

From Conflicts to Development

An Introduction to EU
Civilian Crisis Management

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Foreword



Our perception of today's threats has changed; and threats of interstate wars have been replaced by new types of threats. However, national defence systems and the international collective security system are still based on the fear of interstate wars. The globalisation process has also shaped the international scene; and thus, it has put the international community's conventional methods of work into question.

Nowadays, civilians are those most affected by the consequences of crisis, such as regional or intrastate wars. Thus, it is ever more important that civilian crisis management be complementary to military crisis management. Civilian crisis management is designed to strengthen: states in transition, regions in crisis, so called failed states on their way towards democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights as well as good governance and strong civil society. Civilian crisis management is designed to enable these states to fully participate in political and economic activities to resolve common security problems.

Finland should further develop its capabilities in order to be able to participate in civilian and military crisis management operations. The role of conflict prevention and civilian crisis management has to be enhanced, if the international community seriously wants to engage itself

in preventing crisis from escalating into violent conflicts. By taking responsibility, Finland also strengthens her national security.

It is essential to find and further develop specific national expertise in the field of civilian crisis management where the primary sectors include: protection of human rights, strengthening of the rule of law, democracy, gender equality and civil society as well as, border security, police, civil protection and civilian administration. Furthermore, civil-military cooperation should be enhanced. Finland has to be prepared to participate in international crisis management operations. It is equally important to engage in partnerships with non-governmental organisations both at domestic and field level.

Finland should be prepared for the undertaking of tasks in regions where there already are one or more on-going civilian or military crisis management operations, and where several international and non-governmental organisations are carrying out projects. Hence, cooperation and coordination are highly necessary.

It will be challenging to manage civilian crisis management in its entirety. Activities can range from; monitoring, training and mentoring, to tasks of police and border police forces or to provisional management of justice system, rescue services, infrastructure or public services. Rapid reaction capability is also of growing importance, not only in military crisis management, but also in the field of civilian crisis management.

Civilian crisis management is an essential part of the European Union Security and Defence Policy. The priority areas are Civilian Administration, Police, Rule of Law and Civil Protection as well as Monitoring and support to EU Special Representatives. The EU has also engaged itself to carrying out missions related to Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration as well as election monitoring. In order to prevent security threats from becoming un-


controllable, long-term conflict prevention dealing with root causes of conflicts is also necessary; but its results are not immediately visible and are not shown in news headlines. Here, development policies and human rights policies have a central role.

In addition to doing so in the European Union, Finland should be able to offer her expertise to civilian crisis management activities of other organisations as well. Finland will thus continue to participate actively in the activities of the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and other international organisations.

I would like to thank the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network and the Committee of 100 in Finland for the publication of this very topical book as well as the authors for their contribution. I believe the book will be useful for civil servants, scholars, students and other persons interested in civilian crisis management and its development.

Erkki Tuomioja
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Say Yes to Civilian Crisis Management



Crisis management – whether military or civilian – is an issue that always gives rise to a lively debate. Is it possible to manage an escalated conflict at all? The peace movement sees that there are many ethical and moral problems related to a military intervention in a conflict. However, is it right to let people in crisis areas to suffer even during decades? In fact, many conflicts could be prevented, and escalated conflicts could be managed in a non-violent way. What is the role of international organisations and nation-states in this case? What about non-governmental organisations? And what can a single person do?

The overall objective of the book is to answer some of these questions. We want to highlight the importance of discussion on various forms of crisis management, and in particular on the possibility of using civilian crisis management capabilities beside military crisis management. In the European Union political decision-making and allocation of resources, civilian crisis management has clearly been secondary to military crisis management. However, civilian crisis management is a natural choice to the EU, which was established to preserve peace in Europe. Finland has a unique opportunity to promote the development of civilian crisis management during its Presidency this year.

The book has been published by the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network (KATU) and Committee of 100 in Finland together with United Nations Association of Finland, the Finnish NGDO Platform to the EU and One World Finland. We would like to thank the contributors and editors for their commitment and availability to share their expertise for the book. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior have appropriated finance for the publication of the book. We would like to warmly thank them for their commitment to build structural cooperation with non-governmental organisations working in the field of civilian crisis management. We hope that the book will find its way to readers, and it helps to clarify the civilian crisis management jungle.

Anne Palm
Secretary General of KATU

Kalle Kallio
Chairman of Committee of 100 in Finland

Introduction



Civilian crisis management became a topic in Finland after the tsunami catastrophe in Southeast Asia in December 2004. The natural disaster and capabilities needed for reconstruction were brought up in many television programmes and leading articles in newspapers. At the same time, both political parties and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) started making demands for more capabilities so that effectiveness in civilian crisis management could be increased.

However, the public discussion on civilian crisis management showed that the undefined concept of civilian crisis management caused confusion. Some questions were thus raised: What does civilian crisis management actually mean? What activities does it include?

Many considered the work carried out by relief and rescue teams in Southeast Asia as civilian crisis management. On the other hand, NGOs that lobby for civilian crisis management criticised the way the concept was narrowed to refer only to relief and rescue work.

The concept of civilian crisis management can indeed be understood in many ways. It has sometimes been used to refer to management of crises that hit civilians; in other words, management of “civilian crises”. The peace movement and NGOs working in the field of civilian crisis management have regarded the term as a reference to civilians who carry out crisis management or conflict prevention activities as opposed to crisis management tasks undertaken by military personnel. The European Union has also referred to crisis management carried out by civilians.

There was a real need for this book – the concept and status of civilian crisis management needed clarification. The articles in the book analyse the history, problems and future challenges of the EU civilian crisis management since the concept of civilian crisis management was created in the European Union. A space is also given to an analysis on how the concept has been understood in Finland. The contributors, who have expertise in civilian crisis management, work in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Finnish state institutions, and NGOs.

The book consists in three thematic parts. In the first part, Anna Halonen gives an overview of the history of the EU civilian crisis management. Based on his survey, Mikaeli Langinvainio presents a clarifying analysis on how Finnish experts understand the concept of civilian crisis management.

The second part of the book looks at the current state of the EU civilian crisis management. Senja Korhonen and Markus Peltola give an illustrative overview of on-going and completed civilian crisis manage-

ment missions and present the budget framework for missions. Tiina Jortikka-Laitinen discusses in more detail the outcome of a terminated mission – the first EU rule of law mission EUJUST THEMIS deployed in Georgia in 2004–2005. Reflecting upon her experiences as municipal administrator in Kosovo in 1999–2001, Helinä Kokkarinen raises issues that will have importance for the EU’s eventual civilian crisis management mission in Kosovo, after the negotiations on future status have been brought to conclusion.

An overview of the missions is followed by Antti Häikiö’s article on civilian crisis management training. He also makes concrete proposals for improving the training. Based on their experience from training courses, Leena Schmidt and Kalle Sysikaski analyse the usefulness of training with regard to practical work in missions. To conclude the second part, Mika-Markus Leinonen gives a thorough analysis on the strengths and weaknesses of civilian crisis management from a politico-institutional viewpoint.

The last part of the book discusses the future of civilian crisis management viewed from different perspectives. Kalevi Suomela starts by giving an overview of the international environment in which the EU carries out its civilian crisis management activities. This is followed by two articles on the role of different actors in civilian crisis management. Laura Lodenius presents two projects engaging Finnish parliamentarians in democracy dialogue with their colleagues in Afghanistan and Tanzania. Alessandro Rossi gives an example of a NGO’s project in Sri Lanka where international civilians assist locals in managing crises. As a follow-up to this article, Anne Palm gives a comprehensive list of tasks NGOs can carry out in pre- and post-crisis situations as well as during a crisis.


The EU is extending its competence into new areas among which disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are presented by Katrin

Lindén and Oskari Eronen. Furthermore, there is a growing need for more coherence between the EU's short-term and long-term policies. Reflecting on this, Johanna Sumuvuori looks at the interface between civilian crisis management and development cooperation. Anisa Doty presents the notion of conflict sensitivity that could be used as a framework for civilian crisis management activities, the aim of which should be avoiding negative impacts, and achieving the excellence of "doing good". The book concludes with an analysis by Kristiina Rintakoski on the future challenges of the EU civilian crisis management, and proposals on how it could be further developed.

Indeed, the EU civilian crisis management is being rapidly developed, and its role as a tool under the European Security and Defence Policy has become more important. There are however many areas in which further development is needed; e.g. cooperation between the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, budget for civilian crisis management, recruitment and training of experts, and cooperation between the EU and other actors, namely United Nations and NGOs.

Cooperation between various actors both at national and EU level is necessary. To this end, we want to raise awareness about the EU civilian crisis management and enable increasing dialogue between various actors. The Finnish Ministries for Foreign Affairs and of the Interior have given the book their valuable contribution, and cooperate closely with NGOs; which as such can be seen as an excellent step in the development of Finnish expertise in civilian crisis management. We would thus hope that the book, which has now been translated into English, would give an impetus for similar development in other European countries as well.

The arguments presented in the articles are naturally those of individual contributors, not of the institutions they represent.



European Union Civilian Crisis Management: History and Concepts

The First Six Years of Civilian Crisis Management



Although there is no unanimously accepted definition on European Union's (EU) civilian crisis management, it can be argued that the term covers situations in which a country that is experiencing a threatening or acute crisis is been assisted by foreign actors.

EU's civilian crisis management tools have been developed mainly under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), although some of the actions by the European Commission can also be categorised as civilian crisis management. The CFSP's fundamental objectives are to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the EU; to strengthen the security of the EU in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; and to develop and consolidate democracy

and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms¹. The CFSP was established as the second pillar of EU in the 1993 Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht.

Crisis management – the so called Petersberg tasks – was first created in Western European Union in 1992. In 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, these tasks became part of CFSP, and EU's crisis management abilities started to develop under European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Petersberg tasks included full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks such as humanitarian tasks, civil protection, peacekeeping and “peace-enforcement”. As it can be noted, these tasks include both military and non-military (i.e. civilian) crisis management.

This article discusses first and foremost those EU's civilian crisis management abilities that have been developed under the ESDP. However, it should be noted that the Commission has already for a long time had activities that are related to conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding, which are considered as a part of civilian crisis management, even though they are not part of the ESDP civilian crisis management. For example, as part of the activities connected to conflict in the Western Balkans, the Commission was responsible for the civil administration of the city of Mostar in 1994–1996. It could be arguably considered as one of the first EU civilian crisis management missions, although it took place even before civilian crisis management had officially started to be developed².

The fact that instruments related to civilian crisis management and conflict prevention has been developed both within the Commission-led first pillar and the Council-led second pillar has resulted to the cur-

¹ Treaty on European Union (1993), Art. 11.

² Jacobsen, P.V. (2004): The Emerging EU Civilian Crisis Management Capacity – a “Real Added Value” for the UN?

rent system being rather difficult to understand. In addition, it contains overlappings and institutional differences in rules, procedures and policies. However, the importance of the reconciliation of these different instruments has been emphasised in both the Action Plan of Civilian Aspects of ESDP, and in the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, so the clarification of the system can be expected in the future.

From Helsinki to Feira – defining priorities

Crisis management became essential part of the ESDP in Cologne European Council³. However, the roots of EU's civilian crisis management are considered to be in 1999 Helsinki European Council where an Action Plan for non-military crisis management was adopted. Furthermore, it was decided to establish Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) – an inter-pillar working group that operates under the Council and reports to Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)⁴. The tasks of the committee are to give information, advice and guidance to other instruments of the Council.

In the Presidency Reports to the Helsinki European Council on 'Non-military Crisis management of the European Union', it was stated that the EU and the Member States have accumulated considerable experience or have considerable resources in a number of areas such as civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring. The Action Plan stated that the EU should aim at strengthening the synergy and responsiveness of national, collective and non-governmental organisations' (NGO) resources in order to avoid duplication and im-

³ Cologne European Council Presidency Conclusions (1999), Annex III.

⁴ Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions (1999), Annex IV.

prove performance, while maintaining the flexibility of each contributor to decide on the deployment of assets and capabilities in a particular crisis or via a particular channel. Further aims included the enhancing and facilitating of the EU's contributions to activities within other organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), whenever one of them is the lead organisation in a particular crisis, as well as to EU autonomous actions; and ensuring of inter-pillar coherence.

It was suggested in the Action Plan that a rapid reaction capability should be developed by defining a framework and modalities, as well as by pre-identifying personnel, material and financial resources. A database should be set up to maintain and share information on the pre-identified assets, capabilities and expertise within all areas relevant to non-military crisis management. Moreover, a study should be carried out, taking into account lessons learned, in order to define concrete targets for the EU Member States' collective non-military response to international crises.⁵

Many decisions of the Helsinki European Council were implemented during the spring 2000. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management was established in May 2000 and its first meeting took place in June. In addition, a coordinating mechanism was set up at the Council Secretariat with the aim of further developing the inventory on resources and establishing a database of them.

Some of the most important decisions regarding civilian crisis management were made at the Feira European Council in June 2000. The Council agreed that the priorities of the EU's civilian crisis management would be Police, Rule of law, Civilian Administration and Civil Protection. Regarding police, it was agreed that the Member States should be

⁵ Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions (1999), Annex IV.

able to provide up to 5 000 police officers of which 1 000 police within 30 days⁶.

In other priority areas, no concrete targets were made, but it was noted in the Presidency Conclusions that Member States could establish national arrangements for selection of judges, prosecutors, penal experts and other relevant categories within the judicial and penal system, to be deployed at short notice for peace support operations; and to consider ways to train them appropriately. The EU could aim at promoting guidelines for the selection and training of international judges and penal experts in liaison with the United Nations and regional organisations (particularly the Council of Europe and the OSCE). In addition, it was noted that the EU could consider ways of supporting the establishment/renovation of infrastructures of local courts and prisons as well as recruitment of local court personnel and prison officers in the context of peace support operations.

Member States could also consider improving the selection, training and deployment of civilian administration experts for duties in the re-establishment of collapsed administrative systems, as well as consider taking on the training of local civilian administration officials in societies in transition. Regarding civil protection, it was mainly noted that it is necessary to draw a distinction between operations of civil protection within the framework of crisis management operations, and other types of disaster relief operations. Furthermore, specific coordination mechanisms already existing in the field of civil protection should be further improved.

In identifying these priority areas the existing experience, resources and instruments of the EU and Member States were taken into account. Priority was put on the areas where a rapid reaction was most needed,

⁶ Santa Maria da Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions (2000), Annex I.

and where the added value of an increased and coordinated effort by the EU and Member States would be most evident. However, it was stated that the identification of priorities on which the EU will focus its coordinated efforts in a first phase, does by no means exclude the use of all other tools available to the EU and to Member States.

From Nice to Laeken – strengthening the resources

The Nice European Council in December 2000 did not make any effective decisions regarding civilian crisis management, but for example regarding policing, the tasks were defined to include both strengthening of and substituting for local police forces. It was also noted that in the field of strengthening the rule of law, preparatory work had been carried out in seminar ‘Strengthening the rule of law in the context of crisis management – What are the specific targets of the European Union?’, which was held in October 2000 in Brussels.

The Presidency Conclusion emphasised that the EU should develop an integrated approach to crisis management and conflict prevention. Furthermore, the EU should also strengthen the coordination between military and civilian aspects of crisis management. In addition, it was stated that contributions of non-EU states to EU civilian crisis management missions would be given favourable consideration.⁷

The development of civilian crisis management continued in Göteborg European Council in June 2001, where the Police Action Plan was adopted and it was decided to establish a Police Unit within the Council Secretariat⁸. European Council also set the targets to have 200 officials to contribute in the field of rule of law and to have civil protection intervention teams consisting up to 2000 persons by 2003. In addition, it was

⁷ Nizza European Council Presidency Conclusions (2000), Annex IV.

⁸ Göteborg European Council Presidency Conclusions (2001), Annex I.

decided to establish a pool of experts able to take on assignment within the civilian administration. The civilian administration was defined to include general administrative functions (for example, civil registration), social functions (education, social services, health and medical services) and infrastructure functions (for example, water supply).

The Göteborg European Council emphasised the need for preparatory training of civilian crisis management experts and therefore the importance to develop appropriate common standards and modules for training. In addition, the Exercise Policy of the EU was adopted, as well as principles and procedures regarding participation of non-EU states to the police missions. Also, the cooperation between EU and other international organisations in civilian crisis management was discussed and guiding principles in this field were adopted⁹. Furthermore, decisions were made concerning the cooperation with EU and UN in crisis management and conflict prevention.

After the Göteborg European Council, there were several inquiries and conferences organised on capabilities commitment in the different priority areas of civilian crisis management. The first one of them was the Ministerial Police Capabilities Commitment Conference, where the Member States promised to provide 5 000 police officers by 2003, of whom up to 1 400 could be deployed within 30 days. These commitments made it possible for the EU to state that the objectives set at Feira had been met and even exceeded with regard to rapid deployment. In this context, Finland promised to contribute 70 police and 5 border-guards for crisis management operations. Achieving the police goal assisted further the aim to make the EU capable of conducting crisis management operations, and the Laeken European Council in December 2001 was in fact able to declare that EU had ability to conduct some crisis management operations – however regarding civilian crisis

⁹ Göteborg European Council Presidency Conclusions (2001), Annexes I, II, II and IV.

management missions the similar declaration could only be made later¹⁰. The EU had also continued development of the training of civilian crisis management experts, as the Commission started a pilot project on strengthening rule of law and civilian administration.

A seminar on the development of civilian crisis management instruments was organised in April 2002. The representatives of the UN, OSCE and NATO took part to the seminar. A Capability Commitment Conference on the strengthening of rule of law took place in May. Member States commitments on deployable experts (prosecutors, judges and penitentiary officers) exceeded the target of 200 officers. In the field of civil protection, the Member States were asked to provide experts that would be available for missions. The EU's first Crisis Management Exercise testing ESDP structures and policy-making was held in May. The exercise showed the need to develop further the coordination between civilian and military aspects. The Sevilla European Council in June 2002 decided that the EU could for the first time establish a civilian crisis management mission in the beginning of 2003. The mission was called European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) and it had been previously led by UN¹¹.

From theory to practice – first missions

During 2003 the EU's civilian crisis management was developed primarily through the practical experiences gained from the missions. The first EU-led police mission EUPM started as planned in January 2003. The mission included 480 police and other civilian personnel. The second police mission – Proxima – was established in Macedonia in the end of 2003. In December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'.

¹⁰ Laeken European Council Presidency Conclusions (2001), Annex II.

¹¹ Sevilla European Council Presidency Conclusions (2002).

The strategy emphasised prevention of crises and noted that the Union should intervene to threatening situations before they escalate to full-scale violent conflicts. The strategy also stated that the EU should use all civilian instruments required in crisis management and post-crisis situations. In addition, the EU should plan crisis management missions that include both military and civilian instruments. The European Council also decided to establish a civil-military planning cell, although it only began its work in 2005.

It could be argued, that a second phase of the development of civilian crisis management started in 2004. In June 2004 the European Council adopted the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, which took into account the guidelines from the European Security Strategy, EU enlargement and experiences from the operations conducted by EU and other international organisations. The Action Plan suggested the EU should use better the resources of the Community and the Member States in order to further develop civilian crisis management. The Action Plan emphasised also that civilian crisis management missions should always be especially designed for each crisis' unique situation. Furthermore, missions should have integrated teams of civilians representing different areas of expertise. This should be accomplished by using expertise also from the fields of human rights, political affairs, security sector reform, mediation, border control, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as well as media policy. The Action Plan also recommended that training of experts would be reformed in such a way that it could be guaranteed that people who participate in the training would also serve in civilian crisis management missions.

This process was continued in the Ministerial Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference that was organised in November 2004. The Conference could declare that the targets set in Feira had been exceeded regarding quantitative aspects. The Member States' commitments consisted 5 761 police, 631 experts in the field of rule of law, 565 experts



European Council – Fernand Wauthy 2002

The Sevilla European Council of June 2002 decided on the first EU civilian crisis management mission, which was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003.

in civilian administration and 4988 civil protection professionals. In compliance with the Action Plan, the field of civilian crisis management areas was increased by agreeing to include monitoring as a new area, and by asking experts also from many other fields to be able to participate in multifunctional missions. Finland announced its new voluntary contribution to include 386 civilian crisis management experts.

However, it must be noted that although in theory the EU has over 12 000 persons in civilian crisis management capabilities, in practice the situation is rather different, as the experts reported to the EU's capabilities are also part of the resources of the UN and other international organisations. Therefore, it is not always possible to deploy them in EU missions.

The Brussels European council in December 2004 adopted the Civilian Headline Goal 2008¹². According to the Headline Goal, the

¹² European Council Presidency Conclusions (2004).

EU should continue the development of capacities in order to enable deployment of integrated civilian crisis management packages, conduction of concurrent civilian missions at different levels of engagement and deployment at short notice; even within five days of the approval of the mission concept. The Headline Goal also calls for promotion of coherence of the EU action and a smooth transition from civilian crisis management missions under the ESDP to following long-term EC programmes. In addition, the Headline Goal states that civilian crisis management missions should be able to work with military and that the EU should respond to requests from the UN and other international organisations¹³.

The implementation of the Civilian Headline Goal was started in 2005. The process is monitored by the Political and Security Committee and supported by CIVCOM and a Civilian Headline Goal Response Team. The process was started by evaluating the expertise genuinely needed in civilian crisis management missions by using, for example, imagined scenarios of crisis situations. The EU also established several new civilian crisis management missions in 2005. In April a police mission EUPOL Kinshasa started, and in June a security sector reform mission EUSEC DR Congo, both in the Democratic Republic of Congo started. In addition, a rule of law mission EUJUST LEX was started in Iraq as well as an assistance mission at the Rafah crossing Point and an advisory mission to the Palestinian police. In establishing the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia in the autumn 2005, the EU demonstrated speedy decision making, which can hopefully be repeated also in the future missions.

¹³ Gourlay, C. (2005): EU Civilian Crisis Management: preparing for flexible and rapid response. *European Security Review*, Vol. 25.

Civilian crisis management and conflict prevention

Conflict prevention has been mentioned as a concept in the EU documents as long as civilian crisis management. The European Councils of Cologne, Helsinki and Feira respectively declared that the EU should be determined in conflict prevention. However, only the Feira European Council urged the High Representative Javier Solana and the Commission to make concrete recommendations on development of activities in this field. The Göteborg European Council in 2001 adopted the EU's Conflict Prevention Programme, in which the EU affirmed conflict prevention to be one of its priority areas in external affairs. The Programme listed conflict prevention instruments to include development cooperation trade policy, arms control, human rights and environmental programmes, political dialogue and diplomatic and humanitarian means.

Conflict prevention and civilian crisis management have been developed rather separately within the EU, although in many declarations the importance of their reconciliation has been emphasised. As the EU started to emphasise more comprehensive approach to civilian crisis management in accordance with new the Action Plan in 2004, the strengthening of relations between these two areas was again brought up. During the Irish Presidency in spring 2004, a conference on connections between civilian crisis management and conflict prevention was organised. The conference also discussed connections between civilian crisis management and development cooperation for the first time. The EU has since started to further emphasise the reconciliation of conflict prevention and crisis management to other areas of the EU, such as developmental cooperation, humanitarian aid and country programmes. This broad range of instruments and means can indeed become the EU's strength in all crisis management and conflict prevention.

Cooperation in civilian crisis management

The documents on the EU civilian crisis management have always emphasised the importance of cooperation with the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe and stated that this cooperation should be developed further. In the same contexts, it has also stated that the EU's civilian crisis management capabilities are intended not only for EU-led operations but also for the use of other international organisations. It has been considered important that the EU's actions are compatible with those of the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe and that unnecessary overlapping should be avoided. The Göteborg European Council in 2001 adopted guidelines on cooperation between the EU and other international organisations, which consisted of the value added of cooperation, compatibility of actions and independence of decision-making.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN has been also developed in regarding crisis management in general and the organisations accepted common declaration on cooperation in 2003. It has been considered important, that the EU also enhances cooperation with NGOs. European Councils have noted that NGOs have a lot of experts whose deployment in EU operations, in particular in the field of strengthening rule of law and civilian administration should be considered. NGOs have also conducted civilian crisis management training. However, probably due to the fact that civilian crisis management has been developed as a part of ESDP, the full-scale of cooperation possibilities with NGOs has not been used yet.

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Narrow and Broad Interpretation of the Priority Areas in Civilian Crisis Management



The English names given to the priority areas in the European Union's civilian crisis management are 'Police', 'Rule of Law', 'Civilian Administration' and 'Civil Protection' as well as 'Monitoring', which was added to the list in 2004. The difficulty has been translating each term into Finnish in a way that would value the original English meaning and at the same time make it correspond to the Finnish governmental body in charge of that particular aspect of crisis management and crisis operations in Finland.


It is important to remember that not all police activity comes under civilian crisis management. Similarly, not all international aspects of the rule of law or judicial administration constitute civilian crisis management. The interface between the crisis management and Justice and

Home Affairs is in intensive evolution albeit is an EU inter-pillar issue as well. The concepts of civilian crisis management are determined according to the way in which these establishments operate in conflicts or post-conflict situations and in dealing with multifaceted issues. Today, dealing with problems requires increasingly rapid responses, an operating model which has become known as CRT (Civilian Response Team, earlier also Civil Response Team or Civilian Crisis Response Team). Preparedness for rapid deployment response in civilian crisis management is subject to intense development in Sweden and Finland, in particular. The only aspect that differentiates it from other civilian crisis management activities is timescale: preparedness for rapid deployment response covers all aspects of civilian crisis management, only faster.

Listing and defining the priority areas as separate entities conflicts with thematic and integrated aspects, in particular: for example, where do human rights, gender and equality issues, disarmament, reintegrating armed combatants into civil society, humanitarian aid, elections and democratic development come into the definitions of the priority areas? Naturally, these themes can feature in the responsibilities included in all the priority areas, but their significance may be weakened by the fact that they do not constitute a named priority area themselves.

The term 'Police' refers to policing, an activity that features in many civilian operations. Both the English and the Finnish languages often unnecessarily employ the term 'Civil Police' to emphasise the separation from the military police force which attends to military crisis management and peacekeeping.

The term 'Rule of Law' is still translated and used ambiguously either to refer broadly to the principle of the constitutional state or more narrowly to judicial administration. The rule of law is an essential in-



ternationally recognised principle in democracy, which civilian crisis management unwaveringly supports, promotes and develops. Implementing the rule of law has, nevertheless, mostly been incorporated into the traditional roles of the organisations and officials involved in judicial administration – the judiciary, the prosecution office and the prison service. A more integrated approach, however, already had to

be adopted in connection with the global action taken following the conflict in Kosovo: how can the police conduct investigations and make arrests, the prosecution office construct cases for prosecution and the judiciary pass sentences if the judicial system and the prison service are not operational? In Kosovo – as well as in other post-conflict societies – upholding the culture of law and justice requires more than just efficient judicial administration. The concepts of law and justice, as well as the related culture and practices, should be developed without always involving the police, the prosecution office, the judiciary or the prison service. This refers, for example, to the way in which traffic rules affect the behaviour of road users, or how municipal regulations affect the administration of municipalities and cities and the lives of citizens.


The narrow interpretation of the term ‘Civilian Administration’ encompasses the institutions involved in local and regional governments and the central government, and incorporates an aim of developing and maximising the efficiency of the activities of the institutions in accordance with the general principles of public administration and local self-government. The broader interpretation of the term is – similarly to the rule of law – based on the principles and practices of a democratic civil society and its institutions. This means including non-governmental organisations, the media and political parties amongst the key actors alongside administration, and making elections and the participation of citizens in building their society, as enabled by elections, the critical processes.

In order to better define the priority area of ‘Civil Protection’, the United Kingdom’s presidency of the EU in particular – as well as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – focused on broadening the interpretation of the concept of civil protection from encompassing just rescue missions relating to ma-

for accidents and catastrophes to also incorporating the wider aspects of civilian protection. Translating the term into Finnish and incorporating the concept into national administration still requires work. At the moment, the Finnish translation of the term ‘civil protection’ is associated with rescue and emergency operations. This is due to the Finnish term’s similarity to the Finnish names of national organisations in Finland, such as the Rescue Services Department of the Ministry of the Interior and the Emergency Services College. Interpreting the priority area as only involving rescue and emergency operations fails to give sufficient attention to other activities relating to civilian protection. These include, for example, refugee issues, humanitarian aid, supplies and logistics (medicines, water, food, tents and shelters), infrastructure and rebuilding, and even police or military involvement in ensuring safety and security when protecting the vulnerable civilians.

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A Dozen Interpretations of Civilian Crisis Management



The concept of civilian crisis management is rather complex. It is used in many ways, and has different meanings as well as definitions. With this article on the concept of civilian crisis management, I will participate in the on-going discussion in Finland about civilian crisis management, and try analysing the concept so that it could be used for civilian crisis management activities in the field. For this purpose, and in order to find out the how the concept was invented, how it has been defined and used, I have interviewed experts dealing with the issues related to civilian crisis management.

I interviewed 24 experts representing different sectors as followed: 11 from state administration, 6 from universities and research institutes, 4 from international organisations, and 3 from non-governmen-

tal organisations (NGOs). Twelve of them were interviewed verbally, whereas the other twelve filled an internet-based questionnaire. Ten of the experts had participated in civilian crisis management training, and eleven of them had been trainers in courses. Ten of the interviewees currently work with civilian crisis management issues, and seven of them work or have worked in the field.

The overall objective of the interviews and questionnaires was to clarify experts' views on the definitions and use of the concept of civilian crisis management and its usefulness for practice. The interviews included specific questions on the reasons leading to the creation of the concept, and on its further development and relation to other similar concepts. Different documents and articles have also been used in the analysis.

From an idea to a concept

Before going deeper into the analysis, it is necessary to highlight some of the factors brought up in the interviews, and articles that have had influence on the development of the concept of civilian crisis management. These are in particular the change in the nature of conflicts, and numerous unsuccessful military crisis management operations.

In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the international community saw an increase in interstate conflicts. Still in the beginning of the 21st century, most of the major armed conflicts and minor armed disputes could be defined as interstate conflicts; which are usually characterised by gross violation of human rights, violations of International Humanitarian Law, as well as devastation of social structure and instigation to disorder. These conflicts also cause if not complete, at least partial collapse of state structures, in which situation the work of various institutions such as police and judiciary is paralysed. In some cases – usually called “failed states” – some non-state actors may take advantage of the situation, in order to enhance their own political agenda.

In today's conflicts, there usually are several unidentifiable parties who are more uneasily controlled by military means than in interstate armed conflicts. The consequences of wars affecting societies are long-term, and before achieving a stable state of peace societies may be faced by minor crises. These factors have challenged the conventional methods the international community has used in crisis management, because it has been realised that in order to promote peace in collapsed societies, external civilian help is needed.

Long before the concept itself was invented, civilian crisis management was being practiced as a tool to manage crises. Similarly, crisis management activities had taken place before the concept of crisis management was brought into use. Since the first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation was deployed in 1956, the UN has used civilians in mission support tasks. However, these tasks are not seen as the birth of civilian crisis management. Instead, the crisis management operations of the 1990's have proven that in conflict areas, there is a need for experts in democracy and good governance, human rights and other sectors in addition to military peacekeepers.

The lessons learnt have shown that the use of civilians in peacekeeping operations has had a positive influence on the outcome of many operations. Two interviewed experts stated that the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG, 1989–1990) gave an impetus to the development of civilian crisis management as an independent field separate from military crisis management. UNTAG was established to assist the early independence of Namibia by organising free and fair elections. The operation livened up the traditional peacekeeping; since beside military observation, the UN tried to ensure a peaceful conduct of the elections by using civilian observers and civil police forces. UNTAG headed by Martti Ahtisaari, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN, was a success and came to an end a year after its launch.

Unsuccessful operations and various other problems have also had an influence on the development of the concept of civilian crisis management. The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II, 1993–1995) launched under Chapter VII of the UN Charter failed, and proved that a stable peace cannot always be achieved by using pure military force. It has become clear that using of civilian crisis management instead of military crisis management or traditional peacekeeping actually allows to better pre-evaluate the outcome of an operation. The development of the concept of civilian crisis management has also been influenced by the international community's willingness to give up long-term operations that had led to a permanent stay of peacekeepers in a conflict area, as has been the case with Lebanon and Cyprus.

In current UN operations, a quarter of the personnel are civilians responsible for issues such as civilian administration, rule of law, police as well as public health services and humanitarian aid. However, in the UN language, there is no such concept as civilian crisis management.

After the end of the Cold War and ideological rivalry, the international community has been more able to influence on the internal conduct of affairs in various states based on the consent of these states, and to enhance democratic values in conflict areas. In order to prevent an armed conflict from re-escalating and bring about a more sustainable peace after the departure of international peacekeeping forces, the international community has concentrated on promoting democratic civil society and human rights instead of launching pure military peacekeeping operations.

Besides these factors, the willingness of the international community to resolve the wars in the Western Balkans in the mid-1990's, may have been the driving force behind the idea of civilian crisis management. Europe faced war again with the breakdown of Yugoslavia, and is now willing to resolve the crises in its neighbourhood by using its own military and civilian crisis management capability; which since

the end of 1990's has been a tool under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Understanding the concept

The concept of civilian crisis management in general is rather undefined; this is clearly indicated by various official documents as well as experts interviewed for this article. Different actors define the concept on the basis of the context it is being used in. The following official documents explicitly state the difficulty in defining the concept.

The Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management (2004) introduced by the Government of Finland states that: "The interface of civilian crisis management in particular with military crisis management, humanitarian relief, and development aid is unclear, and the activities partly overlap. Compared to military crisis management and peacekeeping, civilian crisis management is literally about activities of a civilian organisation, although it is usually carried out alongside with military crisis management and in similar context. The concept of civilian crisis management is comprehensive and multipurpose. *In this law, it is not purposeful and possible to give an exhaustive definition of the concept.*" (Unofficial translation, italics added.)

The Government report to Parliament on the human rights policy of Finland (2004) also admits the difficulty of defining civilian crisis management: "The main objective of military crisis management is to create a safe environment for actions, by means of civilian crisis management, support the post-conflict reconstruction of society and the creation of possibilities for economic development. *There is no precise definition of civilian crisis management.* In general, the concept may refer to temporary non-military means used to affect the behaviour of the parties to a conflict and, in particular, to prevent the existing or threatening situation from developing into a crisis or a conflict; to gen-

erally control a crisis situation or to restore the normal situation after a crisis.” (Official translation, italics added).

The report of the Organisation Group (2002) appointed by the Ministry of the Interior starts with the following words: “*The concept of civilian crisis management has been defined in many ways. Common to all definitions are (...) to try and prevent social disorder from escalating into an armed conflict, to repair the damage caused by conflicts, and to secure basic living conditions as well as to restore the smooth functioning of society. (...) Therefore, action should be seen a continuous process, the phases of which are conflict prevention, management of an acute crisis (incl. both military and civilian activities), and post-crisis reconstruction.*” (Unofficial translation, italics added).

The report of the Working Group on Civilian Crisis Management (2004) appointed by the Ministry of the Interior explicitly states that it is not purposeful to define the concept: “It is unavoidable that civilian crisis management and other activities related to crisis situations partly overlap. For instance, the communication on the development policy programme introduced by the Government in 2004 stated that the development policy is a part of the security policy. An objective is developing complementary activities in development cooperation, humanitarian relief and crisis management. *Should the concept of civilian crisis management be defined, it might have negative impact on this nature of development (...)*”. Furthermore, it stated that “The EU is strongly developing its crisis management capabilities, for which reason *it is not purposeful to tie the organisation of civilian crisis management activities to a purely national definition.*” (Unofficial translation, italics added.)

There are relevant considerations in these documents regarding national legislation and political decision-making; but the concept can also be defined outside state institutions. However, other actors have so far rarely attempted to define the concept.

In addition to the official documents, the conducted interviews also proved that the concept of civilian crisis management is not yet well defined. I asked the experts the question how, according to them, the concept had been defined in different arenas – in public discussions in the media, in political discourse and in discussions between various actors. Sixteen of the interviewees argued that the concept is not well defined in these arenas, whereas five saw that it can be seen as “fairly”, “generally” or “principally” defined. None of the interviewees saw that the concept had already been clearly defined in these arenas.

According to the interviewed experts the concepts of civilian crisis management used in public discussions are rather simple. Therefore, actors dealing with issues related to civilian crisis management have demanded for a more exact concept. These actors have tended to define the concept through their own professional tasks or field. In the interview the researchers stated that the concept of civilian crisis management has not gained scientific interest, nor has it been much discussed in scientific articles.

The concept of civilian crisis management has occasionally been used in the media, in which it has been given many different meanings. According to an expert, in the media, crisis management has been used as a whole, and it has mainly been associated with military crisis management. Some of the experts stated that the lack of knowledge about civilian crisis management in the media may have resulted from the fact that political consensus on the importance of civilian crisis management (parties on the political left as well as well as on the political right have been in favour of it, as it may have been seen as a neutral option beside the discussion on NATO) has not offered constructive debates on the direction of its development. Thus, civilian crisis management has not gained space in the news.

The term ‘Civilian Crisis Management’ has recently been used in the context of terrorist attacks, catastrophes and natural disasters; lead-

ing to an enlarged use of the concept of civilian crisis management already regarded as difficult. After the tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia in December 2004 civilian crisis management was associated with emergency services and humanitarian action, whereas before the event, civilian crisis management was mainly used, even in the media, to refer to the work done in the context of armed conflicts.

With regard to the demand for a more precise definition of the concept of civilian crisis management, politicians can be placed between media-based public discussions and discussions between the various actors. Two government officials regarded the undefined concepts as being useful to politicians; as such concepts enable the use of different interventions in discussions. This sometimes complicates officials' work with an issue already difficult to deal with, as one of them argued.

All experts interviewed argued that despite the unclear concept of civilian crisis management, there is a political will to develop civilian crisis management capabilities in Finland. There are many reasons for Finland's ambitions to participate in international civilian crisis management. First, it is seen as an obligation of a civilised society, and it is particularly compatible with policies of a non-allied state. Secondly, history is also regarded as an obligation. Finland has once received help herself. However, in the case of a crisis on the Finnish soil, Finland cannot wait for any solidarity, if it does not participate in international crisis management. Finally, "doctor's but not judge's role" and the participation in traditional peacekeeping operations can be seen as a relevant background for Finland's strong participation in civilian crisis management.

However, many of the interviewees stated that the political will does not correlate with the resources committed to civilian crisis management. One of the government officials saw that the undefined concept of civilian crisis management would be a probable reason for the lack of resources; the concept is still a new issue for both politicians and the

administration. According to another government official, it is difficult for politicians to understand the concept as it is still rather unclear who is responsible for the development of civilian crisis management, and which institutions at European and national level have the right to take initiatives. This reflects the difficulty to define, at the national and European level, the concept and its ownership.

The experts were not unanimous as to which policy civilian crisis management should be placed under. The majority of them stated it involves many policies, whereas in Finland, it is normally dealt with as an issue related to foreign and security policy.

The experts interviewed were asked: “Is the concept of civilian crisis management clear to you?” Two researchers and one representative from a non-governmental organisation found the concept still unclear, whereas seven interviewees described it as partly unclear; as can be seen by the following statements: “I can understand the concept clearly as a non-concept: it is not about military crisis management” and “The concept is not yet clear to me, but I know it is somehow related to conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction”.

Fourteen of the interviewees had a clear understanding of the concept, although some of them stated that the argument presents their personal view, though not their respective institution.

I understand the concept of civilian crisis management clearly, but I believe my understanding is different compared to that of the representatives of other fields.

Civilian crisis management evolves over time; its development must be followed so that the track is not lost. Its definitions change, when the field produces the so called lessons learnt.

It seems that the concept is continuously given enlarged meanings.

The unclear difference between development cooperation and civilian crisis management also causes problems. For instance, the problem is obvious with institution/state building, which is an essential part of civilian crisis management but which is also practised in the context of development cooperation.

The concept is somehow clear, in particular if it is understood as an umbrella concept.

The concept is clear to me, but I would like to point out that it is because of my own experiences (...) through the work in the field, participation; experiences from different actors I have worked for. This is my own interpretation. I think when the concept of civilian crisis management is being defined and political decisions are being processed, it is good that others' views are questioned.

Most of the interviewees had become familiar with the concept of civilian crisis management in the end of the 1990's in the EU context. Three of them referred to the Finnish EU Presidency in 1999, during which they had heard of it being used for the first time. However, an expert emphasised that the concept of crisis management as well as that of civilian crisis management had already been used in the NATO language in the 1990's, and it is still being used in NATO. Furthermore, one expert had heard about the concept in the mid-1980's, whereas another already in the 1970's.

The work of the experts has been partly influenced by the unclearness of the concept of civilian crisis management. Nine of the interviewees did not regard the unclearness as a problem for their work, whereas fourteen of them stated that this has created confusion in their own work.

The interviewed experts mainly agreed about the question of whether the concept of civilian crisis management had replaced other concepts. According to sixteen of them, no replacement had happened. The argument stated that civilian crisis management had been introduced as an answer to new types of problems. Despite the similarities, two of the interviewees saw that the concept had not replaced the concept of development cooperation. Furthermore, an expert stated that there was some overlapping between the concept of civilian crisis management and the concepts used in the UN and OSCE language, but the previous has not replaced the latter. Five experts were not able to say whether any conceptual replacement had occurred. Three experts saw that the concept had replaced some other concepts such as 'non-military crisis management', even though it is still being used in various occasions. A researcher analysed that civilian crisis management could theoretically be seen as non-violent crisis management. In addition, some of the interviewees thought that the concept had changed the meaning of traditional peacekeeping.


Based on the expert interviews, it can be stated that there is no commonly accepted concept of civilian crisis management used either in public discussions in the media, in political discourse or in discussions between various actors. The concept has different meanings in different contexts, and there are several existing interpretations of it that overlap. Furthermore, there are as many definitions of the concept as there are actors that tend to define it, and defining it is sometimes a difficult task. However, the on-going discussions about the concept have a positive tone. It is commonly agreed that there is a need for common definition. In Finland, there are relatively few actors working in the field of civilian crisis management so that such a definition of the concept could easily be agreed compared to several other EU countries.

A concept model for civilian crisis management

In the discussion that follows, I present a model that the analysis of the concept of civilian crisis management could be based on. Figure 1 represents the different components of the concept. They are ‘civilian’, ‘crisis’ and ‘management’, which serve as a reference point for the model and its six components that are idea, objectives, sphere of action, forms of activities, actors and methods.

In this conceptual model, the word ‘civilian’ refers to an actor. ‘Crisis’ refers to the sphere of action. The word ‘management’ has three distinctive parts of reference: methods, forms of activities and objectives. The model also defines the idea of civilian crisis management. The concept of civilian crisis management can be also divided into two distinctive parts: ‘civilian’ and ‘crisis management’. However, the components of the conceptual model remain the same regardless the possibility to divide the concept into two or three parts. There is also a third way to

Figure 1. Concept model for civilian crisis management



divide the concept consisting of two different parts: ‘civilian crisis’ and ‘management’. This issue will be analysed in more detail in the following discussion.

There was an obvious need for creating a conceptual model, because the concept of civilian crisis management has so far been defined or used rather narrowly with reference only to one or two of these above mentioned components. Therefore, it neglects the interdependence between the components, which may have essential influence on action in the field. The conceptual model presented in this article does not suggest any definition of the concept of civilian crisis management but only presents the factors that should be taken into account when defining the concept.

In the following discussion, I will open the conceptual model by using the expert interviews, articles and official documents. My intention is not to give an exhaustive definition of the concept of civilian crisis management but to present different points of views.

Idea of civilian crisis management

An issue the experts were unanimous about was the idea of civilian crisis management. Based on the views expressed by the experts, the idea of civilian crisis management is a responsibility of a civilised state to promote human security in crisis areas in different parts of the world, as quickly and efficiently as possible through peaceful means.

Objectives of civilian crisis management

The objectives of civilian crisis management were seen in a unanimous way as well. As a conclusion, it could be stated that the objective is to promote democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights as well

as good governance and viable civil society in crisis areas, by providing external expertise and assistance.

Sphere of action in civilian crisis management

The sphere of action, in which civilian crisis management takes place, is a crisis area. However, the question of defining a crisis, or the way it is understood – whether it is an event, a moment or a phenomenon – always reflects the definer’s experiences, education and culture as well as the context the definition is being given. A crisis area means an area that is defined by using certain criteria, and the definition of a crisis area is always a political decision. At the EU level the definer is the EU Council together with the EU Commission. In this article, instead of defining a crisis area, I am analysing the types and cycles of crisis the civilian crisis management is designed for.

The experts were asked to define the types of crisis civilian crisis management is used for. All of them agreed that violent conflicts are situations, in which civilian crisis management can be deployed, but the views differed with respect to the inclusion of natural and major technological disasters into the category of types of crisis. Fifteen out of 24 experts were in favour of the inclusion. The Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management also supports their views, as it states that Finland will take part in international crisis management in order to “1) prevent and limit conflicts, to repair the damage caused by them and to restore the smooth functioning of society; 2) to alleviate damage caused by major accidents and natural catastrophes; and 3) to develop the crisis management capabilities and international organizations”. (Unofficial translation.)

There were five experts who stated that civilian crisis management is most of all designed for civilian crises. Two interviewees saw there

was no such concept as ‘civilian crisis’ and emphasised that civilian crisis management is a reference to crisis management as it is generally understood.

The term ‘civilian crisis’ has however been used in several news articles. A Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat wrote on 20 September 2004 that “In Estonia in particular, the capabilities of the armed forces are used for the prevention of *civilian crises* and catastrophes (...) cooperation in managing *civilian crises*”. (Unofficial translation, italics added.)

Another Finnish newspaper, Aamulehti, published an article on 20 May 2004 with the following title: “The EU is active also in *civilian crises*”. The civilian crises are defined in the article: “Civilian crises are situations of various risks, emergencies and accidents, which expose people, environment, property and the core institutions of the society to particularly large-scale threat. Many risks are caused by technological faults, natural disasters or epidemic diseases (...) the sinking of the Estonia claimed hundreds of victims (...) the bomb strike in the shopping centre of Myyrmanni (...) plane, train and car accidents as well as fire or emergency situations caused by chemicals in Finland (...) If civilian crisis management is understood more narrowly as emergency services and related preventive action, planning, training and preparedness the responsible body is then the Rescue Services Department of the Ministry of the Interior (...) in 1985 a ministerial communication for the development of cooperation in civilian crisis management was given (...) the same year (2001) it was decided to enlarge cooperation in civilian crisis management to cover the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (...) In Finland and in many other countries, civilian crisis management has been understood as a purely national policy”. Furthermore, there is a chapter with a title “Civilian crises” in the book “Suomi ja Kriisit” (Forsberg et al. 2003). (Unofficial translation, italics added.)

The concept of civilian crisis management used in the articles above refers to emergency services and security of supply needed mainly for crisis situations that are civilian and non-military in nature, and may cause a threat to Finland and the neighbouring countries. The original use of the concept dates back to the 1980's. For the purpose of this article, the concept could be named 'Nordic Civilian Crisis Management'.

The interviewed experts disagreed about whether civilian crisis management is designed for international or national crisis or both. However, none of them saw that civilian crisis management capabilities are prepared only for national use. Most of them argued that the objective is to create preparedness for national crisis, whereas the primary level of action is the international scene. Only five of the interviewees stated that civilian crisis management is a purely international activity.

The illustrative scenarios have been seen as highly important for defining civilian crisis management activities, since it is not possible to be prepared for all eventual crisis situations. Most of the interviewees understood civilian crisis management in particular as a tool used in the context of violent conflicts. The EU has identified five scenarios based on five different crisis situations, in which the violent stage of the conflict may appear or has already been passed. The scenarios are also prepared for crises that may still be acute and violent, but which may have been caused by complex political or economic problems. In this case, the reference is not only made to the violent nature of the conflict, but to its complexity; which requires different civilian crisis management instruments to be properly managed.

The interviewed experts were mostly unanimous with regard to the question of which stage of conflict cycle civilian crisis management is mainly used for. The report of the Organisation Group appointed by the Ministry of the Interior states that civilian crisis management can be understood as an activity composed of conflict prevention, management of an acute crisis and post-war reconstruction. All experts except two saw

that civilian crisis management activities can cover all stages of conflict cycle. In the internet website of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it has been defined as follows: “In addition to crisis areas, civilian crisis management is practiced in countries where external assistance, support and training are need for the strengthening of democratic and rule of law structures (...) The activities range from early warning and conflict prevention to post-crisis stabilisation of society”. (Unofficial translation.)

Many of the experts emphasised that despite the understanding that civilian crisis management should cover all stages of conflict cycle; civilian crisis management missions have so far been mainly deployed for post-crisis reconstruction. One of the reasons being that no country wants to be identified as a crisis area, and another being that because an international operation is seen as a stigma, countries are not willing to ask for any external assistance before a violent conflict has broken out. According to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the Uppsala University, a violent stage of a conflict has started when fighting between a government and an opposite party has claimed at least 25 victims. Furthermore, the international community is not willing to intervene in a conflict without consent of the state in conflict, and before the number of victims has reached a certain level. The UN Charter allows an external intervention only in a situation where at least ‘gross human rights violations’ have been committed.

An acute crisis situation was stated without exception to be an occasion for the use of civilian crisis management, but the experts saw that the possibilities of using civilian means to react in such a situation are quite limited. However, it was commonly hoped that crisis management would be more preventive in nature in the future. The easiest and the most effective way of resolving a conflict is to act in its latent stage, before any attention is paid to it. Normally, when the media has started to produce news about it, the conflict has already escalated into the vio-

lent stage. The action should be proactive instead of being reactive but, as stated by many experts, it requires early warning capabilities.

One issue that was raised in the interviews was that the normal interstate level cooperation and development cooperation – even if was carried out in a crisis area – is not a civilian crisis management mission. Such a mission always requires a mandate.

Civilian crisis management activities

The activities of civilian crisis management describe activities and sectors of society, in which civilian crisis management is carried out. However, they vary depending on the stage and type of a crisis. Civilian crisis management is often associated with military crisis management, but it can also be carried out independently of it. An interviewee noted that many of today's conflicts do not always demand soldiers as victims; rather, civilians are the victims of today's conflicts.

An issue is rather controversial; whether civilian crisis management is only about activities in the field. According to the EU, political mediation and sanctions can be regarded as civilian instruments of crisis management. Out of 16 experts, nine agreed with this, but two of them stated that only political mediation could be used as a civilian crisis management tool. An example of this type of civilian crisis management could be the Aceh negotiations led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and his office, Crisis Management Initiative. According to the UN Charter, no military force can be used before mediation or sanctions have been tried as a tool to resolve a conflict situation. Therefore, it could be stated that mediation and sanctions are tools that fall within the traditional crisis management.

The Feira European Council of June 2000 agreed that the priority areas of EU civilian crisis management are Police, Rule of Law, Civil-

ian Administration and Civil Protection. The interviewed experts were asked whether according to them, these should be the main four priority areas. All except one saw them as the most important priority areas, but many of them would have added new types of activities into the category. An expert saw that Civil Protection should not be regarded as a priority, because it has not been put into practise yet.

It was agreed in the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2004, that Monitoring should be included into the priority areas. However, according to an expert, monitoring as an independent priority is problematic, since it is rather a method, not an activity. He would prefer a term such as 'human rights monitoring'. Another expert remarked that the support to EU Special Representatives has been defined as an independent priority area: the EU Special Representatives can be supported by a pool of experts from different sectors.

Many of the experts saw that it is difficult to translate the terms into Finnish. The term 'Rule of Law', for example, has been translated either largely as 'oikeusvaltioperiaate' (in English principle of the constitutional state) or narrowly as 'oikeushallinto' (judicial administration). The first word implies that governance of a society is based on the culture of justice, law and order whereas the other refers to judiciary, prosecuting authority, courts or prison service. Many thought that the term 'Civil Protection' should be translated as 'siviiliensuojelu' (civil protection) or 'väestönsuojelu' (civil defence) whereas others saw that 'Civil Protection' is a reference to 'pelastuspalvelu' (emergency services) or 'pelastustoimi' (rescue work), which mean two separate things.

In practice, the EU has so far carried out police and rule of law missions; no missions in the field of civilian administration. According to an expert, it is because such missions would be very complicated, and it is not clear what a civilian administration mission should include. Some think that such a mission should only consist of developing local

and central governance structures, while others see that it could include the development of all sectors of a society from civil society to governmental institutions and administration.

In addition to these priority areas, there are also several other activities that could be considered as independent EU civilian crisis management priority areas: election observation, development of economy, strengthening of free media, education, human rights and post-war reconstruction. Many experts stated that civilian crisis management activities should not be limited to the EU priority areas. It would equally be important to pay attention to the functioning of institutions and social structures that are essential for peace. Some experts criticised the decisions taken in Feira because the priority areas cover only areas that fall within the decision-making power of the Council, whereas activities carried out by the Commission were not dealt with. This division of activities was seen as rather artificial. Many interviewees made a remark that social and health questions have not been taken into account in different civilian crisis management activities, even though they are natural part of civilian administration for example. It was also stated that it would be necessary to use the capabilities of the third sector in different civilian crisis management activities: the International Red Cross movement and Caritas International produce for example social and health services, which the EU does not deal with.

The NGO representatives saw that the non-governmental organisations carry out civilian crisis management work, but their activities vary appreciably. The NGOs give humanitarian aid, mediation and reconciliation services to politically neutral groups; strengthen and educate civil society; distribute information and promote freedom of press; protect environment; engage in mine clearing; and promote human rights and equality.

Actors in the field of civilian crisis management

The actors in the field of civilian crisis management are those who can carry out civilian crisis management activities. The interviewed experts unanimously saw that international organisations are actors working in the field of civilian crisis management, and that they always have a mandate for their work. However, the experts disagreed with regard to the role of NGOs and private sector in civilian crisis management.

The experts answered to the question of whether the word ‘civilian’ in civilian crisis management refers to civilian as actor or civilian as victim, in the following way: twelve of them saw it refers to actors whereas four made a reference of it to victims. An expert did not answer to the question, and another one thought the word refers to both – to actors as well as to victims.

Based on this, it can be stated that the majority of the experts saw that ‘civilian’ refers to an external actor in a conflict, and not civilian population living in a conflict area. An expert remarked that on one hand, the concept is rather controversial because civilian crisis management is normally directed at civilian population. On the other, local armed groups, paramilitary groups and armed forces benefit from civilian crisis management activities, in particular in the context of security sector reform or disarmament, demobilisation and integration.

An actor in the field of civilian crisis management is a civilian, and therefore, soldiers are not regarded as civilian crisis management actors. However, some actors in a civilian crisis management mission may have a military background but they work as civilians, since some activities such as reintegration of members of armed groups into the society may require special expertise.

There have been discussions whether civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) can be regarded as civilian crisis management activities. Six experts disagreed with this,

because the actors in these activities are usually soldiers, and such activities are normally carried out by military organisations.

The role of private sector in crisis management was also raised in the interviews, and some experts saw that the EU should take the UN as an example for promoting discussions on the cooperation with private sector in conflict areas. An expert reminded that the participation of private sector in crisis management may be dangerous and gave an example of Iraq where there are about 20 000 civilians that work in the private security sector, the role of which in promoting peace can, however, be questioned. There is another type of activity where the private sector could have a role: it is a model called 'democracy out of the box' which proposes that private enterprises could engage themselves for example in developing communication infrastructure in a crisis area.

The majority of the experts saw that NGOs can be regarded as actors in the field of civilian crisis management, and their role is seen as highly important. Many experts emphasised that local people can be defined as civilian crisis management actors. However, some stated that the actors that have had an influence on the escalation of the conflict cannot be considered as actors that should manage the conflict.

Civilian crisis management methods

The experts were rather unanimous about the methods used in civilian crisis management; depending on the type of a mission, they range from monitoring and mentoring to the substitution of local authorities. A mission may begin by substituting local authorities; and as the local capabilities evolve, the mission can start using advisory methods in its activities, and later on, the tasks would mostly include monitoring and reporting. The length of a mission is dependent on the nature of the conflict, and on how rapidly it can be deployed. The last phase of a mis-

sion normally includes monitoring and reporting, during which the role of international actors in a crisis area usually is rather nominal.

Summa summarum

On the basis of the interviews, it can be stated that the experts were rather unanimous with regard to the idea, objectives and methods of civilian crisis management, whereas the sphere of action – in particular the types of crises – divided opinions. The EU priority areas in civilian crisis management caused confusion, as did also the translation of the terms into Finnish and the definition of activities other than the EU priority areas as civilian crisis management activities. The most remarkable difference in views related to the actors who carry out civilian crisis management activities, as well as to how the word ‘civilian’ in the concept of civilian crisis management is understood.

Conclusion

Civilian crisis management is a tool that is being rapidly developed. Every crisis situation requires cooperation between different sectors and fields of expertise that also create new approaches in managing these situations.

So far, there is no one institutionalised concept of civilian crisis management. It is constantly being developed, and this requires systematic up-dating of the concept. Its different meanings, and the numerous ways of using it reflect the problematic of the whole concept. The most essential differences are between the so called ‘Nordic civilian crisis management’ and civilian crisis management carried out under the ESDP – they use the same term but activities are not exactly the same, although the resources used may overlap.

In the previous discussion, I have divided the concept in six components. However, it is difficult to define it. In Finland, there are good prerequisites for finding a commonly accepted definition for the concept. However, as long as different actors working in the field of civilian crisis management do not speak with a united voice, it will be difficult to further develop, organise and finance the capabilities needed. It is not a matter of taste as to how to define the concept. Unclearness may have indirect, even tragic consequences that could be leading to a loss of human lives among the local population in a crisis area, and the personnel participating in crisis management.

The conceptual unanimity is not the only issue influencing on effective action; resources are equally important. In order to increase citizens' knowledge on civilian crisis management, a public discussion on its use alongside military crisis management should be started. This might increase the number of expertise available for civilian crisis management missions, as well as enable to transfer the political will existing in Finland into practical resources.

Crises are an inherent part of international reality, and civilian crisis management is expensive, time-consuming and risky. However, without engagement, expertise and cooperation between actors, crises cannot be managed.

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European Union Civilian Crisis Management: Current State

Many Missions – Small Budget



The European Union launched its first ever civilian crisis management mission in January 2003, and during these past three years it has carried out twelve missions. In less than two years the EU's capacity in civilian crisis management has increased exponentially. However, despite the long operative leaps, the EU's institutional capacity has been hardly developed. The 'Guidelines for financing civilian crisis management operations under Title V TEU' states that the effectiveness of a crisis management operation is "strictly linked to the financing procedures and the overall financial resources available during the entire cycle of the operation"¹. In spite of its clear importance, it has

¹ Council of the European Union (2003), 12582/03.

been difficult to find finance for civilian crisis management missions. There is no single mechanism; rather, all missions have been mainly financed through the “costs lie where they fall” principle.

In this article, we will first give an illustrative overview of the EU’s civilian crisis management missions². The emphasis will be put on the activities carried out by missions. Most missions have been either rule of law or police missions in nature; although with the implementation of the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, the EU has started carrying out such operations as missions in the fields of security sector reform and human rights monitoring.

In the second part of the article, we will present the budget framework of these missions. As will be seen, the money allocated to the missions does not reflect the large variety of activities, the circumstances in which missions are being carried out or the number of missions being simultaneously launched.

EU’s presence in the neighbourhood

Stability in the Western Balkans – and in the EU’s neighbourhood in general – has been one of the main aims of the EU’s foreign policy, and of the European Security Strategy. Adopted in 1999 at the EU’s initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is one of the means to promote peace and security in the region. Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are EU candidate countries whereas with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, the EU has started a Stabilisation and Association Process to support the countries in their progress towards being recognised as candidates. Furthermore, since 1991 the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) –

² The EUJUST THEMIS mission will not be presented in this article; it is discussed in more detail in the next article by Tiina Jortikka-Laitinen.

EUMM since December 2000 – has monitored the development of political and security situation, inter-ethnic issues and refugee returns.

With the development of crisis management capabilities, the EU has been able to launch several operations in the Western Balkans. The EU has had a police mission (EUPM) and a military operation (EUFOR – Althea) succeeding the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and another police mission (EUPOL Proxima), and military operation (FYROM/CONCORDIA) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The EU's presence in the Western Balkans will likely be increased in the near future as soon as the process on the future status of Kosovo will come to conclusion.

Police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The first crisis management operation launched under the European Union Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was a police mission, which was started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was established to ensure the follow-up to the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF)³. The aim of the mission was to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in establishing professional and multiethnic police service and in developing operational capacities in accordance with the objectives of the Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995. The reform of the police was a challenge to the international community, because after the war in Bosnia (1992–95) there were three different police forces – Bosnian, Croatian and Serb – in the country, and they all had a separate administrative system.

During three years, the EUPM mentored, monitored and inspected the development of police arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, the EUPM tried – through for example co-location of the

³ Council Joint Actions (2002/210/CFSP and 2005/824/CFSP).

EUPM staff in local police offices – to strengthen the capacity of the police to carry out its activities independently and accountably, as well as to fight against organised crime and corruption. Furthermore, it helped to develop financial viability and institutional structures such as: the State Investigation and Protection Agency that has powers to fight against organised crime, Ministry of Security and the State Border Service.

It was anticipated that the mandate of the EUPM would end on 31 December 2005; but following an invitation by Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU decided to establish a follow-up mission for a two-year term with a modified mandate. Its tasks have focused in particular on the fight against organised crime and on the implementation of the police reform. The number of the EUPM staff was reduced to about 400 persons from about 900 persons as of the end of 2004.

Police reform in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The first crisis management operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was a military operation called FYROM/CONCORDIA⁴, which was launched in March 2003. As a follow-up operation to NATO's operation, the EU's operation was mandated to ensure peace and security as well as monitor the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement; which put an end to a seven-month long violent fighting.

The mandate of the military operation ended on 15 December 2003, when a police mission called EUPOL Proxima was deployed with a three-year mandate⁵. The tasks of EUPOL Proxima were similar to those of the EUPM. The EUPOL Proxima assisted in reforming the police and structures of the Ministry of the Interior, developing the

⁴ Council Joint Action (2003/92/CFSP).

⁵ Council Joint Action (2003/681/CFSP).

capabilities to fight against organised crime, and in building confidence between local police forces and the local people. In order to monitor the further implementation of FYROM reforms, the EU launched a follow-up mission to the EUPOL Proxima in January 2006, an EU police advisory team called EUPAT, which had a six months mandate.

Border assistance to Moldova and Ukraine

Following an invitation from the presidents of Moldova and Ukraine, the EU decided in November 2005, to establish an advisory body with a two-year mandate to provide assistance in establishing an international customs control on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukrainian state border⁶. The region endures smuggling, trafficking and customs fraud. Thus, the mission – medium in size with its approximately 120 experts – has been mandated to assist and mentor Moldovan and Ukrainian officials in improving the border and customs services capacity on both sides of the border.

Increase in the EU's influence in Africa

With its civilian crisis management capabilities, the EU assists in resolving the current conflicts and preventing new ones from occurring in Africa. In order to promote the work for peace and security on the continent, the EU has agreed on a Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution⁷ as well as an Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa (2004). According to the Action Plan, the EU can support African countries or African organisations in different sectors such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and

⁶ Council Joint Action (2005/776/CFSP).

⁷ Council Common Position (2004/85/CFSP).

Reintegration (DDR) of combatants and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Furthermore, the EU can give training, offer equipment and support in the planning of operations.

Police and security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The EU has three on-going civilian crisis management missions in two African countries: two in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and one in Darfur in Sudan. However, the first crisis management operation under the ESDP in Africa was the Artemis military operation deployed in Ituri province in the DRC in 2003. The United Nations Security Council had passed resolution 1484⁸ to authorise the establishment of a temporary multinational military operation to stabilise the security conditions, alongside with the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in the Ituri province and improve the humanitarian emergency situation in the city of Bunia. The security situation in Ituri had aggravated during spring 2003 because of the struggle for power initiated by local armed groups. In June 2003, the EU decided to launch the operation authorised by the UN, which was brought to end in September three months later⁹.

After the operation Artemis, the EU supported the transitional government of the DRC by launching two civilian crisis management missions. After a year of negotiations on an agreement to launch a mission, the EU started its first mission in the DRC in April 2005; a challenging police mission called EUPOL Kinshasa¹⁰. In October 2003, the

⁸ The resolution can be found, for example at

<URL: <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/UNresolution1484.pdf>>.

⁹ Council Joint Action (2003/423/CFSP).

¹⁰ Council Joint Action (2004/847/CFSP).

transitional government of the DRC addressed the EU for assistance in setting up an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) composed of different political and ethnic groups in Kinshasa, as provided under the Pretoria Agreement signed in December 2002. The ESDP mission was preceded by a phase, during which the EU supported the IPU in rehabilitating a training centre, providing basic equipment, and training police forces. These activities were mainly led by the European Commission, and they were funded through the European Development Fund whereas the Member States offered equipment and 18 experts to train 1 000 police officers. The mandate of the current EUPOL Kinshasa mission was to monitor the running of the IPU; to advise the chain of command of the IPU; and to provide coordination with international and local partners. The number of personnel in the EUPOL Kinshasa has been rather modest compared to, for instance, the EUPM; it was composed of about 30 seconded and international experts.

In addition to the support to the IPU, the EU assisted in reforming the security sector in the DRC. In June 2005, the EU launched its first ever security sector mission within the framework of the ESDP, called EUSEC DC Congo¹¹. The role of the seconded experts was to provide support for the integration of the army, and to apply good governance in the field of security. The experts were co-located in the state institutions such as the Ministry of Defence, the army, and the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

Support to the African Union in Darfur

The EU has supported the African Union's (AU) efforts in improving the crisis situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. The violent conflict in Darfur broke out in 2003 between two local rebel groups – the Su-

¹¹ Council Joint Action (2005/355/CFSP).

dan Liberation Movement/Army (SPL/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – and the Janjaweed militia supported by the Government of Sudan. This led to an undetermined number of deaths, and the displacement of about two million people. The EU has mobilised some 570 million euro for humanitarian relief, assistance to Darfur refugees in Chad, and for support of the political process. Furthermore, the EU has given support – through involvement of civilian and military experts and technical assistance – to the monitoring of the ceasefire signed in April 2004 and to the strengthening of the AU Mission AMIS II.

In July 2005, the EU launched its first civilian-military operation under the ESDP¹² in Darfur. The civilian component of the EU operation assisted in building AMIS's civil police capacity by providing support to the police chain of command and in decision-making; and organising pre-deployment training and training for trainers within the AU personnel. Furthermore, it supported the establishment of a police unit within the Secretariat of the AU, and facilitated cooperation with humanitarian actors, including NGOs. In terms of military assistance, the EU supported in planning, management, funding, and logistics.

Civilian crisis management missions in remote regions

Training to Iraqi rule of law experts

The EU participated in the reconstruction of Iraq by providing financial assistance to humanitarian needs, re-establishment of public sector services, and reduction of unemployment. Furthermore, with the launch of a civilian crisis management mission to train Iraqi senior officials from the judiciary, police and prison service, the EU supported the development in the political and rule of law sectors. The first integrated

¹² Council Joint Action (2005/557/CFSP).

rule of law mission called EUJUST LEX was launched in March 2005, but it only officially started in July of the same year¹³.

The objective of the rule of law mission was to train about 770 experts – judges, investigating magistrates, senior police and penitentiary officers – for different posts in the criminal justice system. Another objective was to promote cooperation between these different actors. Due to the fragile security conditions, the training was mainly organised in Europe. The mission used a small and effective expert team with multi-functional expertise, but given the need for overall reform of rule of law and criminal justice system, the mission's contribution will most likely not be enough.

Border and police assistance in the Palestinian Territories

The EU has long been the largest donor of development aid to the Palestinian Territories. It also belongs to the 'Quartet' consisting of the UN, the United States and Russia, which facilitates the implementation of the 'Roadmap', the plan for peace in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. In November 2005, the EU launched two ESDP civilian crisis management missions in the Palestinian Territories; a Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and a Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah)¹⁴.

The EUPOL COPPS that derives its legal basis from a Palestinian Authority invitation was built on the efforts of the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support, which had assisted the Palestinian authorities in reforming security sector since January 2005. With its approximately 30 police and civilian experts seconded from the Member States, the EUPOL COPPS was given the task to assist the Palestinian

¹³ Council Joint Action (2005/190/CFSP).

¹⁴ Council Joint Actions (2005/797/CFSP and 2005/889/CFSP).

police in implementing the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme 2005–2008, which foresees a reform of police arrangements and an increased operational capacity of the Palestinian police. During its three years of mandate, the EUPOL COPPS will mentor the Palestinian Civil Police, coordinate and facilitate the EU's, Member States' and international donors' assistance to and advice on police-related criminal justice elements.

The EU border assistance mission EU BAM Rafah was deployed in November 2005, following only a three-week preparation period. An Agreement on Movement and Access at border crossing points with Gaza, agreed upon by the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority indicated a role for the EU as a third monitoring party. The mission comprises approximately 70 experts who were mandated to monitor the performance of border control, security and customs officials; to contribute – through mentoring – to developing the Palestinian capacity in border management; and to provide liaison to between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities.

Monitoring peace process in Aceh

Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Helsinki on 15 August 2005 and an official invitation by the Government of Indonesia, the EU decided in September 2005 to launch a monitoring mission in Aceh to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement¹⁵. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was conducted in cooperation with five contributing states from the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as Norway and Switzerland.

¹⁵ Council Joint Action (2005/643/CFSP).

The multi-mandated mission was launched in a short period of time, and upon the signing of the MoU, an initial monitoring team consisting of 80 monitors from the EU and ASEAN countries, was sent to Aceh to cover the interim period between the signing of the agreement and the Joint Action's entry into force. The mission's main tasks were to monitor the demobilisation of former GAM combatants and decommissioning of their arms, and the relocation of non-organic military troops and police forces, which was a test case for EU's capacity to work in the field of DDR. The other tasks included the monitoring of political reforms and human rights; ruling on amnesty cases, and dealing with complaints of violations of the Memorandum of Understanding.

The financial framework of the missions

From the budgetary perspective the EU's crisis management actions can be divided into three categories¹⁶:

- 1 Community instrument actions (I pillar) that are financed under respective community budget line. This category also includes actions that may seem to be part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), such as mine clearance, rule of law, election monitoring, disarmament and protection of refugees.
- 2 Actions under the ESDP (II Pillar) that have military or defence implications are not included to the community budget. Instead, the Member States will cover the expenses.¹⁷

¹⁶ Council of the European Union (2003): Guidelines for financing civilian crisis management operations under Title V TEU, chapter IV.

¹⁷ It must be noted that a mere participation of military personnel in an operation does not make it a military operation from the budgetary perspective. Military personnel may take part in civilian aspects of crisis management, such as policing or monitoring. (See the Commission of Europe (2001):

- 3 Civilian Petersberg tasks, which do not belong under the community instruments of I pillar, and the CSFP actions that do not have military or defence implications are mostly financed through the CSFP budget line (II Pillar). Civilian crisis management missions make part of this category.

Expenditure of the civilian crisis management missions under the ESDP can be further divided into two main categories, administrative (general) expenditure and operating expenditure¹⁸. A general rule is that all the costs – wages, equipment, operating, and administrative – should be charged to the CFSP budget line. In exceptional circumstances, the Council can unanimously decide to move the operating costs to the Member States’ responsibility. In this case the costs will be divided according to a gross national product scale, or alternatively according to “costs lie where they fall” principle. In the latter case each Member State is responsible for its seconded personnel.¹⁹

The Committee of Permanent Representatives has stated that it is impossible to find a universal model for financing civilian crisis management missions. Therefore, the Council has decided that the Member States should cover the wages of seconded personnel. All other costs related to the operation, including *per diems*, should be covered through the CFSP budget line. Community actions under the responsibility of the Commission that complement or support civilian crisis manage-

Communication from the commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Financing of civilian crisis management operations.)

¹⁸ Treaty on European Union (1999), Title V, Art. 28.

¹⁹ Treaty on European Union (1999), Title V, Art. 28.; Council of the European Union (2003): Guidelines for financing civilian crisis management operations under Title V TEU, Chapter III.

ment missions can be funded through appropriate budget line of the community budget.²⁰

However, the CFSP budget is limited to the extent that even covering the general costs has proved to be a challenge. An illustrating fact is that the EU's interpretation costs alone amount to twenty times to the whole CSFP budget²¹. The CSFP budget thus makes up only one or two percents of the External Relations budget (see Table 1).

Table 1. Payments under the title of External Relations, the chapter for CFSP, and the article for Conflict resolution, verification, support for the peace process and stabilisation in 2002–2006 (in millions of euro)²². The first number refers to commitments made; the second to actual payments.

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
External relations (Title 19)	3 243 2 829	3 273 2 638	3 047 2 872	3 077 3 281	3 470 3 292
Common foreign and security policy (Chapter 19.03)	30 26	47 30	63 46	62 54	102 61
Conflict resolution, verification, support for the peace process and stabilisation (Article 19.03.03)	20 15	38 21	40 31	31 25	75 32

²⁰ Council of the European Union (2003): Guidelines for financing civilian crisis management operations under Title V TEU, Chapters III and IV.

²¹ Missiroli, A. (2003): Euros for ESDP: Financing EU operations.

²² Budget of the European Union 2003–2006. All the civilian crisis management missions under the CFSP are financed through the article for Conflict resolution, verification, support for the peace process and stabilisation (Article 19.03.03).

In case the CFSP budget is insufficient for financing missions, the Parliament and the Council may, on a proposal from the Commission, decide to allocate additional funding from other lines of the community budget²³. In such a situation the Parliament will have the ultimate power of decision. However, the Member States have been unwilling to start slow and cumbersome negotiations over internal re-allocations of the budget, and thus this option has remained unused. Even if an agreement between the Parliament and the Council was feasible, the Commission's role as the administrator of the funds has not always pleased the Member States. The tug-of-war between institutions has resulted in a situation where the Parliament has reduced the CFSP budget to minimum and the Member States have respectively shifted to using Pillar I financing channels because they are simpler and quicker²⁴. In effect, the EU has been forced to gather leftovers from various budget lines to finance CFSP actions²⁵.

Every year the Council and the Parliament must reach an agreement on the size and internal allocation of the CFSP budget. If they are unable to agree, the CFSP budget will be determined by the budget of the previous year or alternatively by the tentative draft budget by of the Commission.

The present situation makes the internal flexibility of the CFSP budget an important feature. The Commission may re-allocate budgeted funds from one article to another. It can also establish a separate

²³ Council of the European Union (2003): Guidelines for financing civilian crisis management operations under Title V TEU, Chapter III.

²⁴ In 2002, the CFSP budget was approximately €30 million. In a Joint Action of the same year (2002/210/CFSP) the Council allocated yearly €38 million for the EUPM. €20 million of the total mission budget were to be allocated through the CFSP budget line.

²⁵ Missiroli, A. (2003): Euros for ESDP: Financing EU operations.

article for emergency measures, which enables launching of rapid actions, provided that there is sufficient margin in the whole CSFP budget. This separate article can amount to 20 percent of the whole CFSP budget at most. The emergency budget could currently amount to slightly more than 600 000 euro. If the amount is compared to the on-going missions (see Table 2), it can be said that no proper mission could be funded with it.²⁶

Financing of the on-going missions

So far, the financing procedures have reflected the Council guidelines for a “practical way” of financing civilian crisis management missions: the principle of “costs lie where they fall” has applied to all missions²⁷. However, contrary to the Council guidelines, the Member States have mostly defrayed all the expenses of their seconded personnel except *per diems*. Although in some cases, such as the EUPM, the Member States have had to cover the daily allowances as well.

Conclusions

In 2001, the Commission noted that “it is clear that the present procedures related to CFSP operations within the budget are too cumbersome for crisis situations (...) Both procedural and budgetary constraints, in other words, threaten to reduce the potential and credibility of the Eu-

²⁶ European Parliament, Council and Commission (1999): Inter-institutional Agreement, Art. 38 and 39.; Council of the European Union (2003): Guidelines for financing civilian crisis management operations under Title V TEU, chapter IV.

²⁷ Council of the European Union (2003): Guidelines for financing civilian crisis management operations under Title V TEU, chapter IV.

Table 2. Funds allocated to civilian crisis management missions²⁸.

Mission	Funds (EUR)
EUPM ²⁹	87 700 000
EUPOL Proxima ³⁰	37 511 000
EUJUST Themis ³¹	2 307 873
EUPOL Kinshasa ³²	4 370 000
EUSEC DR Congo ³³	1 600 000
EUJUST LEX ³⁴	10 000 000
AMIS II, Sudan ³⁵	2 120 000
AMM ³⁶	9 000 000
EUPOL COPPS ³⁷	6 100 000
EUPAT FYROM ³⁸	1 500 000
EU BAM Rafah ³⁹	7 600 000
EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine ⁴⁰	8 000 000
TOTAL	177 808 873

²⁸ Table includes all funds allocated to the missions from the CFSP budget since the beginning of mission (as of May 2006).

²⁹ General Affairs Council Conclusions of 18 February 2002, annex IV.; Council Joint Actions (2002/210/CFSP), (2003/141/CFSP) and (2005/824/CFSP).

³⁰ Council Joint Actions (2003/681/CFSP) and (2004/789/CFSP).

³¹ Council Joint Action (2004/523/CFSP) and (2004/638/CFSP).

³² Council Joint Action (2004/847/CFSP).

³³ Council Joint Action (2005/355/CFSP); Council document no. 9253/04.

³⁴ Council Joint Action (2005/190/CFSP).

³⁵ Council Joint Action (2005/557/CFSP).

³⁶ Council Joint Action (2005/643/CFSP).

ropean Union’s new global role”⁴¹. However, in the light of the past and on-going civilian crisis management missions that this article concerns about, it could be argued that the Commission’s prediction was too pessimistic. The EU has been able to run ten simultaneous missions. Additionally, through speedily set up missions in Aceh and the Palestine Territories, it has proved to be capable for decisive and swift action.

Yet, even if the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities seem to be operational, the institutional framework is still far from perfect. The cumbersomeness of the financial procedures of the II pillar and the lack of established practice can still threaten the EU’s ability to rapid action⁴². The structures of CFSP would not make multi-dimensional civilian crisis management missions possible without open-handed contributions from individual Member States, also from outside of the financial framework of CFSP. Such “trimming” between the pillars both makes the planning of multi-dimensional and long-term missions dif-

³⁷ Council Joint Action (2005/797/CFSP) €2,5 million for 2005 and €3,6 million for 2006. The final budget for 2006–2008 will be decided on an annual basis.

³⁸ Council Joint Action (2005/826/CFSP)

³⁹ €1 696 659 for 2005 and €5 903 341 for 2006. Council Joint Action (2005/889/CFSP)

⁴⁰ Factsheet on EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, December 2005.

⁴¹ European Commission (2001): Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Financing of civilian crisis management operations, p. 5

⁴² See Jakobsen, P.V. (2004): The Emerging EU Civilian Crisis Management Capacity – A “Real Added Value” for the UN?

ficult, and subjects the implementation of missions to national interests of individual Member States.⁴³

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⁴³ See Missiroli, A. (2003): Euros for ESDP: financing EU operations.

Strengthening Rule of Law in Georgia



The role of the European Union in crisis management has grown remarkably during the past years, and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been one of the fastest among the different EU policy sectors. In addition to the development of military capabilities, civilian crisis management is being developed. The EU has set an ambitious aim for the next coming years: it will increase its quantitative and qualitative capabilities so that it will be capable of undertaking multidimensional operations in various parts of the globe, either alone or in cooperation with the international community.

The development of rapid reaction capabilities has been widely discussed in the media. The tsunami catastrophe in South Asia in De-

ember 2004 clearly showed that the EU does not have capabilities to respond to sudden and massive natural disasters, although in the past years there have been efforts to strengthen cooperation in emergency services. Thus, the need to increase capabilities in particular in the areas of humanitarian aid, emergency services and consular services has been seen as essential. The civilian crisis management capabilities could also be used in these kinds of situations.

Nevertheless, civilian crisis management is more than disaster relief. Its main objective is to support countries or regions in crisis towards democracy and rule of law; as well as to strengthen human rights, good governance and civil society. Meanwhile, civilian crisis management can at best be used to prevent crisis from escalating into open conflict. Instead of focusing only on crisis situations, civilian crisis management can be used to support countries, which need external support to strengthen their democratic institutions and rule of law system. Therefore, the strengthening of rule of law has become one of the priorities for the EU civilian crisis management. The first EU rule of law mission, EUJUST THEMIS, which was concluded in July 2005, presents a valuable example for further development of future rule of law missions.

The EUJUST THEMIS mission can be analysed in terms of success achieved so far within the rule of law sector. It also serves as a background for the analysis of the factors that helped conclude the mission within the time set out in the mandate. On the basis of the analysis, the lessons learnt can be assessed and used for preparations of future rule of law missions.

Rule of law as a priority

The conceptual development of the EU civilian crisis management has proceeded rapidly. One of the reasons has been the challenge the

international community has faced with the so called weak states. Discrimination and restricted access to judicial system usually describe the situation, in which the reconstruction of collapsed social structures has to be started. In this situation the fight against organised crime is also important, since an armed conflict may have laid the basis for criminal acts. In a post-conflict situation, the first institutions to be restructured are police, judiciary and penitentiary so that general order and the functions of judiciary can be quickly restored.

The Feira European Council of June 2000 defined the strengthening of Rule of Law as one of the four priorities in the field of civilian crisis management – others are Police, Civilian Administration and Civil Protection – and concrete targets that were set concerning the improving of national and EU capabilities in the field of rule of law. The concepts of rule of law for EU missions were agreed upon during the Presidency of Denmark in 2002, which then helped to proceed with the planning of eventual missions. A rule of law mission can be a part of a police mission or an independent mission, and it can be regarded as the strengthening of rule of law system in a country, or the substituting of judiciary. In addition to these, monitoring and fact finding missions can be undertaken within the field of rule of law. Furthermore, the expertise offered by non-governmental organisations and experts can nowadays be used for rule of law missions. The rule of law is an important component of police and civilian administration missions as well, and it is included into the comprehensive planning of all operations. Upon the launch of a police mission attention is also paid to the strengthening the functions of judiciary, prosecution and prison administration; as well as to the importance of including the correctional treatment of prisoners into the well-functioning criminal justice system.

The EUJUST THEMIS is an interesting example of a mission, which used a substantially integrated approach to strengthen rule of law in the

recipient country. The European Commission's rule of law and penal code system programmes that had been launched in Georgia before the ESDP rule of law mission, had an essential influence on the final outcome of the mission, and helped to place the long-term EU experts into the core institutions of the Georgian judicial system. Furthermore, the continuation of the Commission's programmes and inclusion of rule of law tasks into the office of the Special Representative (EUSR), have guaranteed that the reform of the Georgian rule of law system has been put forward after the conclusion of the EUJUST THEMIS mission. Other international organisations such as the OSCE, Council of Europe and World Bank have also had an important role in strengthening rule of law in Georgia.

EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia

The citizens of Georgia had high expectations regarding the quick reforms that followed the Rose Revolution in the end of 2003, and the subsequent change of government in 2004. Special attention was paid to the old criminal justice system inherited from the Soviet era. Thus, the objective was to reform the system towards international and European norms. However, the lack of national resources and of a comprehensive reform strategy soon proved to be a serious obstacle. Therefore, a request to the EU was sent on 3 June 2004, which the EU approved and agreed upon a joint action on the EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia called EUJUST THEMIS. It was launched in July 2004, and its mandate was given for 12 months.

One of the most urgent tasks was to assist Georgian authorities in developing a comprehensive strategy for the reform of criminal justice system, while at the same time assistance was also given to the strengthening of overall cooperation between relevant authorities within the

criminal justice sector. Furthermore, as required EUJUST THEMIS supported the planning for new legislation (e.g. Criminal Procedure Code) and the international as well as regional cooperation in the area of criminal justice. The EUJUST THEMIS headquarters was established in Tbilisi, and the EU experts on criminal justice were co-located at the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General's Office and other relevant institutions. It could be stated later that the co-location of experts played a critical role with regard to the success of the mission.

Three operational phases

The mission had three phases. The first was designed to create premises for the reform of the Georgian criminal justice system, by initiating EU experts into the system and introducing a network for coordination between local authorities and international actors. The Government of Georgia established a high-level working group, which was given a mandate to draft the reform strategy. The final strategy was drawn up during the second phase, with the assistance, support and guidance of EU experts. The third phase included the establishment of a steering committee, which was responsible for the development of the plan for the implementation, and for the implementation proper of the strategy.

The breakthrough in the process happened on the 13th of May, when the Government of Georgia approved the criminal justice system reform strategy. An inter-institutional steering committee was then established to implement the strategy. The EUJUST THEMIS successfully completed its tasks so that its mandate could be terminated as previewed on 15 July 2005.

Georgia will be responsible for the further implementation of the reform strategy. The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus will monitor the implementation process on behalf of the EU. Thus, the

EUSR office has been strengthened by appointing some rule of law experts to the office. The action plan on Georgia under the EU neighbourhood policy significantly improves the country's ability to implement the reform strategy. Furthermore, the EU Commission will be able to support the detailed implementation plan financially.

Lessons learnt: Georgia

The role of EU THEMIS as an important stage in the development process of EU rule of law missions cannot be exaggerated. The lessons learnt from it will be useful for future missions. From the very beginning, the success of the mission relative to the overall objective and different stages of the mission was dependent on the commitment of the Georgian Government and sector authorities. At the launch of the mission it was necessary to implement the agreed measures at all levels of the bureaucracy. For instance, the changes in the structure of the government during the winter 2004 had an influence on the composition of the high-level working group, which somehow delayed the process. The support that the government publicly gave to the mission had a significant role in the success of the whole mission, and it also facilitated the transfer of responsibility for the reform process to the local authorities after the one-year ESDP support mission was concluded.

The co-location of the EU experts at the core bodies of the judiciary and the use of national experts proved to be the right decisions. The close cooperation with local authorities strengthened the Georgian ownership in the process, and helped mapping out local needs as well as giving EU experts access to relevant information. Such cooperation was important to the overall success of the mission, and should also be considered in future missions. In retrospect, the importance of pre-mission training and EU experts' knowledge about the recipient country

has been highlighted. According to the analysis, the EU experts would have needed more accurate information about the Georgian rule of law system, as well as about reforms that had already been passed. It would have been equally important to raise local authorities' knowledge about the objectives of the mission as to raise the EU's activities in general.

The EUJUST THEMIS mission was the first touchstone the EU's civilian crisis capabilities faced, in terms of launching a rule of law mission in a third country at short notice. It required special capabilities already at the first stage, due to the absence of a model that could have been adopted from a previous mission. One of the main obstacles was how to organise logistical and technical support in a short period of time. The selection of suitable EU experts and the starting of their work also took time, so that the launch at full speed of the mission came later than expected. Thus, due to these initial stage obstacles some months were "lost", and the EUJUST THEMIS only became fully operational in November 2004. Nevertheless, it can be agreed that one of the main factors in the success of the mission was its rapid launching, and the further fitting of the activities into a tight timeframe; which was essential for the conclusion of the mission as set out in the mandate. One could say this has influenced the positive statements of the stakeholders about the success of the mission.

One of the key strengths in the mission was the possibility to use the EU Commission's support facilities already directed at Georgia flexibly, in particular in terms of mission's logistical and technical needs. The EU Commission's programmes designed to support the reform of the rule of law system, laid the foundation for a synergy that can also be used in the future; as the EU continues to assist Georgia in reforming the rule of law system. The use of the so called round table practice in Georgia, that enables regular information exchange and coordination on the on-going activities between the EU and other international ac-


tors working in the field of rule of law, should be considered also in future EU rule of law missions.

The added value of an integrated approach that covers the different sectors of rule of law and criminal justice system in a mission, was clearly proved by the EUJUST THEMIS. This may be the most useful lesson from the mission, and will most probably be the basis of planning of future EU civilian crisis management missions. Afterwards however, it has been stated that in cases of transitional societies such as Georgia; the approach to the mission could be even more integrated and directed horizontally at different sectors of rule of law system and at the constitution. In fact, the EUJUST LEX mission in Iraq has for the first time applied such an integrated approach to provide training in Europe of Iraqi officials from the judiciary, police, and penitentiary.

On the whole, the EUJUST THEMIS showed that there is a need for civilian crisis management; and the EU may have an important role in particular in strengthening the rule of law. The concluded mission yields valuable lessons for future missions. Those can also serve as a basis for further development of the EU civilian crisis management capabilities, which are needed for credible action in all priority areas. However, the strengthening of the rule of law is a challenge in its own right, upon which the EU has to place more emphasis; particularly in terms of development of qualitative and quantitative capabilities for rule of law missions. Finland has high-quality expertise in this domain, which can be used in international crisis situations as well as in their prevention.

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Kosovo – Challenge to EU Civilian Crisis Management



With the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari as the United Nations Status Envoy in November 2005, the process of determining the future status of Kosovo had started. The problems of Kosovo date back to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the consequent conflicts, the latest of which was the war in Kosovo in spring 1999. Since the end of the war, the responsibility for the interim civilian administration has been undertaken by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK).

In the future, the role of the European Union in rebuilding Kosovo will be strengthened, and the EU will likely take on responsibilities by utilising both European Commission's instruments and tools under the

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, the EU will face several challenges in Kosovo that are not necessarily related to high political or economic questions but to traditional social structures such as land ownership, or efforts to build confidence between local communities.

This article was written in August 2005, in the time when Special Envoy Kai Eide's recommendations to open the status talks were not yet published and the talks for future status of Kosovo not started.

As Municipal Administrator in Kosovo

I base my article on the experiences gained as UNMIK Municipal Administrator in the Municipality of Deçan/e in Western Kosovo in 1999–2001. Many of the issues I have experienced are still open and unsolved and should be taken into account when planning of a possible stronger EU presence in Kosovo in the future.

The United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 defined the plan for interim administration and reconstruction of Kosovo. The UNMIK, under its Head of Mission, Harri Holkeri, created a 'Standards before Status' policy, according to which the discussion on the future of Kosovo could not be started before certain preconditions had been fulfilled and the standards implemented. In December 2003, the UN confirmed the Standards for Kosovo, and in March of the following year, the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan was published. The comprehensive Plan viewed a truly multiethnic, stable and democratic province of Kosovo that approaches to European standards, and required that local political leaders be committed in its implementation. Furthermore, it stated that all institutions, including municipal councils, should work for inclusion of all communities into the reconstruction process, and implement a policy to secure the rights and needs of all groups in the area.

As long as the UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo is in force, and the future status of Kosovo has not been defined, the European Union cannot take on responsibilities which, according to the resolution, belong to the UN. However, since the beginning of the process, the EU has been engaged in the implementation of the resolution. The EU has allocated finance for Kosovo's reconstruction and development of economy, and has thus given important political support to the UN efforts in the region. The EU Commission's Communication, 'A European Future of Kosovo' (20 May 2005) highlighted that the EU's policy on Kosovo has been anchored in the Stabilisation and Association Process.

Building confidence

At first, I considered that the most important task was to build confidence between the local people and the UNMIK representatives. During the summer 1999, Kosovo was ruled by the so called Thachi's government, which was not recognised by UNMIK. This government had in every municipality nominated a representative of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as municipal mayor, who had then recruited personnel for municipal administration and public services.

At that time, banks or other institutions such as civil registrations or municipal minor courts were not functioning and could not offer their services. After the war some European countries started to require civil documents – whether somebody entitled to a pension was still alive – from migrant workers to further continue the payments of their pensions. The identification certificates, with a stamp of an independent Kosovo signed by the municipal representatives of the Thachi's government, were not regarded as legal documents by these European Governments. Instead, the documents signed by UNMIK Municipal Administrator were accepted. This gave the opportunity to UNMIK representatives to strengthen the confidence with the local population.

Troubled times

The beginning of UNMIK interim administration was characterised by unrest and violence. During autumn 1999, the headquarters of a local party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), was bombed by grenades. Houses of Roma people were burnt down, and even old disputes between Albanians led to armed violence.

Therefore, cooperation within the international community – UNMIK, NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and OSCE – was essentially important. But as important it was to build connections for cooperation with – and between – local people and the leading parties, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the LDK, and later on with the new party AAK (Alliance for Future for Kosovo).

Problematic of land ownership

Land ownership is usually without exception an issue behind many disputes. For centuries different conquerors as well as natives have had disputes about the land ownership in Kosovo. During 1998 almost all civil and cadastral documentation from Kosovo had been taken to Serbia. In Deçan/e, the documentation was saved in the Visoki Decani Monastery and the documents were returned to the municipality during autumn 1999. Furthermore, all the documentation of local Serbian inhabitants – such as birth, marriage and death certificates as well as registers and maps of land property – were photocopied and the copies were signed by UNMIK Municipal Administrator and stamped with the UNMIK stamp. Deçan/e is one of the three municipalities which have the completed cadastral documentation left.

In spring 2005, the media brought up an issue of illegal real estate deals that had largely taken place in Kosovo. It turned out that Albanians had sold real estates originally owned by Serbs or Roma families.



Berat Flugaj 2000

A Kosovar family on its way to vote in the elections in 2000.

Therefore, the issue of land ownership is yet to be resolved. In the future, at least the following unresolved cases will have to be dealt with: illegal seizures of land carried out after 1999; changes in land ownership caused by the wars in the Balkans in the 1990's; land expropriated after the World War II; and transfers of land ownership authorised under the Ottoman governance. The EU could have a role in resolving these cases. The new EU Member States, in particular, have experiences with the difficulty of land ownership and defining the so called cut-off-days.

European practices and values as a tool

The use of European practices and experiences was an essential part of my work in Deçan/e. Issues such as transparency, equality, justice, con-

fidence, and management based on inhabitants' needs were brought up when transitional local municipal administration was being established and staff being recruited.

The European Commission had a project in Kosovo through which national municipal experts from EU Member States were co-located within the UNMIK. Deçan/e benefited from assistance from an urban planner, engineer in waste water services, and a human resources expert. The know-how they could shift to local officers was important, but as important was the fact that they were able to transfer European values to their local counter partners. A delegation of eleven municipal civil servants visited some Finnish municipalities in winter 2001 in order to get to know to the Finnish practices in municipal administration. From their perspective the most important was to see the way how Finnish civil servants were committed to work for the inhabitants of their municipalities.

Developing municipality instead of talking politics

For a rather long period of time, working days were usually about talking politics – about the future of Kosovo or the political situation in the Balkans. However, focusing on more practical issues at the local level took time. I tried to explain to the local authorities that from the point of view of the municipality it was better to change the attention, for instance, to finding finance for repairing the toilets of the town hall than discuss Kosovo-level politics. Even in the remote villages issues related to the administration were highly politicised.

The municipal civil servants could be divided into three groups. The first group consisted of former KLA combatants that had earned credit in the war, which was regarded as a sufficient merit to nominate them in high posts in the municipality. The second group was composed of

former municipal officers who had been dismissed by the Serbs in the 1990's. Many of them had worked at an executive level and thus wanted to return to the 'good old 70's'. They also had difficulties in adapting new ideas. As to the third group, persons in it are municipal civil servants at their thirties, who have studied abroad. They were interested in developing Kosovo as well as their and their children's future possibilities. They have not been interested in talking politics for the sake of politics or continuing fighting. Furthermore, based on the experience gained in Kosovo, young people with advanced views and willingness to learn ideas are needed for development.

There would be room for peaceful resolution of disputes unless the political statements of the party headquarters did not have such a weight in Kosovo. The party headquarters have kept local politicians in a surprisingly tight hold. The EU should have a strong role in particular in capacity building at the local level; this would ensure the transfer of European practice and values to Kosovars.

The future


In the future, Kosovo will face challenges, of which the biggest are related to minority issues, decentralisation and safe return of internally displaced Serbs and other minorities. With regard to decentralisation, UNMIK has started a programme with five new established municipalities where the development is promoted through locally made solutions. One of these pilot municipalities is Junik, which belonged to Deçan/e Municipality.

Tasks related to rule of law and police sectors will be crucial with regard to the future of Kosovo, as also outlined in the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan. The EU has already been responsible for police sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would imply a natural transfer

of tasks of UNMIK police sector to the EU. Transfer of rule of law sector to the EU would also promote the realisation of the Implementation Plan, according to which the aim is to create a “truly multi-ethnic, stable and democratic Kosovo which is approaching European standards”.

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Through Training to Cutting Edge Crisis Management



I was in Aceh on 15 August 2005, the day when the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that ended the long armed conflict was signed. In January 2006, on Holocaust Remembrance Day, I was reunited with the other Finns who had been in Aceh in Helsinki where we took stock of what we had learned from the mission. Back in August, we had been invited to the square outside the Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh to watch the live television broadcast from Helsinki projected on dozens of TV screens. Amongst the thousands of people I felt myself carried away by the atmosphere where feelings of hope and peace were strong after almost thirty years of armed conflict. I could only guess at the feelings of the local population, but the experience was immense even for a Finn.

The Secretariat of the Council of the European Union appointed a total of 30 Finns to monitor disarmament, withdrawal of troops, human rights and legality issues in connection with the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), which the Council hastily deployed, truly testing the national performance of all of the Member States. The EU's appointments made the Finns the largest national delegation of experts amongst the 32 countries that took part in the mission. In addition to the EU Member States, the Aceh Monitoring Mission, which is still ongoing, involves five ASEAN countries (Thailand, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines) and the Norwegian and Swiss Governments.

According to the Memorandum of Understanding¹, the mission's mandate was to monitor the implementation of the comprehensive and challenging agreement. Monitoring is one of the core areas of civilian crisis management. Monitoring, taking part in a monitoring mission and acting as a monitor all require specialist expertise and competence. Other requirements include experience of an international environment involving multiple participants, the area where the crisis has arisen and the special circumstances surrounding the crisis zone.

In January 2006 – on Holocaust Remembrance Day – I was reunited with the first Finns that I had taken to Aceh for the mission six months earlier. The disarmament operation for which they had been made responsible had been completed. The first phase of the mission had reached successful completion. The Indonesian Vice President, who visited Finland during the same week, expressed his government's commitment to adhering to the MoU and talked about the mutual resolve of the parties to promote peace and rebuilding. The first waypoint on the journey to permanent peace had been reached. Hopefully the next legs will be completed as well. It feels good to work in civilian crisis management.

¹ The Memorandum of Understanding can be found at
<URL: http://www.cmi.fi/files/Aceh_MoU.pdf>.



Antti Häikiö 2005

People watched the live broadcast in Banda Aceh on the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Indonesian Government and the Aceh Free Movement that took place in Helsinki on 15 August 2005.

Finnish preparedness for civilian crisis management

The skills required in international crisis management missions are honed beforehand at home. According to the rule of law, participation and its forms are governed by legislation. The law governing civilian participation in crisis management missions has only recently been added to Finnish legislation. The law took effect as of the beginning of 2005, being one of the first national laws on civilian crisis management in Europe. On a Finnish scale, the law was prepared, passed by the Parliament and approved by the President in a short amount of time (between spring 2003 and autumn 2004), and serves as excellent proof of Finland's commitment to civilian crisis management. Its main

principles follow Finland's approach to peacekeeping: the Ministry for Foreign Affairs establishes political alignments while the Ministry of the Interior attends to organising civilian crisis management missions – just as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is in charge of directing military crisis management, which is then implemented by the Ministry of Defence and the Finnish Defence Forces.

The clear division of work between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior gives support and efficiency to the activities of both ministries. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs can concentrate on issuing directions in line with national and international policies and decisions, thanks to the involvement of the ministries that specialise in the more practical side of the mission in the implementation and actual crisis management work.

The law includes regulations on civilian participation in crisis management missions abroad, the experience that civilians must obtain in Finland before they are able to take part in crisis management, how this experience must be maintained and developed, and the rights and duties of civilians participating in crisis management operations abroad. The law identifies the duties of the Ministry of the Interior as recruiting the civilians that are deployed to crisis management operations abroad, maintaining material and logistical preparedness, providing crisis management training to the civilians, coordinating the preparation of the aforementioned tasks amongst the various administrative sectors, and cooperating with non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The level of the monitor's skills and efficiency, and the impact of these on the crisis and crisis management, is largely dependent on the groundwork and training provided in the home country. The skills and abilities required of monitors are different from those of the crisis management professionals who have to assume responsibility for all the roles of the absent government, judicial system, police, human rights administration or the body that governs and executes civilian protec-

tion within the crisis zone. The EU has formulated its own requirements for these roles in the course of the process known as the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

International skill requirements

In addition to missions coordinated by the European Union, Finland also participates in other civilian crisis management missions in accordance with its active foreign policy. The Finns have gained considerable experience in missions governed by the United Nations, OSCE and the Council of Europe in particular. Finns have also participated in the civilian dimension of NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. During the past year, however, the Finnish contribution to the OSCE's field operations, for example, has dropped to less than half of the earlier level. The figures do not usually include Finnish experts who are contracted to international organisations as professionals and specialist advisors. These contracts extend Finland's national contribution to various major global organisations such as the World Bank, other development banks, UN agencies and the OECD. The figures also exclude all of the development projects of Finnish enterprises and all the people involved in them. The current national and administrative participation in civilian crisis management through contracted employment therefore does not represent the full extent to which Finns contribute to international crisis and development operations. The broad interface of crisis and development cooperation, in particular, encompasses a lot of similar kinds of work and multiple participants.

Finland deploys national experts for the so-called seconded roles within the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other intergovernmental organisations. The concept of seconding means that Finland deploys the experts and pays their expenses but the operational employer is the organisation to which the expert has been seconded, in other

words, the organisation to which Finland lends its expertise in the form of the seconded person. One example of intergovernmental agreements and seconding is the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), where around ten Finns participate in monitoring the cease-fire under the direction of the Norwegian Government, and which is not a traditional mission led by the UN, the EU, the OSCE or another organisation. Finland contributes to the rebuilding and democratic development of Iraq both by supporting the training provided to Iraqi police officers in Jordan and by participating in the EU project involving the training of the Iraqi judiciary, police and prison service officers.

The goals and requirements established by international organisations with regard to skills vary from one organisation to the next as well as from one role to another, and are based on the ability of the applicant to prove his/her expertise and experience in relation to the organisation's own resources. Participation in specialist training and mission-specific instruction in crisis management is increasingly considered a valued form of this proof. For example, the recently launched Aceh Monitoring Mission is the first mission for which the European Union recognised EU training as one of the criteria for accepting applicants.

The EU deserves merit for having included EU training, and crisis management courses and training programmes in particular, into the criteria that it regularly applies in its application processes today. EU future engagement in Kosovo should definitely require both EU-specific and Kosovo-specific training for most of the mission members in order to achieve the key player's role and added value.

Growing need for training

The need for expertise and training in crisis management – and especially for training civilians for civilian crisis management roles – is critical. The group from which experts deployed to civilian crisis

management missions are selected remains relatively small. Finland has a shortage of qualified experts in some crisis management areas. Even the much vaunted experience is not always an advantage, if the experience is based on conventional crisis management theories and practices that have already been mastered. The drive in responding to new kinds of crises and aspiring for more efficiency and impact is towards finding new crisis management concepts and techniques, and these can be produced through training. For example, the driving force behind developing the EU's capabilities for crisis management and its civilian crisis management resources is a healthy ambition to be faster and more efficient than others. That is why the EU aspires to develop its own concepts and techniques for crisis management and to provide training accordingly. Similarly the UN, the OSCE and the civilian sector of NATO believe in their respective abilities and causes, and are working on their own crisis management functions.

The priority areas defined by the Feira European Council in 2000 determine what expertise is required in civilian crisis management and in what form. In addition to the four fields established in Feira, monitoring was added as a fifth focus area following a Swedish initiative in 2004. The problem is that determining the four focus areas (Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration and Civil Protection) is still difficult both in terms of politics and the projects themselves.

The English terms (Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration and Civil Protection) are translated differently in different countries. The difficulty is that the translated terms are interpreted from the perspective of the existing conventional national organisations rather than with a view to the changed nature of crises and the expertise required. The English term 'Rule of Law', for example, is translated and interpreted broadly as the principle of constitutional state but its implementation is limited to the roles of the judiciary, the prosecution office and the

prison service. In reality, the culture and practice of legislation and justice make up a much wider field of integrated issues in post-conflict environments. Similarly, as much as the term 'Civilian Administration' is interpreted widely as building a civil society, its implementation is often restricted, and only encompasses local governance and public administration, leaving the electoral process, NGOs, the media, and the organisations and functions involved in a multi-party system – all of which are crucial factors in democratic development – out of the equation. Defining the third priority area also has its problems: The Finnish translation of 'Civil Protection' reflects the names of national organisations such as the 'Rescue Services Department' and the 'Emergency Services College', which leads to the term being associated with fire-fighting and rescue operations and not so much with broader civil protection and humanitarian aid operations, IDP and refugee issues, rebuilding, medical assistance and other logistics operations which have recently been the focus of more and more attention.

As new crises and new crisis management techniques have emerged, both crisis management and the associated training have had to incorporate areas that were either not previously known in many of the Member States, or that are being interpreted on the basis of something more familiar. The DDR/R concept (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration/Rehabilitation) aims to provide a permanent solution for armed crises by disarming the armed troops (armies, semi-military formations and guerrillas), reducing and demobilising the troops and reintegrating the former combatants into civil society. Many countries consider DDR to be mainly the work of military experts – which it is in relation to the first two Ds – but in order to ensure efficient overall implementation, the challenging latter part of the process – rehabilitating and reintegrating the combatants into civil society – is where specialist expertise is especially essential. Mastering the entire process from the

first D to the last R therefore requires either an advanced multi-disciplinary specialist or close cooperation of experts from various different fields.

Crisis Management Centre?

In order to be able to provide civilian crisis management training, several new training centres have been established in Europe or old training and research institutes have been converted to accommodate the training and research requirements of modern crisis management. The Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), for example, which specialises in OSCE training and is partially funded by the government, now also trains experts for EU missions. Between 2002 and 2004, the ASPR coordinated the EU's first pilot training programme for civilian crisis management, the responsibility for which was transferred to the crisis management training and research centre Folke Bernadotte Akademi established by the Swedish Government in 2003 as of the beginning of 2005. In addition to the Austrian and Swedish centres, similar training centres specialising in civilian crisis management are found in Germany, Italy, France, Hungary and Spain, all of which provide training under the EU's civilian crisis management programme.

Finland does not have its own centre but it has, by providing certain courses, participated in the implementation of the training programme as one of the members of the EU Group on Training (EGT). The EU Group on Training is an unofficial crisis management training consortium comprising partners from the aforementioned Member States, and it receives funding from the European Commission's Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Finland coordinated two specialist training courses ('Rule of Law' and 'Good Governance and Democratisation') between 2003 and 2004, and a core course

in summer 2005. In 2006, Finland will coordinate one core course and participate in the training of the new rapid-reaction Civilian Response Teams (CRT) as one of four Member States of the EU (Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Finland). In addition to Finnish and EU nationals, the courses have had participants from Africa and the Balkans, amongst others.

In order to accommodate training and research in the field of civilian crisis management, there have been plans to establish a crisis management centre (CMC Finland) to operate in connection with the Emergency Services College in Kuopio, following international models. As a concept, the Crisis Management Centre has already featured in speeches and on paper, but in reality, the centre has not yet been set up. The idea is to include the centre in legislation when amending the law governing the Emergency Services College, and for the centre to be established during 2006. According to a statement by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament, the government must investigate the founding of a Finnish crisis management centre following the examples set by Sweden and Switzerland. At the moment, comparisons appear poor, as the Finnish centre remains just a name without personnel or a budget while the Swedish and Swiss centres employ between 25 and 55 people and have budgets of over five million euro each.

In Finland, the centre's task would be to assemble, coordinate and arrange crisis management training and research using the best and most knowledgeable expert sources. Expertise and teaching resources would be compiled depending on the subject matter and the course from wherever the best expertise could be found – whether in Finland or abroad. The government's report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy calls for investigating and developing the cooperation between military and civilian crisis management as well. In the future, the centre could also take over the Ministry's responsibility for recruitment, as has been the case in Germany. On the other hand, the centre should

not hoard tasks that can be outsourced to more able providers. Training that requires knowledge of civil society could be outsourced to NGOs, induction in human rights and international law to law faculties in universities, other educational institutions, and institutes, and other special training in civilian crisis management to more established centres of expertise.

The Ministry of the Interior, supported by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, proposed an allowance of 1.5 million euro for establishing Finnish preparedness for civilian crisis management (training, recruitment, research, devices and equipment). The budget brainstorming session held in August 2005 did not yet yield funds, but the government did set up a committee comprising permanent secretaries of three ministries with the aim of finding a solution before the 2007 budget. The outcome will be revealed at the budget brainstorming session in August 2006.

Research requirements in civilian crisis management

Civilian crisis management training incorporates research, production of the study materials, and development. There has been little research into crisis management and even less into civilian crisis management. So far, research has been conceptual, and concentrated on analysing ideas and documents based on the theory, concept, politics and discourse surrounding crisis management. Field studies – investigating the action involved and participatory research into the everyday substance of civilian crisis management – are almost non-existent. Nevertheless, field studies would provide the most direct and valuable way of producing new information on crises and conflicts – based on first-hand experiences and research – for developing domestic preparedness, participation and expertise. At the same time, the research would produce material that could be used in learning and teaching.

The United Nations, the OSCE and the European Union should investigate how research could be integrated into a qualitative system and part of the civilian aspect of operations.

The European Union could consider turning an area that has become a conflict into a field study environment for crisis management – and civilian crisis management in particular. Finland could model this kind of field study for other organisations. Finland is piloting a field study on the effectiveness of crisis management in Kosovo, in the form of a joint project of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The aim was also to find a local model for examining the effects of a crisis. Incorporating research into all aspects of crisis management would be an integral aspect of the quality system which is yet to be established on an international level. Research would allow organisations to assess the lessons they learn on location, and the effects of their actions on the local population and area. Regional and situation analyses provide information on how well suited the roles of different organisations are in terms of promoting peace and development. The information can then be used to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of crisis management.

Information that could be produced through research would be especially welcome now that the work of Former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland has commenced in Kosovo and the role of the European Union in the rebuilding process is evident. Kosovo cannot afford the kind of rushed beginning that was seen in Aceh. Despite all efforts, the combined amount of information that the international community has managed to compile on Kosovo in the space of six years is surprisingly meagre.

The experience of participating in civilian crisis management missions can also be useful in domestic research. In particular, young students who are orientated towards international subjects can be guided

towards doing their further studies in crisis management when they are choosing the subject for their thesis. Student and researcher exchange programmes between Finnish universities and universities located in the crisis zones could provide an interesting addition to studying the post-conflict society.

From figures to high quality

The challenges facing civilian crisis management in the near future are immense, and the current situation is far from the objectives that would enable modern crises and conflicts to be responded to efficiently. It may be that the most important goal – foreseeing and preventing conflicts – is still further away. As crises and conflicts, democratic and political dilemmas, financial and developmental difficulties, and religious and ethnic clashes change and diversify, crisis management too must adapt. Skills in conventional peacekeeping differ from the expertise that is required in modern comprehensive crisis management and civilian crisis management. A single mission in Aceh led to the number of Finnish experts acting in international roles to increase from 70 to 100 in a month. On completion of the Aceh mission, the figure will drop below 100 once more.

The civilian resources of the European Union's crisis management forces were scrutinised in July 2005 with the aim of finding out the number of civilian experts that would be required for dealing with impending crises and threats in which the EU intends to get involved. As a result of the resource assessment, the number of trained civilian crisis management experts in the EU will double by 2008. The presidencies of Austria and Finland, in particular, will be faced with the qualitative implementation of the figures: how will the shortcomings be mended or the surplus directed to where it is needed. What areas of crisis man-

agement are suffering from the worst shortcomings and which areas are actually experiencing a surplus? What kinds of exact and targeted expertise are required in the newest missions, such as the imminent EU mission in Kosovo? Solving these questions will be enough work for Austria and Finland – the other member states are sure to be expecting clear answers and results.

Civilian crisis management receives extensive, positive political support both within the government and the opposition. Support also originates from outside the political system. In addition to political alignments, the Parliament has to – when deciding on the budget – consider whether Finland's civilian crisis management resources should be developed to correspond to international development. The EU presidency in autumn 2006 is Finland's chance to prove its worth.

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Civilian Crisis Management Training – Useful or Not?



The aim behind the training for civilian aspects of crisis management was to provide qualified and professional personnel for European Union civilian crisis management missions. In this article, I will look at the usefulness of the training courses and base my analysis on the experiences I gained from the two training courses organised in 2004. Those were the ‘Core Course’, and the ‘Specialisation Course on Mission Management, Administration and Support’ that were held in Pisa and in Berlin respectively. The course in Pisa was organised by Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna and the course in Berlin by Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF), which is responsible for the civilian crisis management training in Germany. Both of the courses were based on the module of training commonly agreed in the EU.

Course curriculum

The Core Course in Pisa dealt with issues such as international treaties giving a framework for a civilian crisis management mission; conflict analysis, civil-military cooperation as well as cooperation between external and local actors. Furthermore, issues related to pre-conflict and post-conflict situations, i.e. refugees, democracy and good governance were addressed during the course, as were also techniques and methods for conflict resolution, core international human rights treaties, and analysis of the cycle of conflict and dialogue between cultures. Some of the issues, such as the establishment of civilian administration in a post-conflict society, and personal security and tolerance for stress, deserved a separate lecture.

In addition to the theoretical lectures, the course included a one and a half day long field exercise with practical lectures on orientation, use of radiophone, mine awareness; and lectures on situations where personal security is threatened.

The Specialisation Course in Berlin was designed for persons with experience in senior management and administration. Thus, the participants represented a large variety of professions from both, the old and new Member States. Among others, those included executive directors and experts from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil servants, chiefs of police and a penitentiary officer; half of whom already had some experience from civilian crisis management missions.

The course curriculum was built upon lectures and different cases. On the one hand, it included lectures on issues related to management and administration such as recruitment of personnel, cooperation, communication and security; and on the other, cases from the EU mission in Georgia and the OSCE operation in Kosovo.

Heading to the field

Since the EU has not yet learnt the lessons from all of its missions, it is rather difficult to analyse whether the training for civilian aspects of crisis management is worthwhile. There are therefore a few questions to be raised on this matter. What kind of missions will the EU carry out? Where? How will the Member States define their expertise? What will the Member States want to achieve in a mission? What areas of expertise will Finland specialise in?

There are also other open questions such as the establishment of a unified system for recruitment. How will the recruitment of qualified persons be organised? How will we be able to find new human resources? When will it be possible to establish comprehensive rosters of experts at national and European level? It will be difficult to find the most qualified personnel for each mission without a centralised system for recruitment. From the point of view of applicants, the large variety of rosters prevents them from applying for civilian crisis management mission. It is also highly important to keep the interested experts motivated and to offer them additional training.

The training courses offered by different organisations, i.e. EU, OSCE, UN and NGOs should be more inter-recognised; as in order to qualify for posts in missions of different organisations applicants have to follow similar courses in different organisations, which may be rather inappropriate.

Most of the participants in the Pisa and Berlin courses were interested in applying for posts in civilian crisis management missions, but they were uninformed about the recruitment processes. It seemed that only few of the Member States had clear application procedures. It also seemed that the posts in missions have been won by “old soldiers”, whereas newcomers have had difficulties in gaining first experiences in the field. Although the election observation missions have been seen

as a good opportunity to achieve this, there are still few questions to be raised. How can newcomers become more integrated into the application processes? Are the processes transparent enough?

In Finland, the new and progressive Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management has been in force since the beginning of 2005. It allows persons in permanent offices to apply for an unpaid leave in order to be able to participate in a civilian crisis management mission and return to their posts after that. This arrangement motivates experts and lays the foundation for real opportunities for participating in a mission.

Developing the training

Recruitment processes

The common impression is that recruitment for a mission has been made on an occasional basis, and that there are no clear criteria or principles guiding the recruitment processes. It is therefore important to further develop the processes, so that the most qualified applicants who are chosen are also those capable of leaving on a short notice. Furthermore, it is also essential to choose persons representing both the public and the third sectors since the tasks in a mission vary largely.

Course curriculum

Both of the courses I participated in concentrated on lectures. They would have been more effective if the first week had been structured on the basis of prior readings, and that lectures had been followed by a second week with more emphasis on practical cases. It would also be useful to organise a training course in a post-conflict area.

The human rights and gender issues should be mainstreamed in all training for civilian aspects of crisis management; also issues such as sustainable development and environmental questions should be taken into account. According to the surveys carried out by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), emphasis should be given to the strengthening of the role of women in prevention of conflicts and post-conflict situations. Here, the question is not only about the special needs of vulnerable and affected women, but also about how women could be used as an equal resource for peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. It should be a requirement that persons sent to the field are committed to gender equality when undertaking their duties in a mission. Women should also be nominated into posts at different levels, including senior management level.

Training – useful or not

The EU should be prepared for the challenges to be faced in the field of civilian crisis management by also developing the training. Closer cooperation with the OSCE should also be considered in order to avoid any overlapping in the training systems. Cooperation with the UN organisations as well as NGOs should also be under continuous scrutiny.

It is difficult to analyse the usefulness of the training without any concrete experience from the field. However, multicultural training strengthens the so called EU spirit while it also recognises national and cultural differences, and offers an opportunity to create networks. With regard to the professionalism of the training, it would be valuable to recruit national trainers from different Member States, and persons with field experience as trainers in the courses.

Furthermore, it would be advisable to establish an internet based network of trainees, in order to keep up their motivation and to offer a forum for information sharing. The possibility of organising some kind

of “brush-up” programmes should be discussed. Finally, with regard to recruitment for missions, it is important to choose those persons who have completed the training.

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Kalle Sysikaski

Reflections on Conflicts and Development



In February 2004, I participated in the European Union Civilian Crisis Management Core Course in England and in June 2005, in the Specialisation Course on Democratisation and Good Governance in Paris.

I found the courses very useful, since they allowed full concentration on questions of civilian crisis management during a two week period. The majority of the participants had experience from crisis situations, in particular from Kosovo, but many had been in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Ivory Coast and Rwanda. Personally, I gained experience in the Middle East, Indonesia and East-Timor. In addition to the participants from the EU Member States, it was important to have participants also from Kenya,

Zimbabwe, Ghana, the Palestinian territories and Sri Lanka. This was a good way to share experiences and test our own thoughts with persons whose background has been influenced by circumstances, which should benefit from civilian crisis management.

During the course, the concept of civilian crisis management was used in a rather large context to include conflict prevention, armed conflict situations and post-war reconstruction. However, the emphasis was put on the last two circumstances. This choice reflects the situation in which the EU currently finds itself. It does not have a coherent strategy for action in crisis situations, and for early intervention to prevent conflicts from escalating. Furthermore, the EU does not have enough resources for civilian crisis management. There are at least two reasons for this. On the one hand, the importance of conflict prevention is not understood well enough; and on the other, intervention in crisis situations is usually carried out because of the public pressure.

However, there is an exception to this; the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. There, the use of conflict prevention by the international community proved to be effective in terms of preventing violence from escalating and confrontations between different ethnic groups from becoming more serious. Before the international community acted, there had already been several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) doing valuable work. For instance, NGOs had facilitated cooperation between media and journalists representing different ethnic groups to create dialogue and interethnic journalism, which then later helped to find a solution to the conflict.

The Core Course was organised by an NGO; Peaceworkers UK. Many of its active members had personal experience from working at grass-roots level in a conflict area. The course concentrated on developing and practicing team skills, and exercises were conducted by trainers from Europe as well as local actors from different conflict areas. The

situation of handicapped persons, children, ethnic minorities and women were then continuously brought up in the discussion. The gender question was dealt with in a realistic and multilevel way, and not on a “woman – good, man – bad” scale. There are many conflict situations which have mostly affected men.

The last part of the Core Course was held in the OCSE training centre in Wales. The final exam of the course was organised there, and it included sections on election observation, a situation related to mine explosion, first aid, and orientation, an exercise with a four-wheel drive, negotiations with a corrupt mayor, writing a report and, designing a plan as well as discussion with an OSCE representative. Some inhabitants of the nearby village of Sennybridge had been recruited to play a part in the exercise. Their role was to form into hostile groups.

The Specialisation Course in France was organised by ENA (École Nationale d'Administration) – the school where many of the French political leaders and high-level civil servants have been educated. Strong on this, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs regulated the organisation of the course rather intensively. It was thus fairly difficult to find lecturers from outside the francophone world.

Nevertheless, the course was rich in content, even though it concentrated in good governance and did not deal very broadly with the problems related to corruption in crisis areas. The subjects that were dealt with were the development of civilian crisis management, the differences in opinion between the EU and the United States, the role of media in conflict situations, elections, and efforts to promote good governance particularly in Bosnia, Kosovo and Ivory Coast.

In the following discussion, I will present some ideas on the themes dealt with in the courses, which I regard as very central in civilian crisis management.

Intervention in conflicts

A peaceful intervention in conflicts is always better and cheaper than a military intervention. One could compare for instance the cases of South Africa and Iraq. The persistent pressure used by the international community on the apartheid government of South Africa saved many lives and eased the process from the racist political system towards a democratic one. However, this argument has been criticised in that the changes were slow during the three decades governed by the apartheid system. The problem with this criticism is that the change would have been essentially rapid if all core international players had supported the UN boycott from the very beginning. The war in Iraq has been expensive, and has caused severe human suffering without there being any peaceful democratic development in sight. The war has also put the common rules of international community into question.

The situations in South Africa and Iraq cannot however be compared. During the apartheid government in South Africa there was a body, the African National Congress (ANC) that was supported by the majority of the people, and which promoted the rights of the non-white population; a body with which the UN was able to cooperate. In Iraq, there was not such an actor. Nevertheless, before the United States with its allies started the war, the international community had had an opportunity to gain more political power in Iraq, when the government of Saddam Hussein had started to become more isolated. By using this opportunity, it would have been possible to promote a change – even a slow one – towards democracy and increase international surveillance in Iraq, instead of creating unnecessary human suffering and chaos. The current political tensions between the Islamic and the western world would also have been prevented.

There are no rapid and easy solutions to crisis situations. Therefore, it is necessary to develop early warning mechanisms for the recognition of a threat of – both direct and structural – violent conflicts. Hopefully, the UN will develop its “lessons learnt” policy into this direction. It is also important to improve communication mechanisms of local and international NGOs with organisations representing governments.

I understand civilian crisis management as an internationally-led administration established in a country or in a certain area; but it should not be responsible for all administrative sectors. For example, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Aceh signed on 15 August 2005 provided no international administration in Aceh, which is a province of Indonesia. Instead, an international monitoring mission was launched with a mandate to rule on disputes on the MoU between the central government in Jakarta and Acehnese people. The mandate was not only to monitor the disarmament process and ceasefire, but also the execution of political, administrative and economic reforms.

An international presence is usually needed, when an effort to prevent a conflict from escalating has failed. In that situation, civilian crisis management combines efforts in managing the conflict as well as in reducing uncertainty and use of violence in the area. However, these activities usually take place when the most violent phase of conflict has been passed. In order to succeed in civilian crisis management, the activities have to enhance the stabilisation of the society towards a sustained and democratic system. A similar example of such enhancement is, when an international actor monitors that local actors work towards these aims.

In Aceh, the role of international actors, EU and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was mainly determined by the international law; i.e. by the fact that Aceh is situated on the state territory of Indonesia. Many Acehnese people felt that the final result would

have been better, if an external actor had taken a larger responsibility; for example, for the provincial legal system. However, if the local actors succeeded in their work, the mission model presented in Aceh would be seen as ideal, because it also enables international actors to finalise their work. With regard to Kosovo or Bosnia and Herzegovina, such a vision for the future is rather unlikely at the moment. There is however, a difference between Kosovo or Bosnia and Aceh, in that there are no deep cleavages between ethnic groups in Aceh; which helps to mobilise local actors and strengthens their “ownership” in the peace process. There is a prerequisite to this though; the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the powerful Government of Indonesia need to keep to their roles as set out in the MoU. With regard to this, it is equally important that the monitoring and reconciliation mechanism will be used in Aceh until the whole peace agreement has been executed.

Peace negotiations

Peace negotiations are usually understood as a process, the aim of which is to stop the war and make the parties to the conflict sign a peace agreement. There is no standard model for peace negotiations, as every conflict is influenced by different internal and external dynamics. In the case of Aceh, the momentum for peace negotiations was in 1998, when General Suharto, who had governed Indonesia with a bloody grip, was forced to leave his office.

In September 2004, Indonesia got its first president elected by direct elections. The elected president, Yudhyono, knew that the international community waited for action towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Aceh. This was also necessary for the internal development in Indonesia and its international reputation. At the same time the Free Aceh Movement had started to understand, after having been

influenced by international interaction, that it was not able to achieve peace by sticking to the demands for independence. Both parties to the conflict were therefore able to redefine their engagement to the peace process in which they wanted to act, and which they wanted to own. Such an engagement eased the launching of the EU and ASEAN civilian crisis management mission.

The situation in Aceh is different compared to for example Burundi, where the internationally supported elections ended up in a massacre of about 300 000 persons. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed in 2000. However, it did not lead to a local peace process, because the signed agreement was an export product without any ownership at the local level. Since then, Burundi has been living in an absence of declared war; a situation in which peace and social development have been very fragile. The presidential and parliamentary elections were however, organised during the summer 2005.

The struggle for power and resources are the root causes of the conflict in Burundi, a country of six million inhabitants, where the government composed of elite representatives of the Tutsi minority killed almost all educated Hutu families in order to stay in power. Local actors and processes were needed to start the peace negotiations. Eugene Nindodera has been such a key local actor, who could be called a local Nelson Mandela. He is a Tutsi who established the first Burundian human rights organisation in the 1990's, and who is highly respected among the Burundians. With international assistance, Hutus and Tutsis representing different professional sectors and administrative levels have been integrated into a new unofficial peace process, financially supported by foreign countries. In the process, different actors have had the possibility to see things from the view point of the others and of the people living in the least developed areas; that, in order to find a common vision for the future without being forced to engage in the official peace process. Should the unofficial process succeed, it would

positively affect the official peace process. This would enable the development and stabilisation of the civilian administration with international support.

Media

The role of the media in societies and communities affected by violent conflict cannot be overstated. In these situations, the media may actually have deepened and strengthened narratives about members of another group. The media had a strong negative influence, for example, in the wars in the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the media can assist in a peacebuilding process, and thus, be an essential element of civilian crisis management. The radio has a particularly important role in societies torn by conflicts, because it can reach out to the majority of the population. For instance in Congo, international assistance has enabled the radio to help communities restore their lives. An international actor and local women's groups have quite often been the driving force behind the establishment of a radio station. International finance has also been given to educate women as radio reporters. Furthermore, radio stations have gathered representatives of different ethnic groups to discuss the similarities and differences in their lives. Radio stations have also launched campaigns to make listeners familiar with the plans on constitution and the prerequisites for peace. At the same time, radio stations have tried to help marginalised groups getting their voice heard. In addition, radio stations have also supported multiethnic theatre groups and enabled them to give a play in theatres. In particular, this has engaged young people from different ethnic groups into multiethnic activities, because theatre has created new local stars.

A problematic issue in civilian crisis management is the disputes between different ethnic groups. Normally problems cannot be resolved by forcing different groups to cooperate. Kosovo gives good examples.

Serbs demanded that the UN establish special administrative districts, which the UN refused to do. Later on however, the UN was obliged to establish such districts in order to secure Serbs' lives. Deep cleavages cannot be translated into a multiethnic life overnight. At first, in view of preventing violence and revenge from reoccurring, it is necessary to create premises so that a life side by side can be tolerated, and then to start developing methods such as those used in the Congo.

Praising war victories and stirring up of hatred have to be stopped and there, the media can have even a decisive role. War journalism that praises heroes and creates sensation is not only a problem in conflict areas, but an issue that also needs to be self-critically dealt with in the EU countries. Similarly, the same is required of the media's possibilities in promoting gender equality and raising voices from marginalised groups.

Elections

A well-functioning government that is free from corruption and supported by the people is a prerequisite for democratic development and political stability in societies. In order to achieve this, free and fair elections that are at least sufficiently representative of the will of the people should be organised. There is also an international legal basis for organisations of elections; it can be found in the 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is difficult to achieve a successful resolution to a conflict without democratic elections laying the foundation for a government supported by the people.

Democratic elections enable society to develop itself peacefully. In the 1990's there have been few positive examples of this, such as South Africa and El Salvador. This century there has been East Timor, Ukraine, Georgia and Indonesia. The international community and the EU have had a role in all these cases. They have provided infrastruc-



Kirsi Airaksinen 1999

On 30 August in 1999, the East-Timorese voted for the independence of their home country. During the transitional period that followed the elections until 20 May 2002, East Timor was governed by the United Nations.

ture, acted as mentor, trainer or observer; or organised the elections. An election process is not separate from the development of society as a whole. Such a process enables parties to start a dialogue and resolve disputes non-violently. Election processes also create confidence towards the future among societies, and institutionalise other democratic processes.

Election processes also enable societies torn by conflicts to participate in the activities of the international community and to follow its norms. Elections have enabled the UN to terminate a mission in a country and allocate resources somewhere else. The success of elections has traditionally been measured by asking whether they were free and fair. This should be the ultimate aim, but it takes time to achieve this. There-

fore, terms such as ‘approved elections’ or ‘elections reflecting the will of the people’ should be used.

In 2004, Indonesia organised parliamentary, provincial and presidential elections. From the Finnish point of view, it was difficult to establish an eligible party or to get nominated as a candidate. Elections in Aceh were not free, and there were severe misuses in the Western Papua. However, it could be said that the elections reflected the will of the people and enhanced peaceful development in Indonesia. Thus, we as EU observers did not regard these elections as a failure.

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Strengths and Weaknesses of EU Civilian Crisis Management



According to Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the progress the EU has made in the field of crisis management has reached the velocity of light. In fact, the metaphor is rather correct when putting the progress made into a time frame. The structural changes made and the missions launched within the framework of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) following the 1999 Helsinki European Council, have had a positive influence both on the internal evolution of the EU and its credibility at the international scene.

This context as well as the fact that there are two complementary and mutually reinforcing elements – civilian and military – should be kept

in mind when analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the EU crisis management capacity. The development of civilian and military crisis management capabilities is a process in which on the one hand, the EU still defines the concepts and rebuilds the structure; and puts them into practise, on the other. Thus, the strengths and weaknesses evolve constantly. However, in order to see civilian crisis management's evolving place within the EU's tools, an attempt to go beyond the purely detailed factual information at any given time is needed. Identifying trends can be helpful for better comprehension.

Political and institutional framework

The changes in the political and institutional structures of the CFSP are crucial for the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the EU crisis management capacity.

The conduct of the CFSP was firmly in the hands of the capitals of the EU Member States until the end of the 1990's. The Political Committee (PoCo), consisting of the Director Generals of the Political Departments of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, gathered for a meeting in Brussels 1–2 times a month to agree upon the proposals made by the Working Groups on Foreign and Security Policies, which were also run from the capital cities. Since the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the focus in the fields of the CFSP and ESDP has gradually been transferred to Brussels, due to the establishment of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the place of the Political Committee. The fusion of the geographical Working Groups has further contributed the shift of overall decision-making to Brussels.

The work of the PSC is supported by the Politico-Military Working Group (PMG), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which are

also responsible for the preparation of the crisis management agenda. This work is further supported by a new preparatory body called Group Nicolaidis.

In addition to the establishment of these Council working bodies, the supporting structure of the General Secretariat of the Council has changed remarkably. The High Representative for the CFSP acting also as the Secretary General of the Council, has a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit plus two other units specialised in crisis management at his disposal, which have been established within the Directorate-General for External Economic Relations and Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Council Secretariat. One of them concentrates on civilian crisis management and has a separate Police Unit, whereas the other deals with security and defence related issues of crisis management. The purely military expertise within the General Secretariat is found in the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), a department directly attached to the Secretary General/High Representative but working under the direction of the EUMC.

Developed under the guidance of the PSC, the EU now has internal guidelines called Crisis Management Procedures (CMPs) and a concept for coherent and comprehensive crisis management planning (Civil-Military Coordination CMCO). These procedures, as well as the work of the committees mentioned above, are further developed through the conduct of regular Crisis Management Exercises (CME).

The appropriate structures established for the conduct of the ESDP were soon declared operational and thus, the Laeken European Council in December 2001 could state that the EU was able to operate in the field of crisis management while certain limitations were acknowledged. This operational capacity was put in practise in January 2003 when the EU launched its first ever ESDP crisis management operation, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM).

The above mentioned factors, i.e. the changes in the political and institutional framework, the commonly developed procedures, and the launch of crisis management operations, have actually reshaped the role and the agenda of the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER). The PSC has become the third most important player alongside the COREPER I and II with regard to the questions related to the CFSP and in particular the ESDP, even though it still formally works under the direction of COREPER.

Crisis management culture

The institutional structure and traditional concepts for action of the EU have not been designed for operational activities such as crisis management. It is a challenge for the administration and the EU's external credibility to plan and control operations in the jungle of paragraphs and committees. Does the EU have credible crisis management capabilities compared to NATO? The EU has a weakness: its work in the field of crisis management is still rather unknown. This should be kept in mind when operations are being planned and launched, regarding the area of operations and the wider international audience.

In order to improve this situation, the EU has started to spread knowledge on the ESDP and to foster a European security culture under the ESDP. In November 2003 the Council approved guiding principles, the EU Training Policy in ESDP. In September 2004 it agreed upon the EU Training Concept outlining the measures and principles required for the training in the EU, and its activities concerning EU citizens working with the issues of crisis management at national level. The Concept is comprehensive, encompassing both the civilian and military dimensions of the ESDP.

Civilian versus military crisis management

In the early years of the development of the ESDP, the role of military crisis management was more visible compared to that of civilian crisis management. There were a few reasons for this; namely, the wars in the Western Balkans, the consensus between France and the United Kingdom in St. Malo in 1998, the dissolution of the Western European Union (WEU) and the transfer of its tasks to the EU.

Furthermore, the decisions of the Helsinki European Council to lay down the foundation for the new structures of crisis management undoubtedly strengthened the firm role of military crisis management within the EU. This is because among the new bodies, there were the EU Military Committee, and the 150-strong EU Military Staff. In addition to this, the media regularly reported on the Helsinki Headline Goal and the voluntary contributions of the Member States related to it. Although the CIVCOM was also established in spring 2000, it was not given with an equally strong support structure within the Council Secretariat as the Military Committee.

The EU statements and documents present the EU crisis management within a comprehensive framework. In other words, military crisis management is complementary to civilian crisis management, and vice versa, depending on the nature of a crisis. However, this equality is theoretical, since neither the EU nor the Member States have directed the same resources to civilian crisis management or taken the same practical steps in order to further develop it compared to military crisis management, although the crisis management operations the EU has launched have mainly been civilian in nature. More attention should be paid to this, because the future operations will include both the civilian and military components, and this requires changes in mission planning and set-up, chain of command and information as well as procurement.

The number of personnel in the EU civilian crisis management missions has so far been rather modest. There have been 10-20 persons in the smallest missions, and up to a couple of hundred in the largest. The reason for this is that the missions have mainly concentrated on advising and mentoring. Regardless of the small amount of required personnel, the problem has been the difficulty in finding qualified personnel for the missions, in particular police officers. The contributions from non-EU countries, the so called third countries, have somehow eased the situation. Still, some missions have suffered a shortage of qualified personnel.

The problem is actually larger; the UN operations also lack personnel. With regards to the EU the contradiction is obvious, since it is difficult to explain the gap between the commitments declared at the highest political level and the actual contributions. The gap may have resulted from the early declaratory phases in the development of civilian crisis management capabilities, during which the Member States contributed experts in great numbers without taking the actual need into account. The contributions also included so called “double-hatted” capabilities; i.e. contributions to other organisations, the availability of which is rather uncertain.

In recent years the aim has been to fill the gap through a process called the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 in which the Member States have elaborated illustrative scenarios, in order to define the actual need for civilian crisis management capabilities. The scenarios also enable national authorities to better define national capabilities and further develop them for the use of the EU.

Chronic lack of money

According to the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (Title V, Article 28) and the more detailed Guidelines approved by the Council in Sep-

tember 2003, the general rule for financing civilian crisis management missions is that all costs from salaries to running costs are charged to the Community budget. If the Member States so unanimously decide, finance for civilian crisis management missions can also be charged to the Member States on a case by case basis, in accordance with the gross national product scale or on a “costs lay where they fall” basis.

One of the factors that have an impact on the activities in the field of civilian crisis management is the limited budget for the CFSP. The situation has remained almost unchanged for years. The budget charged with expected payments such as the expenses of the EU’s Special Representatives, leaves less room for the planning of new civilian crisis management missions. The budget of the CFSP is thus insufficient to achieve the ambitious aims the European Security Strategy set out in 2003, should the recent efforts to increase its over-all level in the EU budgetary framework for 2007–2013 prove unsuccessful.

Interface with the Commission’s activities

The interface between the ESDP and the work and instruments of the Commission in the field of civilian crisis management is continuously discussed in the PSC. The Commission has enormous financial resources available for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-war reconstruction. However, the Member States prefer the use of their crisis capabilities under the ESDP, in particular in cases where there is a demand for a politically visible and rapid response by the EU.

The Council has defined the priority areas of civilian crisis management: Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration, Civil Protection, Monitoring and support to EU Special Representatives. The Commission may also carry out activities in these areas. The basic rule of thumb would however, be that the Commission’s capabilities are used for long-term activities, whereas crisis management capabilities used under the

ESDP are meant for a short-term and limited mission. Continuity between the ESDP and Community activities is essential.

Conclusion

The history of the EU civilian crisis management may be short but it has certainly been intensive. The EU decision-making structure and control mechanisms, operational structures and internal policy guidelines for crisis management have proven to be effective and functional, which is a notable achievement when bearing in mind that all decisions on crisis management operations as well as their political and strategic control are unanimously taken by the 25 Member States.

However, the Member States have not committed capabilities as expected. While this is merely a structural problem without a solution in sight, it is essential for the EU to be able to finalise the Civilian Headline Goal process so that the shortfalls can be acted upon and hopefully remedied, at national level. But in order to fill the gaps found during the process, the EU should look beyond 2008. Nevertheless, some results can be expected already towards the end of 2006 when the Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) will be at the EU's disposal.

There's a growing need for civilian crisis management as also expressed by the interest from the part of the UN, the African Union (AU), and other international organisations as well as non-EU states. The United States has also shown signs of interest towards civilian crisis management as a potential tool within the crisis management capabilities, and thus follows with attention all the activities undertaken and lessons learnt by the EU.

When analysing strengths and weaknesses of the EU civilian crisis management one should bear in mind that developing civilian crisis management capabilities is an on-going process because of which it is difficult to give a thorough analysis. There surely is a need for improve-

ment in different sectors. However, the image of Council bodies and support structures being bureaucratic and slow is also a reflection of, and depends on the level of political will and interest expressed by the 25 Member States. Nevertheless, there are a few positive examples of a successful launching of a mission within a very short period of time; these are the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah) – an achievement which has not gone unnoticed at the international scene.

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European Union Civilian Crisis Management: Further Development

Civilian Crisis Management in a Multilateral Context



There is one thing that clearly comes into mind when thinking about various political processes of the near past that strongly illustrate the European identity: the manifestations organised in tens of European cities to protest against the planned attack on Iraq by the United States and Great Britain. The New York Times presented a classical conclusion on the impact of the manifestations in which it stated that there seems to be another superpower in the world beside the United States – the global public opinion.

The core member states of the European Union, France and Germany, refused to join the US military expedition to Iraq; and thus the main military support came mainly from the Great Britain and the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. However, in the countries

which were willing to give military support – Denmark, Italy and Spain – citizens were unanimous and loud in their manifestations. The American commentators started to sarcastically talk about an “old Europe” and implicitly pointed out that the “new Europe” having supported the United States will give a new direction to the future.

The dispute on the military expedition led in particular, to an analysis of European self-understanding and identity in the “old Europe’s” media and literature. The conclusion drawn from the analysis was not that Europe should have given support to American unilateralism based on the use of military force; rather the conclusion was that there are many good characteristics in the European nature: support to multilateralism, tolerance, and restraint from using military force. In this analysis the European multilateralism was regarded as a historically new attitude: in global politics the “old Europe” represented something new whereas the “new Europe” was still captured by the traumatic past.

Return of multilateralism

When thinking about the present day atmosphere in international politics compared to the rather negative development during the past ten years, it becomes obvious that in order to promote and embed multilateralism, the international community needs exceptional events that shake international consciousness. The United Nations Charter and the important Universal Declaration on Human Rights were born in the wake of the Second World War, at a time the World could feel relief after the war but all the atrocities were still fresh in the mind.

The OSCE Charter of Paris (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) on the enhancement of peaceful cooperation and democracy in Europe, and the other related documents that were agreed upon in the beginning of the 1990’s, were born in an optimistic atmosphere created by the end of the Cold War. However, the next ten years

saw the return of the unilateralism and power politics. Is the international community awakening to the realisation that neither unilateralism, nor power politics or a war against terrorism based on the use of force will lead to any positive outcome; that such policies make it more difficult managing and resolving global and local problems which the international community is responsible for?

In the above example, the concept of multilateralism has been used as an umbrella concept that is understood to cover at least the universally accepted human rights and the principle of rule of law, democracy, and the peaceful resolution of international disputes that all are included in the UN Charter and in international law. These principles frame the responsibility of all states and of the international community to respect the sovereignty of other states. The states also have the responsibility of implementing these principles with regard to their own citizens. When this latter responsibility is being violated, the international community has a right – morally viewed, it's an obligation – to intervene in a situation, where a government neglects these principles or when it cannot guarantee their implementation on its territory.

Thus, it can be stated that universal human rights, rule of law and democracy define the common global set of values which multilateralism leans on. These values are, as a basis of an international community, quickly replacing the previous ideas of the centrality of state sovereignty, which understood the – generally unilateral – *raison d'état* as the legitimate right for states' behaviour. There are many reasons for this change which all can be compiled under a single concept: the unforeseen acceleration of globalisation. In the new international system, state sovereignty is preserved – or rather, is even emphasised – as an important principle; but it should be seen more in the context of the concept of subsidiarity as used in the EU.

It would be a mistake however, to believe that nothing has changed in the world. The changes over the last half a century have been remark-

able. The interwar period and decades after it were characterised by a belief of an inherent inequality between the “races” as well as between and within nations. The belief of the right of the states to deviate from moral norms and international law was regarded as conventional wisdom. These beliefs have now gone through a transformation, both in international politics and public opinion. Over the past half-century old beliefs have been replaced by a consciousness of the equality of people and universality of human rights, and the states’ responsibility for respecting and effectively implementing those rights.

Changes in security environment

International wars that were characteristic to the 20th century are now unlikely. One of the main reasons is the growing technological, economic and political interdependence between states. The superpower relations were static during decades because a nuclear war was seen as not only unreasonable, but impossible because of the high material and political costs. This tendency seems to become true also when it comes to a war fought with conventional weapons. However, there are clear exceptions to this, such as the so called frozen conflicts (e.g. Israel-Palestine) and the conflicts that have broken out in the wake of the collapse of communism and the consequent crisis over legitimacy.

According to a popular argument within the academic circles, World Wars I and II as well as the Cold War were actually the same war. This war started in 1914 and ended in 1989 when the Berlin wall broke down, or in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. This argument states that before World War I, the world was not receptive to demands for “liberal” democratic reforms within nations or in international relations. On the contrary, World War I aggravated the situation by clearing the ground for communism and fascism and thus, for authoritarianism and totalitarianism. This then led to World War

II and the subsequent long Cold War. It is a remarkable achievement that mankind has been able to overcome all the atrocities of the 20th century and reach a consensus on universal values, which national and international development can base on. It now seems that the time of international wars has passed.

Even though this may be the case, it does not mean that armed violence used for political means has been neglected. Nowadays, armed violence has two common contexts: international terrorism and regional conflicts.

International terrorism

Terrorism has simply been equated with international organised crime in the media, but also in many international documents. Seen from the angle of moral indignation towards terrorism, this is rather natural. However, with regard to understanding the whole phenomenon, this approach may not be very fruitful. Common criminals tend to understand the law and its moral basis and normally regard it as legitimate, but in order to promote their selfish goals, they neglect it. What is essential here is that the criminals seem to think they can hide their personality so that no connection can be established between them and a criminal act.

However, terrorist's background is usually completely different. According to their own claim, they have highly social and unselfish ideals. This legitimates the rejection of moral sense, and helps to see the use of violent attacks as acts of heroism. While a terrorist on his own tries to stay beyond reach of law, he wants to make it explicitly clear whom and what noble objective he or she has been working for. The purpose of a terrorist attack is not only to hit the immediate target, but to arouse fear or respect – or both.

Regional conflicts

It is difficult to give an overall view on the nature of armed regional conflicts, since every conflict has its own history influenced by different historical, political, cultural, geographical or ecological factors. It is also rare that a local conflict is purely local. There are usually various “external” interests and actors in a conflict who finance and deliver weapons, or politically support one or many of the parties in the conflict. The interest of the international community is thus to try prevent these kinds of conflicts from escalating. Local conflicts are always a threat to a larger regional security.

Soon after the UN was established, it started to practice peacekeeping. At first it was assumed that peacekeeping was needed for interstate armed conflicts in which, on the basis of an agreement between the UN Security Council and the parties to the conflict, international troops would monitor a ceasefire, and thus would help to agree on a permanent peace agreement. However, it became clear that international troops – peacekeepers – were also needed in intrastate wars; the reasons for which can be – directly or indirectly – traced back to the collapse of colonialist regimes.

The use of force in a peacekeeping operation is strictly limited to self-defence. This has essentially enabled the parties in conflict to accept the international troops’ presence as a “buffer” in the conflict area. It has been clear from the very beginning that peacekeeping is only one of the crisis management tools – or conflict management as it has been used in the UN language. Comprehensive conflict management has always included various tasks ranging from diplomacy to promises of aid for post-conflict reconstruction, or economic aid for the parties to a conflict.

Before the end of the Cold War it was seen that the UN and the regional organisation in the northern hemisphere, the OSCE, were the only organisations that could give a legitimate mandate to a peacekeep-

ing operation. However, after the end of the Cold War this legacy has been questioned. The bombings of Serbia – which were related to the situation in Kosovo – were based on an ultimatum from NATO, which was very loosely supported by the UN Security Council resolutions. According to many experts on international law, the bombings were illegal. Also, the intervention in Iraq by a coalition led by the United States has been defined as illegal by almost all international law practitioners. However, both of these cases have been presented to a larger public as crisis management operations, and there are now discussions on whether other organisations than the UN and the OSCE (i.e. the EU or NATO) have a right to issue a legitimate mandate for a crisis management operation.

Importance of multilateralism to EU civilian crisis management

What is problematic in this on-going discussion is the concept of crisis management. It has been developed within the EU and does not belong to the UN language. From a semantic point of view, the concept is clearer than the concepts of peacekeeping and conflict prevention. In fact, crisis management could be used as an umbrella concept and replace the various preceding concepts. However, the old concepts have a different “ownership”, which has created some confusion regarding the legitimacy of the mandate for intervention in different areas of action.

During the past ten years the EU has tried to deepen the integration and change from a single market area into a political union. These efforts have been particularly clear in the field of foreign and security policy. The EU has created a military capacity of about 60 000 persons who can be deployed within a few weeks. Furthermore, the EU has decided to form rapid reaction battle groups. Some may have understood that the EU has developed these capabilities with UN or OSCE missions

in sight. Others however, have presented strong opinions in favour of EU crisis management operations that could be deployed without a mandate from the UN; in particular in cases when the UN Security Council's ability to take decisions is being blocked by one of its permanent members' veto.

In order to strengthen an international system based on multilateralism, the EU should be clear about how it sees traditional defence and crisis management. According to the UN Charter, the EU has a legal right to self-defence; but international crisis management can only be undertaken legitimately on the basis of a decision taken by the UN Security Council or the OSCE. The conceptual and political unclearness of legitimacy are not propitious to the situation. The EU should therefore strive towards a well-functioning United Nations that has faced serious problems in its decision-making.

Based on an initiative from Finland and Sweden, the EU has started to develop a civilian crisis management capability. The understanding behind this is that a successful crisis management operation – in addition to an eventual military operation – is first and foremost a civilian mission. Negotiations or diplomacy, even if all parties were not formal diplomats, have always taken place in the context of an armed conflict – or its threat.

In the past decades civilian crisis management has also become popular in the field. It has come under various forms such as rescue and reconstruction missions, projects on administration and democracy, election observation, and health education projects as well as humanitarian missions. While there has been a growing understanding of the international community's responsibility to respond to conflict situations, which it has responded to, the respect for local "ownership" in local affairs has also increased.

In order to develop an efficient civilian crisis management capacity for the EU, every Member State must create a well-structured system


for training and legislation (e.g. from the point of view of permanent employment contracts) that enables flexible participation in crisis management operations. In Finland, training has been started under the Ministry of the Interior and has been mainly directed at rescue services and police. Therefore, civilian crisis management has so far been rather too narrowly and technically understood in Finland. Instead, as the previous discussion shows, an efficient civilian crisis management is based on a large variety of expertise.

Yet another aspect has not been carefully taken into account; the participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in civilian crisis management, which has steadily increased. It would be beneficial to establish a tripartite training system based on cooperation between the state, NGOs and universities.

The development of training systems within the EU is not a trivial issue, because the direction this development will take will reflect the EU ability to analyse the state of the World and, its commitment to multilateral international politics and institutions.

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Parliamentarians in Preventing Crises



What does conflict prevention in fact include? How can we help in achieving stability and strengthening democracy and peace in order to support human rights? One of the means is to show and tell about the experiences gained in building welfare state and equality in the Nordic countries.

We seem to forget that a “borderless” sphere based on peace and cooperation between the Nordic countries has not always existed – wars and disputes on frontiers are an inherent part of Nordic history. After the wars, the Finnish welfare state and social equality were not developed through a welfare policy based on solidarity, but through a healthy

“selfish” and far-sighted policy. Therefore, by sharing our experiences and using dialogue we can support, for instance, the establishment and functioning of parliamentarianism and multi-party system in countries where they do not yet exist.

We can also assist in promoting equality between people, and equal opportunities for women to become active actors in society and also political decision-makers. We can show that active and equal dialogue between non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – or the whole civil society – politicians and authorities has been an essential ingredient in building welfare and social stability in Nordic societies.

Although Finland’s aim in development cooperation and foreign policy has been to carry out a human rights policy that supports democratic development and strengthens the rule of law system and good governance – in other words, the cornerstones of stability and peace – the Finnish parties have not done a great deal in development cooperation.

In addition to the official development assistance, NGOs are regarded as actors in development cooperation, but political parties have not been engaged in bilateral or multilateral cooperation outside Europe. Should the parties adopt a more active role in development cooperation, it would be useful on the one hand, for the development of a party system and democracy in a country Finland cooperated with in development, and useful on the other, for the Finnish parliamentarianism in an era during which democratic systems have to face the challenges of globalisation.

Next, I will introduce two parliamentary projects that have been designed for supporting democratic structures and actors in Tanzania and Afghanistan. However, support directed at different peaceful groups in developing countries does not automatically guarantee stability, nor it is the only tool that can be used for work for peace.

Democracy dialogue with Tanzanians

A project called “Democracy Dialogue” was born out of a report of the Advisory Board for Relations with Developing Countries, and of a follow-up process by its successor, the Development Policy Committee. The objective has been to create an instrument and forum for cooperation, which the political parties could use for developing dialogue with future decision-makers from developing countries.

Cooperation started through a pilot project with Tanzanians. The purpose of the project was to provide support to Tanzanian political parties in order to develop their capabilities and possibilities, increase interest in politics, and to strengthen democracy in the country. Also, the aim was to increase Finnish parliamentarians’ knowledge about the challenges Tanzania and other developing countries will face with regard to democratic development.

The pilot project was launched upon a visit of a group of ten persons representing different parties and political groups to Finland, in the context of local elections in October 2004. The second phase of the project took place in April 2005, when a group consisting of members of the Finnish Development Policy Committee and parliamentarians visited Tanzania.

The Finnish society was introduced to the Tanzanian delegation during the electoral campaign, when the Tanzanians also had a possibility to visit campaign events of different parties, and learn about campaigns, the role of the media and NGOs as well as the functioning of municipal services – mainly about educational system and infrastructural projects. The visitors paid attention to the security situation in Finland, and noticed that there were no policemen or soldiers in the streets. They also discussed the active participation of young people and women in politics, which was seen as a positive phenomenon.

It was agreed that dialogue on issues such as the role of opposition and media in democracy, principles of good governance, functioning of electoral systems, participation and role of NGOs, would be continued after the visit. Practical questions important to political groups – finance, membership and activities – will also be discussed in the future.

The visit of a Finnish group to Tanzania took place during a period, when the country was preparing for the elections of October 2005. One of the most topical issues at that time was the compiling of a register of voters, which was indeed a challenging task. Ensuring the fair running of elections, and the citizens' rights for free expression, were seen as important.

The Finnish delegation, which consisted of four parliamentarians and six members of the Development Policy Committee, met Tanzanian political leaders and representatives from both the ruling party and the opposition. The delegation discussed various issues with the Tanzanians, such as preparations for elections, development of economy and budget planning as well as equality and citizens' political and civil rights. Furthermore, the group was familiarised with municipal administration, educational system, possibilities for NGO activities, and the autonomy of Zanzibar where the political situation had become tense.

Tanzania is a rather stable country in terms of politics, but it does not always fulfil the criteria for a multi-party system. Conflicts in neighbouring countries and the ensuing flows of refugees have consequences for the whole region, and thus, endanger social stability also in Tanzania.

An organisation, Political Parties of Finland for Democracy (DEMO Finland), has led on the democracy dialogue cooperation. DEMO Finland has enabled interested parties to continue and deepen a dialogue with political groups from developing countries. DEMO Finland, which is an organisation for democratic cooperation of all registered parties in the Parliament, started its official work in February 2006. DEMO

Finland supports the cooperation between Finnish political parties and political groups from developing countries in various ways.

The idea behind DEMO Finland's work is that the increasing of parliaments' and political parties' capabilities creates a stable ground for democratic development. Some issues, such as improving the participation and influence of women and marginalised groups in politics, increasing transparency in political systems, and developing local and regional activities, are central to DEMO Finland's work. These are also elements for increasing stability, and strengthening democracy; and thus, can be used for preventing conflicts.

Electoral support to Afghans

The new bicameral Parliament was elected in accordance with the new constitution in Afghanistan in September 2005, after two decades of warfare. Since the end of the war most people have lived on international aid. Many international organisations have participated in the reconstruction; but fragile security situation has hindered aid delivery, and impeded the peace process.

The United Nations had a large support organisation for the elections. In addition to supporting the reconstruction efforts, Finland allocated 2 million euro for organisational costs of elections. It was directed at the electoral committee responsible for maintaining a register of voters and for general order; media work, and election observation carried out by international organisations.

There were about 3 000 candidates in the elections, of which approximately 300 were women, who had 68 seats in the second chamber. The aim was to elect a woman from each province; several from bigger provinces. However, in many provinces, there were only few female candidates. Many had high expectations: that elections bring peace

and stability, which were regarded as preconditions for economic and security development.

In spring 2005, a group of Finnish parliamentarians visited Afghanistan, and later in May-June, ten – of whom seven were female, three male – Afghan candidates were invited to Finland, with the aim to familiarise them with Finnish society, and encourage them in their work.

The female candidates were selected through an organisation called Independent Parliamentarian Association of Afghan Women (IPAAW), the aim of which was to inspire women to participate in social activities outside political parties. The IPAAW had organised initial workshops, and continuation courses on parliamentary work and decision-making were provided to women interested in candidacy.

The Finnish political system, work of police, anti-corruption work, and committee work in the Parliament as well as the functioning of municipal administration in Hyvinkää were introduced to the delegation. Invitees also had a possibility to follow the work of the Ombudsman, Ombudsman for Equality, and of the Council for Equality.

However, the political situation, history, and traditions are different in Afghanistan and Finland, and thus the Finnish model cannot – and should not – be adapted as such. Nevertheless, dialogue and visits have given ideas of how politics can be conducted and problems solved.

In Afghanistan, a lot remains to be done: reduction of extreme poverty, reform of educational system, reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, and enhancement of equality between men and women, as Dr. Sima Sama, the Chairman of the Independent Afghanistan Human Rights Commission, stated in a speech given in the Finnish Parliament in April 2006. Nevertheless, the elections were a significant step towards democracy despite the fact that only few women were elected.

Development through cooperation

Military crisis management is expensive, and usually a temporary solution, which can at best, be used only to temporarily settle a situation, part the parties to a conflict, and protect civilians. Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, which aim at long-term stability and peace, should be practiced by the United Nations, the European Union, the Nordic countries, and Finland. Peace cannot be enforced and democracy cannot be exported. Instead, changes can be achieved through long-term cooperation.

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Nonviolent Peaceforce – Helping Locals in Crisis



A global peace army, a standing civilian non-violent peace force, a civilian peace-corps, peace-brigades, and the Gandhian Shenti Sena...The vision of a standing force of non-armed civilians ready to intervene in stopping military escalation has been recurrent, particularly in the context of major armed conflicts. At the same time the international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are being assigned other roles in the support of local populations.

What if mothers began asking their children back from guerilla groups? What if an agreement on a ceasefire were to be reached, but minority groups on the ground had not been fully integrated in the negotiations or in the concrete implementation of that ceasefire? What if peaceful local actors needed protection and external non-partisan

support so that a dialogue could be established, in order to overcome community and ethnic cleavages in a conflict area?

As recent state and non-state interventions in armed conflict areas have shown, an efficient and sustainable way has still to be found in international crisis management so that the needs of local populations are taken into account.

At ‘The Hague Appeal for Peace’ 1999 conference, a world-wide coalition of civil society organisations, the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) was launched as a global answer to this need. Its mission was to build a trained and international non-violent civilian peace force that could be sent to conflict areas to prevent violent death, and protect human rights. This would create a space for local groups in which to struggle non-violently and seek a peaceful resolution. The first NP field deployment was started in Sri Lanka in 2003.

Non-violent groups in the field

Local populations are those most affected in conflict areas, in particular groups working for peace. They are often easily excluded by diplomatic or high-level international interventions aimed at stopping an armed conflict. Therefore, such vulnerable groups need protection and support in order to carry out their work for peace at grassroots level.

Are military means the most efficient way to support these people or to de-escalate a violent conflict? Given the commonly understood negative answer to this question, NP staff and members have put together a Feasibility Study¹, which found that there have also been gaps and limits in previous non-violent third-party interventions. Even in conflict areas with numerous external actors, grassroots level local groups and

¹ The Feasibility Study is available at

<URL:<http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/english/resources/rstudy.asp>>

communities often lack the crucial support vital to effective implementation of ceasefires or similar agreements.

The Nonviolent Peaceforce builds on the experiences and lessons learnt to create international professional teams trained to support locally-driven confidence-building activities that are gender and age balanced, and which include equal participation of staff from the Global South and the Global North. The teams live and work within vulnerable communities 24 hours-a-day, 7 days-a-week. This way they can be trusted by people living in violent environment, and can provide protective accompaniment and neutral facilitation for inter-community meetings and activities, as well as better access to international agencies.

The field team members are selected through an international recruiting process, and then instructed through two training courses of at least two weeks each; the first course concentrating on core non-violent techniques, and the second one on the specific context the teams will face.

NP field deployments are guided by the following principles:

- NP representatives use non-violent means and strategies in all circumstances;
- NP remains neutral and impartial;
- NP teams are sent to the field on the basis of an invitation from local groups, and only undertake activities under the guidance of locals;
- NP strives not to undermine the reputation of any person or group, but rather tries to understand the causes and needs while opposing violence itself;
- NP seeks goodwill and acceptance from all parties.


Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka

The Nonviolent Peaceforce's first field deployment target was Sri Lanka. When local groups from Sri Lanka asked for NP intervention, the 20-year-old civil war was at a ceasefire. The on-going negotiation process between Sri Lanka's United National Front (UNF) Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) promised to create conditions for a settlement, but the peace process is still far from being secured and is indeed "frozen". Several factors trouble the country and have given rise to further unrest in Sri Lanka; such as the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, tense inter-ethnic relations and in particular those in areas most affected by the war, recruitment of child soldiers and continuous human rights abuses.

NP field teams work in three different geographical areas.

Batticaloa

Batticaloa is situated on the east coast of the island, where more than 90 % of the population is Tamil. Since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, this area suffered most casualties from violence and tension between Muslims and Tamils after Muttur. Thus, NP field groups have been seeking ways of preventing innocent civilian non-combatants from being caught up in fighting; as well as seeking ways of providing protection and support for families and activists working on the question of child soldiers. The team has also worked with both the Muslim and the Tamil community groups in ethnically segregated areas, in order to provide protection and general peacebuilding support. Furthermore, the team has been called in to prevent violence in intra-Muslim and intra-Tamil disputes. Since the tsunami the team has provided transport and protection to Sri Lankan relief workers;



David Berrian

Nonviolent Peaceforce's field teams create confidential relationships with Sri Lankan people by living in the same community.

pointed out missed humanitarian needs to other agencies, and worked with community activists to develop ways of ensuring local civilian participation in the area's relief and reconstruction work.

Jaffna

Jaffna is situated at the northernmost tip of the island. Government forces took most of the peninsula from the LTTE in 1996. Almost 100% of the population in the peninsula is Tamil. Many have however been displaced by the Government's converting of about one third of the land into military areas known as 'High Security Zones'. Tensions in the area have arisen from civilian resentment due to military presence, LTTE taxes on businesses and imports into the area, as well as allegations

of forced recruitment by the LTTE. NP has worked with civil society groups and individuals to strengthen their capacity to reduce these tensions on the peninsula. Since the tsunami the team has been active in developing NP's new monitoring role, visiting many of the affected areas under both Government and LTTE control.

Trincomalee

Trincomalee is situated on the eastern coast and ethnically divided into equal groups of Muslims, Sinhalese and Tamils. The NP field site is in the town of Mutur on the southern edge of Trincomalee Bay. The Mutur area has experienced the highest number of deaths through violence since the start of the ceasefire in December 2001. The tensions have arisen from disputes between Muslim and Tamil communities in the area. The team has provided protection to communities under threat and worked with community leaders to seek ways of reducing tension. Before the tsunami the team devoted most of its time to child protection issues stemming from the threat of recruitment by military groups. They have also explored ways of reducing tensions between different factions within the Muslim community, and have been successful in obtaining the inclusion of Muslim representatives in local relief coordination committees.

As shown in the short overview above, the field activities of a non-armed international non-partisan presence can vary widely. Some can be recognised in the following examples:

- **Accompaniment:** Accompanying people to safe areas and helping to strengthen these areas;
- **Presence:** Visiting vulnerable areas regularly, providing and facilitating safe platforms to meet/share/discuss public events, where civil-

ians may express concern on issues such as child/youth recruitment and violence in temple festivals;

- **Monitoring:** Election monitoring especially in phases such as the nomination of candidates, when short-term external observers are not yet present;
- **Fact-finding:** Making enquiries about violence with view of opening discussions, breaking silence, registering concern, getting ideas in an atmosphere of support and concern;
- **Reporting:** Reporting on humanitarian needs to relevant agencies having just arrived in the area, or on human rights violations; which also prevents escalation coming from uncontrolled rumours;
- **Interposition and patrolling:** Presence in areas where there is a threat of violence at nights, or in demonstrations between armed government forces and demonstrating people;
- **Support to local initiatives:** “Translating” the services provided by INGOs and agencies for local needs, and referring local people to national and international resources, including UN agencies;
- **Mediation and negotiation:** Facilitating contacts between potentially tense professional groups such as fishermen from Muslim and Tamil communities and for instance, negotiating the release of child soldiers

Activities in Sri Lanka after the tsunami

On the morning of 26 December 2004, a devastating tsunami washed away the eastern and southern shores of Sri Lanka, killing over 40,000 people. In the wake of the catastrophe, the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE agreed on momentarily setting aside their differences in order to bring humanitarian aid to the affected people and areas. The Nonviolent Peaceforce assisted with the after effects of the tsunami by helping local NGOs establishing a national system for civil society that

would monitor relief and reconstruction projects. The teams monitored and reported on the delivery of relief and actions within IDP camps. In close proximity to the local population, the Nonviolent Peaceforce field staff members have been in an ideal position to identify their needs and plead for aid to un-served areas.

After consultations with Sri Lankan NGOs, it became clear it would be useful to add monitoring and reporting to NP's mandate activities. The field teams in Jaffna and Matara have made extensive visits to affected communities. As a result, they have discovered areas, where relief either had not been equitably distributed or had not reached the actual victims. Building on the experience of the field teams, the Nonviolent Peaceforce has been approached by the UN Humanitarian Information Centre (UNHIC)² to explore ways of including human rights reporting into the weekly reports of the Centre.

Never without local ownership, international support and democratic constituency

The above examples illustrate how locally driven peace activities are “beneficiaries” from the work of external and non-partisan civilian groups.

If non-violent civilian third-party intervention is to become a credible tool internationally, a world-wide constituency is required. Thus every three years, the Nonviolent Peaceforce would gather its member organisations from all continents, to decide about the strategic direction of the organisation and to elect the fifteen members of the International Governance Council (IGC). The elected IGC members represent six continents and the major international NGOs supporting NP. How-

² More information on the UNHIC can be found at
<URL:<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/srilanka>>

ever, inputs from member organisations are not limited to democratic procedures. Depending on their interest and resources, they contribute to different programmes and working groups cooperating with local actors through trainings, preparatory visits or start-up deployments; for instance in the Middle East, Uganda, the Philippines and Colombia.

As Gandhi reminded us, “An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind”. Visionary projects like the Nonviolent Peaceforce can be concrete tools for healing this blindness.

Alessandro Rossi is Nonviolent Peaceforce’s European Coordinator.

Anne Palm

Non-governmental Organisations' Know-how in Crisis Management



Conflicts and crises are more complex than before. After the end of the Cold War the nature of most conflicts has changed from inter-state to intra-state – in other words, wars are being fought within the borders of a state, and quite often between its different groups. Furthermore, conflicts have become crueler: civilian population has become an object for direct and purposeful cruelty. Without being able to intervene, the international community has far too often witnessed situations, in which women, children, and men have been tortured and killed. There is an urgent need for finding new solutions for management and prevention of conflicts and crises in this new context. The international community needs persons to take responsibility, and effective political decisions as well as cooperation and coordination

between different actors. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can have – and they usually have – an important role in conflict prevention and crisis management.

The need for civilian crisis management was rushed to discussion in Finland and at the European level in particular after the tsunami catastrophe that took place in Southeast Asia in December 2004. Many feel that help provided by states and NGOs for relief and reconstruction work is necessary in these kinds of sudden situations.

However, civilian crisis management is more than just “disaster relief”. It usually refers to civilians who work in crisis areas to protect people and strengthen basic social services before, during or after a conflict.

The concept of civilian crisis management is a reinvented wheel – many of the activities now practiced under the heading of civilian crisis management have actually been practiced during decades, if not centuries. Civilian crisis management is an umbrella concept for non-armed civilian activities that are used in conflict and crisis situations to protect different values that are being threatened, or to lessen the influence of a threat directed at these values. Therefore, civilian crisis management refers to *civilians managing a crisis, not to management of “civilian crises” – as opposed to military crises.*

Civilian crisis management must be primary to other crisis management tools. Military crisis management should thus be secondary to civilian action. On the one hand, it lays the foundation for civilian activities and, can be used as a last resort to prevent a conflict from escalating into a violent stage if civilian activities have failed in it, on the other.

According to Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network (KATU) that coordinates Finnish NGOs' civilian crisis management activities, civilian crisis management refers to multidimensional activity with an aim

to prevent conflicts and repair the damages caused by conflicts; which at best, can combine expertise from different sectors. Therefore, coordination and cooperation between different actors must be strengthened.

Many activities carried out by civil society, and in particular NGOs can be regarded as civilian crisis management. Non-governmental organisations can cooperate and coordinate with authorities. Thus, authorities should further strengthen their cooperation with NGOs, and consider the work done by NGOs as complementary to that of the state institutions.

Civilian crisis management is important in a post-conflict situation when society is going through a transition period from an era of military regime or of a long-term conflict, which has caused disorder, to a state when structures of civilian administration can be reconstructed. Experience has taught that a military organisation is not the best solution for, and is not even capable of undertaking a task, which is not normally covered by its mandate. Civil servants are needed for tasks in a civilian administration, and civil society needs professional civilians in its many sectors. This is illustrated by a model example from Kosovo, where transition from a violent conflict to a society based on civilian administration, and where administration and civil society weakened by the war were simultaneously reconstructed.

Role of NGOs in civilian crisis management

Non-governmental organisations can act immediately and flexibly in cases when parties to a conflict have no confidence on other external actors; when other external actors' capabilities are not yet ready to be deployed, or when decisions cannot yet be taken because of the conflict situation being too complex.

Pre-crisis activities

The most essential activity NGOs undertake before a crisis occurs is development cooperation in all its forms. It is particularly important to support the development of local civil society and the strengthening of its structures.

Another significant whole of activities carried out by NGOs is education given by a number of NGOs. For instance, the Finnish UN Association gives global education courses; Amnesty International and Finnish League for Human Rights organise training on human rights, whereas many peace organisations provide peace education courses. The Finnish Red Cross trains personnel for relief work, and KATU organises courses on conflict prevention and civilian crisis management, with an aim to give participants tools for preventing conflicts and working in crisis areas.

Non-governmental organisations can improve information sharing and relationships between parties to a conflict, by enabling cross-border interaction through unofficial meetings, dialogue, common projects, and with civilian diplomacy. NGOs often encourage and assist negotiations between hostile parties in order to prevent occurrence or escalation of violence. Furthermore, NGOs have designed forums for peaceful resolution of conflicts.

There is also a role for research, which is being practiced by different research institutes as well as NGOs. Research is important in many ways; but above all, it provides information tested by scientific methods and critical observation, which can then be used as a basis for planning of activities.

An important activity before a conflict or crisis is maintaining preparedness for delivering relief in an eventual catastrophe situation; i.e. acquiring of material, training of personnel, and planning and maintaining of a recruitment system.

Activities during a crisis

It is almost impossible for NGOs to carry out activities during an armed conflict. However hands are not tied, even during the most acute phase of a crisis. The most important activities in this phase are catastrophe relief and relief for refugees effectively delivered by some of the biggest NGOs with significant capabilities.

The resources state has are central in an accident or catastrophe situation. In these situations, activities carried out by NGOs mainly include assisting and supporting of authorities' work. There are, however, examples of cases, in which voluntary work has been crucial because authorities have not been capable of undertaking action effectively enough.

In addition to the aforementioned field activities, human rights monitoring is an important task, since there are often grave human rights violations against the civilian population in a crisis area. Many non-governmental organisations work in conflict areas – and have usually long been there – which thus helps them to carefully monitor a changing situation. Most of the wars around the turn of the new millennium have been fought within states, and in fact, in inhabited areas. This naturally leads to a difficult situation with regard to civilian population in these areas. Many researches have shown that the civilian population has been the object of systematic violence in conflicts during the past decades. It seems that the violation of rights of civilians is the form of today's warfare.

Political pressure is essential to human rights monitoring; it is used to influence the political decision-makers so that the human rights of the civilian population in a crisis area would be respected. Research can be conducted even during a crisis so that the planning of the reconstruction phase can be started at an early stage and be based on adequate information. Thus, when the situation allows, action can be

taken immediately, and time is not spent on the planning phase after the situation has started to de-escalate.

Post-crisis activities

Should the acute phase of a crisis de-escalate, non-governmental organisations get involved with post-conflict reconstruction activities. These include, among others, projects for demobilisation of former combatants, the aim of which is to reintegrate them into society by providing premises for a re-start of civilian life. Such reintegration activities are important, because quite often the only skills these combatants have after a long-term conflict are the use of a gun and tactics of guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, the only “family” these combatants usually have is the armed group because the actual family has been killed or forced to flee.

Large parts of population may suffer from trauma after long armed conflicts. Cruelties directed at civilian population that took place during the wars in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo are a good example. NGOs specialised in psychological counselling, health services, and work with children and women as well as elderly may have capacity for organising mental health services urgently needed in a post-conflict area. The state does not usually have resources for providing such services to its citizens in conflict areas.

NGOs also have knowledge about democratic governance and rule of law. For instance, they can educate local people on these issues. Civil society is a component of a democratic society. The development and strengthening of civil society is a natural activity for NGOs, which can enable local NGOs to create new connections, assist in establishing their work and act as partners.

The role of women is often threatened during a conflict, and in many areas even before conflict. Non-governmental organisations can give support to local women and their organisations, by providing education and work as well as highlighting the importance of women in society and decision-making structures.

Transition from a crisis situation to a normal everyday life that is stable, and the conduct of which can be anticipated, is highly important to both children and adults. A factor that is crucial for providing continuation and security in children's and young people's lives is the reopening of schools. In fact, while this is important to children and young people, it also has relevance to their parents to whom it gives hope for future of their children. At the same time, schools can provide premises for social activities in community, and they can be a seed for the growth of civil society activities. Many NGOs support schools' work.

Different actors are needed

As experience has taught, it is not an easy task to build stable and just peace but it is possible.

Different actors – state institutions, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and local organisations – are needed for undertaking activities that fit in their mandate. In order to achieve the best results in civilian crisis management and peacebuilding, coordination and cooperation between these actors is highly necessary. What NGOs have to offer, are experience, long-term relationships with local population and expertise in their own field, which is needed in civilian crisis management also in the future.

International organisation – mainly the United Nations and the European Union – should develop mechanisms for civilian crisis manage-

ment whose planning and implementation would be actively assisted by NGOs, which would then bring their valuable input in preventing conflicts, managing crisis and building sustainable peace.

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Oskari Eronen and Katrin Lindén

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: New Field for Civilian Crisis Management



Prior to the early 1990's, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) were seen as a strictly military affair in a post-conflict setting. The focus was on disarmament and demobilisation, whereas reintegration was considered a civilian development issue not connected to the other two. After the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of a new type of conflicts, another view on this conflict management tool has emerged. The aim of this paper is to introduce the reader to this tool and how it relates to civilian crisis management.

In targeting their activities, DDR programmes often take 'combatants' as the primary target group. Peace agreements and mission mandates may specify the groups allowed to participate in DDR. They are often various kinds of rebels, resistance armies, guerrilla groups, militias and

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may comprise the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion.

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

Together these activities comprise 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration' (DDR).

Source: UN IDDRS (2006), Draft.

separatist groups. DDR should not however be conceptually limited to cover only these unconventional troops. Many times DDR programmes or parts of them are directed to scale down official, national defence forces, paramilitaries or police (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia and South Africa). Sometimes DDR initiatives are addressed more specifically to arms-possessing civilians and/or criminal elements (Albania, Brazil and Haiti) than to politico-militarily active persons.

DDR is commonly used as a first tool in immediate post-conflict contexts. It has however also been tested in possible pre-conflict situations as a part of larger initiatives to reform national security sectors. On these occasions, DDR has been used as a preventive instrument in downsizing national defence and police forces and finding new job opportunities for the people laid off. DDR could be tried even in the midst of warfare; in the Democratic Republic of Congo, small numbers of child combatants have been disarmed and demobilised from groups actively engaged in fighting.

Disarmament and demobilisation are in no way novelties as they have been part of peace negotiations and post-conflict policies for decades. After the end of the Cold War and at the outbreak of the new kind of conflicts we see today, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration efforts have gained new interest. Approximately half of all full or partial DDR programmes have taken place in Africa. In many countries, multiple programmes have been launched (e.g. Sierra Leone, Albania, Haiti and Angola). Some of the programmes concentrate more on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and arms proliferation, while others attend to demobilisation and reintegration challenges. These smaller initiatives could be supporting other peace and stabilisation efforts or be separate acts to improve security and development.

After initiatives of individual governments and research communities, the idea of a unified DDR broke through. DDR activities have obtained increasing attention within United Nations peacekeeping operations since the early 1990's. The organisation has been actively promoting the idea that DDR should be part of a larger push for reforms in post-conflict societies, not just a simple uniform tool that is assumed to work in isolation. Alongside the full-scale mission approach that the UN has used, DDR or parts of it have been done by various international actors. Since the 1980's, the World Bank, OECD, UN agencies like UNDP, UNICEF and ILO, national governments and regional

organisations (EU, AU, ECOWAS) have entered the scene. They are participating in many functions; as donors, think tanks and resource pools, implementers and technical supporters.

The most urgent aim of DDR efforts is to minimise the number of weapons in circulation and thus enhance the security situation in a conflict-torn society. The second direct objective is to weaken the will and capabilities to mobilise armed troops. By supporting peace talks or agreements, DDR is hoped to set in motion the process of peace and security. DDR is often mentioned as confidence-building tool. As violent parties are drawn into a shared process which is run transparently and impartially, it might enable new positive initiatives. In the longer run, DDR can support political and institutional change. Today, building national capacities, rule of law and good governance are mainstreamed to all missions. More precisely, DDR is often linked to broader initiatives to reform security sectors in post-conflict countries. Objectives seem to vary between immediate needs and longer term development. DDR seeks to tackle both everyday practicalities and the deeper demands of a post-conflict society.

DDR itself ought to be seen as an integrated process. Previously, programmes were mainly either projects of disarmament or reintegration only, demobilisation moving between the two. In the international toolkit, there were separate instruments divided by their primary target and objective; weapons vs. people, security vs. development. These tensions started to ease during the 1990's and a comprehensive approach under the title DDR appeared attractive. This approach to DDR considers its planning, staffing, funding and operational activities as one set of action that aim to the same overarching objectives. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are not singular, separate projects, but rather tightly interconnected parts of a whole. DDR should make one coherent continuum. The need for integrated DDR was strongly emphasised by the report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations

General Assembly (2006). As an indication of its integrated nature, the parts of DDR may sometimes shuffle in time. DDR need not proceed in the precise order of its acronym.

Preparations for DDR

In order to launch DDR activities in conflict-affected areas, certain elementary conditions need to be met. Most importantly, some kind of peace agreement or at least a ceasefire should be in effect. The peace agreement ought to cover all relevant parties in a conflict and enjoy a real political backup as well as commitment from the respective military leaderships at different levels. The political and military's will to respect peace agreements is however often more dubious. In special cases, some of the parties might have to be disarmed and demobilised by force.

DDR is a hugely sensitive issue of national sovereignty and an approval of the host government or a UN Security Council resolution for starting DDR is needed. In many cases, DDR activities are a part of a larger mandate or agreement to stabilise a region and support a peace process. DDR issues should however be discussed already in the phase of writing the peace deal and mandate. Clear tasks and guidelines should be given to officials responsible for DDR. In many peace agreements the reintegration part of the process has been forgotten totally and only immediate military issues are handled. In the same fashion, the issue of special groups in need of attention and care (children, women, youth, elderly and disabled associated with armed forces) is often set aside. A decision on whether combatants will be granted amnesty (full or partial) should also be made as it has a great impact on further DDR efforts.

An effective and successful DDR programme will be funded sufficiently – and timely. Currently, there are enough funds within the UN

system but it is spread over different branches and the raising of those funds is difficult to coordinate.

Partners and information

A “two way street” of information is essential to a functioning DDR process. Finding the right implementation partners for demobilisation and reintegration activities, sources of accurate information and identifying other key players for DDR takes time. Special attention ought to be paid to involving national officials, including not only the Ministry of Defence, but also the Ministries of Labour, Culture, Education, Social and Health Affairs, and Justice. Other local actors in the DDR process are the local administrations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). They have been in the region for a long time and know it well. They will also stay long after the international community has left. Their active role and broadest possible adoption of the programme itself is in most cases the best guarantee of success. Also the ex-combatants should be involved at this stage. National ownership increases transparency and as a consequence it also increases the level of trust in the programme. To achieve maximum efficiency it is necessary to coordinate the work of these organisations. One coordinating body such as a joint commission monitored by the UN or another international organisation usually works best.

Socio-economic data on employment, businesses, trade, growth, settlements, poverty, gender roles etc. reveal possibilities and hindrances for the reintegration phase. An overwhelmingly common problem in the launching of DDR has been the lack of reintegration planning. Based on earlier NGO field experience from several DDR programmes, reintegration planning should begin at least 6 months before disarmament and demobilisation take place. An ex-combatant with nothing to do is easily re-recruited.

The other lane of the two way street is information to the public about the DDR programme. A well-planned public information campaign should begin already before disarmament and demobilisation by distributing a uniform and realistic message. Even if collecting a maximum number of weapons is desirable, public information should never spread promises that cannot be kept during the demobilisation and reintegration phases. Later on it should address the longer-term challenges of developing SALW awareness that takes safety and storage questions more seriously. Finally public information will try to sensitise local communities to the idea that they will soon be receiving ex-combatants into their neighbourhoods and communal lives.

Eligibility criteria

A crucial point at the initial stages is to decide who will be accepted as a participant into the DDR programme. This question of eligibility is one of the most complicated ones in the whole endeavour. Normally, the peace agreement provides general guidelines on which armed groups are included in DDR, but does not set a clear definition of a combatant. One such definition can be found in the international humanitarian law¹

With respect to the practice in the field, this legal description of a combatant does obviously not meet the characteristics of all the diverse groups that DDR programmes seek to address. Especially in internal conflicts and civil wars, which have become increasingly common types of warfare, the composition, equipment and outfit of armed groups may be very far from the western ideas of what makes an army. Talking about a combatant or soldier in terms of international law and defining a combatant for the purposes of a DDR programme seem to be moving at two different levels. In some contexts the targeted groups indeed

¹ Geneva Convention (1949), Part I, Art. 4.

have clear command structures, wear distinctive signs and adhere to those laws and customs of war that international legislation recognises. In other cases, the reality on the ground is more complex. In defining eligibility criteria one should not stick to a certain predetermined standard, but adjust to the local realities and specific problems.

Gender aspects in planning and implementing all crisis management measures are emphasised by both the United Nations and the European Union. The Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) underlines gender mainstreaming especially within DDR programmes. Child combatants is another sensitive topic as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) draws the line at 15 years of age, but its Optional Protocol (2000) sets the definition at 18 years. In 2004, the latter had 117 signatories out of which only 72 had ratified the convention². The disputes over what constitutes a human rights violation in this area are common. In mission practice, it is important to think through what to do with adult combatants that started out when they were children, and with child combatants turning 18 during the DDR process as to ensure that the needs of these persons are met.

Disarmament

Challenges to disarmament might arise from the scene of armed actors. DDR characteristically takes place in multiparty conflict areas where divergent armed groups and militias compete. Some of them are committed to the peace agreement while others might still run their campaigns. Thus DDR activities have to be adjusted to regionally differing security situations and possibilities to proceed. Special attention should in any case be assigned to unbiased treatment of all parties in order to maintain impartiality. Also, difference in value of reinsertion packages

² Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2004).

given to ex-combatants in neighbouring countries (Liberia – Sierra Leone – Ivory Coast as an example) might create cross-border migration and arms flows in order for combatants to enter the most generous DDR programme.

Disarmament itself is a rather plain set of action, in which the biggest problems arise from technical and logistical matters. In disarmament sites, combatants (or in some programmes civilians, if they are targeted) hand over their weapons and ammunition to DDR officials who register them. After the collection, weapons and ammunition are stockpiled in safe storages or destroyed immediately. Arms disposal is usually mentioned in peace treaties. However, the mode of disposal is seldom clarified and leaves space for speculation and later disputes. It should be noticed that the term ‘disposal’ also covers selling, donating, storing and using in training. The best solution is immediate and full destruction.

Safety and security are paramount virtues in dealing with weapons and therefore disarmament has been seen as task for military personnel. The role of civilians should however not be downplayed. As a DDR programme is a civilian initiative it is to be closely monitored and managed by the same contingents in disarmament as well. The military’s role as implementers could also be reviewed. Technical experts are needed at all times, but most of the manual work can be done by sufficiently trained civilians. Engaging local people, or the ex-combatants themselves, to do the actual destruction of the weapons under competent supervision would be a tremendously powerful tool to increase visibility, transparency and local ownership of the DDR programme. The disarmament phase lends itself most naturally to the use of public information campaigns.

The people who join DDR have to be given a chance to a peaceful future and the attractiveness of taking up arms again must be reduced. If the personal sense of security for the ex-combatant is not sufficient

and the individual risks of handing over one's weapon considered too great, expectations in number of combatants disarmed of DDR officials are not likely to be fulfilled. Willingness to hand in weapons is directly tied to the future prospects of a combatant. Carrying a gun gives a person status, power and an income that can be difficult to replace. DDR together with other means have to decrease the broad value of weaponry and increase the appeal of civilian life. These incentives are among others an enhanced security situation, employment, settlement and healing of local social relations. In addition, a general amnesty over acts taken in war is usually seen as one of the key attractions to disarm. It is a highly controversial topic and produces serious problems with other peace-building efforts such as promotion of transitional justice and human rights.

To boost a slowly advancing disarmament, various kinds of incentives have been used. In direct Weapons Buyback combatants get an immediate cash imbursement on every weapon handed in. Cash programmes were in fashion in the 1990's and were considered to be rather effective in terms of numbers but have later on been abandoned by the UN since they are likely to cause increased market prices of weapons and arms trafficking. They also reward fighting individuals directly without a component that seeks more sustainable impacts on the person or community. Various newer type programmes have been developed in the Balkans region.

No matter how thoroughly planned and extensive a programme there is, all the weapons in the target area will never be collected. The quality of actions that can be taken in addition to the DDR becomes essential: arms embargoes, tighter border guarding and custom policing are needed. This calls for a comprehensive and integrated approach to peace-building. To some extent, weapons might still be irreplaceable. There, the most pressing aim is to divert an existing culture of violence into a healthier gun culture where weapons are handled, stored and

licensed in a safe and legal way. Providing expertise and supporting the national administrations in SALW issues are of major importance in longer-term disarmament efforts.

Demobilisation

The target group for demobilisation might or might not overlap with the target group for disarmament. Administrative staff and camp followers such as wives, husbands and children of combatants could for example be added to the group. There might be a partial demobilisation of certain fighting groups, but not of others. Demobilisation for the ex-combatant is both a change of occupation and mental setup. The combatant has to turn into an ex-combatant and then continue the process and become a civilian. The first year after discharge is a critical period. Practical help like transport from the camp to the receiving community, a package of food and clothing to take care of immediate needs, a short term job in infrastructure reconstruction or seeds and tools for farming might prevent remobilisation for survival purposes.

Demobilisation can take different forms. Self demobilisation means that the participants in a conflict simply leave their units and go home after the end of a conflict, bringing their weapons with them or leaving them with their commanders. Demobilisation prior to disarmament differs from self demobilisation in so much that there is an orderly discharge. There are lists and ID-documents of the people being demobilised. The ex-combatants can come back to disarm or be contacted for the same purpose at a later stage. This method is suitable in a situation when the level of trust is low. Disarmament can take place at a later stage when the security situation has improved.

Demobilisation can also take place immediately after disarmament. The ex-combatants will then most often move into a camp for a period of time at or near the location where they have handed in their weapons.

The time period spent in the camps should be relatively short. In some DDR processes that stay has been up to 18 months long due to various problems. During their stay at the cantonment site, the ex-combatants are registered and identification cards are issued unless this was done during the disarmament phase. These cards should include the picture, name, date of birth and maybe fingerprints of the card holder. The information should be stored in a confidential database preferably maintained by a neutral organisation such as the UN. The cards should not indicate which faction the card holder fought for as this might lead to discrimination and other types of problems later on. During this time sanitation facilities, adequate food and water supplies and some type of work are vital to prevent unrest and outbreak of epidemics.

Demobilisation can also be done without cantonment. In this case, mobile teams with equipment suitable for making ID-cards and enter information into the database go to the ex-combatants to collect and disseminate the necessary information. Prior to leaving the camp or being left by the mobile teams, the ex-combatants should be given information on the alternatives of assistance available to them within the reintegration program, such as vocational training or internships. Information on political and civil rights and responsibilities, stress and trauma management, integration issues, HIV/aids etc. should also be given to insure a smoother transition to civilian life.

Women and children need special attention. Women are often reluctant to admit to having participated in the warfare because the often harsh judgment passed on them for stepping out of the prescribed female role. They, along with child combatants, might also be persuaded by their commanders to self-demobilise in order for a more “acceptable” candidate to take their place in the programme. In some conflicts but not all, these groups have been forced to join, possibly sexually exploited and in other ways mistreated by the other combatants in the same unit and might therefore want to have as little as possible to do

with them. It is a good idea to set up separate camps and assistance programmes for women and children so as to give them access to the benefits without them having to fear for their physical safety. This would also make it easier to cater to their specific reintegration needs later on.

Reintegration

As during demobilisation, it is not desirable to treat all ex-combatants the same way in the reintegration phase. Their needs differ depending on who they are and what kind of group they fought for. It is in the interest of peace to try to meet those needs in a relevant manner. As mentioned above, female ex-combatants are less likely to join a DDR programme, and they might need a different kind of reintegration package than men. It is vital to think outside the box when it comes to creating jobs for them. It is equally important to see where the women can actually make a living as to not train them in sectors where there is no future. For child combatants, a combination of accelerated learning and vocational training or apprenticeship is a way of addressing the needs of simultaneously learning basic reading-writing-math skills, a profession and socially accepted behaviour. It may be worthwhile to make room for a more advanced education for very young ex-combatants. It will be beneficial both to them as individuals and to the society where they will live.

Reintegration is normally the last part of the DDR-programme and might not always be necessary. In the case of self-demobilisation mentioned above, the ex-combatants usually have homes and livelihoods to go back to and will need little or no assistance. In some conflicts, the combatants have maintained their homes and day jobs only leaving temporarily to fight. However, if the ex-combatants continue to be a threat to the peace process after demobilisation, if their actions during

the war creates serious tension or conflict in society or if they cannot support themselves because of marginalisation, there is a need for a reintegration programme.

This programme should aim to find acceptable substitutes for the benefits of war for the ex-combatants. Their physical security must be ensured so that they no longer feel the need to be armed to fend for themselves. There needs to be an economic alternative to looting and organised crime as a means to put food on the table. Initially, this could consist of construction work to improve infrastructure destroyed during the war. Ideally it would be done in the area where the ex-combatant will settle after demobilisation. Working to reconstruct the infrastructure s/he has destroyed creates some good will for the ex-combatant as the work is seen as a contribution to the receiving community.

For long term job opportunities, a thorough labour market analysis needs to be conducted. A skills assessment should be done of the ex-combatants during the demobilisation phase. These two then need to be compared to see where the ex-combatants could find work. Based on this comparison, training programmes designed to fill the gap should be set up.

Apprenticeships have proved effective in many post-conflict African societies where this is the traditional way of providing professional training for young people. Apprenticeships give a valuable connection to the labour market and a reference in the professional field chosen by the ex-combatant. Participation in a civilian work environment also functions as social training. It is a way of learning or refreshing knowledge of acceptable behaviour in the civilian community. Vocational training is another option where a combination of basic education such as reading and writing skills could be combined with on-the-job training. Many ex-combatants in previous DDR-programmes have expressed the wish to go into business for themselves. For these individuals, business training and basic knowledge in accounting, market structures and management

skills is important. Many ex-combatants end up in the informal sector which can make up as much as 80% of the total market structure in a post-conflict society. As such, it must not be overlooked when searching for employment opportunities for ex-combatants.

A reintegration programme should be a part of a general development programme as soon as possible in order to benefit a broader part of society. It is also important that the support is seen as being for the community and not as a reward for those who took up arms. This is to avoid resentment towards ex-combatants from the receiving community or by other groups in a similar situation as the ex-combatants, for instance IDPs, refugees or those who stayed in the country without taking up arms. The situation for those groups is generally not better than that of the participants of a DDR programme. Benefits and assistance to the receiving communities rather than to the individual ex-combatants has the effect that society is more likely to take on the work to reintegrate them.

A vital step towards lasting peace is to heal the damage of war in both society and individuals. This is best done by supporting both societal reconciliation and individual trauma healing. It is important that communities and ex-combatants share a sense of a common future. To take care of the ex-combatants suffering from trauma, the international community should support and promote local mental health treatment facilities and ensure that ex-combatants have access to them and other forums for counselling. The treatment might consist of both Western psychological counselling, psychiatric help and traditional cleansing and healing rituals. Regarding this subject, the cultural context of the conflict cannot be underlined enough. If the society has a functioning system of its' own, it is advisable to make use of it. A successful example of that would be the South African truth and reconciliation process.

There are some contextual factors that make reintegration difficult and that need to be taken into consideration during planning. So called

spoilers, armed groups outside of the peace process, or war going on in neighbouring countries, access to natural resources that are easy to loot, access to weapons in society at large and security vacuums in weak or failing states may hinder or destroy the reintegration process. These factors are best dealt with outside of a DDR programme since they are too big issues to handle within this framework.

Way ahead

The future for DDR looks multifaceted. Use of DDR in missions is still increasing and various actors involved are becoming more aware of its interconnections to such areas as security sector reform (SSR), transitional justice and economic development. At the same time, the overlaps create new challenges and underline the need for integrative approaches. Partly to overcome these problems, some new international policy level initiatives have emerged lately. These guideline drafting processes are backed up by research done in a handful of research institutes. Academic research on DDR is relatively sparse and much more is being done within different organisations involved with DDR practice.

The United Nations started a wide project on DDR a few years ago. The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) unite the DDR related efforts of altogether 15 UN agencies. The process seeking to find common grounds of action is chaired by the UN DPKO. IDDRS aims at sharing planning and operation instruments in missions. It tries to find common policies and to define shared concepts and terms. Most significantly IDDRS is set up to bridge the gaps in planning, implementation and financing of DDR programmes. In 2005, two pilot programmes of integrated DDR were started in Haiti and Sudan. These missions serve as the first examples and field tests for the new ideas. The IDDRS guidebook and a web-based resource centre will be published in 2006.

The European Union is increasingly interested in developing expertise and involvement with DDR throughout its policies. So far it has mainly concentrated in funding parts of disarmament, demobilisation or reintegration. The first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission containing DDR elements is the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) launched in 2005. In its Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP the European Council (2004) lists DDR and SSR in the parameters for the future and seeks concept development for both. Disarmament and security sector reform are also mentioned in the European Security Strategy (2003) as a part of future policy implications. DDR and SSR could also be interpreted to be included in the enlarged Petersberg tasks listed in the Constitutional Treaty for Europe³. Lately, DDR and SSR have been incorporated into EU's Africa strategy⁴.

Support to DDR has been available not only through ESDP, but also through Development Policy and Conflict Prevention activities of the European Commission, which counts DDR as a part of security sector reform. The Commission has contributed to demobilisation and reintegration programmes in several countries (e.g. Cambodia, Somalia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo). The Commission also funds disarmament and mine clearing projects. The fact that DDR/SSR activities are divided between the Council and the Commission may be creating information, programmatic and funding gaps between the rapid reaction mechanism and longer-term assistance. The proposed EU Instrument for Stability might be a suitable answer to these security-development gaps also in the area of DDR funding.

³ European Union (2004), Art. III-309.

⁴ General Affairs and External Relations Council (21–22 November 2005); Press release “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership” (19 December 2005).

The latest experience of the Council–Commission cooperation was gathered and positive solutions found in the hectic build-up of the AMM. The Aceh case also highlighted certain DDR-specific challenges to EU’s civilian crisis management framework. Even if DDR is a civilian initiative, it might need military expertise. Also, DDR activities on the field do not easily fall into generic mission types like monitoring, strengthening or substitution. In certain sensitive tasks a monitoring mission might need to develop capacities that come closer to implementation and substitution. Added to weapons collection and destruction experienced in Aceh, these could for instance be governance and security for demobilisation camps, registration of combatants and database maintenance. Considering these difficult questions should be a part of future European concept development for DDR.

NGO roles in DDR

At large, DDR seems to be a highly sensitive issue of national security. Yet running a DDR programme totally without NGOs would lead to an impasse. NGOs internationally, nationwide or locally form indispensable partners for any DDR programme, even if it is planned and managed by a central national/international office. Adding to this structural backbone, civil society organisations bring practical experience in implementation and a workforce to perform a multitude of tasks. They also provide grassroots insight to the crisis at hand. For their crucial input, NGOs’ roles in DDR ought to be given due consideration in the development of EU civilian crisis management.

In practice NGOs have multiple roles. Already before disarmament they can supply information on local circumstances for the planning of a DDR programme. Also, the civil society is often in a central position to deliver public information and to promote the development of a

healthy gun culture. In the disarmament phase, civilian organisations may be involved with weapons destruction along with the ex-combatants, provide logistical help, and take practical care of the disarmed. Cooperation with various NGOs at this stage to take care of those who seek participation in the DDR programmes but are not qualified would be beneficial for the reintegration phase and long term development of the country later on.

In demobilisation there are several tasks for NGOs. These mainly take place in camps where civil society actors often take responsibility of health care, emergency therapy and various sorts of training and information delivery. The Red Cross, both as an international and national organisation, is frequently present as well as NGOs working with refugees. The conditions in refugee camps and DDR cantonment sites are similar and require information on integration issues, future assistance, trauma management and HIV/aids.

The reintegration process is where most NGO involvement is needed. It is mainly NGOs and the local government that implement the planned reintegration assistance. In the economic sector the work for NGOs consists of market analysis, training of professional as well as job seeking skills, providing jobs, and finding apprenticeships. In social life NGOs try to support reconciliation and dialogue over the boundaries of conflict. Thirdly, NGOs may provide psychological treatment and trauma healing for the ex-combatants.

NGOs on different levels are evidently inseparable from any DDR effort whatsoever. Thus the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), the lobbying organisation of European NGO's concerned, could put DDR concept development on its agenda. Linked to the efforts with Instrument for Stability, the EPLO should pay attention to DDR funding gaps that severely harm the work of NGOs in the field. Secondly, it could keep reminding the EU officials of the crucial role that NGOs play

in DDR. The same should also go along with security sector reform in large. SSR cannot be conceived just as a reconstruction of army, police, judiciary and penal system, but as a larger effort of reform and to create broad democratic dialogue on security affairs in society.

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Peace through Development Policy



Differences in economic development and distribution of wealth sustaining inequality breed ground for conflicts, and are therefore a remarkable security threat. Development cooperation is indisputably one of the main elements in security policy and conflict prevention. Thus, it is an important tool for crisis management.

The United Nations Millenium Summit of the year 2000 that agreed on a Millenium Declaration set out a target in development policy for the international community to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty. However, the World Summit that gathered at the UN premises in September 2005 for the 60th session of the General Assembly, had to state that the progress in reducing extreme poverty has been very slow and that the possibilities to achieve

the target within the next ten years seemed to be rather vague – unless the rich countries would make a real effort in increasing and improving development cooperation. In order to achieve the target, the structure of international trade ought to be reconstructed in a more fair way, and developed countries should allocate 0,7% of their gross national product (GNP) for official development assistance (ODA) as recommended by the UN.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and Asian Development Bank (ADB) drew up in 2005 an expert evaluation on the achievability of the Millenium Development Goals (MGDs). According to the report, China and India have been able to reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty whereas countries such as Armenia, Laos, Bangladesh, and Mongolia have severe difficulties in halving extreme poverty. Furthermore, the report stated that no Asian country will achieve any of the MDGs within the set time. It would be impossible to protect societies from child mortality, HIV/aids, and other fatal diseases if the quality of public services – in particular health services – was not remarkably improved.

Increase the amount allocated for ODA

Finland has committed herself to the values and aims of the Millenium Declaration as stated in the Development Policy Programme. However, there have not been many concrete efforts to achieve the MDGs, and the timetable for increasing the level of ODA up to 0,7% of the GNP has been rather slow. According to the Human Development Report 2005 published by the UNDP; Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg are the only countries to have achieved the level of 0,7%. Finland has set out an aim to reach the level by the year 2010.

Many non-governmental organisations around the world have expressed their disappointment in the results of the World Summit of September 2005, in which the timetable set for the MDGs was watered down – the Heads of State were not able to agree upon new concrete measures.

Challenges for Finnish EU presidency

The Finnish Development Policy Programme (2004) has stated that coherence in European Union activities as well as effective implementation and better quality in development aid will have a central role in the three-year Presidency programme, which Finland will be responsible for during the second half of 2006.

The Finnish Development Policy Committee has emphasised that during the EU Presidency, Finland will have an excellent opportunity to influence the EU development policy, so that it will be more coherent in the future. This was also a commitment the EU made at the signing of the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) that came into force in 1993. According to the Committee, Finland should take an active role in mainstreaming development policy thinking in various sectors, and promoting a development policy approach in the development of the EU foreign policies.

The European Commission already takes development issues into account in its globalisation policy as well as trade and security policies. Coherence between development aid and trade is particularly important.

The European Union explicitly recognised a link between civilian crisis management, development policy and security policy in the European Security Strategy agreed upon in 2003. As to the Finnish Government, it was stated both in the Development Policy Programme and Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy (2004) that there is an important role for development cooperation in crisis management and

conflict prevention. The Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy recognises that development crises aggravate global security threats and increase instability in societies, and emphasises the importance of long-term development cooperation and partnerships in managing development crises. The idea of global security and stability through coherent use of security and development policies has also been written in the Development Policy Programme.

New development policy of the European Union

The Finnish Development Policy Committee gave in 2005 its evaluation on the Finnish development policy and stated that Finland should direct its official development assistance to the least developed countries and reduction of poverty, which is important also at the EU level. There are a few challenges to the EU development policy; in particular, implementation of the MDGs, effective allocation of development aid, and promotion of coherence in development policy.

The EU has committed itself to increase the amount of money directed to development cooperation, and the old 15 EU Member States have set a target to be able to allocate 0,7% of the GNP for official development assistance by 2015. However, the well-being of developing countries is not improved by this measure alone if other EU policies – security and trade policies, for instance – are not coherent with the aims of the development policy.

In the end of 2005, the Council of the European Union, European Commission, and European Parliament released a Joint Statement on the European Union Development Policy that lined out, for the first time, the common principles, aims and values for both the Member States' and EU's development policy. The most important aim is to achieve the MDGs. The Joint Statement also highlights the importance of coherent policy choices for the achievement of these Goals. In ad-

dition to this aim, the EU should commit itself to helping the least developed countries, and make sure that the content of the European Security Strategy is not incompatible with development policy aims.

According to the Finnish Development Policy Committee, the main obstacle in the functioning of the EU development policy has been the division of responsibilities within the European Commission. Different tasks such as planning, implementation and evaluation of the development policy as well as responsibility for different geographical regions have been divided between the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid and Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. There are also other factors that will shape the EU development policy; i.e. the fate of the constitution and the roles of the eventual Minister for Foreign Affairs and the European External Action Service. The Development Policy Committee has thus recommended Finland to pay attention to the effects the division of responsibilities may have.

Aim: long-term crisis management

Non-governmental organisations specialised in development cooperation regard it as an instrument for preventing conflicts and crises, whose finance and planning should be long-term so that development cooperation activities can produce real results. However, the international community must also have resources for managing crises – whether natural disasters or violent armed conflicts – that have already broken out. The tsunami catastrophe of December 2004 in Southeast Asia created a globally shared worry about reconstruction and delivery of humanitarian relief and emergency services to the affected areas. A collection organised by the Finnish Red Cross yielded unforeseeably well. After the tsunami the World was quickly awoken to the fact that more resources were needed for a rapid response to different crisis situations.

It is necessary to be prepared to respond to sudden crises, but it is equally important not to invest too much in preparedness for emergency situations at the expense of long-term development cooperation. Instead, it would be important to make humanitarian relief work and civilian crisis management mission more compatible with development cooperation by, for instance, starting development cooperation as a follow-up to a civilian crisis management mission in order to strengthen stability and support reconstruction work in a post-crisis area.

Poverty often feeds conflicts, but escalated crises may also lead to increased poverty in a crisis area. The report of the Finnish Development Policy Committee has thus stated that development cooperation is crucial in a post-crisis situation. What has been positive in the report is the expression about Finland offering expertise in the fields of conflict management, peacekeeping, and civilian crisis management and linking these issues with development cooperation instruments.

In the World Summit 2005, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva stated that poverty is the most dangerous weapon of mass destruction in the world. The best measure for disarming this weapon is long-term development cooperation and coherent development policy that has been mainstreamed in all sectors from trade to security policy. The EU can take the lead in the process towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, Finland has a unique opportunity to speed up the process so that the aims and commitments made with regard to the EU development policy will be ambiguously achieved.

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Conflict Sensitivity as a Framework for Developing Civilian Crisis Management



The field of civilian crisis management is in an incessant process of development. Concerns as to the effectiveness, coherence and comprehensiveness of civilian crisis management missions are frequently voiced from within the broad community of actors that play a part in them. In this paper, I offer for consideration the notion of ‘conflict sensitivity’ as a possible framework with which to approach the challenge of creating a truly integrated and holistic system of civilian crisis management, capable of going beyond ‘doing no harm’ and achieving excellence at ‘doing good’.

The European Union is a committed actor on the global security and development scene. While the prime responsibility for the development and security of individual developing countries lies within respective

countries themselves, it is commonly understood that the responsibility is shared with developed countries. The EU's commitment to meet its responsibilities is clearly legible from EU-documents.¹ Civilian crisis management, as one of the mechanisms used by the EU toward this end, is in an on-going and rapid state of progress, as has been noted in some of the other articles in this publication. The complexity of the modern challenge of conflict is transferred directly into the policies meant to deal with it as well as the implementation thereof. Despite initial success of EU operations reported on so far², there is still a way to go in the attempt to create a completely functional format of civilian crisis management.

Recent experience and analytical advances underline the need to see conflict not in isolation but as one symptom of more general dysfunctions both in security and governance, within and between states as well as in the global community. Evidence so far points to the need to approach any form of work with conflict in a holistic, multi-dimensional and multi-functional way.³ An important lesson drawn from recent experiences of EU civilian crisis management missions supports this view; the need for a more and comprehensive approach to civilian crisis management – as part of a complex process of conflict prevention,

¹ See e.g. The European Consensus on Development (2005); The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP (2004); Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (2004); and European Security Strategy (2003).

² See Final report from expert workshop (Coordination and Coherence: How to Improve EU Civilian Crisis Management): The Role of the EU in Civilian Crisis Management. 12–13 January Vienna.

³ Bailes, A. J.K. & Wiharta, S. (2005): Armed Conflicts and International Security: A Factual and Analytical Review. Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper 7, p. 36.

crisis response and post-conflict stabilisation – has been identified and iterated. Coordination is perceived essential in an international setting with several stakeholders, and with regard to integrated planning in the EU, execution across pillars is called for.⁴

President Ahtisaari points to the concept of ‘Comprehensive Planning’ as one of the most interesting current initiatives created to enhance coherence of EU civilian and military crisis management in any given situation. The concept involves the EU institutions and member states, and reaches across the whole planning cycle of operations across pillars. This entails the analysis of underlying conflict dynamics, contingency planning, operations, and the processes of evaluation and lessons learned which feed back to the underlying assumptions.⁵ While EU institutions are now seriously striving to improve inter-institutional synergies, to improve the effectiveness of operations and in general to become even more ambitious in the goals they set for themselves, it is clear that a genuinely integrated, comprehensive approach to planning and implementation of civilian crisis management missions is possible only with the incorporation of the perspectives and expertise of the local beneficiary populations, international and local non-governmental and civil society organisations (NGOs and CSOs) as well as other practitioners from the field. One way to do this is to take into consideration

⁴ Final Report from expert workshop: The Role of the EU in Civilian Crisis Management (2006), p.3.

⁵ Speech by President Martti Ahtisaari: Coordination and Coherence: How to Improve EU Civilian Crisis Management. 12 January, Vienna. For comment on comprehensive planning, see also: Opening address by High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to the UK Presidency of the EU, in Seminar on Civil-Military Coordination. 17 October 2005.

the notion of conflict sensitivity as a complementary approach to the on-going development of civilian crisis management.

Conflict sensitivity

It is not assumed that civilian crisis management missions as such would be a cause of conflict. It can, however, with great certainty be assumed that all interventions by outside actors in any given conflict situation affect the dynamics of the settings in which they operate (and vice versa). In the best case scenario, this means effective prevention of the escalation of crisis situations, increased security and thus improved preconditions to post-conflict development and poverty reduction. On the other hand, weak planning, inadequate coordination, un-harmonized management of operations and poor allocation of resources for post-conflict peacebuilding efforts and reconstruction may – and in many cases probably do – have negative impacts on conflict settings. This is when the risk of interventions with good intentions actually contributing to the strengthening of existing tensions and increasing the level of insecurity, is at its greatest. This is where the notion of conflict sensitivity comes to play.

During the 1990's, humanitarian and development agencies mandated to tackle both the causes and effects of poverty and underdevelopment began to explore the link between violent conflict and questions of development and poverty. Research conducted especially in the aftermath of the tragic events of the genocide in Rwanda as well as other conflict-affected areas clearly showed that relief and development initiatives can have an impact on and be influenced by the conflict dynamics

⁶ See Pазzenholz, T. (2005): Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in International Cooperation. IPG, Vol. 4, p. 65.

within which they operate.⁶ One of the most well-known projects in this field is one in which several agencies engaged; led by Mary B. Anderson, the outcomes of the ‘Local Capacities for Peace’ research project has subsequently gained recognition through the phrase ‘Do No Harm’. This project demonstrated that “when given in conflict settings, aid can reinforce, exacerbate and prolong conflict” or it can “help to reduce tensions and strengthen people’s capacities to disengage from fighting and find peaceful options for solving problems”⁷.

The concept of conflict sensitivity has been at the margins of development practice since the late 1990’s. In addition to the ‘Do No Harm’ work of Mary B. Anderson and her team, the notion of conflict sensitivity owes largely to research and thinking on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)⁸; the macro conflict assessment work conducted by DFID (the Department for International Development, United Kingdom), USAID (United States Agency for International Development), the World Bank and other donors; not to mention the insight provided by some three decades of previous academic discourse on questions of peace, conflict and development.⁹

Conflict sensitivity may be understood as a sensitivity to an intervention’s potential impact on the specific context in which it is being implemented; “by being conflict-sensitive one stands a better chance to

⁷ Anderson, M. B. (1999): *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.1.

⁸ See e.g. Bush, K. (1998): *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones*. Working Paper 1.

⁹ Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald & Sheriff (2005): *The utility and dilemmas of conflict sensitivity*. Berghof Handbook, p.3.

ensure that the intervention will not fuel (...) violent conflict.”¹⁰ Conflict sensitivity has also been defined as the capacity (of an organisation) to understand the (conflict) context in which it operates; understand the interaction between its intervention and the (conflict) context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on the (conflict) context and the intervention. This is a specific understanding of the notion of conflict sensitivity developed through consultations with hundreds of individuals and agencies over a two-year period, resulting in *The Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive Approaches in 2004*.¹¹ It is this definition of conflict sensitivity that is offered here as a complementary developmental framework for the further improvement and sharpening of the thinking on and planning and implementation of civilian crisis management.¹²

¹⁰ De la Haye, J. & Denayer, K. (2003): PCIA: A Tool to Move from Conflict-Ignorance to Conflict Sensitivity within Development, Humanitarian Aid and Peacebuilding Work. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, Vol.1:2, p.49.

¹¹ *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding (2004)*. A Resource Pack produced by Saferworld, Forum for Early Warning and Early Response, International Alert, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Africa Peace Forum and Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies.

¹² It should be noted that the notion of conflict sensitivity is not static or even strongly established in academic writings.

Defining conflict sensitivity

The Resource Pack (2004) defines conflict sensitivity as the capacity of an organization to:

- understand the (conflict) context in which it operates
- understand the interaction between its operations and the (conflict) context; and
- act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the (conflict) context

Today, it is internationally and increasingly acknowledged good practice for humanitarian and development agencies to consider the implications of their work on the social, political and economic causes and dynamics leading to violent conflict. The current debate on conflict, aid and peacebuilding suggests that agencies can go beyond avoiding negative impacts (Do No Harm), to contributing positively to conflict transformation and peacebuilding (Do Good). The understanding is that this is possible by applying conflict sensitive approaches to relief and development planning, programming and implementation.¹³ This is not to say that development actors should become peace builders or vice versa. All actors in the business of humanitarian, development, conflict, peacebuilding and crisis management interventions can and should remain true to their original mandates; continuing to provide the services they are the experts at, but doing it in ways that support peace rather than conflict.

¹³ See Trócaire Discussion Paper (2004): Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding in Development: An Analysis of Concepts, Theory and Practice.

Conflict sensitivity in civilian crisis management?

The notion of conflict sensitivity has been developed in and around the fields of humanitarian assistance, development work and peacebuilding. In addition, the debate and implementation of conflict sensitive approaches has so far been predominantly focused on international agencies and national civil society. The thinking and theory behind conflict sensitivity is, however, evolving and expanding and the application of conflict sensitive approaches is moving rapidly into new areas and sectors.¹⁴ European civilian crisis management could and should be one of them.

In their discussion of the applicability of conflict sensitive approaches, De la Haye and Denayer claim that the key to conflict sensitivity is the capacity to think “laterally”; i.e. away from the immediately defined objective and beyond the immediate results of the intervention – thinking the intervention through on its merits vis-à-vis the dynamics of the conflict in which it is involved. Conflict sensitivity requires being sensitive to the operating (conflict) environment every step of the way (planning, implementation, evaluation).¹⁵ The applicability of conflict sensitive approaches is, however, not limited to interventions working strictly in conflict or conflict-prone areas; nor does an intervention necessarily need to be focused on conflict *per se* in order to benefit from conflict sensitive approaches. On the other hand, the fact that an intervention *does* focus primarily on conflict or its aftermath – as would be the case for civilian crisis management missions – does *not* ensure that the intervention’s impact on the situation would necessarily be positive.

¹⁴ Barbolet et al. (2005), p. 5-6. One of the exceptions pointed to here is the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs project on “Building African Capacity in Conflict Management”.

¹⁵ De la Haye, J & Denayer, K. (2003), p. 50.

Consequently, if and when the objective of civilian crisis management is indeed to have a positive impact on the context in which it is carried out, conflict sensitivity can be seen as a useful framework to be considered as an avenue to its further development.

Moreover, if the necessity of incorporating the needs and wants of the beneficiaries and local stakeholders in achieving a truly comprehensive approach to civilian crisis management missions is accepted, then it can again be said with a fair amount of certainty that the development work around civilian crisis management missions could benefit substantially from adopting an overall conflict sensitive approach. One of the principles of conflict sensitivity is, namely, that the people affected by violent conflict should be active participants in the solutions thereof. In order to ensure that civilian crisis management interventions consider and address the contexts within which they operate with consideration of all their nuances and intricacies, the beneficiaries at the local level should be engaged – at minimum – in the analysis and implementation phases. Although the overall objective of conflict sensitivity is not empowerment as such, empowerment has been found to be an important and positive supplement of conflict sensitive approaches¹⁶. Empowerment of local actors through conflict sensitive civilian crisis management in turn, would strengthen the knowledge of how to find the best links between crisis management operations and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.

An increasing number of tools have emerged in recent years for the application of conflict sensitive approaches. The Resource Pack alone refers to 13 different schemes and methodologies¹⁷; one of which is

¹⁶ Barbolet et al. (2005), p.5.

¹⁷ Conflict Analysis in Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding (2004). Chapter 2, Annex 1, Tools for Conflict Analysis.

in fact launched by the European Commission (EC checklist for root causes of conflict¹⁸). It is important to note, however, that tools are merely one dimension of the notion of conflict sensitivity. Tools applied individually, or as part of ‘conflict sensitive islands’ within larger ‘conflict ignorant’ interventions, have little or no impact as to the larger outcome. While a tools-based approach to conflict sensitivity is said to have severe limitations, what is most important to consider is that it is the spirit and approach with which any tools are utilised that determines their impact.¹⁹ With this said, and in connection to civilian crisis management missions in particular, the notion of conflict sensitivity should be understood in the broadest sense: as an ethos about how to strategise, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate missions – and finally feed the lessons learned back into the planning of the next endeavour.

Claiming the need for more and better conflict sensitivity with regard to civilian crisis management is not to say that the actors involved in civilian crisis management are conflict ignorant. On the contrary, many actors – institutions and individuals alike – probably are aware of these issues and are already integrating some form of conflict sensitivity to their interventions intuitively, if not by default. The point here is, however, that conflict sensitivity requires investment in learning about the conflict context as well as a responsibility to act upon that learning to make better-informed choices throughout the intervention cycle. Although these tasks seem simple, they do demand serious commitment on part of any organization. When it comes to EU civilian crisis management, the tasks become all the more interesting – and complicated.

¹⁸ http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/list.htm.

¹⁹ Barbolet et al. (2005), p.4.

No other way

Transforming the thinking and behaviour of organisations, let alone larger networks of miscellaneous actors working in the field of civilian crisis management, is a tremendous challenge. Moreover, one could argue that the civilian crisis management field too (along with the fields of development and humanitarian assistance) is in danger of suffering from “mainstreaming-overkill”. With the already existing pressures to mainstream environmental, gender and human rights awareness to all interventions, it is a fair enough question to ask: is there capacity left for yet another mainstreaming task of conflict sensitivity? Providing that the intention of civilian crisis management is to go beyond ‘doing no harm’ and to achieve excellence in ‘doing good’, I would argue that there is no other way. The crucial aspect to keep in mind here, however, is that mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into civilian crisis management is indeed not a question of applying yet another set of tools to mission planning and management. It calls for the need to create a whole new mindset where all the actors involved are pulling the same way. One could in fact turn the question around and ask: on what basis could we afford not to resort to conflict sensitivity in civilian crisis management?

Calls for coordination in the field amongst various actors representing various denominations, coherence on the policy level and achieving a smooth and mutually complementary continuum of activities among the various interventions in a certain conflict context are nothing new. Achieving all of this is another story. This is true also within the EU, which despite its great potential is at times hindered from using effectively the wide range of instruments at its disposal. One of the greatest challenges in this respect is to break the mental barriers that keep representatives of different institutions and/or fields of expertise sealed off from one another. Conflict sensitivity, accepted as an overall mind-

set and on account of the inherent request for joint conflict analyses provides an opportunity to make progress in the face of this challenge. Finally, perceiving an operational context of civilian crisis management in a conflict sensitive way could help all involved institutions and actors understand that their own positive contributions (to alleviating the conflict and contributing to peace) can easily be frustrated by carelessness from other conflict-ignorant institutions and actors operating in the same area. This realisation could be a key to encouraging institutions across the pillars to be conflict sensitive together and to thus to engage strategically with one another.

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European Union Civilian Crisis Management: Challenges for the Future



The security and defence policy which includes civilian crisis management is one of the most rapidly developing sectors in the European Union. Both the international political situation and internal policy issues such as decision-making and financing mechanism, affect the development and effectiveness of the EU civilian crisis management.

Civilian crisis management is being developed in a world where conflicts are more complex than before. Intra-state conflicts have replaced inter-state conflicts. Collapsed states, “rogue states”, multinational companies, which benefit from war economy, transnational organised crime, and terrorism or its threat – these issues are closely related to conflict situations. During the past years, collapsed and weak states

have become the focus of attention in international politics. The phenomenon was also taken up in the European Security Strategy.

In the future, the EU civilian crisis management must be rapid and coherent in responding to complex problems in conflict areas. There are a few questions that can be raised when thinking about the future EU civilian crisis management. Where should the EU use its civilian crisis management capabilities, and why? How can the EU action be harmonised with that of other international organisations? How will civilian crisis management be related to other EU instruments such as development and trade policies? The EU must be ready to take action in remote regions, and dangerous circumstances.

The EU must be capable of taking prompt action before situation in its neighbourhood is aggravated; when any signs of an escalation of a crisis appear; and before a humanitarian crisis situation is escalated. It is equally important to ensure a smooth transfer of activities to international or regional organisations, or to local authorities, which take further responsibility of reconstruction after the termination of a civilian crisis management mission.

Cooperation with other civilian actors

The EU civilian crisis management is not developed in a vacuum. The aim is to operate within the existing international multilateral framework. The role of the United Nations is seen central. The EU is an important actor in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and its role is strengthened through the enlargement of the EU. Military crisis management has been developed in close cooperation with NATO. Cooperation with international organisations has been institutionalised both at headquarters and field level. However, there surely remains a lot to be done in order to avoid any overlapping.

For the present, there is no systematic consultation mechanism between non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Council Secretariat and the European Commission. The EU should make good use of NGOs knowledge about crisis areas. NGOs normally carry out development cooperation programmes or conflict prevention activities in crisis areas long before violence takes place and conflict escalates. Thus, they have valuable knowledge, which could be used for early warning, or operational planning. NGO capabilities should be also used throughout a whole operation – from assessment and planning to evaluation and training of experts.

Sustainable development and change cannot be achieved in countries that have gone through a violent conflict unless democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights become rooted also at the level of a single citizen. NGOs do valuable work in strengthening civil society in crisis areas and integrating people into a new, more democratic system. This complements the EU's activities, which concentrate on reconstructing and developing state structures and institutions.

The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP includes a reference to cooperation between the EU and NGOs, and several successive Presidencies have organised a conference on the role of NGOs in civilian crisis management. British NGOs International Alert and Saferworld publish recommendations on the development of civilian crisis management upon the start of every Presidency. The quality of these publications reflects the knowledge NGOs have.

New bodies or institutions are hardly needed. Instead, established structures for dialogue with the Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the Commission would be an efficient and easy mechanism. The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), which is a network of about 20 NGOs specialised in civilian crisis management and peacebuilding, has become a recognised interlocutor to the

EU institutions. A next qualitative step would be an action plan for developing cooperation between the EU and NGOs in planning of civilian crisis management action, and in the field. This would ensure a more coherent approach to conflicts, and thus, it would increase the effectiveness of action.

EU's policy coherence in crisis areas

It is often stated that a coherent approach is a strength to the EU which, in addition to foreign and security policies has a large variety of tools in development and trade policies. A challenge is however to combine different tools and capabilities – European aid programmes, European Development Fund, military and civilian crisis management capabilities, and other tools. All these may affect the security of the Member States and the third states.

The interface between security and development is vital. Conflicts, instability, and violence are obstacles for development. Without peace and stability there cannot be development. Security is a precondition to development. So far, the EU has not paid much attention to the interface between short-term civilian crisis management and long-term conflict prevention and actions that increase stability – in other words, development cooperation. It would be important to link these policies so that the all actions undertaken by the EU would promote stability and security in crisis areas. Crisis management and development, trade and environmental policies should have a coherent approach; this is vital in the context of a crisis.

Towards a well-functioning institutional division of labour

In addition to the international political situation, the future of the EU civilian crisis management is strongly affected by internal admin-

istrative and institutional factors. The EU's pillar structure creates challenges to combining civilian crisis management instruments in a comprehensive and flexible way. The complicated structure has been an obstacle in particular in dealing with issues related to finance and decision-making. Planning of training and maintaining of expert rosters also suffer from the present situation.¹ Since the fate of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe is uncertain, any structural changes will not likely take place in the near future.

It is often thought that civilian crisis management covers only the priority areas agreed upon under the second pillar. Most of the European Commission's programmes are directed at post-conflict reconstruction and development cooperation. It should however be noted that the Commission also has instruments that support civilian crisis management activities. Community instruments are essential in developing emergency services, and training of experts. An important instrument complementing the EU's rapid reaction capacity is Rapid Reaction Mechanism, which enables rapid allocation of money for crisis management operations. Rapid Reaction Mechanism was used for example in Afghanistan for political, economic, and social reconstruction as well as for starting peace negotiations between Indonesian Government and Free Aceh Movement (GAM). However, the budget for Rapid Reaction Mechanism is rather modest, and the fact that financing is short-term – only six months – limits the effectiveness of rapid action. Much cannot be done in six months, and it would be difficult to find financing from other sources.

The cooperation between the EU institutions and pillars is also important when a short-term civilian crisis management terminates.

¹ Saferworld (2002): Submission to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Sub-Committee C): Inquiry into the Civilian Aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy.

The transfer of tasks to local authorities has proved to be difficult in many international operations, and exit strategies have usually been planned too late. It is important to link the Commission's programmes aimed at supporting local institutional reforms and strengthening local capacity to the termination of a civilian crisis management mission. Development programmes, set of conditions, and trade measures are instruments that can have influence on adopting the culture of good governance, and strengthening democracy and stability in a post-crisis situation.

Focus on developing civilian administration

The EU has made a wise decision to first invest in police and rule of law sectors. Civilian administration and its role in recovering society after a conflict is however, a sector where the EU civilian crisis management capabilities should be invested in the future. Weak governance – corruption, misuse of power, weak state institutions, lack of accountability, and internal conflicts – deteriorate states internally. In some cases this has led to the collapse of state structures. Somalia, Liberia, and Afghanistan are the latest examples. Organised crime and terrorism are real threats in this context. Collapsed states are an alarming phenomenon, which is a threat to global governance, and increases regional instability.² About 14% of the world's population live in weak states, and about 30% of people living with less than a dollar per day live in these countries. Weak states are incapable of providing basic services to their citizens. Furthermore, these states cannot effectively prevent increase in poverty. From the point of view of effective allocation of aid, weak states are a challenge to the international donor community.

² European Security Strategy (2003).

Civilian administration is one of the priorities areas of the EU civilian crisis management. The work has so far been done at a conceptual level. A step onto the operational level is however quickly needed so that weak states could be better supported. It is an enormous challenge, since in such cases the whole administrative and institutional state structure must be constructed from scratches. Therefore, it would be important to define the most significant administrative sectors to be used as a basis for action.

Attention to quality of capabilities

The systematic development of the EU civilian crisis management capabilities started in the Feira European Council in 2000³. There, the EU decided to develop capabilities in four areas: Police, Rule of Law, Civilian Administration, and Civil Protection. Quantitative aims concerning the number of experts to be sent to the field were also set in all areas. The Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2004 declared that these aims had been met⁴. However, commitments did not reflect the real range of capabilities needed and their suitability to different crisis management activities, and they were not based on a systematic assessment of needs.

It is essential to increase and develop support and planning capacity for missions, so that civilian crisis management capabilities can be effectively used in practice. More capabilities are required, when the EU prepares itself for acting in geographically new and remote areas. The context where civilian crisis management takes place is characterised by new threats and violence directed at international workers. The present capabilities committed to mission planning and staff security

³ Santa Maria da Feira European Council (2000): Presidency Conclusions.

⁴ Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference (2004): Ministerial Declaration.

in the field, in logistics, and in communication are insufficient. Therefore, missions are often being planned by soldiers, who do not have a comprehensive understanding of the nature and needs of a civilian crisis management mission.

Sufficient financing – which also enables rapid action – for civilian crisis management missions must be secured. Furthermore, rules of procurement should be updated so that while rules ensure a transparent and equal competition, they also enable the EU to act rapidly and coherently. The present mechanisms for invitations of tenders create unnecessary problems in organising rapid action under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Also, different recruitment and training systems affect the quality of capabilities. Therefore, it should be ensured that persons in national rosters are available at short notice, and have the right expertise.⁵ Training for civilian experts is one of the most important measures to be undertaken in developing quality of capabilities.

An important document outlining the aims for future improvement of civilian crisis management is the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 agreed upon in December 2004. The Civilian Headline Goal is the first attempt to systematically define – by using methodology adopted from soldiers – the capabilities the EU needs in order to be effective and operational as set out in the European Security Strategy.

Civilian Headline Goal is a good example of advanced thinking within the EU. The future development and evaluation of the EU civilian crisis management capabilities will be conducted through scenarios, which are used for defining qualitative and quantitative needs.⁶

⁵ Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference (2004): Ministerial Declaration, Chapter 5.

⁶ Gourlay, C. (2005): EU Civilian Crisis Management: preparing for flexible and rapid response.

The aim set out in the Civilian Headline Goal is to develop “packages” to be sent out in the field; that respond coherently to the situation they are deployed in, and consist of capabilities from the whole spectrum. The aim is also to develop capabilities of conducting several concurrent missions, of which at least one would be a substitution mission, which could be launched at short notice in difficult circumstances. Furthermore, the aim is to develop rapid reaction capability. Close cooperation with the military is also highlighted. The EU will also develop coherence in its actions, and between missions deployed under the ESDP and the Commission’s long-term programmes. In addition, the EU will plan strategies for transitional periods and exit strategies. It will also strengthen capabilities in order to be able respond to mission requests from other international organisations.

The Civilian Headline Goal process is conducted through stages. The aforementioned scenarios were drafted in spring 2005. A list of needed capabilities was produced in autumn 2005, and it was reviewed in the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference in November. There, a Civilian Capabilities Improvement Plan for the year 2006 was approved. The Finnish EU Presidency will organise the next conference in autumn 2006.

Modalities for unified and multidimensional teams have been simultaneously developed, and the result is Civilian Response Teams (CRTs). A team consists of national experts and personnel from the Council Secretariat, and its size and composition is adjusted according to a crisis situation. The proposal on CRTs was drafted in spring 2005. The idea is that CRTs conduct the early assessment of a crisis situation, support the establishing of civilian crisis management missions, and temporarily support EU Special Representatives or on-going missions if need be. Experts for CRTs have already been chosen, and their training has started. The aim is to have a capability of about 100 persons ready by the end of the year 2006.

In addition to developing qualitative and quantitative capabilities, it would be equally important to conduct transparent and critical evaluation from the terminated and on-going missions, and learn from the EU's own as well as other international organisations' lessons. Evaluation could then be used for further development of scenarios and capabilities.

Sufficient financial resources as preconditions for future capacity

There is a growing need for civilian crisis management. The zone of open or latent conflicts reaches from the Middle East and Caucasus to South and East Asia up to the Korean peninsula, and Africa. These also affect the stability and security in the EU and in its neighbourhood. During the past year, the EU has started new missions in, for instance, Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, Sudan and Aceh.

The most evident threat to development and coherence in the EU civilian crisis management is the lack of resources. Different missions have been financed on an ad hoc basis. In many cases, the operational capacity of a mission has been adjusted to the available financial resources. The situation where civilian crisis management missions are financed from the EU budget, and military operations outside it, is untenable, in particular because the future crisis management operations will consist of both aspects – civilian and military. The established Civil-Military Cell reflects this tendency. Administrative costs of missions launched under the ESDP are still financed outside the EU budget or charged to the Member States.⁷

The Communication published by the European Commission states that coordination and flexible use of procedures are needed in develop-

⁷ Duke, S. (2002): The Rhetoric-Resources Gap in EU Crisis Management.

ing civilian crisis management priority areas. Therefore, it is necessary to make the decision-making on civilian crisis management and conflict prevention more effective and rapid. Proposed solutions have been the establishment of an ad-hoc fund or flexible use of budget mechanisms. The Commission has favoured the last solution, since such a fund would raise questions about division of responsibilities, control of financial administration management, and coherence in activities.⁸ Financial resources are also needed for developing national capabilities and maintaining preparedness.

The EU's action still relies on the resources of the Member States. Thus, the future of the EU civilian crisis management is dependent on how the Member States are capable of raising national qualitative and quantitative capacity onto a level where credible action is ensured. However, qualitative development of preparedness is a challenging and time-consuming task in the EU of 25, and demand for leadership and initiative. It would therefore be a natural choice for Finland to take the development of civilian crisis management capabilities to its Presidency agenda in 2006.

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⁸ European Commission (2001): Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Financing of Civilian Crisis Management.



Annexes

Acronyms

AAK	Alliance for Future for Kosovo
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ANC	African National Congress
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPR	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution
AU	African Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-military Cooperation
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Centre, Finland
CMCO	Civil-Military Coordination
CME	Crisis Management Exercise
CMP	Crisis Management Procedures
CRT	Civilian Response Team
COREPER	Permanent Representatives Committee
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DEMO	Political Parties of Finland for Democracy
DFID	Department of International Development, United Kingdom
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECMM	European Community Monitoring Mission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EGT	European Group on Training
ENA	École Nationale d'Administration, France
EP	European Parliament
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy

EU	European Union
EU BAM Rafah	European Union Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories
EUFOR Althea	European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUJUST LEX	European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
EUJUST THEMIS	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPAT	European Union Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUPOL COPPS	European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
EUPOL Kinshasa	European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
EUPOL Proxima	European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUSEC DC Congo	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAM	Free Aceh Movement

Acronyms

GNP	Gross National Product
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGC	International Governance Council, Nonviolent Peaceforce
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPAAW	Independent Parliamentarian Association of Afghan Women
IPTF	International Police Task Force, Bosnia and Herzegovina
IPU	Integrated Police Unit, Democratic Republic of Congo
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan
KATU	Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network, Finland
KFOR	NATO's Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Sri Lanka
MDG	Millenium Development Goal
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NP	Nonviolent Peaceforce
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development

PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
PoCo	Political Committee
PMG	Politico-Military Working Group
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SFOR	NATO's Stabilisation Force, Bosnia and Herzegovina
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SPL/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNF	United National Front, Sri Lanka
UNHIC	United Nations Humanitarian Information Centre
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WEU	Western European Union
ZIF	Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze

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