

# FUTURE OF CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

PRIORITIES, SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

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*Civilian crisis management is going through major changes. The circumstances in which the operations are conducted are becoming increasingly complex and the priorities of civilian crisis management are under revision. The seminar was organized to look for answers to the challenges that the civilian crisis management is facing. We discussed what civilian crisis management is useful for and what are the issues that can be tackled with it.*

*Looking through the lens of the integrated approach we tried to find out what is the added value of civilian crisis management in different phases of a violent conflict. Identifying the right combination of tools for each phase increases the effectiveness of solving the issues we are facing. Civilian crisis management should not be regarded as an isolated tool but rather as a part of a wider toolkit to address and prevent conflicts. Finding the limits of civilian crisis management is also necessary for the most effective results. Finally, to evaluate the effectiveness of civilian crisis management we discussed what we mean by its successfulness. What kind of indicators can we use to measure success? From whose perspective is a mission successful? Do the recipient and the sending countries understand the success in the same way? How could we bridge this gap?*

***Some presentations in the seminar were delivered under the Chatham House Rule and will therefore not be publicly distributed.***

## **SPEAKER BIOS**

### **TIMO SOINI**, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Timo Soini is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland. He has been serving in his current position since May 2015. He is also the Deputy Prime Minister in Juha Sipilä's coalition government. Mr Soini has made a long career in politics. He is one of the four founding fathers of the Finns Party, established in 1995, and he has been leading the party since 1997. As he became a member of the Finnish Parliament in 2003, the current term as an MP is his fourth one. Between 2009 and 2011, he served as a member of the European Parliament. Mr Soini has wide experience in foreign and security policy as well as EU affairs. From 2011 until 2015, he worked as the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Finnish Parliament.

### **PIA STJERNVALL**, Ambassador, Civilian Crisis Management, MFA Finland

Pia Stjernvall currently works as an Ambassador for Civilian Crises Management at the Finnish MFA. Prior to this position, she worked as the Head of Mission for EUPOL Afghanistan (before that being the Deputy Head of Mission and the Acting Head of Mission). Ms. Stjernvall has previously been the Special Representative for International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-building (IDPS) at the MFA Finland and the Coordinator for Mediation at the MFA. She also has served i.a. as Charge d'Affaires at the Embassy of Finland in Kabul and as Finland's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) in Kenya.

### **OLLI RUOHOMÄKI**, Senior Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Dr. Olli Ruohomäki is currently Visiting Senior Fellow with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. He was previously the Deputy Director for South Asia at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. He has worked on the topics of violent conflict, crisis management and reconstruction for over two decades and has field experience from a variety of settings including Afghanistan and Kosovo. He has also served as the Deputy Representative of Finland to the Palestinian Authority and with the United Nations in war-torn Cambodia in the 1990s. His research interests include political economy of war, terrorism, insurgency, fragile states, and the nexus between development and security. Olli Ruohomäki is a frequent commentator on terrorism, Middle East and South Asian affairs in Finnish TV, Radio and print media.

**ANNE PALM**, Executive Director, Wider Security Network (WISE)

Anne Palm works currently as Executive Director of the Wider Security Network WISE - a Finnish NGO working in the field of human security, peacebuilding and crisis management. She has served as Operations Officer in two civilian crisis management missions; 2008-11 EUMM in Georgia and 2014-15 OSCE SMM in Ukraine. Prior that she has worked as Secretary General of the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network and as Advisor to the Human Rights Commissioner of CBSS in Denmark, and has lots of experience from Southern Africa, Timor Leste and the Balkans. She holds a Master's Degree in International Politics (Security Politics) from the University of Helsinki.

**SOFIE FROM EMMESBERGER**, Ambassador, Representative of Finland in the PSC

Sofie From-Emmesberger serves as of 1.9.2015 as Finland's Ambassador to EU's Political and Security Committee. She arrived in Brussels from Nairobi where she held the position as Ambassador of Finland to Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, the Seychelles and Eritrea as well as the Permanent Representative to the UN in Nairobi. In her previous assignments she served at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki as Director of the Human Rights Policy Unit and Deputy Director of the Unit for Civilian Crisis Management. She has been posted to Tel Aviv and to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

**PAUL PICARD**, Deputy Director for Operations Service, OSCE

Paul Picard is the Deputy Director for Operations Service of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre. Before joining the Conflict Prevention Centre, he served as Head of the OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk, holding the position of Acting Chief Observer and then Chief Observer from 25 July 2014 until 31 August 2015. Prior to that, Paul worked in the OSCE in the Transnational Threats Department/Action against Terrorism Unit (2012 to 2014) and in the Office in Tajikistan (2009 to 2012). Before joining the OSCE, Paul was an officer in the French Army (1999 to 2008). He started his military career in the airborne troops and subsequently held posts in the Army Headquarters' Office of International Affairs, and Civil-Military Co-operation. He served multiple tours of duty in conflict areas including in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Paul Picard graduated Magna Cum Laude from Brigham Young University in international relations with a specialty in Middle Eastern Politics.

**TANJA TAMMINEN**, Senior Cooperation and Coordination Officer, EUAM Ukraine

Dr. Tanja Tamminen works as the Senior Coordination and Cooperation Officer at the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine. She has long term expertise working with CSDP matters having served as a political advisor in the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, as a researcher in the Finnish Institute for International Affairs in Helsinki, and as an advisor in the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. She moved to Kyiv from Regensburg, Germany, where she led a research group on "frozen conflicts" at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies. She has done extensive research on CFSP including her PhD on EU policies in the Balkans (2009, Sciences Po, Paris). Recently her article "Civilian CSDP: Responding to challenges and meeting expectations" was published in the EUISS Report Recasting EU civilian crisis management available at [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report\\_31.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_31.pdf)

**NICK WILLIAMS**, Head of Operations Section (Afghanistan-Iraq), NATO HQ

Nicholas Williams is currently the Head of the Afghanistan and Iraq Team within the Operations Division of the International Staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In November 2009, he completed almost three years in Afghanistan working with ISAF, first as political adviser to ISAF forces in the south, based in Kandahar, and latterly as Deputy NATO Senior Representative in Kabul. He has worked extensively in conflict and post conflict countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans. From 2000 - 2003 he was attached to the policy directorate of the French Ministry of Defence where he was responsible for developing NATO-EU relations and Franco-British defence cooperation. From 1997 - 1999 he was Assistant Director for Counter-terrorism in the British Ministry of Defence.

**ERIK DE FEJTER**, Deputy PSC representative and CIVCOM delegate, the Netherlands

Erik de Feijter is the deputy PSC representative and CIVCOM delegate for the Netherlands in Brussels and has worked for the past four years on various aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy

and civilian crisis management in particular. He has been a Dutch diplomat for the past 20 years and worked on political and humanitarian issues in West Africa (2000-2003, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone), India and Nepal (2003-2007) and as a political advisor to the Dutch PRT in Baghlan province, Afghanistan (2005/2006). At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague he was part of the Uruzgan taskforce within the Security Policy department (2007-2010) and was coordinator for the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa within the Africa Department (2010-2012), with a particular focus on security sector reform.

**KIRSI HENRIKSSON**, Head of EUCAP Sahel Niger

Since September 2016 Kirsi HENRIKSSON has been working as a Head of Mission for EUCAP Sahel Niger. Previously she was working as a Deputy Head of Mission for EUCAP Sahel Mali (2014-2016) and as a Chief of Staff for EUBAM Libya (2013-2014). In 2010-2011 she was working as a Rule of Law and Best Practice Officer in EUJUST LEX Iraq. Before her engagement in Civilian Crisis Management she was working at the University of Tampere as a lecturer and a researcher (1996-2006).

**ANNA PENFRAT**, Senior Policy Officer, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)

Anna Penfrat is a Senior Policy Officer at the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a platform of European NGOs, networks of NGOs and think tanks which are committed to peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict. She joined EPLO in 2012 to support the 'Civil Society Dialogue Network' project and EPLO's work on EU-Africa relations. Since 2015, she also coordinates the work of EPLO on EU institutions and policies, including the Common Security and Defence Policy. Prior to joining EPLO, she worked for different peacebuilding NGOs (Search for Common Ground, ESSEC IRENÉ), focusing on programme support and EU fundraising. Anna holds a Master's Degree in Conflict Analysis and Peacebuilding from Sciences Po Lille (France).

**ANNE SIPILÄINEN**, Under-Secretary of State, MFA Finland

Anne Sipiläinen has made a long career in the Finnish MFA. Currently she serves as Under-Secretary of State responsible for Foreign and Security Policy. Prior to her present post, Ms Sipiläinen has served i.a. as Under-Secretary of State responsible for Development Cooperation and Development Policy and as Finland's Ambassador to the EU's Political and Security Committee in Brussels.

**TARJA KANTOLA**, Chairperson, Wider Security Network (WISE)

Tarja Kantola has been the Chairperson of the Wider Security Network WISE since the establishment of the network in October 2015. She also chairs the Board of Finn Church Aid. Ms Kantola has a long career in the Foreign Ministry of Finland. She has served four different Finnish Foreign Ministers as their Special Adviser. Latest assignment was with Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja until spring 2015. Tarja Kantola has been very active in many Finnish NGOs working in the field of peacebuilding, human rights and development.

**REETTA PURONTAKANEN**, Communication Manager

Since 2014 Reetta Purontakanen has been working as the Communication Manager of the British Embassy in Helsinki. In 2011-2014 she was working for EULEX Kosovo in Pristina as a reporting officer and programme manager, and in Nis, Serbia, with a project implementing the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue agreement. She has previously been employed as the Head of Press and Public Affairs at the British Embassy, in Parliamentary affairs in Westminster, and has participated in several election monitoring missions from Bosnia to Ukraine. She holds a Master's Degree in War Studies from King's College London.

## WELCOME

### Pia **STJERNVALL**

Pia Stjernvall opened the seminar by pointing out that the seminar's topic, civilian crises management, is going through major changes and that the circumstances in which the operations are conducted are becoming increasingly complex. According to Stjernvall civilian crisis management should not be seen as an isolated tool but rather as a part of a wider toolkit to address and prevent conflicts. Finding the limits of civilian crisis management is also necessary for the most effective results. Finally, to evaluate the effectiveness of civilian crisis management the definition of success must be agreed upon. What indicators can be used to measure success; from whose perspective is a mission successful; do the recipient and the sending countries understand the success in the same way; and, how to bridge this gap? Stjernvall introduced the main speakers and facilitator and invited the speakers and participants to be inspired, excited and challenged by the following discussions.

### Timo **SOINI**

Minister Soini pointed out that the EU security system needs strengthening due to pressure created by the destabilization in North Africa, Middle East, wars in Iraq and Syria, conflict-feeding terrorism, trafficking and cyber/hybrid threats. In short, the world has become more unpredictable. European Union needs to do more to promote security in Europe and its neighborhood, working with international organizations in a concerted effort.

Today's crisis management focuses more on building local ownership in mission countries, activities that help strengthen rule of law and institutions, police and judiciary - highlighting the role of civilian crisis management.

The aim in all crisis management operations is to complete the mission successfully, to have a smooth exit, and to have sustainable results, so that people could live in peace and to rebuild their societies. However, there are no easy solutions to longstanding conflicts.

The EU has almost two decades of experience in civilian crisis management. Finland has been in the forefront developing the EU concepts, policies and tools and contributing personnel for civilian crisis management. Finland has today over 130 civilian crisis management experts serving on foreign missions. Many of them are policemen, but Finland also sends human rights, gender and legal experts on missions. Currently there are some question marks over EU's continued commitment, since during the last three years the EU has not started a single new civilian mission, due to the member states' lack of political will. We need firm political commitment by the EU member states to civilian crisis management, and willingness to contribute personnel for missions.

The adoption of the EU's Global Strategy last year was an important step forward. The comprehensive approach is a way ahead, but its implementation in crisis management poses serious challenges. How to bring a multitude of actors active in crisis management in a conflict area to act together with each other and the local political leaders and decision making structures- including women - that have a crucial role for reaching positive and lasting results? The key in promoting the comprehensive approach is to strengthen co-operation and dialogue between different actors. It would also be useful to enhance cooperation with non-governmental organisations, since many of them are involved in aid activities in the same conflict areas where crisis management tools are used. It is also important to figure out how to prevent conflicts more effectively. Prevention is the simplest, most humane and the cheapest way to address conflict. Early-warning signals should lead to actions, including when human rights are breached.

This seminar was put together to seek new and innovative solutions to developing civilian crisis management

– and to figure out how to be more effective at a time when countries are struggling with budgetary constraints. An inter-governmental expert group recently presented a report to the Minister of Interior, Paula Risikko, recommending developments on CMC Finland. The goal should be to step up our own homebase activities so that the output – Finland’s active participation in civilian crisis management missions – would be even better. <sup>1</sup>

## CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES

### OLLI RUOHOMÄKI

Ruohomäki pointed out he does not believe in the good of man and hence presents quite Hobbesian viewpoints. He noted that conflicts are on the rise, war is often non-violent, but extremely disruptive. As David Kilcullen describes in his book “Out of the Mountains”, population growth, urbanization and digital connectivity lay the framework for today’s conflicts. Conflicts, such as taking place in Raqqa, Aleppo, Mosul and Fallujah, are on the rise. Atomized jihadist militancy and islamist terrorism is here to stay. The arc of instability is growing and the conflicts are mostly asymmetric. Peace and wartime are blurred and the different phases of the so-called conflict cycle as well. Conflicts are becoming diffuse, diverse and disruptive. Instead of weapons of mass destruction we can now fear weapons of mass disruption. Civilian crisis management is old-fashioned. There have been a lot of unintended consequences to civilian crisis management missions and its operational space is shrinking. The role of civilian crisis management, as currently understood, will not work and the current state-building agenda is not relevant anymore. It is evident that the most adaptive and resilient countries will survive and prevail, and they will be able to withstand devastating shocks, and this can be achieved by increasing the security and redundancy of critical infrastructure and networks, by deploying defensive systems and by enhancing societal emergency-preparedness-levels. Encouraging global partnerships; short-term, small and less intrusive, agile rapid-reaction surgical teams; and local expertise interweaved with outside knowledge are also a co-design for resilience.

### ANNE PALM

Palm put it bluntly: “Crisis is the new black.” Whether we talk about man-made crises, internal or cross-border violent conflicts; environmental disasters; economic and political instability; massive streams of refugees escaping from extreme poverty or violence or inhumane conditions; or despicable terrorist actions, we live in the midst of crisis. Despite of this “normality” of crises, we are trying to manage them in order to avoid or at least to reduce the worst, negative consequences. One way of doing this is civilian crisis management - a policy, which involves the use of civilian assets to prevent a crisis, to respond to an ongoing crisis, to tackle the consequences of a crisis, or to address the causes of instability. This seminar’s purpose is to address the future of the civilian crisis management; to set priorities, to look at the successes and to meet the challenges. To follow up on these objectives, some topical questions could be posed to be discussed in the seminar.

Why we are involved in civilian crisis management? How do we respond to the presuppositions determined by the European Union’s fundamental values and the Lisbon Treaty as well as the requirements of the UN Charter? At the same time there seems to be a growing tension between the values/principles and interests. Are our security, political and economic interests defining more and more the contents of crisis management? In addition, internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders. How do these aspects change civilian crisis management?

Who does the civilian crisis management? In the EU, civilian crisis management has mainly been the Council’s

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<sup>1</sup> Minister Soini’s speech can be found from the MFA website:  
<http://www.formin.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=363111&nodeid=15149&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI>

responsibility, belonging to CSDP. However, the role of the Commission has been increasing. Most of the Commission's external action financial instruments fund programmes that relate to crisis management one way or the other. Also, new types of actors in the field of Justice and Home Affairs have emerged and FRONTEX, EUROPOL and EUROJUST are supporting and cooperating with several CSDP missions. What does this mean to member states who are sending experts to missions?

For years, the international community has been talking about the comprehensive approach in crisis management, that is, joint planning, cooperation and coordination to reach a coherent and sustainable solution to a crisis. In the EU Global Strategy framework this entails a coherent **USE OF ALL POLICIES** and instruments at the EU's disposal. However, the meaning and scope of the 'comprehensive approach' will be expanded, to include acting at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts; and interacting and cooperating with other international and regional organisations and civil society actors.

How do we do civilian crisis management? Due to complex crisis situations new, brave, innovative solutions are needed. Palm called for more short-term, precise operations with clear end goals and exit strategies in the future, as well as crisis management done by experts, men and especially women, in missions, which respect and involve local communities, and are based on human security- and do no harm -principles, sustainability, and strengthening the resilience of the local communities in their pursuit for a stable society and sustainable peace. Durable, sustainable solutions can only be reached when the local community takes ownership of the peace process.

In the following Q&A-session the audience members enquired, how would it be possible to increase the credibility of EU missions for instance in Libya, and would it be possible to have an EU mission with executive powers. The example of Sahel was raised, where, in order to reinvent the mission, you would have to restructure the whole Brussels-based EU structure. One participant also pointed out that locals/mission countries often criticize the credibility of EU missions due to wrong expectations and due to not understanding the mission mandate.

## **PANEL I: COMPREHENSIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF A CONFLICT CYCLE**

### **SOFIE FROM-EMMESBERGER**

Ambassador From-Emmesberger highlighted that the EU has a broad scale of instruments to be used in the different phases of a conflict cycle. In her dual role as the Commission's Vice President and as High Representative, Federica Mogherini has brought the Commission and the External Action Service closer together. Country and regional specific strategies are important in directing EU's work and in defining the most relevant EU actors. Among them the EU Special Representatives as also the Heads of the EU Delegations have an important task in bringing the different EU strands together. More coherence and breaking of silos is, however, still needed in order to make the best use of EU's instruments and to enable a seamless transition from one EU instrument to another.

Terrorism, radicalization and energy security know no borders. This means that EU has to find new ways to tackle the nexus of internal and external security.

### **PAUL PICARD**

The OSCE's work is based on field operations (sixteen) and OSCE Institutions (ODIHR, HCNM, RFOM) and the Parliamentary Assembly. The Ministerial and Permanent Councils are the executive decision-making structures and work on consensus of the 57 participating States. Most of the OSCE staff are on the field

working in all phases of the conflict cycle. In OSCE, these are referred as early warning and early action, crisis management, conflict resolution (specifically through dialogue facilitation and mediation), as well as post-conflict rehabilitation and peacebuilding.

The OSCE contributes to the resolution of the conflict in and around Ukraine using a wide array of its tools including the good offices of its Chairmanship, OSCE Institutions and three of its field operations. One of OSCE's flagship field operations is the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (SMM) established in March 2014 to monitor the situation on the ground. The SMM is a civilian unarmed operation.

**From the OSCE's experience, three points are essential in civilian crisis management:**

1. Complex crisis situations require innovative and tailored solutions

A crucial condition for success is the close cooperation between all parts of the OSCE family described earlier. The crisis in and around Ukraine has demonstrated the complex character of today's conflicts, which requires creative and tailored solutions. The SMM provides such an example. It has become the largest OSCE field operation in more than a decade and has deployed for the first time in OSCE's history new technology such as sophisticated cameras, drones of various types, satellite imagery etc. The situation on the ground indicates that this will continue to be required in the foreseeable future. The challenges faced in deploying a mission in such a complex environment have also required new approaches to crisis management within the OSCE Secretariat and the Conflict Prevention Centre.

2. Comprehensive crisis management on the ground needs comprehensive support from headquarters

The OSCE has made considerable progress in strengthening its capacities for crisis response since the adoption of Ministerial Council Decision 3/11 (2011) by, for instance, developing tools related to swift deployment of staff and assets, which were successfully implemented during the initial deployment of the SMM.

OSCE experience in Ukraine shows how important it is to have functional instruments and that it is crucial that efforts of crisis management on the ground are supported in a comprehensive manner from headquarters through policy guidance, as well as operational and logistical support.

OSCE is constantly learning lessons from our engagement in Ukraine. A critical one in that regard is that we need to further expand our surge capacities in terms of planning and executing the rapid deployment of personnel and assets and be prepared to work in challenging security environments.

3. Civilian crisis management can be an effective tool but has limitations when dealing with violent conflict. Crisis management by external actors cannot solve any conflict, only the parties can.

The SMM deployed when the security situation in the Donbas was comparatively benign. Since then, we have witnessed a massive escalation with dramatic consequences for the civilian population on both sides of the contact line. The SMM has taken on a number of tasks including ceasefire monitoring and verification, which were not originally foreseen in its mandate. Despite the courageous and valiant work of the SMM monitors, there are limits to what a civilian unarmed operation can achieve in such volatile contexts, but there are also advantages including being viewed as inoffensive to the parties and civilian populations. This allows the Mission to operate without representing a threat and also to be a confidence-building tool on the ground.

Lastly, civilian crisis management by external actors cannot solve a conflict – only the parties to the conflict can. Mediation in this regard is an essential tool to bring the parties together and work toward a peaceful solution. The OSCE's Trilateral Contact Group and its four Working Groups provide a platform of discussion for the sides with the OSCE as a mediator. On the societal level, the OSCE facilitates dialogue between groups, communities, local populations and local authorities; and reports on issues of concern for people on the ground, such as access to water, displacement, gender, the humanitarian situation, protection of civilians, and many others.



## TANJA TAMMINEN

According to Tamminen, it is a cliché that coordination is a key to the success of peace building and state building missions, but nobody wants to be coordinated.

In Kosovo, the transfer of competencies from UNMIK to the local authorities and within a limited scope to EU Rule of Law Mission EULEX did work out – even though with hiccups. During the five years Tamminen was there, there was no platform created where international community as a whole focusing on rule of law reforms could coordinate actions. Some actors worked under UNMIK umbrella, others not. Most coordination was done in ad hoc manner, for instance between KFOR, OSCE and EULEX, when preparing elections in the North, rather than a continuous process with joint objectives.

In Ukraine, the EU Advisory Mission, EUAM, on the contrary has a mandate to coordinate between EU organs and international actors in the field of civilian security sector reform, also encouraging local actors to take ownership of the donor coordination mechanisms

In Ukraine, the integrated approach of the EU is being implemented in an exemplary manner as a number of assistance projects are jointly planned and programmed between the CSDP Mission EUAM Ukraine, EU Delegation and the Commission Support Group to Ukraine. The IcSP project “Support to Police Reform in Ukraine” (SPRU), co-located with EUAM and implemented by the Swedish Police and UNOPS. The EU Anti-Corruption Initiative (EUACI) implemented by DANIDA is also co-located in the EUAM premises. Both started in early 2017. Recently the Special Measure on Rule of Law (PRAVO) has been planned together with the Commission and the implementers. As for the EUAM projects, the complementarity and synergies with other EU instruments is also carefully checked already in the planning phase. Monthly meetings between EUAM, EUDEL and existing EU projects are helpful to coordinate operational activities. EUAM updates regularly donor mapping of EU Member State activities as well as activities of other international partners in the field of civilian security sector. The Mission also holds regular donor coordination meetings in various formats and cooperates in addition to EU family, with other international partners such as the OSCE PCU and the Council of Europe.

Indeed, during the past years EU has learned a lot and the integrated approach highlighted in the Global Strategy is being implemented. Overall, international community should aim now to move even further from joint planning and coordination to assessing impact on the ground together including also jointly identified lessons.

Shortly, integrated planning taking into account synergies of different projects and missions, co-location of different actors working on the same reforms and from day-one existing exit/transition strategies are key elements to successful missions. Moreover, a shared situational awareness among international actors on the ground and jointly shared assessments would add to the efficiency of actions.

## NICHOLAS WILLIAMS

The role of NATO is shifting in today’s world. NATO has spent 20 years managing and intervening in crises from the Balkans to Afghanistan. But once again the pendulum is shifting back to Europe. The one crisis to prevent in Europe is a crisis involving Russia. And NATO is devoting increasing effort and resources to this aim.

There is one aspect to NATO’s crisis management responses which is constant: NATO cannot manage crises alone. There are diverse responses to the meaning of a comprehensive approach to crisis management, but the main point is, NATO does not work in isolation from the rest of the international community. NATO disposes of one main and powerful instrument, i.e. the military one, which has to fit into a civilian framework. In Afghanistan, for instance, NATO went to help the international community to develop security institutions.

However, in practice, the international community had a fragmented approach. Every institution worked, more or less in complete isolation, despite the framework that was imposed by the UN on international actors.

One aspect of NATO's intervention in Afghanistan deserves mention for bridging the military civilian divide. NATO developed the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which do have a bad reputation among some NGOs, but which Williams wants to appeal for as a concept to be applied and developed beyond Afghanistan, and could usefully be adopted and adapted by the EU. Projecting civilian capabilities to an area in need, using military capabilities, is a good and practical concept. The military helped keep the civilian experts within the PRTs protected; their purpose was to deliver aid, assistance and medical help to vulnerable provincial societies, often remote and distant from the Government in Kabul, which did not have means or resources to provide support to the provinces itself. Thereby, so the theory went, the Government would gain credibility by demonstrating the delivery of necessary services. Although the danger here was that PRTs became parallel structures which weakened the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Indeed, some PRTs became comfortable in doing activities they could successfully complete in a commander's short tour length i.e building small infrastructure, or giving hand-outs. They did not take on the more important and harder aspects of development like multi-year big infrastructure projects and building the capacity in the Afghan sub-national government. The focus on projects as opposed to capacity building was misguided. PRTs should have emphasized the latter in order to prepare for the inevitable transition one day to Afghan local ownership and responsibility. These are key lessons to be learned for future endeavours in the still experimental concept of civil-military cooperation.

The prime reason why the PRT concept fell into disrepute among many NGOs was the confusion between civilian and military elements and purposes of the teams, and particularly the confusion of who was responsible and for what. According to some NGOs, PRTs also violated the principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence rooted in International Humanitarian Law and blurred the space with a so-called 'combatant, NATO Allies, delivering development (although NATO and like-minded stakeholders would argue development is political). Instead of connecting local governors to people and instead of institution-building, the international actors drove a wedge between the Government of Afghanistan and the provincial governors who were nominally the servants and agents of the Afghan government. In practice, provincial Governors looked more to the international presence in their provinces and the PRTs for support and finance than to the government in Kabul.

Another internal PRT problem was that the civilian development experts in PRTs also tended to have a longer term perspective on development, while there were pressures on the military element within the PRTs to contribute to the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) campaign by instigating quick impact projects for the purpose of winning "hearts and minds" in the short term. Nevertheless, some PRTs, particularly US-led ones, created better synergies between the military quick-impact funds and the civilian long-term development projects, although neither civilians nor military stayed long enough in the province to create a sustainable development impact.

These confusions and differing priorities between the civilians and military do not invalidate the PRT concept. It is important to see beyond the inevitable problems of implementing a new and demanding concept and focus on the essential benefit of what civilian military cooperation can deliver, in short that is the unique and productive synergy between civilian expertise and know-how and military force protection and logistics, in remote, and but not necessarily hostile, areas in need.

In Iraq, NATO has taken a different approach, and more modest approach to civil-military cooperation in institution capacity building and training. There is a civil-military core team permanently in Baghdad, housed at the British Embassy. NATO activities involve training teams coming in for a week or two to train the Iraqi military. This helps develop Iraqi niche-capability, and at low cost. NATO's Iraq model also has potential to be applied elsewhere, with the distinct advantage of not requiring a substantial and permanent military presence or foot-print.

The following discussion turned to interests and neutrality vs. impartiality. The example was brought to the table about Serbs being strongly stigmatized during the Bosnian crisis. A participant enquired why the UN is not involved more in peacebuilding, being non-interested unlike the EU, for instance. Tamminen pointed out that peacebuilding is always highly invasive and never neutral, but what needs to be kept in mind is that we must go on missions without principles. If we choose some, we are not neutral actors. Picard followed up on the question of UN activity stating that for instance, with the Ukraine crisis, the veto from one powerful member state has prohibited UN action altogether. The UN Charter Chapter 8 organisations; the OSCE and other regional organisations, must be relied on more. The OSCE, is in essence neutral and impartial. The Organization, for instance, acts on the ground before the issue proceeds to the UN level. In the near future, the OSCE is also relying more on logistical support from the UN. In addition, new Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) are not welcomed by many member states. NATO has been asking the OSCE to take part in simulation exercises. However, it is a politically contentious question, so the political context has to be considered carefully.

Why is the comprehensive approach so difficult to implement, when it is so important? Picard replied to this fundamental question, by highlighting that the geopolitical system has changed a lot, so it is very difficult to obtain and share information, deal with a multitude of players and manage the different stages of a crisis.

## **PANEL II: WHAT IS SUCCESSFUL CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT?**

### **ERIK DE FEJTER**

Erik De Fejter opened the second panel discussion of the seminar by addressing the challenges of mission work. De Fejter pointed out that we need smaller, more defined missions, or clarity on how to divide tasks between the European Commission and the EEAS. We have joint planning and programming within the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP - EU's main instrument supporting security and peace-building activities in partner countries), but once we are already on the ground, it is too late to begin these. Institution-building is of utmost importance, since once they are up and running, it is easier to do development work in the mission area. Conversely, sense of ownership of our own institutions helps with the fieldwork, which is in today's Europe quite different from the times of Solana's more prosperous and stable Europe. Furthermore, local ownership is not considered enough in planning missions.

Some questions that need to be posed as regards CSDP and development activities. When does the added value provided by a CSDP mission stop and when can we take on development work? What is the added value provided by the possible mission, or should we go in at all? How to measure the impact of a mission? As impact is concerned, a baseline study allows us to track the points, where we have got things right or wrong.

The underlining trends of CSDP are not very good. For instance, there are less than half mission staff deployed today than was four years ago. However, the Global Strategy provides a window of opportunity this year for CSDP to develop. It should be acknowledged that CSDP does not need to be big mission-minded, but that also smaller proportion missions are possible.

### **KIRSI HENRIKSSON**

In earlier times, mission evaluation was basically not allowed. Impact assessment was very "cruel" and lessons were identified, rather than learned, which was considered more politically correct. Coordination with other international actors was difficult because of different means of measurement and different timelines of baseline studies.

The mission Henriksson leads has been in Niger since 2012, but it is impossible to measure whether it has

prevented a crisis in Niger or not. The mission is audited regularly, but it is difficult to measure the fulfillment of objectives, since they are so politically correct. Tackling irregular migration was added as objective 5 to the mission. A field office was established in Agadez, which used to be a migration hub, but it has shifted now. Nigerians themselves don't consider irregular migration as a challenge. It is also hard to systematically measure the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

The mission is a success if it is getting development projects in Niger to build the economy and it is also a success if it involves the locals. When measuring mission success you have to think about the tools you have in use, including human resources. Security restrictions and illnesses diminish the expectations set for, for instance, 120 staff. It is also possible to correct the mission on the way, if the measurements prove so.

The ensuing q&a -session brought up questions such as women's participation in peace processes and local ownership. Too many endless operations turn the international community into part of the problem, so how can local ownership be enforced?

Henriksson described the Touareg women she interacts with as actually quite strong, but their goal is to bear children. Nigerian women have on average 7 children, but their goal is 11. Involving women is somewhat watered down by this and thus, the mission aims at pushing girls to go to school until the age of 16 – to get past their old-fashioned views.

De Fejter felt that bringing women and other groups in peace negotiation tables adds accountability to the process, since generally, peace negotiations are about power and control and hence tend to take place between power groups.

To the question on what grounds to do impact assessment de Fejter responded by pointing out that the evaluation should be done on the basis of what we can do with the instruments we have in our toolbox. Then again, local ownership is implemented when locals own the problem, i.e. understand what the counterpart needs rather than what he or she wants.

## **ANNA PENFRAT**

Anna Penfrat brought the civil society actors' viewpoint to the discussion. She called for local parliaments and CSOs in mission countries to be more engaged in mission activities. She emphasized that if the security of people (in contrast to the security of the state) is not taken into account, capacity building efforts may inadvertently strengthen dysfunctional or repressive structures. Therefore a human security lens should be used in the missions, having the people in view and addressing the security needs of different sections of society.

When measuring the impact of the mission, its impact on conflict dynamics should be measured and not the output of the mission, i.e. number of staff etc. Key elements of the evaluation results should also be shared to help with future mission planning, although declassification of the results may be difficult.

The participants were then invited to think about successes in CSDP missions. Olli Ruohomäki argued that missions should aim at trying to deliver or contribute something rather than strive for a certain end-state. Trying to come up with one, he said, is like chasing a mirage. More precision is needed, not unrealistic, broad objectives, such as establishing rule of law in Afghanistan. What is there to measure then? A political mission uses political tools, so what is the political gain?

Anna Penfrat referred to the EUMM mission in Georgia and pointed out that the confidence-building efforts aim at changing participants' behavior, but to measure the change, you need assessment tools. De Fejter concluded that no mission has fulfilled its mandate, but have nevertheless produced positive results. The Afghan police are identifiable, which was not the case before. EUPOL COPPS and EUCAP

