination. The role of the People-to-People Program would be to help create and to empower such hubs, rather than to implement projects. We wanted to act primarily on the middle ground, rather than grass-root, in ways that linked grass-root activities with top level restructuring of the political environment for peoples' interaction.

The founders of the People-to-People Program were convinced that a strategy for broad outreach was called for, or many and many kinds of activities. We believed that the deep dialogue kind of projects were mainly outdated. And, in order to facilitate such a strategy, the Program would have to use existing infrastructure (like the education system) and to prepare support structures for activists. Of course, we wanted to work with the media. One example of such a project was to launch a painting and novel writing competition that would reach out to all schools in both societies on the theme of peace, and invite for a “Holst Prize” celebration for the winners with celebrities and media at the end. We worked on a huge open air youth concert held in parallel on both sides of the green line with TV broadcasting between the two and shuttling of artists by helicopters – transmitted all over the world by international TV. Funds were raised for the “Sounds of Peace”, but the political circumstances killed the initiative.

We struggled with several conceptual difficulties. One was related to the issue of normalisation and reconciliation. In our view, we did not prepare for any normalisation of the status quo. Quite contrary, the Program would demonstrate the need for change on both sides and the impossibility of status quo. We thought that it was urgent to change the basic image of the other in order improve the changes for reaching an accord. To do this only after the agreement would be too late. But, alas, while we struggled with concepts, the world around us changed.

The People-to-People Program did not develop according to these initial ideas. It had to adjust to the complex realities that developed as a consequence of bombings, the murder of Prime Minister Rabin and the change of the government in Israel. In reality we never got started before we had to make major revisions and to downscale ambitions dramatically, just as all the other major players in this business have done. We still had the support from the political leaders at the top on both sides, but their priorities changed. They did not want to get really involved and publicly to launch the Program. Our solution became to “de-couple” the activities from the events on the political level and to “go grass-root”. We launched the NGO Program in 1996. This program has the following characteristics:

1. We recruit participant NGO’s through *newspaper advertisements* on both sides. The idea was to become visible and to open the initiative for all organisations interested.
2. Only co-operation projects are supported. Organisations on both sides have to co-operate to design their project and to apply jointly. NGOs with ideas and interest but no partner are helped to find a partner. This way the application process has a people-to-people structure in itself.
3. We prefer projects that pursue a common interest or solve a common problem, rather than to address the issue of peace or cohabitation in itself. We help these organisations in overcoming the obstacles they experience.
4. We limit the funding available for each project (USD 20,000) in order to make access more easy for smaller and less experienced organisations. We want to invite organisations whose main areas of work is not P2P to extend their work to also do projects of P2P kind.
5. We make provisions for creating equality between the partners. The budget is split in two halves and the support is given to each of the partners individually. We provide help to weak partners so that they could develop the necessary systems to deal with money. It is an explicit aim to strengthen the Palestinian NGO sector through the program, and the Palestine Center for Peace will provide capacity building for Palestinian NGO’s.
6. The two parties run and have full control over the program. They have the final say and have to agree on which projects to recommend for funding. The authorities on both sides are involved in

the selection of projects, and take ownership of the program but not responsibility for each project. The final list is made to reflect their priorities. For example, it has been an objective to balance the regional coverage and broaden the spectrum of political affiliations of organisations. Priority is given to projects involving new organisations, new ideas and new participants.

7. We solicit support from the authorities. We try to solve permit issues through the official channels, for example, even if creative solutions are also found. The purpose is to increase the acceptance and legitimacy of people-to-people co-operation on a societal level and to present experiences to the owners of the Program.
8. The Program builds arenas for exchange of experience and learning across projects. In December 1997, against all friendly odds given to us, and after having organised consultation meetings on each side, we gathered 120 P2P activists, representing most of the organisations that received funding from the P2P Program, in Gaza for an overnight workshop. Afterwards several such encounters have been hosted, and over the last 15 months we have organised meetings both on program level and within each of the sectors of the Program.
9. The Program keeps a database over all organisations engaged in the P2P field and all the projects that are known to us. In practical terms we have a very good overview of the NGO's that are active, and of their activists as well, but less about projects. All the projects and applications of the Program are entered. The purpose is to serve as an information base about activities and potential partners, in addition to serving our more day-to-day administrative purposes.
10. Norway is playing a facilitator role. Norway is providing the Program with a Norwegian secretariat and with funds for the Palestinian NGO's. Norway also does advocacy for the Program on the political level.

The P2P Program does not limit itself to a strategy of supporting NGO-implemented projects. The Program still has the ambition to design and fund bigger projects, but on one very specific condition: Big projects should be identified and promoted by the authorities jointly. It means that they should address issues of concern on other levels of society so that more far reaching change can be the result.

Let me talk briefly about results.

What have we achieved? Has the P2P Program made a difference? I may not be the right person to judge, and the issue is difficult. If we ask for documented effects on the peace process or on the general opinion on both sides, I am afraid that the answer is "probably not very much" – or at least, I cannot document it. My feeling is that certain modesty is called for, and we have to recognise, in all fairness, that other factors dominate. We are all climbing pretty much uphill.

If you ask for effects within the People-to-People field, I think the answer is "quite important effects". And I would immediately add that this is not only due to us, but to the fact that several actors have put a lot of good work, energy, resources and ingenuity into to similar projects. The P2P Program has received and reviewed more than 500 applications from 1995 to date. The last years the advertisement attracts more than 150 applications. The number is increasing and the quality is improving from year to year. We have funded around 120 joint projects of which only 16 have failed in the sense that they had to cancel the implementation. All in all, a very substantive number of organisations are or have been involved in our program. Our database over NGOs that have presented proposals counts around 350 organisations. In my view this constitutes an important infrastructure for People-to-People activities. These numbers are significant even before we try to calculate the number of participants in the events

that are produced. Our information about the outreach in terms of number of persons who have actually met at least once with somebody from the other side, is insufficient, but we are working at the moment to establish the number. I would be very surprised if the number of persons involved has not increased rather much over the last years, but I am not able to give empirical substance to this claim.

I would like to turn to the last point in my address and sum up three core challenges:

1. We have to increase and broaden the top-level support and involvement in People to People activities.
2. We have to become even better in solving the inherent challenges in the P2P field as it is today and how we think it will be tomorrow. This implies handling the issue of freedom of movement on both sides, dealing with the asymmetries between parties and partners, managing the internal negotiations in each project and constituency.
3. We have to expand the field of activities. I am not only talking about outreach and numbers of individuals that participate in our events, but about levels of interventions in society. We have to change institutions and to use other mechanisms of presenting the peace process and the complex problems of coexistence to change both the society and the peoples. We have to move from "Bypass-solutions" to real removing of obstacles for interaction.

In my view these three challenges are interconnected. Please permit me to make a final note as a conclusion: We may have to distinguish between building an infrastructure for peace and a coalition for long-term change on the one hand, and the need for mobilising support for the whole effort on the other. In the latter case, campaigning and advocacy are required to convince and to gain popular support. I think that the people-to-people activists constitute a major asset for this work and that we can build on their infrastructure.

But I frankly also believe that if we leave the issue for them to solve with the small amounts of money available for people-to-people activities and the current methods of operation, we risk losing an important battle while we are struggling to gain the war. Therefore, I think we have to move on with P2P projects in their own rights, and some of them will most probably target particular issues of relevance for gaining popular support for a coming agreement. But we may also have to find specific sources to support the campaigning and the advocacy needed to settle an agreement in the year 2000. Hopefully by then, the real work of building the peace can gain momentum.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Mr. Hazem Qutaineh**

**Research Paper**

**DONORS' INTERESTS AND PRIORITIES WITHIN THE 'PEOPLE TO PEOPLE' PROGRAM**

**Introduction: From the Donors' Perspective**

Six years since the signing of the Declaration of Principles a number of international donors, mostly governmental have invested in the funding of joint Palestinian-Israeli projects, via the 'People to People' Program.

This paper provides a valuable opportunity to clarify the input, investment and significant role of a number of international donors and their contribution to the joint Israeli-Palestinian projects since the signing of the (DOP) in September 1993. Some donors played an active role in the 'People to People' arena even earlier than this. In addition this paper will clarify donors' perceptions, their mechanisms, their positions regarding a number of issues, and how they envisage the future of these joint projects. Also this paper will be useful for project implementers, service providers and beneficiaries, in enhancing understanding of donors, their priorities and the most effective ways to develop appropriate projects and activities, so that the communities of both parties can reap mutual benefits from joint activities.

**Need for the Assessment**

This workshop will evaluate the Israeli-Palestinian Civil society Co-operative Activities. The basic objectives and purpose of these kind of joint projects are to encourage contacts between Palestinians and Israelis, simultaneously breaking down long-standing barriers to peace and development at the grassroots level, whilst creating a mutual understanding of the situation and the will to find common ground. This development of mutuality and respect is the key to a peaceful future. This paper will help both donors and civil society players to identify, clarify and plan future strategies for their goals and objectives.

**Procedure**

This paper contains data regarding the involvement and contribution of the donors (15 donors) gathered via personal interviews, research and information collection. The research was conducted throughout October 1999 until the 12<sup>th</sup> November 1999. It is based on a questionnaire consisting of 21 questions divided into four categories in the following way:

- a) Three general questions,
- b) Application and selection procedure, nine questions,
- c) Evaluation and follow-up process, five questions,
- d) Assessment of People to People to date, two questions.

The information and results gathered from these interviews have been collated through computer application, to help you to have a clear and greater understanding of the donor's role in these fields.

## **Results**

- 1- Total funds from 14 donors to joint Israeli Palestinian projects since 1992 to date about \$20,840,580
- 2- A total of 444 projects were funded.
- 3- A total of \$4,000,000 has been committed by the European Commission but the contracts have not yet been signed, this sum was included in the total sum mentioned above.

### **A            *General***

#### 1- When did your office start funding P2P activities?

- a) Between 91-93, 23%.
- b) In 1994 to 96, 53,8%.
- c) In 1997 to date, 23%.

#### 2- What are your specific areas of interest (if any) within P2P?

See chart 1.

#### 3- Do you have fixed funding guidelines, or do they change annually or otherwise?

- a) 53.5% have a fixed funding guidelines.
- b) 30.5% - their funding guidelines change annually.
- c) 15% other, usually donors who have only one project and not sure about the next.

### **B            *Application and Selection Procedure***

#### 4- How do you advertise for, or solicit, applications for funding?

Most of the donors solicit applications for funding in two ways, firstly through direct contacts with NGOs, secondly through advertisement.

- a) Through direct contacts 77%.
- b) Through advertisement 23%.

#### 5- What are your guidelines for selection (formal or informal)?

See chart 2.

#### 6- What is your funding cycle?

Most of the donors have calendar year funding cycles.

#### 7- What percentage of the budget devoted to overhead do you tolerate?

28.5% of donors tolerate max.10% for overhead.

14% of donors tolerate max. 15%.

14% more than 15%

42.8% no specific figure mentioned.

#### 8- What is the ceiling on funding for individual projects (in US\$)?

\$10,000 - 7.5%.

\$20,000 - 7.5%.

\$40,000 - 15%.

\$500,000 - 7.5%

no specific ceiling - 61.5%

9- What kind of NGO (if any) do you favour?

- a) Small NGO - 7.5%
- b) Social development - 7.5%
- c) Education - 23%
- d) Environment - 7.5%
- e) Civil society - 38.4%
- f) Youth - 7.5%
- g) No specific "type" - 53.8%

10- What features/elements are important for you to find in a proposal?

I choose here the most common elements donors see it important to find in a proposal.

- a) Defined objectives - 61.5%
- b) Target group - 38.5%
- c) Ownership - 15%
- d) Clear budget - 38.5%
- e) Clear working plan - 53.8%
- f) Results - 38.5%
- g) Gender - 7.5%
- h) Partnership - 30.7%
- i) Cost of effectiveness - 15%
- j) Sustainability - 23%

11- What is important for you to know about the NGO, which solicits your funding?

- a) General structure - 42.8%
- b) Experience in the field - 50%
- c) Financial management - 42.8%
- d) Audit account - 7%

12- Do you involve outside experts in the given area of the project submitted in the selection process?

- a) Yes - 18%
- b) No - 54.5%
- c) Sometimes - 27%

## **C                    *Evaluation and Follow-up Processes***

13- Do you require evaluation of the project during its implementation?

- a) Yes - 50%
- b) No - 30%
- c) Sometimes - 20% (e.g.; in big projects, more than a year or with some phases)

14- Do you require evaluation of the project following the end of the project's implementation?

Yes - 100%

15- Is the evaluation done by the organisation, which received the funding or is it commissioned from a third party?

- a) By the organisation which received the funding - 45%
- b) By a third party - 27%
- c) Both - 27%

16- Do you require the submission of a final report on the achievements of the project?

Yes - 100%

17- What is your policy on funding a given organisation more than once?

All the donors have no reservation in funding a given organisation more than once with two conditions by two donors, first not at the same time, secondly only once in a fiscal year.

#### ***D Assessments of the People to 'People Program' to Date***

18- How do you see the role of your office in the area of P2P in the future?

- a) To continue the same role - 66.6%
- b) Limited - 25%
- c) No specific definitions - 8.4%

19- What areas do you think your office should concentrate on in the future?

- a) Youth - 14%
- b) Education - 28.5%
- c) Civil society - 35.7%
- d) Environment - 7%
- e) Institutional support - 7%
- f) Economic co-operation - 7%
- g) No specific sectors mentioned - 21.4%

#### **Problems / Obstacles / Limitations**

Due to the limited time to prepare this paper and the kind of target groups, i.e. Embassies and Consulates, it was extremely difficult to conduct all of the necessary interviews. The time limitation was more of an obstacle than I anticipated. There were too many interviews and many of the diplomats involved were continually otherwise engaged. A couple of times the person concerned was overseas. Some interviews were delayed and, some information I did not manage to collect. So whilst the data collected here is reasonably comprehensive it is not exhaustive.

Additionally several of the interviews were protracted, and occasionally the information faxed later was not exactly what was required, and therefore needed secondary and tertiary follow-up for a number of reasons:

- 1 Not all the donors had a clear definition of the people-to-people type of activities, often sending lists of incorrectly classified projects.
- 2 Not all donors provided the financial information for the projects they funded.

## Observations and Recommendations

- 1 The research showed that two thirds of the donors grant funding through direct contacts, which means the funds will remain within the same small circle of NGOs, whilst other grassroots NGOs will remain out of this circle, without any opportunity of entering the 'people to people' arena.
- 2 The same small number of NGOs repeatedly appear on the project lists of several donors, which means the range of beneficiary NGOs is limited to the same NGOs, therefore the impact of the 'people to people' projects and programs will be limited.
- 3 Some donors have problems in supporting 'people to people' type activities, due to certain criteria or governmental policies, i.e. they cannot support Israeli NGOs because they consider Israel is a rich country while at the same time they can support a Palestinian NGOs. For example one donor said, "Only countries with a GNP per capita under USD 2.500 are entitled to receive development assistance."
- 4 Some donors consider funding mixed NGO (Arab & Jewish) in Israel is kind of people-to-people line of activities.
- 5 Most of the donors are interested in the possibilities and outcomes of these kinds of activities. They see them as having an important input into regional peace and stability, but they still need more encouragement and information from those who are more closely involved in these P2P programs.
- 7 Most of the donors were unaware of the priorities of other donors also supporting the same kinds of projects. A small number of NGOs are receiving funding from the majority of these donors and the donors are unaware of this. It would be more productive if the donors would co-ordinate their programs and publicise these projects more.
- 8 Greater publicity is needed for the P2P program - from the point of view of advertising funding cycles, so as to enable more NGOs to participate in the programs, right up to final publicity when a successful program is completed. This kind of positive publicity would encourage more donors to become involved and perhaps, existing donors would be encouraged to increase their funding to these important projects.

## I- Appendices

## II- Chart 1

Specific Areas of Donor Interest within the People To People Program





Chart 2

**Donors Guidelines for Project Selection**



## ***Session Three: People-to-People on the Eve of the Final Status***

**Professor Munther S. Dajani, Director, The Palestinian Centre for Regional Studies**

### **Discussion paper on THE PALESTINIANS ON THE EVE OF THE FINAL STATUS ISSUES: IMMEDIATE HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS?**

I am writing this provocative paper to open the discussion on the status of the Palestinians on the eve of the Final Status Issues Negotiations.

We all realise that one of the most important issues is how to get to trust and confidence building measures. We have learnt from lessons of the past, that it is not important to sign treaties or agreements but what is more important is their acceptance and implementation by the people concerned.

In order to sustain the peace treaties already signed and make the existing peace, a warm peace; the treaties must be accepted not only by the leadership but also by the people whose life are going to be effected by the agreements and, must not be imposed on them. We have to develop the mentality of win/win situation.

First we have to acknowledge the adversarial relations which existed between the occupiers and the occupied. Acknowledge the need to transform this relation to a partnership. Given that both parties do not have to love one another or even like each other, the final analysis shows there are many people such as businessmen who team up for mutual benefit. We can start by learning from them. It can all begin with the Israelis having to come down to earth. They can start with ceasing the maltreating of Palestinian Arabs. They can start by a policy of desisting from the condescending attitude towards the Palestinians. This is documented on videos, PCRS and Peres Centre for Peace in a joint project entitled "Tension".

This harassment of Palestinians was even shown by TV news stations and some soldiers were investigated for such actions.

The relationship of hegemony that dominates the paradigm occupier/occupied, master/slave relationship is actually giving the whole paradigm a bad start.

For example, the Palestinians see this paradigm all the time, namely and in general terms when the Israelis negotiate among themselves and then come to impose their own consensus on the Palestinians. In other words what they have agreed upon between themselves.

This assumption of what is good for Israel must be good for the Palestinians is adopted from the motto "what is good for GM, is good for the United States". This assumption and logic is unacceptable as the ground to building the peace process, and hopefully a sustainable and everlasting peace.

The action of the Israelis speaks for themselves. They continue to confiscate land, and to expand the settlements that are already on confiscated Palestinian land. All is done for different logistical reasons. This is done in the name of Israel's security or for biblical, historical or traditional reasons, while knowing full well that the whole old classical concepts of territorial expansion for security purposes has been scratched by even the Israeli generals themselves, especially after the Second Gulf War of January 1991.

On one hand, whether in the name of religion, tradition or history or in the name of security and the good of everybody, the result is more of the same. Land confiscation, the establishment of new settlements and the expanding of old ones. This is becoming the imposed nature of actions creating new facts on the ground (de facto) in flagrant ignorance of everything else.

It's true that the Palestinians are currently in a weak position. However, the Israeli leadership should have long-term vision and policies based on long term interests and on lessons from recent history, which keeps reminding us all that balance of power changes, alliances change and above all, nothing is permanent in a continuously changing dynamic World which is full of surprises.

The Palestinians feel that as a partner to the peace process, the Israelis should reassess and re-evaluate their long-term policy towards their next door neighbour, namely the Palestinians.

In this particular case, it is not feasible to have a cold peace with somebody who not only lives next door to you, but is also virtually sitting in your lap most of the time. The Israeli should not allow themselves to take advantage of this peculiar point in history and kill the hen which lays golden eggs, (particularly the moderate Palestinian leadership) which has positioned all its credibility on the success of the Peace Process.

This eventually will lead to a Versailles Treaty where as time passes, bitterness and shame becomes a common nightmare of the Palestinians, and the old Versailles Treaty becomes the source of public shame and humiliation which must be corrected - eventually with a face saving war.

In the thirties, we all know how it came to be a popular logo to go to war in order to get rid of the shame the ancient regime brought with the old treaty, which evidently became fertile ground for planting the seeds of hatred and revenge. As we all know, this led to World War II.

This leads me to another issue, which I want to raise and open for discussion. The Israelis, at one stage or another, have to start a truth and reconciliation Committee, a stage for accepting the responsibility of wrong doings. We were delighted the other day about the declaration that the IDF were responsible for the problem of the refugees.

This is the kind of staff that will prepare the Palestinians to be as equal partners. It's true that it took the Palestinians a long fifty years to accept the Israelis; but by the same token, I hope it does not take the Israelis another fifty years to accept the Palestinians; apparently it seems that it might take them even longer than one expects to accept the Palestinian as partners even to the peace process.

In the Peace Process, both parties must start by acknowledging the fact that both people have to share the same piece of land, it's water, air, environment and all the rest of it's natural resources. Both parties

have to accept that the Israeli and the Palestinian people must have each their individual share, and only their share. Israel to its proper 1948 borders, that is their share of the land and, an independent, sovereign, fully recognised, piece of land called Palestine in the 1967 borders, that is the Palestinian's share.

This logic that after the fact that the Palestinians in particular and the Arabs in general, have approved and recognised the Israeli borders of 1948, the Israelis say, lets share what is left, ranging from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the Golan Heights.

*The logic of "what's mine is mine, and what's yours we share".*

Again, here I must remind you that history has shown beyond reasonable doubt that over the long run, the best everlasting peace treaties are the win/win treaties and not the zero sum treaties.

The last and final point I would like to open for discussion, and it is a very important point. It is that the Israelis have to see the Palestinians for what they are, and not stereotype them in two categories. The Israelis have to accept the Palestinians for being more than terrorists and labourers, either are bad enough to be jailed or good enough to be sent to work in construction and other menial jobs unfit for Israelis.

The Palestinian people are also professionals, some of them are even high calibre professionals who can make a difference, if given a chance, to join and co-operate on important and viable projects.

Again I warn that we live in a very dynamic World, which due to globalisation is being reduced to a village, especially with the technological communication revolution which we currently are experiencing. Needless to say, that the Palestinians have among them highly specialised doctors pharmacists, dentists, lawyers, engineers, scientists, entrepreneurs and businessmen.

Only yesterday, I heard a new term called "Cooperation", which stands for co-operation and competition.

In the final analysis, from what we have experienced in the last four decades and the fact that all present here have survived several wars, we ought better accept that it is going to be a catholic marriage. Neither party has successfully been able to get rid of the other.

Having said all this: What is required of the Palestinians?

The Palestinian National Authority understands the importance and significance of security, regional security, regional co-operation and integration. Particularly in this era of globalisation where, no one nation can, regardless of military might and power, geographic, demographic or economic size, achieve growth, sustain development or progress by remaining in isolation.

Recognising international trends, where new economic concepts have replaced traditional ones, the PNA is co-operating and actively participating in the regional activities (ranging from economic to security matters), while understanding that it is impossible to by-pass the initial phase of "**security for all**", which is the foundation for peace building.

This leads to the following phase, regional co-operation. This is basic in confidence building arrangements, and in complex security relationships in particular. Here, I suggest that both parties should be looking for a package of negotiated items, and to seek ways of accelerating implementation to facilitate the improvement of relations between the states.

The media, who are helping in forming public opinion, whether public or private, must be actively involved in the transformation of this public opinion. Furthermore, the academic faculties at universities, the bureaucracy and the machinery of both governments should play an active role in the transformation of attitudes of students and public officials in particular, and of the masses in general.

From a Palestinian perspective, regional security is viewed as Israel's acceptance of the Arabs as equal partners and granting the Palestinians their political rights for self-determination. This relationship must be based on political as well as economic independence. It is a relationship based on mutual co-operation, mutual respect, mutual trust and not a relationship based on occupier– occupied Zero-Sum Game where winners take all and losers are left humiliated and empty handed, but a non-Zero Sum Game where everybody perceives himself to be a winner.

The successive Israeli governments have been implementing their policies based on the assumption that the Arabs and particularly the Palestinians should not be equal partners in peace; and have thus negated any confidence building measures. It is understood here that one should differentiate between the different Israeli governments. However, all in all, all parties are responsible for the eventual success or failure of the peace process.

The Palestinian position on this matter is that peace should not be imposed by one upon the other, but rather negotiated between and among equal partners.

Destroying bridges of mutual trust and respect, established in the aftermath of the signing of the Declaration of Principles in Washington, is a matter basically **all** parties should be blamed for. Nevertheless, each should be accountable for their share of failure.

The PNA aims at giving top priority to the security of all, to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Palestinian economy so that it can regain some of its strength and ability to grow and, to lay the foundation for sustainable development. Reform the Palestinian–Israeli economic relationship, by focusing Palestinian efforts to improve on the Israeli–Palestinian Economic Protocols which are de facto being abrogated many times over because of the different Israeli policies. It is necessary to work gradually to redesign the basis of economic relations in accordance with a partnership and the principle of mutual benefit.

This constitutes an essential condition to push the peace process forward and to promote security and stability. It is important to acknowledge the economic inequities and to work to raise the standard of living of the Palestinian people and to improve the quality of life of the Palestinian citizen while remembering that development must revolve around the Palestinian individual.

Finally, we recognise that this will be achieved only through co-operation and the efficient management of the economic, human and physical resources available and, through the proper administration of external economic relationship, to provide additional resources for such growth and sustainable development. Assert the ability of the Palestinian economy; promote its performance on

both macro and micro level; enlarge its productive capacity; and enable it to benefit from the potential of mutual, regional, and international co-operation.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Mr. Gary Sussman**

**Discussion Paper on  
“PEOPLE – TO – PEOPLE TOWARDS A PERMANENT STATUS  
AGREEMENT”**

*“Even when essentially favoured, the shift from war to peace is often difficult to contemplate and carry out, especially in situations of protracted conflict. The numerous potential problems attending such a shift include not only the recognition and interpretation of a new situation but also the need to change attitudes and values and to deal with issues of value complexity, uncertainty, risk-taking, as well of legitimacy and consensus building.”* (Yaakov Bar – Siman - Tov, 1997: 170)

*“Grass – roots peace building will not have an immediate dramatic effect on conflict situations. It works to a different timeframe and agenda.”* (Stephen Ryan, 1995: 257)

**1 Introduction**

There is a diversity of opinion on what it is that we mean when we speak of people-to-people (P2P) activities and similar differences exist on the question of a “strategy” or master plan for the P2P effort. Some argue that the absence of a grand strategy has been a major failing to date, others argue that the essence of P2P is its randomness and spontaneity. The latter school views strategies or guidelines as an anathema to the idea of a civil society based - bottom up - peace effort. This diversity of opinion is no doubt represented around this table, but all agree that the over-arching aim of P2P is to create wide and deep-rooted legitimacy for the peace process in both societies.

Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov identifies two forms of legitimacy, formal and informal. The former, pertains to “established constitutional and legal stipulations,” whilst informal legitimacy relates to public support for the process.<sup>[1]</sup> Alexander George (1980: 235), whose work underpins Bar-Siman-Tov’s analysis of the Israeli post-Oslo experience, maintains that securing “policy legitimacy” requires both cognitive and normative/ moral legitimacy. Normative legitimacy is concerned with the “desirability” of a policy, i.e. the extent to which a “policy is consistent with fundamental national values and

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<sup>[1]</sup>The two are clearly linked and the absence of a significantly large parliamentary majority for the Oslo agreements fed into the efforts of the hard line opponents of the process to conduct their ongoing de- legitimisation of the Oslo process. This process was abetted by Palestinian terror attacks that undermined public support for the process. Bar-Siman-Tov (1997: 178) argues that the Labour Government’s “failure to clarify the objective of its peace policy, especially in terms of the final arrangements” [permanent status understanding] further hampered its quest for legitimacy.

contributes to their enhancement.” Cognitive legitimacy is concerned with the feasibility (attainability) of the policy.<sup>2[2]</sup>

Some of the key contributions of the P2P effort towards securing legitimacy, particularly normative legitimacy, are

- 1 Creating political legitimacy by generating maximum support on both sides for the need to coexist.
- 2 Engendering security legitimacy by creating an overall support in both societies against acts of violence.
- 3 Forging economic legitimacy by facilitating contacts and cooperation that enables both sides to reap the benefits of coexistence.
- 4 Providing social legitimacy by furthering an understanding on both sides that coexistence can be implemented in a non-intrusive manner that both respects and offers potential benefits to the social and cultural traditions of the two sides.
- 5 Securing religious legitimacy by nurturing support from the religious communities for the compatibility of peace with Judaism, Islam and Christianity and their values.
- 6 Demonstrating in very practical ways that peace and co-existence can be attained.
- 7 By forging institutional ties and relations on a decentralized basis between different groups and strata, P2P activities are creating institutional legitimacy for coexistence.

It is evident that all these components of legitimacy play an important supportive function in accompanying the conclusion of a Permanent Status Agreement (PSA) and offer an essential guarantee for sustainability of peace. And all gathered here, both implementers and donors, and the many others<sup>3[3]</sup> dedicated to the challenge of bringing Palestinians and Israelis together, have formed part of a concentrated effort of different groups and disciplines to create a wide-spread legitimacy for peace.

Accordingly, this paper is designed to suggest three objectives that will guide the efforts of P2P implementers and their varied “micro initiatives” in parallel to the “macro” effort to attain a lasting permanent status (PS) understanding.<sup>4[4]</sup>

- 1 Creating a peace constituency and maximising public support for peace via *Outreach*.
- 2 Painting a clear “end-picture” that clarifies the major ingredients of the PSA and exposing the public to sensitive PS issues, in order to increase awareness and understanding of these issues and in doing so pave the way for compromise on them: *Probing Permanent Status Issues*.
- 3 Creating an infrastructure for peace, by encouraging maximal institutional ties and contacts on a de-centralised basis, in order to ensure the long-term success and sustenance of the agreements: *Forging Good Neighbourly Relations*.<sup>5[5]</sup>

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<sup>2[2]</sup> Alexander George’s essay deals with the challenges of legitimating US policy with US public opinion. The challenges confronting the Nixon-Kissinger Administration in its attempts to promote its policy of Détente, after many years of Cold War, are particularly instructive.

<sup>3[3]</sup> Those of you who are fortunate enough to receive Len and Libby Traubman’s updates are well aware of the multiplicity of initiatives being undertaken. They now have a home - page that lists these activities. See <http://www.igc.org/traubman/messages.htm>

<sup>4[4]</sup> For a discussion on the notions of micro/bottom – up and macro/ top - down initiatives in South Africa see Thuens Eloff 1988.

In a nutshell, the focus of our efforts should be to address the desirability (normative legitimacy) and attainability (cognitive legitimacy) of the PSA and to ensure its sustainability by providing a peace infrastructure. These three objectives (drawn from a non-exhaustive list) are suggested in order to provide a set of basic and common terms and references for the P2P effort over the coming 18 months.

If the Helsinki meeting will in some way contribute to forging a common set of objectives and a common language to guide the work of both implementers and donors, then we will be in a position to effectively harness the experience and drive of those gathered at this meeting and many others, to give maximum support to the political effort to attain and sustain the permanent status understanding.

In addition to addressing these three objectives, this paper hopes to pre-empt a needed discussion on the challenges of coping with the post-PS agreement context and its potential problems, which is also referred to as the “Morning After Effect.” Due attention to potential future problems, in spite of the pressing present challenges, will no doubt prepare the P2P community for perhaps the most challenging and important hour of the peace process: its implementation. Indeed, contrary to the anticipation of expectant publics, who await instant peace dividends after protracted conflict, signing a permanent status understanding is only a pre-condition for beginning a substantive processes of reconciliation and not the end of reconciliation. Moreover, once the “ink dries” new and unanticipated challenges may arise.

## **2 Overview**

In this paper, each of these three objectives will be discussed and some practical measures, designed to fulfil these goals, are suggested. It is designed to serve as a catalyst for discussion on objectives and, as such, practical measures will receive less attention. Before elaborating on these principles, the paper will set out some basic political assumptions about both the content and course of the peace process. These assumptions are subjective in that they are both Israeli and personal. Following this set of assumptions the three objectives will be elaborated upon. Lastly, the challenges of the “Morning After effect” will be addressed.

## **3 Political Assumptions and Timetable**

The Sharem Al Sheikh Memorandum for the implementation of the Wye Agreement, signed on September 4, 1999 has determined that a Framework Agreement on Permanent Status (FAPS) shall be concluded by February 13, 2000. It may be assumed that this FAPS will include a mutual understanding of the need to establish a Palestinian State and to create good neighbourly relations between the two nations. Moreover, the FAPS will have to address all the main conflict issues and declare a common agreement to put an end to the conflict, as well as to describe the ways and means by

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<sup>5[5]</sup> These three principles are not dissimilar to the three components of John Lederach’s (1997: 202 – 214) comprehensive framework for ensuring “conflict transformation.” Lederach proposes an integrated perspective that combines short (initiating the process, taking care of immediate issues like cease-fires, amnesty, mutual recognition) and long term (a framework to address the long term agenda) transformation. 2) Establishing an infrastructure for peace. 3) And building a peace constituency. Lederach (1997: 211) believes that, “An adequate transformative framework must explicitly and intentionally devise mechanisms for integrating and coordinating high- middle and grass roots level strategies, ensuring that they are given space and are legitimated and coordinated. Such an undertaking is directly linked to the idea of building a peace constituency.”

which this shall be achieved. It is assumed that the ongoing implementation of the Interim Accords (safe–passage, prisoner releases and further re-deployments), in parallel to the efforts to negotiate a FAPS, will create a positive atmosphere within which P2P activities can be conducted. This will serve to both enhance the relevance (particularly for Palestinians) of these activities and their impact. The conclusion of FAPS will place the more sensitive PS issues, like refugees, security and Jerusalem, squarely on the public agenda. Toward the conclusion of the FAPS and beyond, increased attention on *outreach* work and coalition building will be essential.

The Sharem Memorandum also obliges both sides to translate the agreement–in-principle of February 2000 into a detailed PSA that shall be concluded on September 13, 2000 (seven years to the day from the signing of the Israeli-PLO DOP). It is assumed that after the conclusion of the PSA, in November 2000, a referendum will be held to obtain the necessary formal and popular approval of the Israeli people.

Hence, even if the timetable will not be completely observed, the coming year (between November 1999 and November 2000) will be decisive on the political level. Whatever the ups and downs in the official negotiation process may be, the preparation of the Israeli and Palestinian publics is a priority. This effort needs to translate into a substantial majority in support of a conclusion of a historical deal to end the conflict – support which, on the Israeli side, will be gauged in a consultative referendum. Significant support will be a decisive factor in the political equation and strongly influence the decision-makers. The referendum issue will thus come to dominate the “peace effort” and it is of outmost importance that a decisive majority will support the referendum, reflecting sufficient consensus in Israeli society. In light of this challenge, P2P activities will be crucial and require a well thought out and clear strategy that employs multiple tactics.

It is also worth noting that progress towards a PS understanding may witness increased efforts by extremists to scupper the process. As Richard Wilson (1997: 23) notes with regard to the South African and Guatemalan transitions, “violence is not wholly a product of transitions, but it certainly worsens during transitions compared to low intensity conflict that usually precedes the talks.” If not prevented, acts of terror will serve to undermine public support for the peace process, possibly affect the time-line suggested above and impact upon the practicalities (closures) of the P2P community’s work.

#### **4 Major Objectives for P2P towards PS**

##### ***a) Outreach***

In examining the Tami Steinmetz Center’s Peace Index for September 1999, the following conclusions can be drawn. When asked about their opinion on the Oslo agreement 34,5% of the Israeli respondents indicated that they were “heavily in favor” (14,1%) or “somewhat in favor” (20,4%). Those that are “somewhat opposed” (13,8%) and “heavily opposed” (12%) represent 35,5% of the respondents. The single largest constituency of respondents is the 31,8% who classify themselves as “in the middle.” 8% of the respondents’ chose the “don’t know/ no opinion” option.

When asked if the Oslo Agreement will bring about peace between Israelis and Palestinians the respondents who “greatly” (11,3%) or “somewhat” believe (22,7%) totaled 34% whilst the respondents who indicated that they “somewhat” (15,1%) or “certainly” don’t believe (23,3%) represented 38,4%.

Once again the middle ground was the largest single response – with 23,5%. 4,1% of the respondents’ chose the “don’t know/ no opinion” option.<sup>6[6]</sup>

Thus, assuming that we factor out the “heavily in favour / greatly believe” and the “heavily opposed/ certainly don’t believe” constituencies, we observe that a significant portion of the Israeli public maintain the middle ground. This middle ground is divided into two categories - the “convinced, yet reluctant” and the “sceptical and unconvinced.” Effectively building a peace constituency (maximising support for the peace process) therefore requires increased “outreach efforts,” that target these two key constituencies, by P2P implementers. Beyond serving as an effective methodology to engage these constituencies in activities related to the peace process, P2P activities provide tangible evidence that peace is attainable – thereby contributing to cognitive legitimacy.

i) *The Convinced yet Reluctant*

One of the significant achievements of the P2P effort since the signing of the DOP is that considerable progress was made in “mainstreaming” the P2P process. If the pre-Oslo dialogue constituency mainly involved the “soft left,” the P2P implementers have made significant inroads into the centre or “mainstream left” (Labour Party supporters and beyond). Yet much work remains to be done amongst even those who voted for Ehud Barak in the May 1999 Israeli elections.

Indeed, for many “pro-peace” Israelis, P2P activities seem to counter their perceptions of the peace process. Whilst they view the Oslo process as a divorce settlement, that will let them live their lives without the Palestinians (“us here and them there”), P2P actors are seen as marriage counsellors trying to reconcile the quarrelling couple<sup>7[7]</sup>. This conundrum is central to the wider Israeli debate on separation or “hafradah.” Effective political separation and the success of the peace process will require forging durable contacts on as many levels of society, particularly local government, as possible. And a very important role of P2P strategists and implementers is to clarify the concepts and language of separation and co-ordination alike and, in doing so, overcome seeming contradictions. In this regard, the P2P effort and the various components of legitimacy have a vital role in clarifying the different aims of peace making.<sup>8[8]</sup>

The outreach effort geared towards this “convinced yet reluctant” constituency will require greater emphasis on activities that target professionals and address professional issues as well as encounters. A

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<sup>6[6]</sup> The Peace Index has been conducted on a monthly basis since June 1994 and over that time period the Oslo Index has ranged between an all time low of 43,7% in January 1995 and an all time high of 57,9% in November 1995. The inaugural score was 51% and in 1999 it has remained in the 50’s until August and September when it slipped to 47,8% and 49,4% respectively. The September sample covered 501 persons and the margin of error for a sample this size is 4,5%. See [http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/p\\_9909.htm](http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/p_9909.htm)

<sup>7[7]</sup> Jerusalem Report journalist, Yossi Klein Halevi, presented this notion in a phone interview.

<sup>8[8]</sup> On the one hand, political legitimacy for the conclusion of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian State entails widespread support for political separation and the re-enforcement of separate political identities as well as the right for self-determination of the two nations. On the other hand, economic legitimacy for peace entails support for good neighbourly relations and co-operation in trade, the provision of basic services, and the development of joint ventures, when beneficial for both sides. Likewise, social and religious legitimacy – premised on recognition and respect of the social, cultural and religious differences – allows for and depends upon ongoing contacts and interactions in these three areas. These contacts nurture the necessary empathy between the two nations. Finally, institutional legitimacy depends on the creation of co-ordination mechanisms that will enable both nations to co-operate when necessary and to act independently when desirable.

welcome addition to the former field of co-operation would be co-operation between representatives of formal professional associations, unions and societies (lawyers, teachers, nurses, doctors, etc.). It is assumed that in an environment where the Interim Agreements are fulfilled and basic trust and relations between the two leaderships are re-grafted, the various Ministries and state agencies (previously withdrawn from these activities) will become more involved and ---- accessible. Extensive dialogue and co-operation is particularly important between those professionals that are seen to provide a sense of social, economic, and legal security and stability to their own societies. Thus, co-operation between educators, health and social welfare providers, industrialists, lawyers, judges, municipal workers and policeman can contribute to a sense of separate and co-ordinated stability in both societies.

Greater media coverage of these activities is vital in order to ensure a broader impact of the P2P effort. Increased media coverage however needs to be linked with a common language legitimising peace, a language that the pro-peace leadership on both sides has to nurture. Media coverage then has to turn that language of peace to be commonly accepted and internalised on a wide popular basis. In attaining this objective, wide coverage of a great variety of P2P activities, addressing all different aspects of peace making (rational, emotional and substantive) is vital. Moreover, wide coverage of the P2P stories is crucial if we are to counter the negative stereotypes generated by the opponents of peace out of isolated incidents. Israeli opponents of the process effectively manage to transform an individual stabbing incident or a spate of car thefts – all appearing in the daily papers - into a negative picture of the Palestinians as partners and of the process. The challenge of the P2P community is to counter each of these images with stories that paint a different picture.

The recently formed Palestinian – Israeli Media Forum as well as a forum of the editors of major papers need to be mobilised.<sup>9[9]</sup> Moreover, politicians, opinion-shapers and media stars could be more effectively used to create press interest and news worthiness and penetrate new constituencies.

ii) *The Unconvinced and Sceptical*

Clearly a major challenge for the P2P effort over the coming 24 months will be to make further inroads into key sceptical Israeli constituencies, including the moderate (or soft) Likud and right, Russian Immigrants and Shas leadership and constituency. To date much progress has been made with the Russian immigrants (in particular the media) and a major path-breaking initiative with the right wing and Shas political representatives was made with the Rhodes Process.

The real challenge is to engage the second tier leadership (party activists and community leaders) in these activities. In the event that a referendum is staged on the eventual PS deal, this constituency is even more vital as they can be crucial in mobilising voters in either direction. The Rhodes approach and similar efforts that target the political leaders (MK's) and second tier leaders are a priority.<sup>10[10]</sup> It may be appropriate to identify effective agents drawn from within these communities to spearhead such

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<sup>9[9]</sup> Journalists consulted in this regard suggested that a more proactive way to ensure coverage of P2P activities was to create a change of policy on the level of editors. Thereby creating a situation in which journalists respond to their editor's demands instead of journalists, unsuccessfully, trying to convince their editors to cover such activities. A delegation of P2P implementers and MK's should meet with each of the editors of the major newspapers and then arrange for a workshop with all the editors to explore ways to increase media coverage of such activities.

<sup>10[10]</sup> One example of a means to target such leaders is via the associations representing store holders in the major Tel Aviv, BeerSheva and Jerusalem markets as they are made up of Shas activists. Similarly, important work can be done with the leading representatives of El-Hamayan. Here a common issue that they could discuss with Palestinian counterparts is the dilemmas facing religious educators when dealing with modernity.

initiatives. Unfortunately, the motivation so common to the P2P community is often sorely lacking here. Another crucial dimension, pertaining to Shas in particular, is to get the support of major spiritual figures for the peace process. Here inter-faith/ religious dialogue activities with the Shas spiritual leadership and the Palestinian spiritual leadership are essential. The involvement of the Rabbinical establishment, on the Israeli side, should further legitimise and mainstream such a dialogue.

On both the Palestinian and Israeli side, vital segments of society have not been involved in P2P activities for ideological and political reasons<sup>11[11]</sup>. In such cases, the Palestinian – Israeli interaction may not be the most effective methodology for outreach purposes. Instead it may be more practical to use internal dialogue activities that focus on internal Palestinian – Palestinian and internal Israeli – Israeli interactions. Here, the use of scenario planning exercises and internal dialogue fora that will cover the peace process as well as other issues process (like religion and state, education and social welfare issues) pertinent to those indifferent or opposed to the peace will allow for increased outreach.

One excellent example of such activities is provided by an internal Israeli scenario planning exercise, modelled after the South African Mont Fleur Scenarios exercise, which has been carried out for the past year under the auspices of the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation<sup>12[12]</sup>.

The Israeli group included representatives from the Labour Party, the Israeli Arab community, Likud, Shas, Mafdal and the Settler movement. This exercise of internal Israeli scenario planning has contributed, along with other factors, to the understanding that the ideological concept of “the Greater Israel” has, in reality, failed. The awareness within the Israeli right wing of their failure and of the need to accommodate with the reality on the ground may become an important factor in developing common ground between the Israeli-Palestinian understanding on one hand, and the Israeli-Israeli understanding on the other. As part of the process of accepting reality it appears to be necessary and possible to create linkages with right wing groups. Dealing with their issues of concern will serve to both make the peace process more relevant (to them) and our work more holistic. Furthermore, such contacts and dialogues may prove invaluable in addressing some of the post – permanent status challenges that will confront the two societies. It is indeed worth considering synergies with groups like Geshet, Tsav Pius and others that address these issues and may have access to constituencies that are less accessible. As part of these “inward looking” activities, a focus on the peace process should include meetings with Palestinians.

In addressing this category of sceptical Israeli constituencies, the inclusion of settlers as individuals or as a group in P2P activities needs to be further discussed. Engaging certain settlers (particularly leaders, community leaders and professionals) in such activities may be crucial in exposing differences

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<sup>11[11]</sup> On the Palestinian side, some from the left, who were traditionally involved in dialogue during the Intifadah period, withdrew from these activities as they became formally linked to the Oslo process and “nationalised” through Annex 6 of the Oslo Two Accord.

<sup>12[12]</sup> The South African exercise was launched in mid-1991 and brought together a group of 22 prominent South Africans representing trade union leaders, business leaders, academics, economists and NGO actors linked with various political parties. The group initially suggested 30 different scenarios for South Africa’s political, social and economic future. These were eventually narrowed down to 4 scenarios (the lame duck scenario, the ostrich scenario, the Icarus scenario and the flight of the flamingo’s scenario). In succeeding to reach consensus on 4 scenarios for the country’s future, the exercise created a common discourse between representatives of deeply divided communities, demonstrating that it was possible to reach consensus, despite the divergent interests of South Africans. The exercise and the group’s findings were extensively publicised and reported on in the press ensuring a broad impact. The exercise was funded by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Swiss Development Agency.

amongst the community regarding the peace process. South Africa provides some inspiring examples of how the ANC conducted a “charm offensive” amongst whites and widened the supportive coalition for an negotiated agreement on a new constitution within the white community whilst isolating extremists.

More specifically, in May 1991, four months after his release from prison and with precious little to show his own constituency, Nelson Mandela addressed an audience at Stellenbosch University in Afrikaans, soothing them with the following statement. “We have to address the fears of the whites and we should go beyond the mere rhetorical assurance in order to address the structural guarantees which would insure that this principle [one person one vote] will not lead to the domination of whites by blacks.” (Adam and Moodley, 1993: 62). In our context that would be tantamount to Yasser Arafat addressing an audience at Bar Ilan University and making his Stockholm speech<sup>13[13]</sup> in Hebrew. Another example is provided by a 1988 meeting in Leverkusen, Germany, between representatives of the South African Communist Party, Soviet Academics, the ANC Executive and Afrikaner liberals (organised by IDASA). This strategic intervention went some way to challenge white fears of a communist take-over.

In the likely event that a *referendum* is staged, it will be essential that the outreach effort will already have matured by then, enabling the launching of an effective, all embracing “YES” campaign. Two vital contributions of the outreach work and the P2P community to the referendum are suggested. Firstly, the convinced yet sceptical – if effectively reinforced and mobilised - could lead and support a credible and broad "non-party political" effort to win a YES vote. Outreach efforts can therefore provide the motivated and party activists essential to the campaign. Second, outreach activities could pave two important strategic inroads into the sceptical and opposed communities.

On one level, the creation of an effective “yes” presence and atmosphere within these constituencies (islands of support in a sea of likely opposition) can sway other hesitant “swing” voters in these constituencies. In doing so, we can prevent an atmosphere in which it is perceived (by Russian immigrants or Shas voters) that the community is against legitimate support for the PSA. In Addition, such activities could limit the impact of scare-mongering and negative “no” campaigning. In preparing for the referendum, it may be worthwhile considering the creation of a forum of P2P actors that could begin planning and preparing for a referendum. As in the case of Northern Ireland, an effective yes campaign may demand a structure that is not built around parties and hampered by the search from minimal consensus – which often requires ambiguity and undermines efficacy.

Securing an emphatic YES majority in the referendum will serve to provide both formal and informal legitimacy for the PSA and serve to marginalise hard-line opponents. The effective use of a referendum in marginalising hard line opponents was displayed in France, where Charles de Gaulle staged two referendums (January 8, 1961 and April 8, 1962) on the issue of Algerian self-determination and the subsequent peace agreement with Algeria. According to Vincent Wright (1978: 164), “The Algerian

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<sup>13[13]</sup> Arafat’s 5 December 1998 speech was made on the occasion of Tenth Anniversary of his 1988 Stockholm declaration calling for the creation of two states and his foreswearing of violence. The essence of his speech was that a PS understanding must be reached on the basis of mutually acceptable solutions. He called for dual sovereignty and for the respect of the sovereignty of the two states. On Jerusalem Arafat called for an open area, whilst suggesting that there needs to be a just solution of the refugee problem that is accepted by both sides. On security, Arafat suggested that both sides refrain from acts that compromise the security of the other side. Lastly, Arafat called for the determination of borders in a manner that both sides mutually agreed upon. (Ze’ev Schiff, 1998)

referendums legitimised a badly needed surrender, isolated the extremists, and helped ensure the loyalty of the army.” Butler and Ranney (1994: 10) argue that the South African case provides an “outstanding example of how a referendum can enormously strengthen a government’s hand in a very difficult situation”<sup>14[14]</sup>. Victory and victory by an “emphatic margin” (two thirds) cannot be assumed and several historical cases have shown that coalitions of the disgruntled can defeat government initiatives as in the cases of Canada (1992), Australia (1916 & 1917), Norway (1972, 1994) and Switzerland (1992).<sup>15[15]</sup>

### ***b) Probing Permanent Status Issues***

The articulation of a clear and balanced vision of the final end-of-conflict picture (Alexander George’s cognitive legitimacy), so often a major obstacle in “grassroots” efforts to make peace,<sup>16[16]</sup> is deemed essential in this phase of the peace process. Whilst outreach efforts can be very effective in engendering support for the general, noble and often ambiguous notion of peace, the quest for a permanent status understanding will demand clarity and agreement on may sensitive issues. Indeed, the moment of truth and clarity requires hard compromises that cannot be shielded and sweetened by “ambiguity.”<sup>17[17]</sup> Ambiguity on these “big” issues – which is sometimes necessary in order to get ahead – could be a great liability as it reinforces the public’s negative perceptions of the prospects of the attainability of a deal<sup>18[18]</sup>. Moreover a vital factor in ensuring that a PS deal will stick and be sustainable is ensuring that the agreement is one that both Palestinians and Israelis – particularly the expectant publics – can “live with.”<sup>19[19]</sup>

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<sup>14[14]</sup> Following defeat at the hands of the Conservative Party (CP) in a by-election in the Potchefstroom constituency, F.W. de Klerk called a referendum to obtain a mandate for his plans to negotiate a new dispensation for South Africa. The 19 February 1992 defeat, in a traditionally safe National Party (NP) constituency, exposed the extent of Afrikaner discomfort with the negotiations with the ANC. The Government secured an impressive 69% Yes vote in the referendum held on 17 March 1992. Adam and Moodley (1993: 2, 152) contend that; “The decisive defeat of the conservatives in the referendum of March 17, 1992, and the preceding wavering of whether to boycott or participate in the referendum, has further exacerbated cleavages between conservative moderates and hard-liners.” They also contend that, “The referendum alliance of the respectable “party conservatives” with neofascists has discredited all conservative politics in the eyes of the majority of Afrikaners.”

<sup>15[15]</sup> In the case Australia, Trade Unions and a coalition of dissatisfied interest groups twice defeated the government’s efforts to introduce compulsory conscription (28 October 1916 & 20 December 1917) and contribute to the war effort. In the case of Norway, voters twice (1972 and 28 November 1994) rejected EEC/ EU membership and the 1972 defeat was interpreted “as a victory of mass over elite’s.” Swiss voters, having supported a free trade agreement on industrial goods in 1972, rejected a vote on Switzerland’s membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) on 6 December 1992. Sciarini and Listhaug (1997: 430) argue that in both the Swiss and Norwegian cases “European referendums re-vitalised old cleavages in Norwegian and Swiss politics.” Lastly, the 1992 Canadian referendum on the Charlottetown Accord, following the failure of the 1987 Meech-Lake Accord, was rejected by 55% of the electorate. Here poor economic conditions and the Brian Mulroney Government’s unpopularity were major contributing factors, but the proposed constitutional changes were opposed by a broad coalition of interest groups for a variety of reasons. Thus women’s groups opposed the package on grounds of under-representation. In some provinces the no-vote was very high as these citizens opposed continuous concessions to Quebec. (See Butler and Ranney, 1994). These examples therefore underscore the importance of coalition building for the purpose of the referendum.

<sup>16[16]</sup> Stephen Baranyi, 1998.

<sup>17[17]</sup> Aahron Klieman (1999) explores the use of “constructive ambiguity” in the Oslo process.

<sup>18[18]</sup> Based on personal experience from South Africa, it is my conviction that people are more inclined to support difficult processes if they have a clear picture of where they are going.

<sup>19[19]</sup> As the current balance of power favours Israel, there is a danger that Israel, with US support and pressure, could squeeze out a compromise that slants towards Israeli demands and expectations. Such a deal may lack fundamental legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian public and be presented by the PA’s internal opposition as a “sell out.” Likewise,

Only a decade or so ago contact with the PLO, let alone the idea of a Palestinian state, was considered taboo in Israel and support for such ideas was limited to marginal segments of Israeli society. Today both have been widely accepted and thereby legitimised, while at the same time taboos are still upheld regarding the most sensitive PS issues, such as Jerusalem, refugees, security, borders, settlements, etc. Public discourse on these issues, on both sides, is anachronistic and limits the scope of negotiations and the achievement of compromise.

Hence one of the challenges that have to be addressed by the dedicated P2P community, is how to break old taboos and create a sense of acceptability for compromise – oriented solutions on these issues as well as try to engender greater clarity and acceptance of that “alarming” clarity. In doing so we need to “jump” over long-held dogmas and taboos and address these issues. In other words, in flanking the political leadership on the left we can expand the borders of debate and pull them ahead by setting the agenda. One heartening example of how debate and discussions has affected the perceptions of the political leadership and later the public on a sensitive PS issue is water. Only few years ago the problem seemed irresolvable, yet it has gradually receded from the list of “red lines” and “no’s.” And just like Israelis today internalise the inevitability of a Palestinian state, the public also needs to confront and internalise certain minimum compromises and changes.

In this context, the “convinced” are clearly our target constituency. In parallel to outreach activities (widening support for the peace process) we need to increase (deepen) public discussion and understanding on the “tough issues” and reframe the parameters of consensus. In addressing this category of activities, more politicised or ideological organisations, that have clear positions on the peace process, need to be mobilised. As a starting point there is great value in reaching some kind of basic, yet clear, Palestinian - Israeli consensus on principles that will guide a future PS understanding on important issues like Jerusalem and refugees. The greater the level of consensus and the clearer the map of the road ahead, the more effective these P2P actors can be in “preparing public opinion.”<sup>20[20]</sup> One additional, yet related comment, in this regard is that as we approach PS there is an urgent need to increase the synergy between political society and civil society, i.e. between politicians and P2P actors addressing these issues. For this purpose a forum of P2P actors and political leaders should be created.

This paper posits therefore that a greater effort should be made by the P2P effort to expand the scope of debate and discussion on highly sensitive issues. In doing so we can give the two publics greater clarity on what reaching a deal would require and promote these ideas. Amongst the PS issues, Jerusalem and refugees should receive undivided attention. When approaching Jerusalem, on the Israeli side, the following principle messages are suggested:

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on the Palestinian side, positions long held and entrenched could limit the scope for Palestinian negotiators to find pragmatic solutions needed to ensure Israeli public support for the understanding reached.

<sup>20[20]</sup> In encumbering such clarity a Peoples Peace Conference of NGOs and community leaders could be staged in order to debate such a roadmap. Such a forum could be a once off event or take the shape of an ongoing forum that – in parallel to negotiations – defines common position papers on issues under discussion. In the case of Guatemala the Government and the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (UNRG) created a Civil Society Assembly (ASC). This forum included representatives of 12 sectors of civil society: religious groups, journalists, labour leaders, political parties, Mayan groups, women's groups, human rights organisations, development NGOs, academics, cooperatives, private business and study and research centres. The ASC was mix of success and disappointment and did not always entail the desired consultation with broader society, but it did provide another channel for debate and served as a mechanism to incorporate those affected by the process. See Palencia Prado and Holiday (1996: 32 – 36).

- 1 Jerusalem shall become a city of peace in a PS understanding.
- 2 The Palestinians need to have as their capital Al-Quds. Such a development will provide international recognition for Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
- 3 Municipal and cultural autonomy for the Palestinian residents of the city - within the framework of a united city structure.
- 4 Unfettered Palestinian access to holy sights and ongoing waqf (Palestinian) control over the Temple Mount.
- 5 Palestinian citizenship for the Palestinian citizens of Jerusalem.

In practical terms this requires a major increase in activities that focus on the city and its residents in order to both challenge Israeli myths of a united Jerusalem and localise a problem that has been nationalised by both camps. The Israeli public should gain a clearer understanding of the municipal borders of the city, its demography and neighbourhoods and life of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Such activities could include social history tours of Jerusalem which focus on borders and visits to refugee camps in the area. An additional idea would be to twin neighbourhoods and institutions (schools) in the East and West sides of the city. Moreover such activities should provide a forum to float possible solutions, and allow for debate on these proposals. This should be done in order to create greater public involvement in the search for a compromise. Another suggestion is to create an ongoing Palestinian - Israeli Jerusalem forum of local organisations to deal with local issues and the peace process. All of the above would also require greater donor support for activities that centre on Jerusalem.

The basic messages guiding Israeli work on refugees could include:

- 1 Formal acknowledgement of the common responsibility of Israel, the future state of Palestine, and the regional and international communities to bring an end to the refugee problem.
- 2 Issue of refugee compensation.
- 3 The right of return to the future state of Palestine - though not to Israel, with the exception of family reunification.
- 4 Rehabilitation for refugees in current host states.

On the issue of refugees the primary objective should be to increase Israeli understanding of the problem and its various dimensions and, no less important, facilitate Israeli empathy. If Israelis were to see the human suffering dimension of this problem greater space for compromise could be created. Here increased visits by Israelis to refugee camps, activities that involve the retelling of personal histories, increased public education and encounters with refugees need to be explored. In parallel, P2P activities should instil within Palestinian refugee community a win-win approach towards ending the conflict and introducing a process of reconciliation with Israel. Activities could include a joint Israeli-Palestinian effort to upgrade health services (particularly primary health and children's care services) for the refugee community. This process may in time require a joint re-evaluation of histories and narratives. Again, as with Jerusalem, the donor community should recognise these efforts as a special category of activities. Moreover, a dedicated group of Palestinian and Israeli NGOs that will focus on the refugee issue should be created. Such a group should co-ordinate and brainstorm individual and joint efforts to address the issue and raise public awareness.

There is clearly a potential dialectic between the objective of outreach, selling the general notion of peace, and the effort to probe permanent status issues. Work on the former requires ambiguity, whilst addressing PS issues demands clarity and detail that may undermine the outreach effort. As such these

two efforts, particularly addressing PS issues, should be conducted in such a manner so as to avoid cancelling one another out.<sup>21[21]</sup>

### ***c) Forging Good Neighbourly Relations***

The long-term sustainability of the peace process and the PSA requires that relations be consolidated on as many levels as possible – particularly on a local institutional level. The political logic and urgency behind this understanding stems from the experience of the past three years and from future challenges.

The Oslo process and any peace process for that matter assumed and required a commitment by both sides. The Likud election victory in Israel in 1996, exposed Israeli-Palestinian relations to a to a prolonged crisis and undermined the goodwill and trust required to fuel the Oslo process.<sup>22[22]</sup> Multi-layered Institutional ties are essential to create a safety network in such situations and it is here that P2P has a strong contribution. Whereas the early Oslo agreement was concluded by a small group of people (the “Oslo Club”) the continuation of the political process in spite of all difficulties and the promotion of P2P activities have enlarged the grassroots support for peace. The institutionalisation of P2P activities was put down in Oslo and was actually started on the NGO level and since then has steadily incorporated other institutional actors, particularly structures of local government, like local governances, municipalities and regional councils.

Even without the “stick” of crises, there is a real need to put in place what John Paul Lederach (1995: 201 – 202) calls the “infrastructure for peace” and create links across different levels and domains of society. This leads us to our second political logic for de-centralising, geographically and organisationally, the P2P effort. In order to address the sustainability of a PS deal an elaborate system of co-operation, that supports the process of political separation needs to be put in place. Effective political separation requires that there be full co-ordination and co-operation between the vital systems that directly impact on relations between Palestinians and Israelis. Simply closing off borders and labour markets are simply not rational pre- or post-peace actions. Moreover, co-ordination and co-operation on the basic issues that affect everyday quality of life issues (education, sewage, school, environment, public health, etc.) is vital as these are issues by which people will judge the process. Finally, de-centralised and localised initiatives, conducted via local structures, also have the added value of ensuring effective outreach beyond the Tel Aviv – Jerusalem – Ramallah triangle. It is in for these reasons that projects designed to facilitate co-operation on a local or cross border level are to be encouraged.

The cross-border co-operation approach of peace–building represents “a self conscious attempt to link peace-making and peace-building.” (Stephan Ryan, 1995: 229).<sup>23[23]</sup> This approach is rooted in the

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<sup>21[21]</sup> Both donors and implementers, when considering major projects that are “probing” PS issues, should therefore at the very least consider possible negative “spill-over” effects of such activities.

<sup>22[22]</sup> Whilst good will and trust were undermined during this period, it is important to recognise that this period also witnessed the signing of the Hebron Protocol in January 1997 and of the Wye Agreement in October 1998. Both agreements were fully in line with the Oslo concept and underlined the fact that no alternative existed and hereby legitimised the Oslo process, particularly among Israeli right wing constituencies.

<sup>23[23]</sup> Stephan Ryan’s (1995: 224) distinguishes between peace – making (ending hostilities and reaching an agreement) and peace building reinforces the importance of issues of sustaining the peace process. “Simply put, whereas peace-keeping is

*Functional Integration Hypothesis*, which posits that “through co-operation in areas of common interest it is possible to induce a transfer a loyalty away from the narrow parochialism to supranational institutions, which are able to satisfy concrete needs. Thus activity in economic and social spheres can bring about political transformation, as interdependence is increased and conflict is reduced” (Stephen Ryan, 1995: 235). Historically the European Community and the French-German experiences are offered as successful examples. Most recently this logic has been applied through an extensive cross-border co-operation project between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in the framework of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the subsequent Good Friday Agreement.

Good neighbours also need to respect and acknowledge one another’s identities and histories. And the arduous process of re-framing the nature of relations, from those of adversaries to partners in peace, requires a new language in the print and electronic media, in the schools and the texts used in the classroom. It is in this vein that the important work on peace education and the development of curriculum by groups like IPCRI and Givat Haviva are adopted by the state institutions. Whilst the advent of a pro-peace government and the re-moulding of a peace partnership mean should improve the likelihood that this important NGO work is adopted and implemented by the formal education system, this cannot be taken for granted.

## **5 Suggested Guidelines**

Ensuring maximal effectiveness for the P2P effort over the coming 18 months requires adopting a common language and set of goals that will guide the thinking and work of implementers and donors. What then are some common buzzwords and objectives that we could take home from Helsinki in order to complement the macro-political effort to reach a sustainable PSA?

The first objective is the enlargement of the “peace constituency” via effective outreach activities. Public support for the peace process will be measured in the forthcoming referendum and securing an emphatic result requires work on both the outreach constituencies identified in this paper. Widening support for peace requires increased emphasis on professional to professional activities in order to further mainstream (legitimate) co-operation and make deeper inroads amongst the community “convinced yet reluctant” supporters of peace. This also requires effective PR and media exposure of such activities in order to enhance their broader public impact. Making inroads into the “unconvinced and opposed” constituency requires creative strategic interventions like the Rhodes process – both on the level of second tier leaders as well as political leaders. This will also require greater emphasis on and work within the settler community. Here internal Israeli-Israeli activities – that address the peace process as well as matters of concern to the religious – are to be encouraged.

Moreover, strategic interventions in the form of a “charm offensive” aimed at groups like the settlers; Russian Immigrants and development town residents are required. Here the objective is not only generating support for peace but also exposing divisions and nuances that exist within the opposition to the peace process. It is vital that the donor community responds to this challenge recognising that outreach activities are a priority – in light of the referendum - and that budgets are allocated for this specific purpose of outreach. Outreach budgets need to be focussed on and include special categories -

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about building barriers between groups who want to fight each other, peace-building attempts to build bridges between the parties allow for positive and creative interaction; and whereas peace-making is concerned with intervention at the elite, decision-making level, peace – building is focused on the social, economic and psychological environments of ordinary people at the grass roots level. As such peace-building is the conflict resolution strategy most likely to result in conflict transformation.”

professional activities – internal dialogue – Rhode's type interventions - charm offensives etc. In parallel, the donor community needs to respond to this challenge of facilitating increased outreach activities by providing for greater flexibility and decentralisation. This means that European capitals and Brussels need to give local missions greater autonomy in responding to requests to support such interventions. Improved response times to requests and greater support for medium scale projects are crucial in assisting the work of peace entrepreneurs.

The second objective is to enhance cognitive legitimacy and address the major components of the PSA. The P2P effort has to expand the scope of the debate on these issues and inform the public. In effect, enhancing cognitive legitimacy means taking the numerous studies and solutions, funded by the donor community, and integrating them into the public discourse. This will move the debate away from simple “yes” and “no” statements to a debate on the details. Debating details pre-supposes accepting that the answer is yes. In this regard the donor community needs to provide greater support for activities that tackle Jerusalem and refugees. It is also worth considering the creation of forums on these two issues under the shepherding and support of a member state.

Last but not least, the Helsinki program needs to complement outreach (building a peace constituency) and greater clarity and debate on PS issues (cognitive legitimacy) with a focus on forging and developing long term good neighbourly relations. Local council / cross border co-operation has the added benefits of incorporating effective and deep outreach and decentralising the peace process – geographically and politically. But its major contribution is that it provides an “infrastructure” for peace and addresses long-term questions of sustainability.

## **6 The Morning-after Effect**

The so-called “morning after effect” incorporates the trials and tribulations that accompany the implementation of the agreements, disappointment with peace (“this is not peace!” attitudes, frustration at the absence of immediate dividends) and the arrival of a new set of problems – particularly internal ones. In parallel to the advent of the various components of the “morning after effect,” the arrival of peace may also induce its own crises within the P2P NGO community. Namely, the sense of “the job being done” and feelings of irrelevance accompanied by increased competition over limited funds (the donors have now gone to East Timor). All of this happens at a time when we can now really begin real reconciliation - after the signing of a permanent status accord. The first major challenge therefore is to try and anticipate these problems and map out what can be done to pre-empt them and - if unable to prevent them – cope with them.

Problems of implementation and delays associated with the deal can result from virulent opposition to the agreement, disagreement over the letter of the agreement, particularly subjective interpretations, and a variety of other factors. Such problems reinforce the seemingly weak opposition at a time when the peace camp may have dropped its guard. Such developments also play upon the sentiments of disillusioned supporters of peace who don't see their expectations fulfilled. The Palestinian frustration at confronting poverty, closure and unemployment (instead of the promised Singapore) after Oslo provides a stark reminder of how exogenous variables serve to undermine the process. Ongoing press incitement or exposes of anti-Zionist or Israel curricula in Palestinian schools can also serve to undermine relations and poison the atmosphere. In this regard, the adoption of peace education curricular and a re examination of our history texts are vital.

For each of the parties, the end of conflict will see the emergence of internal problems and differences long plastered over by the conflict with the other. Suddenly problems of religion and state or social inequality assume a new importance and dominate the public agenda. Peace dividend and opportunities for some may spell high personal costs for others – factories may move to Gaza or Jordan leading to increased unemployment. Indeed the peace process can become the scapegoat for many of these problems. Even problems like increased crime can undermine people's attitudes and support for peace. In South Africa crime spelt the end of liberalism for many.

In coping with these new problems the P2P community and their channels of communication (within our respective communities and across the two communities) will come to play a vital role. These points are simply raised to remind both implementers and donors that there is much work to be done and that we would fail in our duty to the process in not assisting it during this difficult phase. At the very least we need to start thinking of these problems – studying them in other settings – and plan for them.

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## ***Session Four: Discussion on the Future Aspects And Prospects of P2P***

Dr. Zuheir Elwazer, PLO Representative in Finland

### **Speech in the Closing session**

First of all, I wish to thank the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Citizens' Security Council, KATU. At the same time I am glad to say today, that two weeks ago KATU succeeded for the first time in the history of our work in Finland to invite both H.E. Ambassador of Israel and the Representative of PLO in Finland to participate in the same preparatory workshop.

So again and in front of all of you, I wish to thank KATU for this event.

Of course, if I had been speaking one or more years ago, I would have had different things to say than I do now. That, because the new Israeli government, headed by H.E. Prime Minister Ehud Barak has given us new optimism, even if optimism with caution.

We all know that in the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington on the 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1993, the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, time to recognise their mutual legitimate and political rights, time to strive towards a life in peaceful coexistence and in mutual dignity and security. This, in order to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and a historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process, and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

Just a few hours before initiating the final status talks in Ramallah between the Israeli government and the PLO, Prime Minister Ehud Barak raised a subject described by a Palestinian official as an undermining of the peace process.

In a press statement the Israeli Prime Minister argued that UN Security Council resolution 242 does not apply to the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the Israeli Government and the PLO soon agreed upon stopping talking about this subject.

The signing of the Sharm-el-Sheikh agreement and its implementation constitutes a positive step towards a comprehensive and just peace.

Both Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat showed their readiness to go ahead in the peace process. The signing of the Sharm-el-Sheikh agreement gave hope for the Palestinian people for a good future, because of the Israeli side's implementation of that agreement. Especially the opening of the safety passage of 44 km between the Palestinian areas of Gaza and the West Bank was important. This meant that the passage gave geographical unity and social unity to the Palestinian people. We are looking forward to the opening of the North safety passage, as agreed upon.

The agreement of the establishment of the Gaza port was also a sign of improving economy for the Palestinian people. The initial release of prisoners gave us the hope that the Israelis would also release the rest of the prisoners, who are political prisoners. The human being is dearest to us.

The meeting in Oslo was an opportunity to reaffirm the commitment of Israel to all agreements signed with the Palestinians.

We received considerable economic and moral support from the European Union as a whole and from its member states individually, when they in their Summit in Berlin on the 25th of March 1999 reaffirmed their support in the negotiated settlement in the Middle East, reflecting the principles of "Land for Peace" and ensuring both the individual and collective security of the Israeli and Palestinian people.

We, the Palestinians, are so glad that the European Union reaffirmed the continuing and justified Palestinian right to self-determination, including the option of a state, and look forward to the early fulfilment of this right.

It is also my pleasure to mention that an International Committee in the UN has adopted a decision reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. On the 4<sup>th</sup> of November, 77 states (among which the EU) adopted a decision in the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the UN. The decision includes the reaffirming of the right of the Palestinian people for self-determination, as well as the option of establishing a state.

We may all be happy to hear that the Israeli government re-located some settlements. But in fact, the Israeli government legalised 35 settlements out of 42 established by the government of former Prime Minister Netanyahu. Mr. Barak promised us that he would stop the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem and the area around.

Our position towards the settlements is the following:

- Based on the decisions of international legitimacy and international law, on the American and EU letters of assurances as well as on the decision adopted by the European Parliament on the 8th of October, the number of dismantled settlements is 160. This means that 180 000 settlers must leave Palestinian land, as these settlements are illegal.
- 89% of the Palestinian land must be returned before reaching the final solution, which means that only 11% is subject to discussion.

In fact, Mr. Barak considers the legal reference of the settlements to be the decision of his government, while the peace process, the international legitimacy and the international community consider the settlements in the Palestinian land as an illegal practise and as destructive for the peace process. So for the first time, we hear the Israeli government consider that the settlements are a matter related to its own decision.

During the donors' meeting in Tokyo on the 14th and 15th of last October, the Israeli Government promised to transfer all the PNA money collected from the taxation and customs. Israel must recognise

the Palestinian free trade with the international market and independent economy policy based on the benefits and needs of the Palestinian people.

The donor participants expressed their satisfaction with the progress made as to the duties of the PNA and, their appreciation of the PNA's role on economical and financial fields and in controlling the general expenses.

We confirm the necessity in reaching a comprehensive, just and permanent peace in the region, in accordance with the international legal resolutions, including the UN Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425. We also reaffirm the principle of "Land for Peace" approved at the Madrid conference, and the realisation of all legitimate national rights, the most prominent of which being the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own fate and the right to establish an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.

We call upon the sponsors of the peace process and upon the international community to intervene for the return of the refugees, in accordance with the UN resolution 194.

We stress the necessity of resuming negotiation in both the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, with the aim of achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the core of the Arab-Israeli confrontation. There will be no real and durable peace relations between Israel and the rest of the area unless an independent sovereign Palestinian State, with Holy Jerusalem as its capital, becomes a central element of the regional stability. But, there can be no stable Israeli-Palestinian peace unless we achieve progress on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks.