

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON  
**THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN CONFLICT  
PREVENTION IN SOUTHERN  
AFRICA**

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## Opening remarks

### Ms Anne Palm, Secretary general, KATU, Finland

We presently live in the midst of conflicts. We Europeans are facing an extremely serious conflict in Kosovo. There is a great risk that this conflict escalates in the neighbouring states and thus becomes an even bigger tragedy.

We also can say that Africa today is a conflict-ridden continent. In spite of slight reduction in military expenditure of some African governments, there have been 14 major armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1989. The human cost of these conflicts is depressing. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of all deaths in these conflicts, but it has been said that over 2 million people have died.

The nature of conflicts has changed over the time. Most of the conflicts nowadays are intra-state or internal conflicts; they take place within one state, not between countries as it was before. Most of the victims of these conflicts are civilians. In the First World War it was estimated that about 10 % of all the casualties were civilians, in the Second World War the number of civilian victims was about 50%. Now it is estimated that some 90 % of all war casualties are innocent civilians: mainly women and children. Conflicts cause also a lot of other related problems: refugees, famine and other serious long-term effects on people.

But conflicts do not have only these humanitarian costs (the number of dead, wounded, displaced persons, refugees etc.). The costs of the escalating violence of conflicts are enormous, as the profound Belgian researcher on conflict prevention, Dr Luc Reychler has analysed. According to him, an overall analysis of the costs of armed conflicts contains eight categories.

There are the already mentioned humanitarian costs that usually are the most obvious consequences of the war.

The political costs reflect to ia. the breakdown of democratic system/process, the disintegration of state, political corruption. The economical costs of conflicts include the cost to operate the machinery of war, impacts of losses in investments and commercial boycotts, collapse of the economic infrastructure and war damages.

The social costs of conflicts include the break-up of families, war orphans and the social exclusion of rape victims. The cultural costs include destruction of historical treasures and living cultures as well as substitution of a culture of peace by a culture of war. Conflicts have also ecological costs. Nature usually suffers a lot from wars and their aftermaths: refugee camps etc.

The psychological costs of conflicts include the psychological wounds caused by the violence. The spiritual costs are also very important: the meaning of life and all moral and human values are destroyed by the violence.

In order to avoid all these terrible costs of conflicts, we have to prevent new conflicts from occurring. Recent international cooperation in conflict prevention has been 're-active', only reacting when conflicts have already broken out (for example in Rwanda). There is a need for a 'pro-active' approach, seeking measures to prevent conflicts from breaking out.

NGO's can play an important role in conflict prevention, especially on the grass-root level. Strengthening the structures of civil society, promoting democracy and human rights,

empowering youth and women, and practising good governance, are good examples of measures for preventing violent conflicts.

Citizens' Security Council KATU is a conflict prevention network of some 40 Finnish NGO's. We believe that prevention is better than cure. We believe that NGO's have an important role to play on this arena.

KATU is willing to cooperate with Southern African NGO's on this field. This workshop is the first of the two workshops KATU is organizing in Africa this spring. We want to share views and experiences on various ways and means to prevent violent conflicts from breaking out.

You are all warmly welcome to this workshop. I hope that during these five days we can get to know and understand each other better, and hopefully find some common activities and projects on conflict prevention in Africa.

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**Mr Juha Eskelinen, Executive Director of Finnish UN Association and Member of KATU Board**

Youth as a concept has Janus faces in our minds. On one hand youth symbolises hope, and on the other youth is traditionally seen as a potential threat to the social order in a society. Actually the concept of youth policy as such has been developed as a mean to control youth.

Well over half of the population pyramid in Africa is under 25 years of age. For the most part, Africa's young people have grown up in societies marked by severe economic and social crisis. The decline in rural livelihoods has pushed youth into urban centres where formal employment opportunities are rare or virtually non-existent. Municipal school systems are unequipped to deal with swelling numbers of urban youth, many of whom have a very modest educational background.

Marginalisation lays the foundations for the escalation of social tensions into violent conflicts. Youth are the victims and the actors of the wars. They are casualties of overt conflicts such as civil wars. They are members of families that are broken up by death, homelessness and exile. Warlords and the military leaders exploit their marginalisation by turning youth and children into soldiers. Much of the growing, and increasingly ruthless crime afflicting Africa's cities involves youth. If youth have lost their hope, violence and taking part in the conflict may sound "sexy" and can give for many the feeling to be needed and respected and even economically rewarded. These items contribute to the perception of youth as a threat to social order.

All of the above is true all around the world. We can see the same type of increase in violence in the backyards of Northern societies as well. Africa is specific in the sense that the demographic structure is by far the youngest in the world.

We can ask and try to answer to the following questions: How can Africans turn this situation around? How are they attempting to restore one of their greatest assets to the service of peace and welfare? What can be learned from the experiences of the various actors who have been working throughout the crisis years with African youth?

The aim of the KATU workshop is to bring together representatives of NGOs, public agencies, decision-makers and the research community to pool views and experiences about the role of youth in conflict prevention. An important aim is to give all of us the opportunity to get to know each other and each other's organisation. Finally if we are lucky enough we might find joint

ideas to be developed into concrete projects in the field of conflict prevention. We should be able to show that wording "conflict prevention" can and should be something else than only the nice decoration of political rhetoric.

KATU is well situated to promote partnerships between Finnish grassroots organisations working in the youth and development sectors and their counterparts in the African context. The workshop should lay the foundations for such partnerships to promote African capacity building in the realms of youth work, human rights and conflict prevention. The scope of the challenges facing African organisations is immense. Partnerships with Finnish organisations can involve professional, moral and material support for people doing a difficult task under very adverse circumstances. An important aspect of this support is the mutual sharing of experiences on various intervention models and other techniques, which have proven successful.

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## ***AN OVERVIEW ON THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN CONFLICTS IN AFRICA***

**Mr Ngande Mwanajiti, Executive Director, AFRONET**

### **ON-GOING CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION**

#### **1 Introduction**

It is fair to state that contemporary Africa knows very little of PEACE. As a matter of fact, most African countries have been involved in one or another kind of conflict.

Conflicts, both civil and military, have raged primarily because of extremely weak governance structures, which neither permit people to participate nor respond to the dictates of a multi-party political dispensation - often anchored on some kind of consultation. It is fair to indicate that the lapses in governance have their genesis in failed transitions into the post-colonial state. The post-colonial state as we know it, suffers from ineptitude and a general lack of a supportive culture of government based on effective checks and balances. This scenario is not at all surprising in the view of the fact that the colonial institutions served a different political order based on uncontrolled exploitation.

The failure to transform the political systems, is at the root of Africa's incessant conflicts. A cosmetic attempt at moving from the once famous one party states to a new order cannot and will not save Africa from strife and conflict. Similarly, the failure to accept and recognise the shortcomings of the international system, will continue to pose a major threat to peace and stability in Africa. This observation is made with the full knowledge of the fact that virtually all African conflicts, now and before have an international dimension which requires an international solution. Others may argue against this observation - in which case a point must be made that Africa's capacity to generate weapons of mass destruction is still very limited.

It is important that we define our main concerns regarding the subject matter.

1. Conflicts may be military in nature. The reasons have always been different. For instance, most of Southern Africa experienced war arising out of the desire by the majority and

indigenous populations to regain their humanity and dignity. The resistance by minority and illegitimate regimes, lead to severe blood-shed, crimes against humanity and the destruction of property. The consequences of such anarchy are unmitigated poverty, disease, high illiteracy levels and a generally weakened civil society.

Some other conflicts are caused by the quest for self-determination. The case of Biafra in Nigeria is a good example. Eritrea and Ethiopia had their fair share of a protracted civil war whose consequence was the political re-alignment of the country and giving birth to a new state - Eritrea. The two have gone back to war for other reasons. Mozambique dealt with an externally engineered civil war which saw the country grind to its knees. Presently, there are more than five armed civil wars going on in Africa and the prospects for their settlement are very dull.

2. Conflicts also exist in relative calm times. This is always manifested by the failure of governments to govern to the satisfaction of all citizens. The major characteristic of this form of conflict is the absence of political will on the part of government. These conflicts are worsened by the absence of effective checks and balances that would ordinarily intervene and cushion the impact. The consequence yet again is continued civil strife, hindered national development, absence of priorities and most worrying, the break down in the rule of law.
3. The absence of civil war or political strife has not spared the continent of other forms of conflict. Africa's failure to effectively tackle poverty has continued to result in milder forms of conflict as witnessed in state sponsored harassment of journalists, human rights defenders, trade unions and all those that dissent. All these are a result of failed government policies in the midst of undemocratic practices. Africa is still home to tin pot dictators of all kinds. Africa is also still a safe haven for all those who pretend to be democrats.

We observe with sadness and deep concern that in the mean time, citizens of Africa, have decided to take 'a laissez-faire attitude' amidst what constitutes day light rape of the continent by greedy politicians with no heart for the welfare of the continent. A budget comparison on expenditure for social services with the military or personal comfort drives the point home.

Some other factors influencing conflict in Africa include;

- The legacy of colonial rule, which has left Africa with many multiethnic states. This has sometimes leads to intra-ethnic conflicts as was the case in Burundi and Rwanda.
- At one time the struggle by super powers to establish hegemonistic spheres of influence.
- Religious fundamentalism.

## **2 Some cases of On-Going Conflicts**

Up until 1993, Africa was an ideological battlefield. The countries affected by this war include Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa and Sudan.

New types of conflicts have reappeared in Africa. These new conflicts are based upon ethnicity, religion, cultural exclusivity rather than liberal democracy which will fill the vacuum created by the collapse of a particular ideological thought, and the nature of distribution of political power and resources in a society.

The fundamental domain of war in Africa is no longer inter-state wars but internal wars.

*An overview of some of the conflict countries:*

### Angola

Angola has the longest running history of conflicts. When the Portuguese surrendered in the 1970's, the Cold War was still a factor and Angola was granted independence in a disorganised fashion. No elections were held and no government of national unity was formed, although there was an intention to form one. MPLA, UNITA and FNLA went to war with each other. MPLA emerged winners in the conflict. From that time onwards, there has been war.

On October 17, 1992, after several initiatives to bring peace to Angola, MPLA won the elections, which were internationally acclaimed as free and fair elections.

Various pre-requisites were however not fulfilled such as disarming and demobilisation of two armies. Sporadic clashes between MPLA and UNITA were actually reported on October 11, 6 days before the election results were announced and warfare resumed virtually throughout the country.

On November 20, 1994, following increased international pressure for peace and protracted peace talks, MPLA and UNITA signed a Peace Pact in Lusaka (Lusaka Protocol) which was aimed at forming a government of national unity. The Agreement, which marked a new state in the Angolan peace process, set forth a comprehensive implementation timetable and laid out the United Nations role in helping the parties to implement that timetable. UNAVEM III, a UN peacekeeping operation was established in February 1995, following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. But the road towards a lasting peace in Angola remained difficult, with tensions in Northern regions underscoring the unsettled situation.

The government of national unity was short-lived and UNITA reinforced its presence in the North-Eastern part of Angola. The resumption of hostilities is blamed on UNITA by the government, although a survey conducted by AFRONET and Human Rights Watch among refugees who had entered Zambia in October 1998 revealed to the contrary. According to accounts obtained from the refugees, there is hardly any difference between the MPLA and UNITA regarding the development of models for proper governance of Angola. The accounts given by refugees reinforce the image that the conflict is a struggle for power in the narrowest sense of this word in which both sides use methods that are irreconcilable without any commitment to human rights.

### Congo DRC

Since the independence in the sixties, the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, came out of colonial rule under the leadership of President Mobutu Sese Seko as the first president. The country was led under a one party regime for almost three decades under the firm hand of President Mobutu.

During 1996, a number of conflicts began to arise due to the discontentment over the economic and political situation of the country. A faction lead by Laurent Kabila began to fight against the Mobutu regime in order to bring a change in the republic. These conflicts were supported by the Rwandese forces, which played a critical role in the rebellion that erupted in 1996.

Although Kabila was able to remove Mobutu from power, his fortunes disappeared with a new rebellion lead by Banyamulenges. The renewed fighting has the support of Rwanda and Uganda on the rebels' side, while Kabila is supported by Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Chad. Peace efforts have yielded little and the suffering continues to be an eyesore.

### Sudan

Sudan has been independent for 45 years. The country has however been in a civil war for a period of 32 years. Since the independence, Sudan has not enjoyed any peace at all. The country has been governed by military regimes, which have overthrown and taken over the civilian governments.

The conflicts have been perpetuated by the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the Christian groups because of religious fundamentalism. The other source of conflict has been the issue of racism. Sudan is predominantly composed of two main races; Arabs and black Africans or Moslems and Christians.

The Southern part of Sudan, composed mostly of black people, has continued to be ravaged by armed conflicts, which have provided fertile ground for appalling violations. The splintering of Southern Sudan rebel groups with hostile factions has compounded the conflict and led to further atrocities since the civil war began. The country has continued to suffer armed conflicts until today.

### Ethiopia/Eritrea

In May/June 1998, war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The two countries had close ties due to historical links. Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until it became independent in 1993.

The conflict broke out after disagreements over several points on the common border worsened, despite the creation of a joint border commission. Despite intensive peace efforts led by United States and Rwandan facilitators, events escalated to a peak in early June, at which point land forces clashed heavily on three fronts (Badme, Zal Anbessa and Bure). Over 300,000 civilians have been displaced and in one incident, school children were killed in an Eritrean air raid on Ethiopia's Tigray Northern provincial capital of Mekelle.

Economic activity in both countries has been disrupted. Eritrea refused to withdraw its forces, saying it would only withdraw after the territory was demilitarised and controlled by a third force.

### Rwanda/Burundi

The 1997 Amnesty International Report has revealed that in 1994 the world's most brutal massacres of human life were seen in Rwanda and Burundi. Efforts of ethnic cleansing saw the killing of millions of Hutus and Tutsis in a war that lasted almost two years. This was a war of the minority against the majority, Hutus and Tutsis respectively.

Throughout 1997, intense fighting continued in Rwanda between the RFA and armed opposition who participated in the 1994 genocide. Burundi and Rwanda have continued to experience such conflicts of wars ever since the genocide.

## **3 Conflict Prevention**

### Human Rights and Democracy

The conflicts in Africa have endangered lives of millions of civilians, torn communities and families apart and have led to human rights abuses on a massive scale. Massacres, extra-judicial killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, arbitrary arrests, torture and other atrocities have become the order of life. Millions are forced to live as refugees or internally displaced persons deprived of their livelihood, human dignity and hope.

Respect for human rights and the rule of law are the key components to durable peace and long-

term human development. In situations of war, there is however no respect for human rights and the rule of law. Democracy therefore becomes a fallacy. Democratic governance cannot prevail in situation where there is armed conflict because of the obvious effects of war on human life.

### Initiatives for Conflict Prevention at Regional Level

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have taken an increasing interest in African conflicts. While the OAU endeavours to build the African Economic Community, conflicts on the continent have created the greatest obstacles to sustainable development, which will help alleviate poverty and disease. In 1981 African countries established the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. Subsequently, an African Charter on Human and People's Rights was signed; giving content to the words of "freedom, equality, justice and dignity" in the OAU Charter and defined the co-operation of the African peoples which includes 'living in a society in which their human rights are respected and protected'.

In 1993, in Cairo, the OAU Summit adopted a declaration on the establishment of a conflict mechanism. The purpose of this mechanism is the prevention and resolution of conflicts within and among states. In order to carry out the conflict prevention and resolution mechanism, the OAU established a Peace Fund in March 1993, which has since that been operational. Furthermore, in June 1998, the OAU Assembly adopted a protocol to the African Charter on the establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights to strengthen the protection of human rights in Africa.

Following the OAU, SADC also committed itself to develop a human rights culture and enhancing democratic practice in the region. In August 1996, SADC established the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, which is supposed to be the institutional framework by which all SADC countries would co-ordinate policies and activities of a political nature. The establishment of this organ has been a source of conflict rather than mitigating conflicts.

Despite of these and other initiatives, the wars in Africa have continued to ravage the continent. The most frightening emerging trend is the involvement of other states as has been the case in the Congo DRC conflict.

The question that comes to mind is whether the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention put in place by the Cairo Summit will ever succeed. The OAU mechanism is characterised by several weaknesses. The OAU has no means of sustaining interventions in any one country because it is a bankrupt organisation. However, it must be understood that the weaknesses of the OAU are a reflection of the lack of support by African governments. African governments have failed the OAU Secretariat and not the other way round.

The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security places heavy emphasis on political processes, yet two years after its establishment the mechanisms in terms of practical implementation and institutional structures are undeveloped.

The approach taken by SADC to provide military support to Kabila's unelected regime has been condemned by many sections of the African society. It is the view of many, that SADC has relegated its mandate for peaceful resolution of conflicts. It is a widely held opinion that a diplomatic solution was much more appropriate than a military one. The other schools of thought hold a different view and support the military intervention by other SADC countries. This school is supported further by what appears to be double standards as exhibited in the intervention in Lesotho by Botswana and South Africa, allegedly, on behalf of SADC.

The events in Congo DRC have now even cast doubts in the minds of many human rights activists in the region as to the relevance of SADC as an organisation.

The inability of the United Nations to restore peace to Somalia slowed international support for the conflict intervention and precipitated a rapid retreat by the international community from peacekeeping worldwide. A direct consequence of this retreat was the failure of the international community, including the United Nations, to intervene and prevent genocide in Rwanda.

In the competition for oil and other precious resources in Africa, interests external to Africa continue to play a large and sometimes decisive role, both in suppressing conflict and sustaining it. The 20 year old war in Angola is a demonstration of how access to resources by warring parties can foster violence, and has highlighted the impact that international business interests can have on the success or failure of peace efforts.

#### Other observations are:

- Electoral Processes: Political organisations in Southern Africa have to have well-researched, well-articulated and workable blueprints to respond to existing challenges.
- There is an apprehension on the names in which electoral reforms to accommodate the emergence of plural politics has been carried out in most African states. It is evident that simply holding a multi-party election does not necessarily change the character of a repressive state. This is particularly the case in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia. In Zambia, the ideals that ushered in the era of plural politics were not only forsaken in the run-up to the 1996 Parliamentary and Presidential elections, but the government introduced restrictions with the purpose of damaging specific political forces. There have been numerous allegations of abuse of the election process in several countries. This is definitely a threat to national unity and needs to be addressed immediately. Good practices and procedures need to be identified and shared and ultimately lead to harmonisation of the electoral process in Africa.

#### Participation of Civil Society

Exclusion of the majority of the people from participating in elections shows that the mere act of casting a vote into a ballot does not by itself ensure the entrenchment of civil democracy and good governance. A meaningful process of democracy and good governance requires the active participation of civil society - in close collaboration with structures of the government - in formulation, funding and implementation of local development projects.

A civic culture needs to be promoted that will ensure entrenchment of democratic values. Democracy has to be learnt and it will retain its stability and efficiency only if it promotes actual identity, a sound economy, social justice and political acceptance. Consensus on major values is therefore a major factor. It is worth noting that a legal order by itself cannot guarantee human rights respect. Ethics and values that promote democracy have to be fully entrenched. A culture of understanding, tolerance, human rights, democracy, consensus, peace stability and economic development must be nurtured.

#### Early Warning Mechanism

Early warning mechanism plays an important role in conflict prevention. As part of the OAU mechanism, an early warning system has been developed for the purpose of gathering information and providing advance notice of impending conflict structures.

There is growing recognition that conflicts in Africa can best be managed when all sectors of the African society are fully integrated into the process. Civil society has an important role in providing early warning. Since the OAU has no presence in all the African countries, it must

rely on experts, practitioners and other groups operating in local situations.

### Information and Analysis

The role of the academic community, of which the youths form a major part of, cannot be overstressed. Scholars are often repositories of knowledge that is critical to understanding the root causes and evolution of conflicts. This knowledge and analysis can be channelled to policy makers. Such information can also be publicised through media to reach a wider audience. Analysis of human rights issues in conflict areas helps post conflict rehabilitation and prevention of further occurrence of human rights violations.

NGOs concerned with conflict prevention have a task to acquaint themselves with the work of other actors so as not to duplicate efforts.

In conclusion, we observe that there is a growing tendency by the international community to let Africans butcher each other using the most sophisticated armaments from the west. Africa in turn, is running away from acting decisively to stop conflicts. If the war in the DRC is not managed properly, SADC is in a danger of breaking apart. It is about time that consideration is given to reproducing the efforts of ECOMOG, which in my view has done a commendable job for West Africa.

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**Dr Ibrahim Abdullah, University of Western Cape**

## **THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN CONFLICTS**

Let me first of all start with the customary. I want to thank the organisers of this historic workshop for inviting me to give this address on a subject that will undoubtedly remain the most pressing concern for governments in the coming millennium. I would like to single out Ms. Liisa Laakso of the University of Helsinki for suggesting me as a possible resource person to undertake this historic task. I say historic because no workshop/conference has been organised in Africa specifically on youth and conflict prevention. Indeed, youth and conflict prevention has remained on the margin of political discourse. When it gets discussed at all it always appear as an add on to what is supposedly the primary issue. Even though the subject has been discussed in some scholarly circles, the attention it has recieved has invariably been limited to specific countries. In South Africa, for instance, the issue has received sustained national attention culminating in a major study sponsored by the government. The subject has however received considerable attention in war-torn Sierra Leone and Mozambique, and to a lesser extent Liberia. The violence in the oil producing area of Nigeria has given rise to a national discourse on youth alienation and conflict.

The present workshop is to my knowledge the first regional gathering addressing not youth per se but youth and conflict prevention. It is a step in the right direction. I would therefore encourage the organisers to broaden their concern from the regional to the continental level, and to move ahead with a major continental conference on youth and conflict prevention, possibly in the year 2000.

The subject of youth and conflict prevention is not limited to countries like Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia, Congo and Mozambique currently classified as war-torn states. Youth and conflict prevention constitute a major African problem precisely because the principal actors contesting power and authority today are generally classified as youth. Demographically they constitute the majority in the continent. In Mali, Sierra Leone and Liberia, over 60% of the population is under 25 years. In Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Angola the figure is between 35 and 50%. Africa not only remains the world's poorest continent, it is also its youngest. Half or more of its population is under 18 years. Thus youth and conflict prevention should be regarded as a continental problem requiring urgent attention.

It is generally the case that youth is defined in terms of age. Youth, in this formulation, are those within the ages of 15-30. This cohort is bracketed in between the period of adolescence and adulthood. Youth is seen as an experimental stage, a period of apprenticeship tenure for a group of people in the process of formation. This is the dominant view in international law, a position, which is strikingly similar to the prevalent conception in Africa before the coming of the West.

Thus there were, and still are, societies in Africa where certain organisations are structured around age-group/grades. An age-grade is an organisational unit consisting of members within a given age group, say 15-20. They are normally tasked with specific duties in the community and are always responsible to a higher authority made up of people slightly older. Age-grades were always strictly under the control of elders. In some societies this form of organisation was strengthened by a kind of male or female bonding in the form of a secret society. Examples of this type of gerontocratic arrangement existed among the Igbo and Tiv in present day Nigeria, the Luo in Kenya and the Xhosa in South Africa. It could be found in almost all African societies. The key underlying assumption in such organisational set-up should be obvious: young men/women should learn from their elders through a process of apprenticeship. This sub-alternalisation of the young existed and still exists in cultures all over the world. It is presently universalised in such documents as the UN Geneva Convention; UN Convention of the Rights of the Child; and the African Charter of Rights of the Child.

In societies where age-grades as a formal system of organisation were non-existent, respect for age/elders formed part of the cultural repertoire. The popular expression---leaders of tomorrow-- in reference to youth/children, captures their subordinate and marginal position. In these societies control of land or cattle, the most important factor of livelihood, was entrusted to the head of the patriarchal family. Control over these resources gave these family head control over the labour power of the young as well as the distribution of resources. A young man could only access these resources through hard work on his own or when he is considered old enough to take a wife. In extreme cases, he only gets to establish his independence through inheritance. For a young woman the situation is much more complex: she has no claim to inheritance nor is she given land or cattle when she leaves her parents house.

The worsening economic condition in Africa is compelling youth to redefine themselves in social terms, which reflects their marginal status in the political economy. Thus in Mali youth and adulthood are defined as the productive capacity to sustain a marriage. In the absence of jobs or salaried employment young men continue to depend on their family at an age when they would be expected to have a family. But the inability to reproduce themselves economically have made marriage an impossible proposition. This grim economic situation underscores their lack of autonomy/independence. "Youthhood" therefore becomes a prolonged social position to nowhere. The youth in Freetown, Sierra Leone, have coined a new word to describe this extreme privation and inability to reproduce themselves. They have invented the phrase "Youth-Man" for those well beyond the age customarily associated with youth, that is to say, those who are economically incapacitated because they are chronically unemployed or underemployed. The prolongation of "youthhood" is therefore a symptom of underdevelopment.

This ambiguity in the definition of youth raises a fundamental question relating to power. Those who define what constitutes the young are those who control the society/community, that is to say, the elders, or those with power. It is therefore an imposition from outside; there is no such thing as youth per se. It is a constructed category. The construction of youth is therefore related to the politics of everyday life. This line of reasoning can be extended to the study of childhood. Both categories are supposedly transitional; stages through which we all pass in the course of our development. What connects the two stages is their dependent character: children and youth are in need of care; they should not be left on their own. But this conception changes once we begin to see young people not as adults-in-the-making and in need of protection but as beings-in-the-present and as conscious historical actors. To grant them the status of conscious actors is to recognise them as integral members of the society who should be engaged as such.

The centrality of control over the distribution of resources in the life of the young has prompted some observers to suggest that the problem of youth in Africa is inter-generational, that is to say, a struggle between the young and the old. This is a rather simplistic reading of the problem. The struggle by the young for access to resources is not necessarily against the old; it is first and foremost a struggle against control and a struggle for independence. This struggle for independence is at the same time a refusal not to be youth/children; it is a struggle for full citizenship; and it is central to an understanding of youth and conflict prevention. What is at stake is the refusal by the young to accept the dictates from without, from above. It is a struggle against exclusion and the benefits there from. To understand this is to begin to engage the reasons why youth and children are involved in conflict.

An important angle to ponder as we deliberate on the question of youth and conflict prevention is the context within which the whole drama of war and the disintegration of society is occurring. For most of the continent this is the fourth decade of independence; an independence that delivered a political kingdom without any meaningful space for Africa's youth. For the first two decades the youth remained voiceless, or as appendages to single parties (youth league) even though their population more than doubled in some countries. Now that they are in the majority in more than two-thirds of the continent and in the forefront of all the major wars in Africa's current rebel phase, thanks to the failed one-party/ military dictatorships and their international backers, the youth have now moved from their erstwhile voiceless and invisible position to their current status as visible political actors. This process of re-birth at the end of the millenium, forcefully raises the perennial question: the question of democracy, development and social justice. We cannot understand the struggle of Africa's youth and children if we are not prepared to tackle the multifaceted problem of modernity.

The struggle against colonial rule in Africa was the beginning of youth involvement in modern politics. Whether it was armed struggle or constitutional negotiations, the process of decolonisation inaugurated a chain reaction, which catapulted Africa's youth into political agitation, and eventually the politics of confrontation. Youths, mostly young men, organised ethnic unions; proto-nationalists organisation emerged; benefit societies were established; and finally political parties were formed. All these activities were spearheaded by the educated elites and it involved different categories of youth: the unemployed, market women, students, workers, peasants and ex-servicemen. But the qualitative leap with regard to youth involvement in politics did not come about during the struggle for independence in the late 50s. The quantum leap occurred during the struggle against settler colonialism. And it was in South Africa, with its outdated and inhuman regime, that Africa's youth were to demonstrate their explosive political potential. The history of the struggle against apartheid is the history of youth struggle writ large.

But what kind of youth or children are we talking about? To understand the current situation in the continent it would be necessary to disaggregate what we mean by youth. It is not all youth that are involved in conflict nor is it all children in war-torn countries that are drugged wielding AK 47s.

The war that never was in South Africa saw different categories of youth coming together in the name of the struggle. There were radical students, migrant workers, hostel dwellers, stabilised workers in the townships, alienated youth, criminals, thieves, in a word, the lumpen-proletariat. They came from different areas in South Africa, different class background, loyalties and ideology. To understand how these subalterns were linked to the larger world of the ANC, the PAC, IFP, and AZAPO is to begin to understand why youth do what they do and how and why they do what they do. To provide answers to these questions I turn to sociology of Africa's youth.

A close look at the conflict areas in Africa tells a story: those who are wielding the AK 47s can barely explain why they are fighting; they are neither middle class kids nor members of the educated elite. Most of them can hardly read or write; they come from disadvantaged communities or marginalised ethnic groups. Majority of them have hardly had anything like a regular job. They are to be found in every city in Africa. Compare the early combatants in Chad, the first rebel casualty in Africa, to that of the rebel movement in Casamance, Senegal, or the blood-thirsty vandals in Sierra Leone, to that of RENAMO in Mozambique or the UNITA bandits in Angola. What they all have in common is a marginalised existence prior to their recruitment as combatants. To understand this group is to understand youth culture; what I have elsewhere referred to as lumpen youth culture.

By lumpens, I refer to the largely unemployed and unemployable youths, mostly male, who live by their wits or who have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or underground economy. They are prone to criminal behaviour, petty theft, drugs, drunkenness and an anti-social culture. This youth culture became visible in the early twentieth century in South Africa; in West Africa it appeared in the aftermath of the 1918 war; and in East Africa during the inter-war period. It is a male specific oppositional culture, which easily lends itself to violence. In Nigeria, they are generically called area Boys; in Algeria, they are called hittiste; in Uganda and Kenya they are generally referred to as bayaye; in Zambia they are called Kaponye. To understand their grammar of protest, and their struggle for inclusion, is to understand aspects of what I would call the rebel phase in contemporary Africa. This group constitutes about 98% of the fighting force in war-torn Africa today. We need to understand its genealogy and more importantly why they fight.

A major characteristic of the current rebel phase in Africa is the fact that lumpens have replaced students as the most politically volatile groups. Historically, students had been in the forefront for change: they organized in the struggle against colonial rule and were the initial vanguard opposition against one-party dictatorship and military rule. Whereas students were largely articulators of ideas for change, the lumpens, because they lack systematic or coherent ideas about change, are more of a violent social cohort than armed militants. The predominance of lumpen culture in the current rebel phase is visible in the area of drugs, indiscriminate violence and the general indiscipline of the fighting forces. The violence in Liberia and Algeria are as shocking as the brutality committed by RENAMO in Mozambique, the rebels in the Congo or the RUF in Sierra Leone. This culture of violence an aspect of youth culture has invaded and subdued the rather civil protest culture in Nigerian universities.

Once upon a time campuses in Nigeria were a hot bed of radicalism; today they are derelict outposts of what are nationally known as cults. Cults are predominantly male student secret societies; they are found in all Nigerian universities. Members are mostly students with the occasional lecturer/professor patron. They operate like terrorist organisations, structured along mafia lines, complete with a dress code, ritual and initiation ceremonies, and an exclusive language. These violent gangs engage in turf wars on campuses with guns and machetes. Lives have been lost as a result of their activities and scores of students expelled. They are law unto themselves; they rule the lives of students and even threaten university authorities. Student gangs are a veritable representation of the new identity amongst some of Africa's urban youth.

It is indeed tempting to attribute some of these momentous changes to globalisation as some scholars have done. Simply put, the argument about globalisation and youth culture assumes that Africa's youth are the passive recipients of global culture, American culture, and these are absorbed through the media and popular video. Thus, celluloid images plus drugs equals violence. This violence, it is argued, is evident among student gangs in Nigeria, among young combatants in war-torn Africa; and it is a central aspect of the gang culture and violence in Cape Town, South Africa.

There is no doubt that globalisation continues to shape and define some aspect of youth culture in Africa. Popular and mass culture in the west has become, to a large extent, part of the repertoire of African youth culture. In fact, we can, within the context of globalisation, talk of a global youth culture of consumption.

But youth in Africa do not just accept coca-cola, jeans, base ball caps, and Michael Jordan shoes uncritically. These artefacts and symbols of modernity, are mediated, filtered, and assume multiple meanings through local histories, memories, and struggles. They are shaped and are reshaped by local identities and tradition. The rap artist Tupac Shakur is an icon and positive role model for some youths in Cape Town, South Africa because his views on race, class and gender resonates with the experiences of coloured youths. An image of an RUF combatant with a Tupac T-shirt might mean nothing precisely because he does not know who he was or what he represents. To understand these differences is to get at the ambiguities of globalisation and its multiple meanings to Africa's troubled youths.

And globalisation is not necessarily a unifying project, or a homogenizing one. Globalisation celebrates difference, and diversity, as well as selectivity and choice. It is this celebration of difference, which empowers youth in their struggle for autonomy, for inclusion, and recognition as conscious actors in their own right. Youth gang members have talked about their need for respect and friendship as well as an identity and a replacement family. From Uganda to Mozambique, from Liberia to Sierra Leone, the techniques and tactics for recruiting young combatants have been the same: a violent separation from their family and continuous re-socialization into a violent culture. Similarly, ex-child soldiers have expressed their dire need for a replacement family. This begins to explain their loyalty to their commanders in the absence of a viable alternative.

Perhaps, we should start looking at the multidimensionality of what is meant by the family, we should start examining the available social space(s) for our youth and children; we should start interrogating the different meaning(s) of childhood and youthhood. A situation wherein a so-called child wields an AK47 raises the question of who is a child and when is a child a child. Similarly, a situation wherein a man of fifty is considered a youth, dependent and lacking autonomy is obviously a crisis situation. In short, more research needs to be done to enable us devise effective strategies to tackle the monumental task of conflict prevention.

Comparative research within the continent, say Southern and Western, or Northern and Eastern would throw light on a number of issues on which we are currently ignorant. Examples from South Africa and Nigeria throw up quite different experiences on the phenomenon of gangs. Whereas in South Africa there were gangs before the liberation struggle, what we see after 1994 is a new kind of gang culture rooted in drugs and market than in the migrant labour system. I suspect this would give rise to a different kind of conflict, and possibly a different route with regards to its prevention. The phenomenon of gangs was relatively low keyed in pre-independence Nigeria. Today, however, it has proliferated among students and lumpen youth. Nigeria has not experienced a liberation war but a civil war. This poses a different set of questions in dealing with the issue than that of South Africa.

Comparisons with Latin America, particularly El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala would broaden our understanding of youth involvement in conflict. We should not limit ourselves to

countries that have experienced war. We need to look at how those that have not experienced war are coping with issues relating to youth and children. But we cannot address this issue in all its ramifications, if the larger questions of development, democracy and social justice are left out. Subaltern struggle, the struggle of youth and children, women, is all about democracy, social justice, and inclusion.

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## ***MILITARISED YOUTH AND CHILD SOLDIERS***

**Mr Martinho Chachiua, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa**

### **DEMILITARISATION OF POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF DEMOBILISATION OF YOUTH IN MOZAMBIQUE**

#### Introduction

When I received the invitation to this Conference I was very excited to have the opportunity to discuss issues of my concern. However, by the time I started to think about the specific area I am going to talk about, Demilitarisation of the youth: the case demobilisation in Mozambique, then I realised that I was in a very difficult position. The reason I am saying this is that I share the prevailing feeling amongst young people as being a lost generation, and yet I am expected here to make a rather objective assessment of the problems of the youth. Therefore my opinions have to be taken as the possible balance resulting from the inner fight between my deep emotional feelings as a young Mozambican and the need of making a rational evaluation of the situation.

You may well be aware that since early 60s Mozambique has not witnessed any meaningful period of peace and stability, not until the 1994 general elections. Throughout this period of wars and their related scarcities, deprivation and despair, violence has been the rule as opposed to exception. Those who we call young people in this conference were born and had become young adults in this context, and therefore even if they did not adhere to practice violence, the unpleasant experience of it is still alive in their minds and ultimately they have not ruled out the possibility of being victims.

If demilitarisation is all about uprooting violent attitudes towards conflicts and violence as a means for conflict management and resolution, then in Mozambique it should be targeted to the whole society. However, given the degree of exposure to violence, priority has understandably been accorded to former fighters. With the same token, and taking for granted that the youth is highly militarised, my presentation discusses how demobilisation and reintegration programmes have contributed to the demilitarisation of youth. Instead of describing the demobilisation programmes in detail, it contrasts with a briefly outlined concept of demilitarisation (section one) and the priorities of the demobilisation programmes (section Three). These two main sections are mediated by an overview of the current context of militarisation in Mozambique and the main underlining factors.

The concluding section just summarises the fact that given the deep militarisation (reliance on Violence) of the youth, formal demobilisation without alternative means of problem-solving, as

emphasised by the way programme priorities were defined, is just a partial demilitarisation. Hence in order to complete demilitarisation community-based reintegration projects that can tie demobilised youth to its community are needed.

### **Demilitarisation: the Reverse of Militarisation**

A popular principle of avoiding getting lost on your way home is that one needs to ensure that he/she knows the way out very well. According to this principle, then, the best way of understanding demilitarisation- the way back- is analysing militarisation- the way out. Militarisation<sup>i</sup> lato sensus is defined as a social process involving the mobilisation of resources for war at political, economic, social, cultural and psychological levels. It presupposes or it is an indication that actors in a conflict situation have reached the point where they are no longer contemplating any other means for conflict management or resolution, but violence. This process is meant to cause or contribute to the spread of institutionalised and behavioural militarism. Literally, militarism increases the power and influence of the military and spreads militaristic behaviour, ideology and values in society. All these concepts mean simply that violence is seen as a legitimate means to solve problems or conflicts.

However, given the obvious link between violence and the military institution, militarisation is often narrowly defined as process of military build-up, i.e. increase in military spending, the size of the armed forces, arms production and imports/procurement. One should not forget though that this common notion of militarisation is just the surface of a deep political, social and cultural phenomenon. This is the instrumental end of the ideological militarism.

From the reverse of the concept of militarisation one can clearly see two dimensions of demilitarisation: quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative demilitarisation is the tangible side of the whole process and can be measured through defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the strength of the armed forces, the extent of arms procurement, the military involvement in politics, and so on. It reflects generally the diversion of human and material resources assigned to violent solutions to conflicts. The qualitative dimension on the other hand is the non-tangible side of the process - demilitarisation assumes then a form of reversing the militaristic ideologies and values. It becomes the build-up of a belief system according to which violence is no longer a normal means of conflict resolution. It sets the basis for the illegitimisation of violent attitude and behaviour towards conflict.

This distinction is quite important to make in order to ensure that demilitarisation is comprehensive enough to uproot both the ideology and the instruments. Indeed, very often we assume that demilitarisation has taken place just because the instruments are withdrawn through processes such as downsizing or rightsizing, demobilisation and disarmament. While these components are very important mainly because it tackles the organisational and material side of militarisation, in situations of non-conventional wars such as the case of Mozambique, where there is no clear distinction between fighters/soldiers and the ordinary civilians, the non-material demilitarisation becomes much more important. All I am saying is that demilitarisation, as the reverse of militarisation has to be about removing the instruments as well as **uprooting the ideological basis**. The latter means entrenching alternative values and means of conflict resolution and conflict management, other than violence. It is against this conceptual frame that I discuss the demobilisation process in Mozambique.

#### The context of militarisation in Mozambique

The war in Mozambique had been all about people's lives. The preferred target was the human person and its social basis. By late 1980s, the war had disrupted 50% of the countryside, nearly 1 million people had been killed and 4.5 million made refugees and/or displaced.<sup>ii</sup> 250,000 children had been either orphaned or separated from their parents<sup>iii</sup>. The public security system

had deteriorated. The state and society remained apart<sup>iv</sup> creating conditions for lawlessness. These figures indicate the extent of people's involvement in the war from which they could not shy away, but had to fight. Physically they endured death, scarcity, destruction and general violence; and psychologically and culturally, communities witnessed their traditional conflict-resolution and conflict management mechanisms being uprooted by logic of violent solutions to violent situations. The traditional mechanisms of social control were upside down. That is what militarisation is all about.

As far as the youth is concerned, along with this rather conventional nationalist type of militarisation, they have been subjected to a particular type of militarism, associated with socialist revolutionary zeal. Perhaps this is harder to reverse than the mere exposure to violence. With that I mean the fact that from the early times of independence the youth had been subjected to violent processes of **cultural uprooting**. They could no longer have their parents as role models because the tradition was politically rejected, as being feudal. The youth has to incarnate the "new man" with no social references in his/her own communities. From this he/she just gained conflict with his/her own social basis. Unfortunately, the new man was supposed to fight for the revolution and the modern nation. The recruitment methods were aimed at changing the basis of identification from one social norms system to another. This led to a break down of the social and family nets. It was a complete re-socialisation. In the new social system an individual was not to be seen as socially divergent, and violence against defenceless civilians was perpetuated. Any resistance was neutralised by torture, humiliation, threat of death, etc. Violence became politically legitimate throughout his/her childhood and youth.

Most of them were forced to leave school at their fertile (27.67% were recruited under 18 years of age)<sup>v</sup> learning age. Allegedly, the war was more important than studying (See Table). Ten years down the line they are thrown into a knowledge intensive economy. It seems that their use of the art of war/violence is logically justifiable. Otherwise, their claim that they are a lost generation, betrayed generation, sacrificed generation need to be understood. This is the backdrop that demobilisation process in Mozambique was meant to face.

It was with this in mind that in 1994, Hans and Anders, wrote that "*In Mozambique demobilisation is not just confined to armed forces of the two warring parties, but also it is demobilisation of the whole society which, except for very short interruptions, has been in war for the last 28 years.*"<sup>vi</sup> Whilst theoretically such statement may be taken as wrong for the fact that demobilisation is a concept conventionally referred to as the process of retrenchment of people employed in a organised army, the unconventional nature of the war in Mozambique, as described above, seems to validate its scope.

Table: **Educational Background of the Demobilised Soldiers**

SCHOOLING	NUMBER DS	% OF TOTAL
None	26,434	28.26
up to 6 years of school	37,438	40.31
7-12 years of school	13,894	14.96
Tertiary Education	271	0.29
Other	185	0.20
No Information	14,659	15.59
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>92,881</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: UNDP; 1997:33.

It is very hard to measure the extent of residual militarism in post-conflict situations. One obvious indicator however is the extent of violence and social attitudes towards it, which are usually manifested in criminal deeds. Having this in mind, and despite the fact that one can neither equate criminality with militarism nor establish a clear link between them<sup>vii</sup>, the extent of

violent crime seems relatively important to use as an illustration of the prevalence of militarism in the country.

Indeed, despite the lack of systematised crime statistics and their unreliability when available, reports indicate that in the 1994-1996 period, there was a considerable increase of criminal activities in general. While in 1994 there were 26 063 total reported crimes, in 1996 there were 37 725 criminal cases. However, as far as arms-related crimes which tend to be generally violent, are concerned, there were 1 122 arms related crimes in 1994 against 1 679 in 1996. This shows that, while general crime increased 44 per cent during the period of three year, arms related crimes showed an increase of 49.6 per cent.

Given the inherent inaccuracy of the statistics, to broaden the picture one needs to add isolated sources of information. Estimates given by a hospital care giver to the TCP survey team, for example, indicated that, in 1996, two bullet-related casualties a day were reported to the Hospital in Maputo alone.<sup>viii</sup> This means a total of 720 a year. This is nearly half of the number given by official statistics for 1996 for the entire country.

Although there are no systematically compiled data, the extent of youth involvement in violent crime is clearly high. The Attorney general reported to the Parliament in 1998 that of 9496 prisoners in 1996, 62% (5927)<sup>ix</sup> were between 16 and 30 years age group, and a police report pointed that 10% of known criminals in 1997 were youngsters less than 18 years of age<sup>x</sup>.

A Refugee Studies Programme pilot study found no evidence linking former soldiers with armed crime. It recognises, however, that the lack of formal employment coupled with the inability of the small-scale agriculture to guarantee the subsistence of rural families, has forced former combatants to look for alternative income-earning in urban centres' informal commerce.<sup>xi</sup> There, their vulnerability to crime of all kinds is real, not only because the products on offer in the informal economy are stolen, but also the temptation to use anything at their disposal for survival, including weapons, is very high. Incidents of demobilised soldiers selling weapons to criminals and/or using themselves in violent criminal activities have been reported in many occasions. Besides, the simple fact that they joined the unemployed army in the urban areas is potentially a destabilising factor in itself.

In short, Mozambique is in a situation where for political reasons violence was elevated and taught to the youth. Now the state is unable to monopolise the use of force and protect the people. Alternative social organisations, such as family, kingship, ethnicity and other traditional and primordial institutions, have also been destroyed. This supports the general feeling of moral decay of our societies of today, where violence seems to prevail. The youth unfortunately is the most affected.

### **Demilitarisation of youth: the case of Demobilisation in Mozambique**

Before discussing demobilisation let me show briefly the socio-economic profile of the soldiers to be demobilised to complete the picture given by the table above. At the time of recruitment 27.6% of the soldiers were under the age of 18, 58% were at age group between 18 and 25. 45% were students at time of conscription<sup>xii</sup>; 59% served more than ten years; therefore one can deduce that most of the demobilised soldiers had no civilian work experience. At the time of demobilisation, 52% were between 20 and 30 years of age (See also table above for education). So whatever I say assume that youth constituted the majority of the demobilised soldiers.

Now, it is not my intention to give a detailed description of the demobilisation process in the country, not only because the process has been extensively described, but also because it has not been any exception. Indeed, though a result of a unique peace deal and hence a reflection of the prevailing political environment, the structure has followed the traditional path, namely after cease-fire, separation of forces, assembly, disarmament, discharge and finally reintegration programmes.

My intention however is to look at the emphasis given to each of these phases in order to appreciate whether the two dimensions of demilitarisation have been all taken into account. In effect, there is a clear link between these phases and the two-demilitarisation dimensions. Those, which are clearly aimed at getting rid of the human instrument of war, are part of downsizing, decreasing the resources and technically called demobilisation, fulfil the instrumental demilitarisation. On the contrary, those, which are aimed at providing alternative means of livelihood to retrenched soldiers, tend to fulfil the ideological and psychological demilitarisation.

In Mozambique, physical demobilisation was an essential ingredient of the peace process. The General Peace Accord (GPA) of October 1992 called for a cease-fire, followed by the separation of forces and assembly, and subsequent disarmament, formation of a new armed force and demobilisation of the remaining forces and, development of programmes to support the economic and social reintegration.

The programme package that was eventually approved by the Reintegration Commission (CORE) included programmes in three interdependent but overlapping phases- formal demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration. The overall cost amounted to US\$95.0 million (or approximately \$1000 per head). But as explained below, the manner in which this amount was spent leaves much to be desired.

The **formal demobilisation** phase included limited programmes to prepare soldiers for civilian life; namely an information and social reintegration project and support for demobilisation and other vulnerable groups. According to the final report, the cost of all these projects consumed 1% of the total package of demobilisation and reintegration.

**The reinsertion** phase constituted 80% of the total cost of the demobilisation programme spent on targeted projects. This included a range of benefits for all demobilised soldiers such as civilian clothing, transport to their chosen destination, seeds and tool kit, a two-week food-for-home ration and three-month ration at their destination. The government provided six-month salary, which was supplemented by a Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS)- eighteen-month cash subsidy. An Information Referral Service (IRS) implemented at the provincial level in order to provide information and assistance to DS regarding DS entitlement and other training and employment opportunities. This is the settlement phase. The respective projects were conceived to **buy temporary stability** for the election process. The RSS project for example, clearly sought to keep the DS in their chosen places of resettlement. This has been clearly stated in official documents of the implementing agencies.<sup>xiii</sup>

Finally, the reintegration commission approved the so-called Occupational Skills Development to figure as the **reintegration phase**. With two identical projects, this programme was meant to provide vocational and entrepreneurial training so as to facilitate self-employment. Community based projects, which would provide temporary or permanent employment was apparently funded. Paradoxically this programme received only US\$15.3 million, 16%, of the total cost of demobilisation and was able to benefit only 7,550 (8.1%) demobilised soldiers of which only 5% are believed to have been employed as a direct result of the training obtained.<sup>xiv</sup>

Apart from the limited number of demobilised soldiers benefiting from the reintegration projects, the most worrying problem is that though the discourse around the programme emphasised concepts of self-employment, community based projects, vocational training, the methodology of the projects did not realistically empower the demobilised soldiers. Indeed, it has been acknowledged that the training course had taken into account neither the need of the demobilised soldiers nor the local conditions. But still demobilised soldiers went to participate. Carpenters, bricklayers, shoemakers, plumbers, electrical repair, auto-mechanic to mention but

few were trained with no employment opportunity or some of the trainees asked themselves am I going to die as an unemployed carpenter. Another problem with so-called self-employment projects is that given the educational profile less than fifteen percent could realistically elaborate a project proposal. As result many of those who had their projects approved, probably did not understand what the project was all about because someone else has written up for him. I remember at the time a friend of mine asking me to write a proposal to start up a fishing business because he could get funding for it. He had no idea whatsoever what fishing industry was all about.

This is a clear indication that that project, irrespective of their good intentions, most of the time did not have the desired impact of creating a demobilised soldier as an integrated member of the community. They did not give him back the confidence he has lost because the military establishment used to think for him.

Table II: Relative emphasis of demobilisation and reintegration programme as per cost

Demob/Reintegration Phase	Cost (US Million)	Percentage of total cost
Demobilisation	<b>0.746</b>	<b>1</b>
Reinsertion	<b>78.0</b>	<b>80</b>
Reintegration	<b>15.3</b>	<b>16</b>
Administration costs	<b>2.954</b>	<b>3</b>
Total	<b>95.00</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Compiled out of the UNDP data, UNDP, 1997, pp ii-vii**

As a result, in 1997 reports indicated that 71% of all demobilised population were still unemployed.<sup>xv</sup> " My contention here is that if reintegration is meant to be a process were the demobilised soldier rebuild ties with his community, then the projects did very little if any effort to that end. The projects instead were designed to tie demobilised soldiers to the geographical area not to the communities- all for electoral expedience, which would allow the successful end of the UN deployment.

Alternatively, Lundin<sup>xvi</sup> emphasise the role of local community and traditional authorities for social reintegration. She notes that in the circumstances of lack of job skills as the education profile indicates rural traditional communities have managed to reintegrate quite smoothly the demobilised soldiers, through traditional ceremonies and marriage. She also correctly points the fact that rural economic activities do not require any special skills. The reintegration programmes did not attempt at least to understand these community mechanisms that Lundin calls African heritage.

In short, demobilisation and reintegration programmes/projects were clearly designed to get rid of the soldiers. The most important was to make sure that the warring parties had no organisational resources in the form of military personnel to return to war. As far as the demobilised soldiers were concerned, the aim of the projects was to keep them as far a way as possible from each other in order to ensure stable elections.

Therefore, looking from the conceptual lenses, demobilisation process had emphasised on the instrumental dimension of demilitarisation. In situations of militarisation such as those prevailing in the country, it is insufficient to just inform people that they are no longer in the service of an army. Formal demobilisation and reinsertion are just the beginning. Actions that provide alternative ways of solving problems need to be thought of.

If they learnt the art of violence under political and ideological constructs, they will use it as a resource in knowledge intensive economy, in which they were thrown with no **marketable**

**skills.** Long-term **education programmes** should have been emphasised. Obviously one can not talk about 6-years of schooling but some kind of life-skills training programme aimed at enhancing self-confidence, personal development and hence empowerment.

### Conclusion

The militarisation of the youth and the society as whole was an all-encompassing process (political, social, economic, and cultural). Demilitarisation as a post-conflict response tended to be narrowly defined in military terms – conventional demobilisation, where the youth are formally discharged from the military institution by way of symbolic civil identity document, civilian cloths, some money and that is it. When reintegration projects are designed which are clearly targeted in projects with no sustainability in their communities, on the contrary they just further alienate them.

Formal demobilisation was aimed at buying short-term stability for the elections.

Demobilisation projects were accorded to this overall objective;

The projects have not been designed to enhance ties between the young demobilised soldiers and their rural communities. Information and Referral Services project was based in towns, and once again a handful clever project wise experts designed projects for them regardless of whether they were able to keep the business running or not, instead of training them to understand their environment and seize opportunities as they arise. This was once again one way of telling the young demobilised soldiers that they are unable to take responsibility of their own destiny. For this end, the assembly phase should include personal profiles of individual in order to make needs assessment which could allow a some sort of categorisation.

Reintegration programmes should be about tying demobilised to their communities, buy way of supporting local initiatives for reintegration. Otherwise, one gives the impression that the survival of demobilised soldiers does not depend on the communities they are settled. This alienates them even further from the community and motivates them not to abide to the local norms and mechanisms of social interaction and control.

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## **AN EXPERIENCE OF HOW RECONCILIATION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION TOOK PLACE IN RURAL AREAS IN MOZAMBIQUE: FOCUSING THE CASE OF CHILD-SOLDIERS**

### Introduction

In Mozambique, 80 % of the population has been a direct victim of military violence during 16 years of civil war. The material and human resources offered for rehabilitation benefited very few of the victims.

The number of psychologists and other social workers who work directly with rural communities, which were victimized by the war in this country, is insignificant in comparison to the number of victims.

It is highly recognized that these communities need to recover from the impact of war. In the face of this need, communities have developed their own response mechanisms, which are linked to or based on their cultural tradition, in order to adjust to the social, moral and material destabilization.

The communities developed their own ideas about the personal and social consequences of human-made disasters. They have explanatory models and concepts regarding positive survival strategies, change agents, and protection, like for example mutual assistance.

This paper aims essentially at highlighting the potentials of self-help (self-rehabilitation) in some communities with traumatic experiences of war. The analysis of the process, which is basically social in content, was made using as reference the effects of the attempts at rehabilitation carried out by the communities themselves for people returning from camps, those who were abducted to serve different military interests.

### Facing the psychological reality

There is a cycle of healing that victims go through within these communities. This cycle represents a period full of controversies and ambiguities. Most of all, it is a period in which a balance is reached between the self-confidence, resulting from the practice of purification implemented by the communities where one somehow learns to create some meaning out of the suffering; and on the other hand a balance with the reality of material needs – food, clothing, medicine etc. – which are lacking and are the day-to-day concerns for these populations.

The cycle is open, continuous and progressive, and consists in different stages, which the healing person goes through. The process results in the restoration of familial, generational and community links, in a general improvement in cultural conscience, self-esteem, self-concept, and interpersonal relationships that appear to be important indicators of achievement.

### The stages of the cycle

- *The return to the community*

The return to the village is a moment surrounded by much confusion, doubt and insecurity. There is a great fear of probable manifestations of rejection, marginalization or even reprisal from those who stayed in the community and who in some way were victims of the plundering attacks and abductions carried out by some of the youth.

The period is characterized by manifestations of fear, isolation and profound anguish aggravated by the consequences of the major changes in the family structure, where in a majority of the cases the hierarchical system has lost its value.

Various other isolated symptoms arise, which clearly reveal characteristics of behavioural dysfunction, and which are recognized by persons close to the victims. In this case, they are advised to consult with traditional and spiritual leaders in the community.

- *The cleansing*

A ritual purification or cleansing is carried out under the guidance of a religious leader whose objective is to flush out the evils of war. The participants undergo special baths, and counselling on morality and future life. It is a ritual of reconciliation through which children, youth and adult who were forced to perpetuate military violence are forgiven the harm that they have committed. Consequently, this ritual helps renewed acceptance by the community.

This results in both a defensive and protective response in which the processing of the trauma is done collectively, without much space for individual debriefing.

The "Curandeiros" or healers fulfil rites of healing in which they act as media, entering in a trance and offering the patient the possibility of reliving her or his traumatic experiences in a dialogue with her or his dead victims and victimizers. This is highly individualized, and enables individual processing.

The great therapeutic values of these practices are found in the finding of a meaning to the suffering from war. The historical and cultural context in which this meaning is associated with allows a quick identification with the arguments presented regarding the misery provoked by war.

The meaning is attributed to the discontentment of the ancestors, which then helps the victim-perpetrators to get rid of guilt feelings or of the need to point the finger at someone who is responsible (the bad or the good), substituting this with the necessity to satisfy the demands of the ancestors.

The apparent lack of self-confidence and trust in others results from self-protection when questioned by others about one's life situation. It is legitimate to have a fear of having again displeased the ancestors. Thereafter, any steps suggested after the discovery of the reasons of the suffering, have to be carried out cautiously.

- *Community reintegration*

After the purification rituals have been held, the patients can return with more energy to the daily life in the community. Feelings of fear, marginalisation, etc. are substituted by a state of greater performance in the struggle for survival.

A new era begins. The material reality starts to become evident. New affective bonds are created, even preparations for marriage etc.

- *The repetitive phase*

In this phase, some of the initial symptoms reappear aggravated by frustrations from not being able to resolve material problems. The anguish again overpowers these persons. But for them the problem is something new that has a different cause, and it must be resolved in a different manner. The patients return to the curandeiro where they learn the reason for the new problems. In some cases the reasons behind the persistence of problems are non-fulfilment and ancestors' demands.

### Facing material reality

It is highly debatable whether this process is effective, but as Chongo (1996) wrote, there are more possibilities for success in this process. This success is based on some fundamental aspects:

1. Motivation –community and family support for the individual to submit to such therapy.
2. Expectations –believing that the ritual may be able to drive away the bad memories, the possible traumatic manifestation and to make the person accepted by the group.
3. A social recognition of the efficiency of these institutions.
4. The break with the past happens in a magical, vertical and indisputable way. The individuals are not confronted by their past. The act happens in the "now" of the individual and in the community.

As a result of the process, there are increased possibilities to strengthen the self-confidence and self-esteem in the individuals as well as in the whole community.

Given the fact that the concept of psychotherapy does not aim at curing the client, but at the process of taking possession of one's self, I would agree that the effects of this process on the individuals contributes strongly to the restructuring and creating of a hierarchy of priorities in one's life, as well as to making them deal properly with their psychological wounds without rejecting them.

### Case report

In the analysis of this process, it was important to distinguish between two large groups of victims:

- Those who were abducted to serve as carriers, cook and even sexual objects by the military, usually girls and women, the elder of whom having died before reaching the military camps.
- Those who were abducted to be trained for and employed in combat.

### Reference:

Chongo, A. (1996) 'Challenges for Psychology: An Experience in Psychological Treatment in a Rural Community', Children, War and Persecution – Rebuilding Hope, 83-7.

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**Mr Salomao Mungoi, PROPAZ, Mozambique**

## **DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN MOZAMBIQUE: AN OVERVIEW FROM THE EX-COMBATANTS PERSPECTIVE**

### Introduction

Following its independence from Portugal in June 1975, Mozambique lived through a period of conflicts that led to civil war.

In the eighties, the civil war had reached almost every corner of the country, and both RENAMO and the Government Army had to recruit men to feed their armies. Most of the people who “joined” the armies were selected indiscriminately, i.e. both men, women, youth and children were asked to fight the war.

After sixteen years of violence, a peace agreement between government troops and RENAMO combatants was reached under which the war stopped, and more than a hundred soldiers of both sides were demobilised. A social and economic reintegration programme was designed under the peace accord and implemented by the government with support from the international community, the main aim of which was to prevent, on a short term, the ex-combatants to go back to violence. It was in this context that from 1994 the terminology 'Reintegration of Ex-Combatants' became most popular in Mozambique.

## The Reintegration Programme

As stated before, the main aim of the programme was to prevent ex-combatants from going back to a war.

Generally, the objective was reached because instead of going back to war, the ex-combatants went back to their communities, willing to reorganise their life projects and dreams. However, the reintegrating programmes – mainly consisting of vocational training and scholarship – did not benefit everyone. This was frustrating to both those who were able to participate in the programmes and those who, as in most of the cases did not have a chance to were asked to either join training courses or run small business that were in discordance with their life conditions. They would have been trained as fishermen where there were no rivers or sea; as electricians where there was no electricity; funded to run small business in fixed small stalls (Baracas) where there was no money in circulation due to the poverty of the community members. Summing up to this, ex-combatants were constantly facing exclusion due to their former-soldiers status. In most of the cases, the other members of the community often saw ex-combatants as killers and as people that would only solve their problems by means of violence. The last suggests that the marginalisation of youth cannot only be seen as the precondition for their militarisation, but also their militarisation as a precondition for their marginalisation.

Six years after the end of the armed conflict and one year after the end of the Reintegration Programmes, ex-combatants are still facing difficulties and feel that they have been forgotten. Every ex-combatant carries images from the past that is difficult to forget and always refer to his poverty.

As a result of frustration, a considerable number of ex-combatants with neither employment nor any perspective of getting it are driven to "exile" in alcohol and drugs. The resolution of their daily problems and adversities is always characterised by the lack of respect to the local authorities, the use of physical violence and sometimes the use of light weapons that had been hidden during the demobilisation process.

Ex-combatants in almost every corner of the country find themselves unable to negotiate a solution to their problems in a peaceful and constructive way. The Reintegration Programmes brought by the UN did not include psychological, cultural and educational aspects seen as keys to the process.

Ex-combatants had been oriented towards a culture of violence for long periods of time. More than 27 % of them had "joined" the army when younger than 13 years old<sup>1</sup>. They are children that had been brought up in a world of killing and destruction.

### PROPAZ: Ex-combatants' contribution to peace building process in Mozambique

The Peace Promotion Programme, PROPAZ, emerged from the two major associations of ex-combatants in Mozambique: AMODEG (Demobilised Soldiers' Association) and ADEMIMO (Disabled Veterans Association). The main aim of this Programme was to promote reconciliation and the culture of peace, tolerance and national reconciliation, between both the ex-combatants of each side of the conflict and among the communities. But then, a question arose: how to fulfil the objectives? Neither AMODEG nor ADEMIMO had any kind of resources apart from the will of seeing the civic participation of ex-combatants in the process of rebuilding the country destroyed by war.

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<sup>1</sup> Pardoel, T., p 28, Demobilisation in Mozambique: Socio-Economic profile of 92881 demobilised soldiers as per the end of the demobilisation programme on 30/11/94. Maputo.

The contacts made with other kind of organisations and institutions working on the same field, such as the Nicaraguan Peace Promoting Network (made up of ex-combatants and disabled veterans that fought in the civil war in Nicaragua), the Centre for International Studies, etc. were of great help.

Through these contacts, and with the will to participate in the preservation of peace in an active way, the first steps were taken and a core group of three people was formed. Since then training of the ex-combatants and disabled veterans has started and achievements encourage the continuation of the process.

The training process has been based on the following principles:

- *Reconciliation:* The participation of the ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict would be the key for the success of it;
- *Integration:* The participation of the disabled veterans would play an important role not only to defend the cause of disability but also to establish a dialogue between people of the sector;
- *Gender:* The women who contributed in the war have gained an experience that would be important to the post-war period.

PROPAZ has focused on training of Peace Promoters at national, provincial and local levels. Most of the Peace Promoters and trainers are ex-combatants and disabled veterans and gender balanced policy is taken seriously into account during the selection process of the activists.

### Field results

As the result of the work that PROPAZ has done, many positive results were achieved:

- Further development of strategic vision focusing increasingly on the peace-building context, with a balanced integration of training and action oriented components. This, in order to assure community impacts aimed at enhancing community initiatives for the containment and eradication of violence;
- Increase in analytical capacity to disaggregate aspects of inter-communal relations at the local level;
- Generation of new initiatives that engage members of potentially conflicting groups in organisational non-partisan activities that serve their common interests: the identification of mined places - most of the ex-combatants were responsible for laying mines and, they still remember where they did -, contribute mostly to the change of the image of violence that the community associates with the ex-combatants. As a result of the sensibilization of Peace Promoters for example, more than three cages were identified and weapons including machine guns, mortars and mines were destroyed in Moamba, a district in the Maputo Province.

In conclusion, positive behaviour of the ex-combatants in their communities helps them to reintegrate themselves in the community dynamics.

### Field experience

During the implementation of the activities designed under PROPAZ programme, a number of key aspects to reintegration of ex-combatants were identified, and we feel they may be of considerable help to future process insofar as the peace-building practitioners take them into account. The main aspects identified are:

1. The civic behaviour of ex-combatants has more impact on the reunification of communities divided by war than the proliferation of many economic benefits directed at ex-combatants.

2. Ex-combatants are generally trained people in the sense they have a discipline, which can be used in the post-war period.

### Challenges

The efforts of AMODEG, ADEMIMO and PROPAZ in the field of reintegration of ex-combatants have met some barriers. Some of the problems ex-combatants' associations would like to solve in order to contribute to the reintegration of their members, are jammed by legal aspects in the most of the cases of which only the government has the power to deal with. These aspects include issues like the now fashioned child soldiers. In the context the ex-combatants' associations have been working on, two dimensions have to be recognised:

1. People who joined the army as youngsters but had become adults by the end of the war.
2. People who joined the army very young and reached the peace accord still youngsters.

Those referred to the first case and who have been demobilised, had their demobilisation card allowing them to apply for any benefit directed to ex-combatants. However, they have problems in getting their pension, which is paid to everyone having spent ten or more years in the army.

The second group brings together those who were not even considered for demobilisation, apparently for political reasons: none of the fighters would like to be seen as having used children. This group is the most difficult to work with from the perspective of the two associations and even in PROPAZ. One reason is that in terms of law, they are not identified as ex-combatants.

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**Ms Petronella Mayeya, Clinical Psychologist, Zambia**

## **MILITARISED YOUTH AND CHILD SOLDIERS: WORKING WITH TRAUMATIZED CHILDREN**

### Introduction

All over the world where conflicts are taking place or have taken place, young people have been involved in one way or another. And in most cases it has been against their will.

The results of this involvement has had enormous effect on the young people physically, psychologically/emotionally, economically, socially/culturally and spiritually.

This is the reason why young people should not be exposed to a military climate until they are mature and capable of making informed choices.

### Definition of youth

By definition, a youth is in transition between puberty, through adolescence, to early adulthood. Therefore, young people are going through a difficult period. Being half-child, they are still young enough to be controlled, guided and told what to do; but being half-adult, they are old enough to stand on their own, and make decisions about their lives. Thus, they are at a stage where they are impressionable and can easily be swayed either positively or negatively.

## Use of young people in conflict situations

With the above scenario, it's no wonder that society takes advantage of the vulnerability of youth and makes use of them to further the cause of a particular grouping. Little or no thought is given to the suitability of these young people, or the possible implications of involving them in whatever type of conflict.

## Reaction of youth to involvement in conflict

The question we might ask is what exactly is the reaction or response of affected youth to conflict involvement?

The way the young people will respond will obviously differ, depending on their genetic inclination, the environment they have been brought up in, and the way they have been raised to deal, and cope with "difficult" situations in life.

This is because the personality of people is determined by nature or hereditary factors, as well as nurture or environmental factors. Therefore, the identity of young people will be influenced by both their parentage, and the environment in which they grow up, and where they find themselves.

It therefore follows that while some young people will be quite excited and look forward to the adventure of being involved in a war, for example. There are those who will be withdrawn and surrender themselves to the fate. As a result, even the sort of activities the young people will be involved in, and the behaviour they will display will be dependent upon their reaction to the whole process of involvement. Therefore, even the effects will be based on:

- the type of conflict
- the young person's personality
- the preparations he/she had in dealing with particular conflicts
- the gender of the young person
- the adult range (whether nearer to puberty or nearer to adulthood)
- the length and intensity of the conflict.

### ***Type of military conflicts***

There are two major types of military conflicts:

- external conflicts, between countries
- internal conflicts, within a country (for example civil wars)

However, other resulting conflicts could be socio-economic, religious and cultural in nature.

### ***Effects of military conflicts on young people***

#### *Physical effects*

- physical injury
- death
- poor hygienic conditions leading to poor health
- poor nutritional conditions leading to poor health, such as stunted growth, and poor physical development
- susceptibility to illnesses

- sexual abuse by soldiers will have implications for HIV/AIDS for both male and female youth

### *Psychological effects*

- normal mental development is hampered in the conflict environment resulting in impaired intellectual functioning
- the trauma due to the conflict will lead to impaired cognitive function, associated with poor memory, attention and concentration
- there may be inadequate personality development and lowered libido. Any feelings of importance are usually short-term and therefore temporary
- there could be behavioural problems, such as violence or suicidal tendencies
- the youth might have poor interpersonal relationships, either between the same sex, or between opposite sexes leading to inability to establish long lasting relationships
- resulting personality changes could lead to harmful lifestyles with implications for health, and HIV/AIDS
- the young people may begin to abuse alcohol and/or drugs as a way of dealing with the conflicts, again with it's implication to health
- the young people might suffer from depression caused by the conflict situation

### *Economic effects*

- it may be difficult to be reintegrated into ordinary society again
- there may be a lack of equal job opportunities, especially when young people are forced to become refugees in foreign countries
- they may not have the appropriate skills to enable them get the available jobs

### *Socio-Cultural effects*

- failure/difficulties in adjusting to a new way of life
- disintegration/loss of families
- difficulties in accessing resources in terms of education and other amenities
- difficulties in settling down in a foreign country with its different social and cultural norms

### *Spiritual effects*

- may lose faith in God
- may go to the other extreme and may become fundamentalists in their religious beliefs
- may begin to question the purpose of life, and thus develop suicidal tendencies

### Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC)

Most countries in the world have ratified the Convention, which age limit partly covers youth. The Convention seeks to protect the rights of all children up to the age of 18 years.

It has an additional protocol that deals with the rights of children in armed conflicts. This protocol states that children have the same rights as civilians not taking part in an armed conflict. They are as protected as persons entitled to protection and assistance according to Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols of 1997.

Also children have special protection stemming from their vulnerability as children. Apart from referring to the protection of children in armed conflicts, the CRC also states the rights of war-affected children to rehabilitation.

## Rehabilitation

The CRC Additional Protocol II, Article 4.3, as well as the CRC Articles 38 and 39 give guidelines as to the requirements in terms of Rehabilitation for children affected by military conflict. They state that children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular:

- they shall receive an education, including religious and moral education
- all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated
- measures shall be taken to remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer area, and ensure that they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well being
- all appropriate measures will be taken to promote the physical and psychological recovery and social integration of a child victims of:
  - any form of neglect, exploitation or abuse
  - torture or any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
  - or of armed conflicts
- such recovery or reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self respect and dignity of the child

## Other issues

- Voluntary involvement should not be accepted because:
  - Children seldom make informed choices when they join, they do not know why they are joining and what the military life will do to them.
  - Many join because this is the only way to support the income of their family and can thus not be said to truly join as volunteers.
  - Many join for protection and in order to survive, neither of this can be said to be a voluntary reason.
- Indirect participation should be prohibited because:
  - Experience shows that children who have been recruited into support functions, and thus live and move with the soldiers will subsequently be given guns to participate directly in the fighting.
  - Verification will be very difficult if only direct participation is prohibited. The distinction between direct and indirect participation is difficult to make. If only direct participation is outlawed, troops may claim that all children are participating indirectly.
  - Children who are participating indirectly are subjected to much the same dangers as children participating directly. Children should not be subjected to such mental and physical hardships, as this will hamper their normal development and well being.

## Resolutions of the International Committee of Red Cross

Before I share some experiences of the work I have done with young men and women traumatized by military conflict, allow me to quote from resolutions passed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at one of their conferences:

" DEEPLY ALARMED

- by the spread of violence and the massive and continuing violations of international humanitarian law throughout the world,

- by the immense suffering this causes among the civilian population in case of armed conflict or foreign occupation of territory, and in particular by the spread of acts of genocide, the practise of "ethnic cleansing", widespread murder, forced displacement of persons and the use of force to prevent their return home, hostage-taking, torture, rape and arbitrary detention, all of which violate International Humanitarian Law,
- by serious violations of international humanitarian law constituted by acts aimed at the expulsion of civilian populations, and the acts of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population and by acts of violence or terror making civilians the object of attack,
- by the difficulties encountered by humanitarian institutions in performing their tasks in armed conflicts in particular when state structures have disintegrated,
- by growing disparity between the humanitarian pledges made by certain parties to armed conflicts and the profoundly inhuman practices of those same parties,
- by the rapid expansion of the arms trade and uncontrolled proliferation of weapons, especially those, which may cause indiscriminate effects or cause unnecessary suffering,

2. Aware that the urgency of alleviating the suffering of the civilian population in times of armed conflict should not distract attention from pressing obligation to fight the root causes of conflicts and the need to find solutions to conflicts.

3. Particularly concerned by the plight of women, children, displaced families, the disabled and elderly and civilian populations stricken by famine, deprived from access to water and subjected to the scourge of antipersonnel landmines as well as other weapons used indiscriminately.

The CRC, resolved, among other things to encourage states, the Red Cross Movement and other competent entities and organisations to develop preventive measures, assess existing programmes to ensure that the child victims of conflict receive medical, psychological and social assistance, provided if possible by qualified personnel who are aware of the specific issues involved."

### Case study

Patrick (not real name), a young student, was forced to flee Rwanda during the genocide of 1994. He lost track of his family except for an older brother. His first country of refuge was Tanzania, but he left for Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) shortly afterwards. There he enrolled at University of Kinshasa for a degree programme, but was unable to stay when conflict between Kabila and rebels started with Rwanda being implicated. So he travelled to Zambia, where he is currently a student at a college studying for a diploma. He is now in his second year.

Gradually Patrick began to have problems with his studies; especially because of poor memory, therefore having an inability to recall learned material, which led to poor academic results. He was therefore referred for psychological assessment.

Assessment revealed the following:

- impaired attention and concentration leading to impaired memory functioning
- poor coping mechanisms
- limited number of friends and at 28 years no girlfriend
- usually spends time alone in his room
- worrying about the whereabouts of his parents and other siblings (last information about them was by Red Cross in Congo DR who had traced them to the Eastern Zaire in 1997, before current conflicts broke out, next attempt to trace them failed by the Zambia Red Cross Society)
- not able to go back to his country because its being ruled by Tutsis; he is a Hutu and feels unsafe
- top it all, he has been having sleeping problems and is therefore constantly tired

- during the assessment process and subsequent interviews, Patrick was tearful and broke down in sobs periodically while relating his story.

This gives an example of consequences of military conflict on one young man. It gives an idea of what young people go through as a result of armed conflict.

The plan for Patrick is

- To help him to go through the traumatic situation he is in.
- Initially by giving him stress reduction methods through the use of relaxation techniques.
- At the same time attempts are being made to trace his family by referring his case to the Zambia Red Cross Society tracing programme.
- Eventually helping him to deal with the absence of his family and therefore the lack of a family support structure.
- Later affording him the opportunity to acquire counselling skills so that he could begin to work with other refugee youths/students and help them come to terms with their traumatic situations.
- Last but not least teach him good studying techniques.

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## ***THE CULTURAL ASPECTS OF THE AFRICAN SETTING***

**Mr Sean Tait, U Managing Conflict (UMAC), South Africa**

### **EXPERIENCES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

#### Introduction

This presentation seeks to provide an overview of my personal experiences in conflict resolution and is based on the work of UMAC ( U Managing Conflict) and its results in the Western Cape Province of South Africa over the past ten years. These experiences are related to incidents that have taken place within a specific context time and place.

UMAC is an interesting case study as it is a relatively small NGO with a small budget and staff. Nevertheless it has managed to be on the forefront of conflict resolution in the Western Cape. This is important because finance and capacity are often problems among African NGO's. The UMAC experience shows what can be done on a small scale. In the same way I will use this overview to develop a critique on conflict resolution methodologies and their sustainability and applicability in Africa. The areas I will seek to highlight are:

- that conflict is multi faceted - There is hardly a single cause or single conflict being addressed within the community context but rather a multiplicity of intertwined conflicts,
- that resolving conflict takes time dedication and effort - This means you have to gear yourself up to sustainability and commitment,

- that neutrality is power in conflict resolution work.

## UMAC - A History

UMAC is an NGO based in the Western and Eastern Cape, that specializes in conflict resolution and process facilitation. It was founded in 1985 during the height of the state of emergency. This was a time of severe unrest. The police were used to suppress political activity and restrictions were placed on media reporting of these events. UMAC was established as a vehicle to monitor events and pass information through to sympathetic parliamentarians who could ask pertinent questions in a parliament, which was not, subjected to media restrictions. In this way the story got out. Hence the name Unrest Monitoring and Action Committee. During this time UMAC built up a wealth of knowledge and grassroots networks which were to stand it in good stead during the coming years.

## CROSSROADS AND TAXI WARS

### - Conflict Management vs. Resolution and the Multi Faceted Nature of Conflicts

In 1989 UMAC received its introduction into Conflict Resolution. This was the time of the Crossroads war and the first of a series of Taxi wars. These conflicts were important as their dynamics set the scene for much of the unrest of the 1990 - 1994 negotiation process and continue to haunt the 1999 elections.

Crossroads could be seen as the first stand against the Western Cape's colored labour preference and Group Areas Act. A deal was struck between Crossroads residents under the leadership of Johnson Nxobongwane and the then government to establish a permanent settlement in the area. Nxobongwane, originally a supporter of the United Democratic Movement, split with popular politics when he inter alia accepted the position of mayor of the area under the Black Local Authority System. The Witdoek war between supporters of the council (witdoeks ) and the comrades resulted in Nxobongwane fleeing the area and Jeffrey Nongwe, a former lieutenant taking over. The cause of the war rested in the development of the area and the allocation of houses, and one of the lasting results has been the mushrooming of squatter camps in the adjacent Nyanga and Browns Farm areas as people fled the area. In short, houses meant for Crossroads residents (and who had paid Nxobongwane for the privilege to be on the waiting list) were unable to afford the houses, which were subsequently taken over by people from outside the area. Much of the conflict was encouraged by the state's security apparatus and has been born out in the revelations of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee.

The Taxi wars followed much the same pattern. The industry within the township areas existed in a state of deregulation. Taxis with operating licenses ran services between the townships and the Business districts of Cape Town and Bellville under the banner of Western Cape Black Taxi Association (WEBTA), and unlicensed operators plying the inter township route did so under the banner of Lagunya ( Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga ).

Following the events in Crossroads, the government established a residential area in Khayelitsha as a means of accommodating the Crossroads overflow. While moving to Khayelitsha was scorned by the Crossroads population, the offer was taken up by a growing tide of emigrants from the Eastern Cape. Over the ten years of Khayelitsha existence, the population of the area has grown to some 1 million people.

The new Khayelitsha market proved attractive to both Webta and Lagunya and competition spilled over into war. The taxi war infected every aspect of township life. It was the biggest industry. Again as a strategy of divide and rule, the state exacerbated the conflict through supporting association against association. Civic leaders that took up a mediation role found

themselves the target for assignation. These were outspoken critics and leaders of the soon to be unbanned ANC and their removal suited political interests

These conflicts soon became intertwined and their actors inseparable. This highlights the multi faceted nature of conflict and that resolution cannot simply be achieved through addressing one component conflict. This makes resolution difficult work, but it also opens up the possibility of many different techniques being used in the resolution process.

The fact that the conflicts were never fully resolved points to another very important aspect of conflict resolution - that of the management of conflict rather than its resolution - It implies an on going effort at bringing down the manifestation and potential for violence.

### The 1994 Elections - The Importance of Neutrality

Following these events UMAC was firmly placed in the mediating role and acknowledged its changing role in a name change, to the Urban Monitoring and Awareness Committee. With the unbanning of the political parties and the beginning of negotiations, UMAC took a lead in the transformation process. It was an active member of the Peace Accord structures and established some of the most effective local peace structures.

UMAC played a central role in establishing a dialogue between state organs and the communities. The most important of these being the Police. Negotiations were facilitated between Police intelligence and ANC intelligence as the beginning of relationship building, in preparation of the eventual transformation of these structures. These negotiations came from a very practical beginning. A conflict in Khayelitsha was being spurred on by the two sides as they attempted to out manoeuvre each other almost subreptuously. This largely in the form of one set of sources providing information against another. The dialogue between the two parties was to be crucial in the eventual integration and set the scene for the transformation role UMAC plays today within the criminal justice system.

Another important aspect was the work done regarding the transformation of the Internal Stability Unit and Crowd Control Management in South Africa. The ISU was a special unit to address so called riot situations. UMAC saw the unit as exacerbating the tensions that resulted from the need to negotiate and find solution for years of non-existent relationship between people and state. The attitude of the ISU and their militaristic way of addressing demonstrations fuelled conflict. UMAC worked on policy development around crowd control and the retraining of members of the unit as well as the negotiation between this unit and the communities. UMAC played an important part in a wider process to address this important aspect of the transition. The result was very successful and led to the introduction of new legislation and techniques.

The process is important because UMAC had its beginnings as an organization opposing and monitoring the very same police. Now it was engaged in mediating a solution in conflict between the police and community. The police's acceptance of UMAC's role attests to the fact that organizations can be neutral. The vision of a future was shared by both parties and UMAC was able to prove to both that they could assist in the attainment of that vision without prejudice to either. This was achieved through the tried conflict resolution techniques of focusing on the issues and not apportioning blame or judging.

### Methodology

UMAC's original role was easy to define. The monitoring and reporting of security force abuses in the townships. The negotiation process thrust a whole new role on the organization. Much experience had been gained over the past years in the labour field on the art of negotiation. However important differences existed between community and labour negotiations. In annual wage negotiations a set of rules was agreed to and annually negotiations took place within

certain parameters. The community negotiations that marked the transition period were vastly different. Agendas and parties did not often come forward clearly. Mandates were often distorted and many separate negotiations took place within a single conflict. These experiences were important in UMAC's definition of its role during this period.

During this time UMAC became well versed in conflict prevention and early warning approaches to addressing conflict.

Society could be seen as a pyramid existing in various levels of order. At its apex order and at its base a benign chaos. Labour negotiation took place in this field as a means of ordering the relationship between capital and labour. Below this pyramid existed a shadow pyramid, which had anarchy at its apex. UMAC focused its attention on those conflicts, which tended to become anarchic and sought to address these through a process of crisis intervention, which reversed the tendency and set the scene for formal negotiations to take place.

The Crossroads war and the Taxi War were a case in point where the conflict between the parties and the exploitation of the situation for personal gain, within the very tense period of the transition to democracy was a situation, which threatened the very fabric of society. UMAC was ideally placed to identify and access the parties on both sides. This had been achieved through the trust built up with the community over the monitoring years, the knowledge of the system and role players and the acceptance of UMAC's role by the state, through its work on the peace accord structures. The most crucial part of conflict intervention is getting parties to the table while some sort of relationship still exists and before too much damage has been done. There is a saying that a conflict of one month takes one year to resolve. Sometimes it seems more like ten.

With conflict seeming to follow conflict without breathing space in between, UMAC did not possess the capacity to mediate a conflict to its ultimate resolution. A kind of division of labour took place with UMAC establishing the mediation, then handing it over to third party mediators to continue while it sought to bring another set of conflicting parties into process. From this process UMAC defined its work of the moment as Crisis Intervention.

One of the most valuable tools during this time was that of "closing the window of opportunity." This again was borne out by experience, as much conflict during this period was exacerbated for political or personal gain, often by shadowy third force figures. When confronted with this, UMAC sought to expose the situation in the newspapers and with role players, thus making it more difficult for protagonists to operate. When this happened there was more often than not a small reduction in the resources made available to conduct violent conflict.

### Post 1994 - Conclusion

Today UMAC has gone through another change as it seeks to meet its current mandate. A number of issues can be identified for the next millennium, that impact on the focus and nature of the organization. After the elections, funding patterns to South Africa changed. One of the results of this process was the going under of many NGOs, and a reduction in the capacity available for conflict resolution. This has meant that UMAC has again taken on the role of capacity building and conducting conflict interventions.

U Managing Conflict is the current identity. UMAC has developed several projects through which it continues its work. These are:

- policing and the transformation within the police, and the establishment of relationship between community and police and between the police and the various partners of the criminal justice system;
- the integration of ex community defence structures into mainstream society;

- facilitation of capacity development and conflict resolution in development issues;
- local Government and conflict resolution and facilitating the interaction between traditional and local government authorities in the Eastern Cape and
- conflict facilitation for the upcoming local government elections.

Each of these projects stress the development of the capacity within local communities, to take on the task of conflict management

Another result of changes in funding, has been that funding had more and more been channelled through government. This has implications for the neutrality of the NGO movement. Again community capacity is an effective mechanism in dealing with this issue. Provision is made within South Africa for formalized interaction between state and community. These include the community police forum, in response to tension between community and police and, the Reconstruction and Development Forum in response to development issues. UMAC looks to develop and capacitate these structures as the vehicle for conflict resolution and early warning.

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**Mr Michael Langa, ACCORD, South Africa**

## **YOUTH AND ETHNICITY PROGRAMME**

### 1 Introduction

Many books and papers have been written and many more remained to be written about the problem of ethnicity and the impact that it imposes upon the community. Different scholars say different things around this subject. Some are positive in the sense that they look at the end result brought upon by ethnicity, whereby others are negative in the sense that they view ethnicity as immoral and something that causes a lot of division in communities.

This paper would then look at the problem of youth and ethnicity, special emphasis and attention should be given to identify ethnicity in and around my community and the negative impact that has developed. This paper would then form part of the strategies in the planning workshop that seeks to identify such issues around the youth and the consequences that they bring, and highlight this as the identity problem. Then try to invite the community to work out amicable solutions around this issue.

To contextualize this paper, the target youth groups should be from 12-18 years old, because they are more conscious and more concerned by ethnicity and violence. The age group could be adjusted to take into consideration groups starting from 8 years old, because youth as young as this is also beginning to be influenced by the problem of ethnicity and that of violence.

To estimate the gender category, youth groups could be broken down into 20 % males and 5 % females and referred to as those who are politically active and who are motivated.

This paper is an attempt to illustrate the social impact of youth and ethnicity, which is becoming increasingly more diverse and difficult to combat at this point in time.

### 2 Aims and Objectives of this paper

- To define and analyse issues relevant to ethnicity and youth, violence in the community and to identify problems encountered in ignoring such issues. Getting the community to propose strategies and solutions to this issue.
- To promote a new approach to the problem of ethnicity which includes all youths as equal member of community.
- To promote a balanced gender-sensitive approach to youth decision-making, conflict prevention and resolution which would be more sustainable and acceptable to all members of the community.
- To draw other strategies from similar problems in other civic societies which would enable all in the community to benefit from and to maintain a peaceful solution.
- To increase an understanding of the impact of ethnicity in the community and the role of youth in the post-conflict reconstruction.
- To share experiences with the Zambian youth in related issues and also exchange strategies that would prevent such immoral issues from happening.
- To recommend strategies and some measures that would increase youth involvement in peace initiatives and peacekeeping in all forms of conflict.
- To set-up a communication level between all youth sectors of the community as well as their participation in building a better future.

### 3 Causes of youth being drawn into violence

It is very important that one should take the geographical situation of youth in South Africa and the highlighted factors that lead them to take to violence, which stops them from being progressive. It is a fact that South Africa is overpopulated with young people who are more or less affected by the following factors:

- *Education*

Statistics from the youth commission clearly show that only 12 % of African youth have studied as far as they wanted to as compared with 58 % of their white counterparts. It is shocking that all studies have shown that only 8 % of young Black people in South Africa have attained post-matric qualifications (this includes tertiary education as well as any certificate or diploma courses undertaken since leaving school).

To be precise, in my community for example, of the 40 % youth from the ages of 12-18, only 3 % of the youth have attained university degrees or diplomas, not to mention those who are without matric. About 10 % of the youth are attending private schools to try and get better matric results, which are in a shamble in our community.

Presently, the youth show no interest in studying, and some of the supportive measures, which were set up to assist them have failed.

- *Employment*

Education and employment are two sides of the same coin. It would not be true to say that poor education is the only reason for youth unemployment. Again, the youth commission survey indicated that young women experienced higher rates of unemployment than young men, across all race groups. It is also true that young women find it more difficult to get access to the labour market and encounter particular problems such as discrimination and harassment when seeking employment. Therefore a special clause needs to be put in place, to address this issue for women to be protected against all these immoral activities.

Statistics have shown that unemployed youth are more depressed and stressful than those who are engaged in youth programmes or employment and they are therefore more vulnerable. The

unavailability of jobs for young people would mean that programmes should be put in place to address the problem of unemployment.

There are various factors, but for now our efforts should be focused on these two primary issues in this paper and, should the two factors be resolved, it would be better for the youth to face other consequences that are stumbling blocks to their developments.

#### 4 The problem of ethnicity must be addressed openly

The Oxford dictionary defines ethnicity as a group differing from the main population by racial origin or cultural background. This definition is most suitable for my community because it would mean youth with different cultures and other ways of life that are completely different from what is expected.

An article from the Sunday Tribune dated 4<sup>th</sup> of April 1999 clearly states that for the sake of transformation, ethnicity must be nailed down. Ethnicity is not a Black on Black issue or youth issue, but a global issue in a sense that it affects all members of the community both Black and White. In my community it is still an issue because community members are still feeling embarrassed to talk about it. Because of the problem of ethnicity, young people have become vulnerable. Ethnicity would then continue to surface either as a sporadic conflict that prevents youth from developing in the transformation processes.

Discussion in the streets of my community is about where other people should belong in relation to others – people are defined by where they should belong. Take the case of "amaklereklere" who are considered to be foreign and thus should be sent back to their country of origin.

Ethnicity brings with it some strong elements of language, cultural colonization and religious differences. In my community, not all institutions divide people according to their colour or religion. Churches for example are still welcoming all members of the society as equal and created image of God. Thus some religious leaders are being impelled to work together to tackle the social problems. The most dominant problem is the free access of drugs and guns.

Another article from the Sunday Tribune dated on 4<sup>th</sup> of April 1999 clearly states that the youth form a strong presence in the community. Their thumping music, informal networks and loyalties, contribution to family vulnerability and uncertainty, relationships between boys and girls add colour and flesh of optimism to the group.

Criminality is on the rise. Crime worries do not centre on robbery and theft, the main concern is the growing drug pushing. This goes together with police collusion and corruption. All the youth that are involved in criminal activities know one another. Those who operate beyond lawful behaviour are widely admired as heroes/role models. Their status is displayed by the use of guns, bizarre court performances, their ability to have top lawyers, and of course the prevention of going to prison through bail, and their connections with members of the police force.

#### 5 Characteristics of ethnicity

The most common characteristics of ethnicity is that it sets people apart from each other. This creates a division where some people feel better than others. People's history, language and their unique style of living is something that sets them apart. Thus the notion of both superiority and inferiority becomes the competition in people's life.

Ethnicity also carries along with it the issue of status. The youth are divided by status. All social activities are therefore affected by status. Take for instance a soccer team within each and every community, some youth would never associate themselves with another youth member because

of his status. Those who are travelling with cars and also working would not associate themselves with those who do not own cars, not to mention those who are not working.

To consolidate this point, I think I would agree with Gerald Mare when quoting B.A. Khoapa in his book, "Black Community Programmes":

*"The black man ... will continue to address his black brother and sisters because of events and the rich heritage that is their history that has not been made fully available to them in the usual way in which a society informs its membership about the significance aspects of its development. Blacks want to know, and must know, more about who they are, where they come from and are seriously concerned about who they intend to become."*

In this case, the youth that feel powerful and superior would be ignored by those who feel inferior on the other hand. Politically speaking, the Afrikaner ethnic group has been perceived in a negative way, not only by those they oppressed but also by the majority of white English-speakers. Thus Afrikaners could ignore their relationship to black people because they felt superior to this population. In this case, black people could not be Afrikaners and, therefore, did not associate themselves with them.

It is on this note that Gerlad Mare says that *"groups exist even if they differ from each other in many respects, are not fixed, and are perceived in a variety of ways by each individual member who at the same time employs an array of other, non-ethnic identities"*.

In this case the concept of ethnicity refers to social identity formation that rests on the following:

- Culturally specific practice and unique set of symbols and beliefs. A belief in common origin and a common history. A sense of belonging to a group that in some combination confirms social identities of people in their interaction with both insiders and outsiders. This is most common in religious groups within all communities who are labelled by certain names to belong to those sects.

Therefore ethnicity constitutes the way in which people think of themselves and others, and the way in which they act upon the world around them. Thus to come up with a more practical definition, ethnicity refers to both the call addressed to ethnic subject in their mobilization and to the outlook and practice of members of ethnic groups.

## 6 Ethnicity and gender

Gender means the roles attributed to both men and women through socialization and the relationship that exist between them. When the gender aspect is being examined in my community, it is very important to question the characteristics given to both male and female ethnic subjects.

I fully agree with Mare when he says that the gender perspective of ethnicity is under-researched. Not much has been done by researchers to check the balance of ethnicity and their impacts upon the community. Most researchers are traditional in their approach, by that I mean statistics prove that men are still by far considered as the leading subjects in social issues, that affects the community.

The gender dimension of ethnic group formation needs to be historically situated. Again, Mare quoting from Walker qualifies this point by saying:

*"It is clear that a static and culture-bound understanding of gender is inadequate... The role of women was not the same in precolonization as it is in the twentieth century South Africa... The differences went beyond obvious ones in the type of work and responsibilities assigned to*

women, to encompass the structural significance of the sexual division of meaning assigned to women's roles (Walker, 1990:26)".

I would like to sum up this paper by saying, if we take the most common example of a family in the African community, the family still remains a strong element in ethnic mobilization that serves to reinforce not only authority of age and the role of parent(s) but also the gender hierarchy that exists in the family. It is a strong belief in the African culture to practice and preach polygamy. Some men in my own community still marry more than one woman. This has affected the youth of today who are also seen to adopt this trend of having many affairs/relationships. They should be made aware that the polygamy factor invites AIDS and other related diseases into the family.

\* \* \* \* \*

## ***BUILDING NEW COMMUNITY-APPROACH ON CONFLICT PREVENTION***

**Ms Clare Hansmann, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa**

### **PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN: A TOOL FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION**

Reflecting for a moment on the topic that I chose to deliver a paper on this morning, *a public awareness campaign: a tool for conflict prevention*, I think about how ambitious myself and the other delegates attending this conference are. When considering conflict prevention, are we not merely talking about minimising the propensity for situations within our society from becoming violent? Or are we looking at containing an increasingly violent society from spilling over to such proportions that it jeopardises the safety and security of the people within it. In considering the option, I reflect on the meaning. Minimising implies a sense of diminishing or decreasing; containing implies putting a lid on, but offering no solution; and preventing means stopping, eradicating.

The paper puts forward one of many tools for conflict prevention, encapsulated in a public awareness campaign. Talking about my experiences as part of a national process within South Africa designing a campaign on violence prevention.

In 1998, the Institute for Security Studies entered into a co-operation agreement with the national Secretariat for Safety and Security to design a public awareness campaign that would reduce the violence within South Africa.

In definition of the parameters of this task, a number of executive decisions were made based on certain over-arching concerns about the historical factors, nature of violence and various community groupings in South Africa. This involved a trade-off between the complex means through which violence manifests itself in our society and the effectiveness of the campaign.

An effective public awareness campaign needs to be focused on a specifically defined area and directed towards a targeted recipient. The broader the scope of the campaign, the more diluted the message and the less effective the results. As such, it only considers one form of violence,

namely violence that arises as a result of the presence of a firearm in the situation. The campaign needs to be directed at those people most affected by, and influenced by firearms. Although the target group for the campaign is not yet confirmed. It is strongly felt that the target group of the campaign need to be youth and women.

### Youth violence and conflict

In authoritarian societies, the approach to conflict is usually containment through repressive actions. While in a true democracy it relies on communication and articulation of needs between groups to solve problem.

Youth within South Africa are subject to an education system – although under transformation – which is largely authoritarian. Under which the youth are taught not to challenge authority but to accept the authority's decision as supreme. A large proportion of the youth within South Africa received little or no systematic education. Instead, they were educated on the streets in protest, subversion and demonstration. The youth were taught to challenge authority, to question the system and to voice dissatisfaction. However, this path of expression was confrontational and offered little option for dialogue. Was it a necessarily predetermined path for the youth within South Africa?

Youth within the South African democracy are marginalised from both economic opportunities and democratic processes – especially by government. Youth fall within an unstructured and unorganised area of civil society. A quick reflection on the composition of local community forums demonstrates this: the youth voice is absent.

Conflict largely arises out of competition over resources and the uneven distribution there of. The key to preventing conflict from arising is in how the confrontational situation is mediated. An analogy to demonstrate this would be as follows. A child is playing with a toy. A second child would like the toy, on instinct grabbing it from the first child. A parent intervenes in this situation.

- a) The parent, as an authoritarian figure, takes the toy allocating it to which ever it feels owned, and in this case synonymous with possessed, the toy - leaving neither child with any example or precedent of how to deal with conflict when it arises.
- b) Alternatively, the parent intervenes offering both children sweets as a means of defusing the situation – once more leaving neither child with any example or precedent of how to deal with conflict when it arises.
- c) The parent intervenes showing both children that they will have to make a trade-off. This could effectively be done through opening dialogue between the two children encouraging them to look for substitutes or considering the sharing options. The operative being to demonstrate an understanding to both parties of the others perspective.

Conflict prevention is a skill. Although it is a skill learnt through life experiences, it can also be taught. These skills include amongst other diplomacy, negotiation, mediation and conciliation. These skills allow a person to articulate their views in an effective manner.

Within society, the youth are the least skilled in diplomacy. As a result of a lack of alternative fora through which to express their ideas, the youth have historically claimed their public space through protest and demonstration. These methods, although often slighted as the lowest form of conflict resolution, are adopted by youth as a result of a lack of other alternatives – their impact being largely limited in a democracy. Clearly it may put the issue on the agenda, but it offers little or no means of solving the issue. Until the youth learn the skills of debate, negotiation and

diplomacy, and the need for a trade-off between demands, they will remain unable to effectively participate, hence marginalised, from democracy.

The forthright attitude of youth is refreshing: no compromise and no negotiation. The adoption of this characteristic with regards to decreasing corruption would be welcomed in Africa. But in emerging democracies it difficult to reconcile. Short-term alternatives need to be offered to youth for expressing their ideas such as dance, poetry and art. But in the long-term, the government, as well as civil society, need to take cognisance of the need to provide vehicles for the participation of youth, and the re-education of youth with new life skills.

Perhaps government do not take the youth seriously – this would not be difficult to believe given the fact that a large proportion of youth cannot vote and effectively hold no political power. A serious reconsideration of this stance should be made. Youth have mastered the politics of protest and a strong counter-culture – largely unpenetrable to the adult world and even of other youth groupings within society. For the extreme to which youth lack diplomacy skills, they have numbers on their side.

In conceptualising youth, the youth need to be clearly desegregated. In a recent pilot project, undertaken by the Institute for Security Studies, aimed at understanding youth conflict, there were multiple youth sub-categories identified for sampling. These arose out of both a geographic and education classification. These included, amongst others, the following:

- Geographic divide: deep rural, commercial farm, commercial farm workers, secondary town, peri-urban, urban residential, urban township, urban inner city
- Education divide: completed secondary education, school-going age attending school, school going age not attending school

In the pilot survey, marked diversities were found amongst these sub-categories of youth. Most notable were different:

1. attitudes to crime and violence
2. style of speaking and appearance
3. conceptualisation of family, household, neighbourhood life
4. perceptions of safety

All these factors need to be taken into account when designing a public awareness campaign. The empowerment of youth involves re-skilling the youth with life-skills to engage other people in an effective manner so that the youth can identify with the other parties' perspective, while at the same time articulating their own needs.

The Institute for Security Studies based their involvement within the public awareness campaign on the premises that engaging with the youth requires not only a sound understanding of the youth's perspective on life, but also effectively transferring skills to the youth. For this reason, the public awareness initiative is phased over three years: the first year would involve building public awareness; while year two and three provides education.

#### Tools for demilitarisation of youth or the reversal of the culture of violence

There are a number of tools for the demilitarisation of youth or the reversal of the culture of violence. Broadly speaking these include:

- Example
- Practice
- Education

*The example set by the household and society*, leads and directs the actions of young people. Young children see the example given by their parents and grow up following the precedent

established within the household. Within society, young people are influenced by the example set in the media. Society permits the media to display misleading images. For instance, cosmetic violence portrayed as in the media does not really allow people to see the damage produced by a bullet, perpetuating myths around the lethality of a bullet.

Young people in society grow up to believe the norms and standards set by it. Consider the standard and example set by government that recruits children for armed conflict. Young children concept of violence stems from justification of a country to enter a war situation, the use of violence by the armed forces, the precedent set by the judiciary with regards to corporal punishment, etc. Any attempt to change society would require a change in the example or precedent set for young people. Society and households have to give young people an alternative model to follow, one based on conflict resolution and non-violent means of dispute mediation.

*The practice of the household and society* also provide examples to the young people. A society that reinforces a culture where masculinity is supreme, colloquially called a macho culture, where force and imposition of one's will on other person is considered normal. In such a context, compliance is achieved through violence.

Both social (comparing government, family, role models, amongst others) and environmental factors determine the level of violence in society. Any attempt to redress these would have to change both the long-term examples and practice set within society.

The society – government and people – need to make a conscious decision not to replicate a violent culture both in terms of the examples it sets and the practices it follows. This will be achieved by a redefinition of what is acceptable norms and practice within that society.

There are many starting points for the redefinition of society – from the constitution of the country, the restructuring of the law enforcement agencies to the value given to life and the preservation thereof, to name but a few. With regards to addressing the long-term morals and values of youth, a young person would have to be educated in a different manner to the existing practice.

The state should not be under the misconception that merely changing the laws of the country would change the practice of the people within the country. A changing of what could be referred to as intellectual violence needs to occur. Intellectual violence is that conception held by people through their education that violence is the norm.

A starting point for government would be to address its main organisation responsible for training people within society: *the education system*. As previously mentioned, the South Africa education system is authoritarian. The school curriculum needs to be changed to include the teaching of tools such as tolerance building, conflict resolution and democratic processes. In this way, teach the young people a new example and practice.

Education is a long-term tool for changing the culture of violence. But it is a long-term method for change, at a generous estimate the soonest it would be effective would be over one generation (say seven years). While education as a tool holds benefits for long term planning, it does not assist in the short-term. The very problem affecting the so-called 'lost generation'.

A public awareness campaign serves the short-term purpose of justifying the need for changes to the education system and other organs of state that perpetuate a violent society. A public awareness campaign should accompany an education campaign in that it raises the awareness of issues for why the society "is doing what they are doing".

A public awareness campaign can perform many roles. Commonly it is used as launch or precipitation of a longer-term idea or objective. But it is also invaluable as a tool for the

consolidation or justification of a long-term objective, such as reforms to the education system, maintenance of democracy, societal health building, etc. In this role the public awareness campaign works as a 'reminder' of the long-term project objective.

State and society, similarly to the earlier analogy of a parent intervening where two children are fighting over the toy, usually react to violence with regards to youth in one of three ways:

- Prohibits the violence or activities using punishment as a deterrent.
- Providing incentives for change such as involving the youth in sports, nature conservation, and dance or theatre activities.
- Providing youth with other alternatives to violence.

These solutions only act to convince - as a temporary measure - youth to change. It is idealistic to think that you can only convince the youth to change an education or set of beliefs that they have known since birth. It is at this juncture that a public awareness campaign could impact by providing short-term actions. While through the education of youth, society needs to change the parameters of how violence is viewed. This involves the change in the norms, moral and values of society.

### Background to the public awareness campaign

Before I proceed with a detailed overview of a public awareness campaign, I would like to explain the origins of the campaign the Institute for Security Studies is involved in.

### **National Crime Prevention Strategy**

Safety and security is a national concern to the South African Government of National Unity. For this reason they developed the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) which is an inter-governmental framework for crime prevention. In itself, the NCPS is one of six areas of focus within the National Growth and Development Strategy.

The NCPS comprises of four pillars, each representing the four most critical areas of intervention identified that had to be immediately addressed in order to combat against the factors that create or facilitate criminal activities.

The NCPS framework was intended as a reference point for provincial, metropolitan and municipal programmes to guide the efforts of all sectors of government, reduce overlap of efforts and resources, and provide uniform indicators of performance<sup>xvii</sup>.

### *Four Pillars of the NCPS*

Within the NCPS, there are four pillars to reduce crime through, as cited in the NCPS, are:

- Pillar One: Criminal Justice Process  
"An effective and legitimate criminal justice system is a vital foundation for crime prevention and the protection of human rights<sup>xviii</sup>."
- Pillar Two: Environmental design  
"The high incidence of many forms of crime are partly due to an environment which provides ample opportunities for crime, and where risks of detection, or prosecution are low.<sup>xix</sup>"
- Pillar Three: Community values and education

“The prevailing moral climate within communities, attitudes towards crime and the willingness of citizens and communities to take responsibility for crime are critical factors in reducing tolerance towards crime, and hence reducing crime levels.<sup>xxc</sup>”

- Pillar Four: Transitional crime  
Aims to address “the large influence of international and regional criminal syndicates.”<sup>xxi</sup>

#### *Common objectives of the Institute for Security Studies and the NCPS*

The Institute for Security Studies, in recognition of the area of common concern between their programmes and that of the NCPS, approached the NCPS with support regarding to the pillar three of the NCPS on community values and education.

#### *NCPS pillar three: community values and education*

Within pillar three of the NCPS, there are two sub-programmes.

5. Programme 1: Public education programme
6. Programme 2: School education

The aim of the pillar include broad based objectives which aim to<sup>xxii</sup>:

- Provide citizens with a working understanding of the criminal justice system, to enable them to participate fully in the working of the system
- Provide information which underpins the development of a strong community values and social pressure against criminality, or ‘grey’ activities with support criminality
- To promote the use of non-violent means of conflict resolution
- To promote awareness of gender issues and the empowerment of groups most prone to victimisation
- To promote awareness of the steps that individuals can be taken to reduce the risk of victimisation

#### *Critique of the NCPS*

The NCPS is currently just over two and half years old. During this time, certain components of the programme have advanced, while other components of the programme have largely remained untouched.

The founding thoughts and ideas established within the NCPS were as concepts appropriate and definitely a move in the right direction. When the NCPS was first conceived it was a very important priority on the government’s agenda, but over time it appears to have decreased in priority.

There is currently a lack of governmental commitment to certain areas of concern within the NCPS. As well as a lack of co-ordination between various tiers of government, although this was identified as a key area to be addressed in the NCPS.

It largely appears that governmental officials guiding certain components of the NCPS do not know which steps should be taken to transform its policy aims and objectives into workable action plans. Clearly, what the NCPS lacks is the ‘how do you do it’ component on each of its deliverables. This would transform it from a ‘non-deliverable orientated document’ towards a more substantial action-orientated solution.

#### **Public awareness approach towards addressing: the demilitarisation of youth and the reversal of the culture of violence**

*What is a public awareness campaign?*

A public awareness campaign is an on-going project giving information or knowledge to the community.

In a community-based workshop run by the Institute for Security Studies with members of the Kathlhong, Thokosa and Vosloorus community, South Africa, in January 1999, participants unpacked the concept as follows:

PUBLIC	AWARENESS	CAMPAIGN
Community Masses People You and me Women Youth Men Children	Knowledge Understanding Making the unknown known Be alert Enlighten	Project Crusade Initiative

*Aim of a public awareness campaign*

The aim of a public awareness campaign is to:

- Disseminate correct information
- Raise awareness
- To challenge the values and perceptions within a specific target group

A public awareness campaign needs to be differentiated from a public education campaign in that the former does not aim to teach skills, provide alternatives, or train. What it aims to do it to enlighten, draw attention to and create dialogue over social issues. An education campaign would aim to transfer skills and train a specific target group. As previously mentioned, the campaign would in the first year raise awareness and thereafter educate.

*Premise underlying the public awareness campaign*

A campaign is based on the understanding that certain leverage points will be effectively targeted under certain circumstances and conditions.

For instance, A affects B under circumstance X, Y, Z

A = message, song, demonstration, proof, experience

B = women, men, elderly people, children, youth, police, gangs

X, Y, Z = transparency, trust, participation, environment

For each of these factors there is a maximum point at which the optimum effect is achieved.

- Youth (B) are more susceptible to accept a message (A), if it comes from someone they respect, if it is a message they helped design, if it is in a language they understand, and if it is a message that they feel is of concern to their well being.

- Women (B) are more susceptible to accept a message (A), if it fulfils their primary concerns or roles. Such as protecting the family, providing or assisting in their domestic role such as child rearer, child bearer, etc.
- Adult men (b) are more likely to accept message (A), that supports the traditional role of men, and their traditional role in the community, or a message, which is linked to masculinity.

There are certain optimal conditions under which a message will filter through to your target group. The limitations thereof need to be continually borne in mind. Research is critical with regards to assessing what the factors are which impact on target groups.

Large strides in this area of research have been made by the advertising industry, yet the limitations of advertising are well recognised. A television advertisement in the early evening may trigger a thought that you are hungry, and could suggest a type of food that will satisfy the hunger. But as you are aware, this hunger can be satisfied by many means.

Similarly with a public awareness campaign, a message can be sent to a target grouping raising an issue, but what will be done about the issue (once raised) will largely be determined by the options available to the target grouping. A public awareness campaign needs to closely be followed by an education campaign to provide options or choices to the target grouping.

#### *How to undertake a public awareness campaign?*

There are a number of stages within a public awareness campaign.

- Research
- Monitor and evaluation
- Role players co-ordination
- Design
- Implementation

#### *Phase 1: Research*

The public awareness campaign requires research for insight into the:

- the nature of the problem to be targeted
- the situation and context in which the problem is to be addressed
- the recipient, or target, community

There are many different types of research, which would assist in undertaking the various forms of information gathering, or analysis, which is required within the design and implementation of a public awareness campaign. Each type of research illuminates different facets of the problem.

Some of the research methods that could be utilised to obtain information to design a campaign include:

- Quantitative survey
- Round tables
- Focus groups
- One-on-one interviews
- Participatory research techniques

Each type of research has its own strengths and weaknesses, and provides only a facet of understanding of the problem under review. Given this it is preferable to use a combination of techniques and sources of information.

Although I have extensive experience in quantitative survey design, administration and computation analysis, I always prefer the insights given by participatory research tools. Workshops of this nature give a richer insight into your subject matter, as well as a textured understanding of problem statement. Qualitative surveys give evidence for the scope of a problem, but if the survey was poorly conceptualised is often misleading and fuel for misdirected policy directives.

### Phase 2: Monitoring and evaluation

The monitoring and evaluation phase is a longitudinal process (measured over defined time junctures) that needs to be established at the start of the campaign. It provides a mechanism through which the success of the campaign can be objectively measured.

In order to monitor and evaluate a campaign, one needs to have very clearly defined objectives of what the campaign aims to achieve. For each of the objectives, measurable indicators need to be identified.

In the case of a campaign around curbing the levels of violence in our communities, the measurable indicators would both be perceptually based, as well as physically based. The perceptual indicators could be encapsulated in a quantitative survey asking respondents, for instance, about their perceptions of safety, willingness to go to the police for help, the level of support for the peace structures in the area and the frequency of hearing gun shots at night. Or by monitoring structures in the community, by for instance, the regularity of meetings, the frequency of report-backs to the community, perceptions of the structure's effectiveness. Physical indicators would measure the incidence of firearm injuries in hospitals within the community, incidence of crime; level of victimisation.

Observation also provides a good indicator for monitoring changes in the built-up environment. Such as painted walls, slogans, and graffiti. Vandalism is also a measurable indicator of the discourse in the community. Indicators to monitor would include, for instance, the state of public phones in the area, the vandalism of structures and assets in community; the level of time investment in the up-keep of domestic residences, such as the vegetation in the gardens, or the amount of litter in public spaces, etc. The premise underlying this is the link between built-up environment, crime, violence and perceptions of the aforementioned. A community that is proud and democratic reflects this in their built-up environment.

### Phase 3: Role player buy-in

Critical phase in the public awareness campaign is to obtain the commitment of the various role players to the process. This will ensure that the process is inclusive – a necessary step for a successful campaign.

The process of obtaining role player buy-in provides an effective marker of the success to be achieved in the campaign. Any problems in this phase of the campaign need to be addressed during this phase, or they will manifest themselves at another stage in the campaign – jeopardising the campaign.

The role player buy-in phase is perhaps a misleading title. It is not the phase where the community structures are 'sold' the package of ideas, which comprise a campaign. Rather it is a process through which the ideas are explained and mediated with the community. Where the community structures access for themselves whether this is an initiative their community would like to adopt and adapt to their circumstance.

It is also the phase during which the community assesses who will take up the campaign, and provide leadership to the process. This would be based on community democracy. The outside agency would have to ensure that all people in the community are given an opportunity to decide on this.

The role of national government in a public awareness campaign is to provide a point office for information dissemination and queries. The point office would provide incentives for communities to discuss the options of a campaign in order that they can make well informed decision on whether they would like to design a campaign of their own. And finally, the point office would have monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

The role of the community in the public awareness campaign is to consider the information provide by the state, and decide on whether they would like to reinforce the public awareness campaign at a local level; and consolidate this with an education component.

An external agency, which likes to precipitate a public awareness campaign, within an area would have to individually engage the community. The 'buy-in' process works differently to the national buy-in process discussed in the previous section.

The involvement of the community in the process involves a series of steps, falling broadly within the ambits of community liaison. This involves the following:

- Community meeting
- Meet with elected structures or representatives
- Meet with gate-keepers
- Meet with activists
- Letters in papers, air time etc.

To evaluate whom to meet with, a community assessment is a useful tool. From my experience, a participatory research workshop provides a sound grounding for this. Specific evaluative tools used would include a venn diagram exercise; ranking matrix; focus groups; historical time lines.

There are many limitations to participation, which include amongst others, the following:

- Lack of capacity
- Different priorities and ranking of priorities
- Lack of resources
- Different agendas
- Historical factors of past disillusioned with agencies delivery
- Gate-keepers

The objectives of the obtaining community buy-in in order to achieve, amongst others:

- Transparency
- Ownership
- Empowerment
- Efficiency
- Democracy
- Sustainability

Besides the above mentioned, community buy-in is important so that when an outside agency withdraws from a community the community knows how to proceed and minimises the risk of the process loosing direction or halting.

#### Phase 4: Campaign Design

The actual campaign comprises of the following elements:

- Aims
- Clear definition
- Clear motivation for each aim
  
- Objectives
- Clear definition
- Measurable indicators
- Recognised priorities
- Recognised target groups
  
- Slogan
- Link to objectives
- Strong associations
- Process for obtaining the slogans
  
- Coverage of campaign
  - Prioritise resources in terms of effectiveness or exposure
  - Utilise multiple media forms such as billboards, written media, television, radio and theatre.
  - Recognise the limitations of the various media forms. For instance, televisions run on car batteries may only be viewed on Saturday for soccer matches; radio listenership maybe limited to evening for the soap operas.
  - Recognise the limitations of various levels of literacy
  - Co-ordinate campaign with other agency and departmental programmes
  
- Design:

The design of a media campaign needs to be community-based, utilising the skills located there within. These skills can be harnessed through drawing and song writing competition. Or by offering running national competitions that communities which design and implement a public awareness campaign receive a community assets of their choice such as a community hall, clinic building, etc.
  
- Implementations

A point office should be established for communities and interest groups to contact for more details, support, comments and interactions. The point office should provide direction, but not prescribe the campaign delivery and design contents. The community through their own means and resources, as guided by the national point office, should implement the campaign in the manner that they are comfortable. Communities in South Africa are no new to the concept of mobilising resources and running a campaign. Consider for a moment the Free Mandela Campaign and the Right to Vote Campaign within South Africa in the early and late 1980s

### Lessons to be learnt to date

The ISS/South African Government campaign is at an important juncture. Broadly speaking it is in the design phase, with research being undertaken in one of three pilot project areas. Already there are a number of valuable lessons that can be learnt:

- The various government departments need to show effective commitment to the delivery of such a campaign. In order to raise support for the campaign, the role of lobbying for support

needs to be undertaken by a strong and experience leader. Without a clear charismatic head to the campaign, the campaign will never gain a sense of ownership.

- The various tiers of government need to co-ordinate their priorities and objectives. From our experience, the priority on a national level does not necessarily transfer to the municipal or local level.
- Community dynamics will play a very large factor in mediating the success of a campaign.
- Never underestimate the time-consuming role of lobbying
- Assessment of demand for campaign. The demand of the target ordinance for outside intervention needs to be assessed. Never assume that the message you want to transfer is necessarily the message they want to hear.
- Foreign concepts and terminology. These need to be reinterpreted to increase local understanding and meaning.

### Conclusion

As means of a conclusion, I will consider what it is that I have been saying in this paper.

- A public awareness campaign is a short-term tool to build awareness around an issue or idea, whether as a means of launching a project or providing substance to an existing project.
- A public awareness campaign is used as an intermediary measure, while a long-term solution is implemented.
- The re-education of society is the long-term solution for the demobilisation of youth and for breaking the cycle of violence.

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## **YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL SOCIETY: WHAT, WHY & HOW**

### Defining Youth

In the report given by the Secretary General on Youth, at the United Nations Fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly, it was reported that there has been a slight decline in the youth population between the period 1980 to 1995. This decline was recorded in all regions except Africa, where the youth population continues to increase. The report further states that the annual growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa continues to increase at more than 2 percent.

While taking account of the UN report it is important to note that there is no universal definition of youth. The UN defines youth as persons between 15 and 24 years old while in many African countries the age definition starts as low as 12 years and is as high as 35 years (Appendix 1). Thus the annual growth rate for Africa as quoted earlier is most likely higher. As a social

construct, youth is that period between childhood and adulthood – a period without clearly defined boundaries and specific to individual countries.

In an attempt to define youth, Dr Mkandawire (n.d) asks the following poignant questions. *Is the 13-year-old Yao girl in Malawi getting married soon after puberty, a child, youth, or an adult? What of a thirty-year-old man among the Nyakyusa of Tanzania who, although married, may still be dependent on his father for most of the decisions related to his welfare and that of his immediate family? What of child soldiers in Liberia and Sierra-Leone? Are they youth or adults?* In attempting to answer these questions, Dr Mkandawire, further states that *...it is apparent that the definition in the African context assumes operational meaning only when considered in relation to other factors and variables.*

However our society chooses to define the youth, what we need to recognise is that young people are real citizens of this world and carry within them the energy and potential to be great agents of social and cultural change.

### Youth as Citizens

*The youth of our country are the valued possessions of the nation. Without them there can be no future.*<sup>2</sup>

In making this statement Nelson Mandela echoes a sentiment, which adults and even the youth bandy about often and that is, that the youth of today are the leaders of tomorrow. However by being caught up in the rhetoric, we fail to see that the youth are in most instances not being viewed as citizens, and therefore not being accorded their right to actively participate in our society. The irony of the situation lies in the fact that in wanting to protect our young people from the problems of our society we rob them of the opportunities to learn the skills of participating and the responsibilities that goes with it.

*Full citizenship is not automatically conferred on reaching a certain age* (Furlong and Cartmel :1997:41). The gradual conferring of citizenship rights are expounded in the laws of a society. These laws are often in conflict with the laws of morality and culture. One of the laws, which concerns those of us attending this workshop, regards the minimum age for recruiting persons into the armed forces. While children as young as 10 years of age are forced into battle we deny them the right to vote and participate in decision-making processes. An example is Uganda, where as reflected in Appendix 1 the voting age is 18 years while the minimum age for recruitment into the armed forces is 13 years of age (see appendix 2). A second less traumatic example would be in the case where children as young as 12 years are sent out to work in order to supplement the family income while the laws of that country state that all persons under the age of 16 years should be in school.

Full citizenship is about active participation and so at this point I would like to focus on the topic *Youth Participation in Civil Society*.

### What is Youth Participation?

In much the same way in which there is no universal definition for youth the same is true when we talk about participation. For the purpose of this paper I will use the following definition:

*...the involvement of young people in policy and program development, in having a say about what is done, and being involved in decisions about what is done.* (Ewen, 1994:14 as cited by Kaplun, 1995:2)

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<sup>2</sup> President Nelson Mandela in his State of the Nation Address in May 1994

If we accept this definition we accept that youth participation is much more than just giving the youth a voice. It is an acknowledgement that true participation is about the person i.e. the youth being involved in all aspects of programming that affect their lives.

Ewen's definition is a challenge to the traditional belief still apparent in many of our societies and cultures i.e. that seniority should be valued thus excluding the youth from the discussions and decisions that affect their lives. It forces the adult world to open the door to the youth and to see them as equal partners in all our efforts to improve the livelihood of all persons.

Youth participation is therefore not just a youth issue – As Roger Hart puts it -*Youth participation is not just about giving young people a voice but getting adults to have an ear.*<sup>3</sup>

### Why talk about Youth Participation?

I present some of the following as reasons why I believe this issue is important:

1. As part of his opening address in 1994, President Nelson Mandela in talking about the youth, acknowledged that the needs of the youth are immense. Mandela was acknowledging that the youth like all other people, have their own concerns and problems. These include issues of:
  - unemployment
  - inadequate facilities
  - poverty
  - illiteracy
  - war and violent conflicts
  - displacement
  - health problems
  - negative stereotyping
  - societies lack of faith in the abilities of the youth.

*Countries throughout the world have been working to address these issues by instituting mechanisms such as Youth Commissions, Special Task Groups, Youth Ministries developing programmes, passing policies and legislation. Yet, in spite of all these attempts the situation of youth has not changed significantly. I believe that some of the reasons for this is the fact that the youth are not even aware of most of the initiatives, that they may be consulted. However the consultation is often a mere exercise in accountability, and the youth opinion is overridden by government or agency policy.*

It is a known fact that when we involve people in all aspects of an initiative, the chances of sustaining that initiative is much higher than when we design programmes and present them to the relevant group, without having given them the opportunity to be part of the development. The same is true for our youth. Civil society is a platform from which the youth can affect and be part of the decision-making.

2. By encouraging and allowing the opportunity for full participation we empower the youth to be active agents of social change.
3. The youth will begin to feel that they are citizens of their country and know the importance of participating in the development of their country.
4. Civil society needs young people as active members in order to ensure that new ideas, visions and expertise are brought in, and that the older more traditional ways of doing things

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
<sup>3</sup> Roger Hart in delivering the keynote address at the Asian regional meeting in Thailand, 1996

adapt to our changing world. E.g. In Africa, if the youth become more entrenched in the principles and practices of non-violence then we are due to experience a shift in attitude. A shift away from war and genocide to finding peaceful resolutions to conflict.

5. The youth already occupy many roles in our society and often their contribution is overlooked or they are used as pawns in adult games. This contributes to the apathy and lack of faith the youth are currently displaying. This would need to change if Africa is to become a vibrant and democratic society.
6. By giving youth the space to participate we provide the youth with an opportunity to grow as a person and learn the skills and responsibilities, which accompany involvement. We need to remember that the youth population is growing, that our youth are our now and that by encouraging participation, we are taking care of our future.

### Youth Participation – A Conflict Analysis

Africa is a continent plagued with war and violent conflict. In all cases of intense conflict civilians are most affected. The youth are seldom- passive victims in these situations. The example of the child soldier shows clearly how young people are both victims and perpetrators of aggression during these times. The following model is an attempt to highlight what happens in post conflict situations with respect to the youth & the options available.



\* This is an ideal time for the youth to mobilise through civil society. The energy is still high and most often there is a genuine feeling to want to end hostilities and become involved in constructive initiatives to rebuild the society. It is the responsibility of providers in civil society to create the space for the youth to participate as well as equip them with the skills.

### Understanding the Degrees of Participation

I am sure that if we take some time to think, we will come up with a myriad of examples of ways in which the youth are already participating in civil society initiatives. My question to this workshop is – At what level is this participation happening?

Roger Hart (1992) offers a very dynamic model, which helps us in understanding the various degrees of participation and non-participation. The model I am presenting today (Appendix 3) is a modification of Hart's model.

The following scenario's provide an explanation of each of the levels as well as the effects these actions have on the youth.

#### *Scenario 1: levels 1 & 2*

Youth organisations could realise the financial benefits of running programmes to address the needs of youth and design projects without involving the youth. If we return to Hart's model we see this would fall in the category of non-participation and would lead to alienating the youth. These are methods employed by those in positions of power that use the youth for their own gain. The use of children as soldiers in periods of war is an example of operating at this level and the dangers thereof. The child soldiers as we know are forced into this position and the large majority do not even know why they are engaging in battle. At this level the youth are not willing or equal partners but pawns that have no understanding of what they are being involved in.

#### *Scenario 2: levels 3, 4 & 5*

Youth workers do a needs analysis of the issues concerning the youth and return to their offices to design programs to address these needs e.g. job training. Through the consultation process the youth have been given a "voice" and even though they have had no input into how their articulated needs should be addressed, they are non the less satisfied with the product and become involved as they are made to believe that this is the best possible solution. The involvement at this level is as a client of the service provider. Some providers would go a step further by training some of the youth to be facilitators.

#### *Scenario 3: levels 7 & 8*

As a result of their lack of faith in traditional systems, the youth could decide to go out on their own. While the level of youth participation is total at this level – the project is youth initiated and driven, the sustainability factor can often be difficult. Unless the youth involved have had opportunities to be skilled in all levels the programme could run into difficulties. One of the ways of ensuring this does not happen is to have expert adult members available to offer advice and support.

#### *Scenario 4: level 6*

In our present reality this is the level at which we can best achieve true participation. The youth service provider at this level can be the vehicle through which youth learn about participation and develop skills. It is the space where the youth can elect their own representatives: take

decisions and provide leadership on issues, which affect them. An example of how this can be achieved, is to have youth represented on the Organisations board, to allow the youth groups with which you work to decide for themselves who will represent them, to ensure that the youth have the opportunity to input into the agenda, and that projects are made through joint decision-making. Most importantly would be to ensure that the youth receive the necessary training and support which will make them active members.

Roger Hart, speaking at a conference in 1996, sums it up best with the following statement: *Real participation is achieved only when those involved are informed, consulted and ideally, encouraged to decide and manage.*<sup>4</sup>

### The Principles of Participation

Before rushing out to design the best model to ensure true youth participation in your Organisations and/or projects we should understand the principles upon which true participation is based. The following principles propose that true youth participation should:

- not be forced on the youth – they need to agree that they want it
- be enjoyable, challenging and fun
- be related to issues the youth identify as being real for them
- conscientise the youth to social, political, economic and cultural aspects
- involve training and skills development
- have clear goals and strategies
- offer accountability and challenge in decision-making
- create opportunities for building supportive relationships between the youth and the community
- ensure that the youth feel a sense of belonging and ownership
- affirm the participation of the youth
- provide opportunity for critical analysis of the process
- have a strong infrastructure and resource base
- encourage collective action at all times

(adapted from Best, 1992:2:Hoyne, 1993:5 as cited by Kaplun, 1995:5)

### Conclusion

Participation is basic human right, and clauses to this effect are found in all international conventions that protect the rights of all persons, and this includes the children and youth. As persons here concerned with and working with youth, it is our responsibility to ensure that these rights are protected, that the youth are aware of them and that the space is created for the youth to participate fully.

We cannot expect to have the co-operation of our youth if we are turning them away through our actions. The youth have a vibrancy and energy, which challenges society thus preventing us from becoming static. We should not be afraid to draw on this energy. As stated in the report by the Secretary General on Youth (1999), *Youth participation does not only provide opportunities for growth and learning for young persons; it also contributes in real ways towards the development of the societies in which they live. Countries benefit from ensuring...opportunities...towards the development of society.*

The youth are more than just developing leaders they are also developing citizens and we have a responsibility to ensure that they participate fully and actively in the life of her / his society. To

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<sup>4</sup> op cite

the youth present I want to encourage you to seek out the opportunities already there for getting involved, and where there are none, to lobby for your right to be actively involved.

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## **YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL SOCIETY**

### Introduction

All nations endeavour to achieve peace and avoid conflict. However, many countries across the world are experiencing conflict situations. Conflict here is defined as a fight or struggle arising from the collision of opposed principles. Conflict manifests itself in different situations: armed conflict, political conflict, etc. The youth have to a large extent been implicated in conflict situations either as the victims of it or the means by which it is perpetuated. As victims of conflict the youth experience: direct military action – holocausts, landmines, bombs, gunshots, trauma, etc; indirect effects of conflict – drought, food insecurity, forced migrations, etc; and the inter-linking effects of malnutrition, disease and a breakdown in the network of health services.

Our area of interest in, terms of conflict prevention, is the latter (where the youth are used as the means by which conflict is perpetuated). The youth are lured into conflict situations due to their disadvantaged or vulnerable position (as a result of economic hardships and/or influence) and are often 'recruited' as implementers of violence. It is not uncommon to see children carrying

rifles and pangas used to slaughter the masses. For instance, in the recent heightened civil war in Angola, the government has enforced legislation legally binding all youth aged 20-25 to enrol as soldiers.

Conflict is nothing new for Africa. Angola, Congo, Brasiilia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, etc had or are still experiencing civil war. Young people are currently the victims of armed conflict in almost fifty countries around the world.<sup>5</sup> Over the past ten years, after the liberation struggle, southern Africa has experienced relative peace. However, this trend is unfortunately changing as can be seen in the new developments in Angola, DRC, and the new wave of violence in South Africa. It is often said that the youth are the leaders of tomorrow, yet during long periods of war they are being brought up to tolerate and facilitate conflict situations thus creating under nourished, frustrated and possibly violent potential leaders. There is need for a concise effort to prevent conflict.

The aim of this paper is to look at youth participation in the civil society as a possible community approach to conflict prevention. Youth here refers to young people collectively. Young people can be classified as those who are not yet considered adults or who are in the transition period from childhood to adulthood. This definition takes into account children as well as adolescents. I would be hesitant to put age to this definition, but one can assume that people between the ages of about 0 – 28 years of age could be considered youth.

On average, more than half of the population in Southern African countries is comprised of the youth. In Malawi, more than half are below age 25; in Zambia about 68.5% are below age 24, in Namibia about 72% of the population are below age 30; in Mozambique 43.2% are below age 15; while in Swaziland 48% are below age 15.<sup>6</sup> These statistics point to the centrality of youth development in the future of the Southern African Region.

Constituting the majority of the population, the youth ought to be effectively involved in civil society. ‘Civil society’ refers to institutions of society such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs), and government itself. In contemporary society, these institutions are considered the mechanisms by which change can be effected. Thus the general argument of this paper that if youth become more involved in civil society their contributions and ideas are likely to enable the birth and implementation of effective conflict prevention strategies. However, to what extent this is possible and practical requires much debate.

### Youth Participation in African Civil Society

In African society the young are considered as that section of the community that have almost no say at all and are almost entirely at the mercy of adults. In a village setting the youth take orders and go to great extents to respect, listen to and fetch for adults. They have hardly any voice until they reach “adulthood” which is symbolised by an initiation ceremony, which varies from tribe to tribe. Even in urban society, the youth are not considered as people whose ideas and concepts can effectively contribute at decision-making level. Thus one finds that most if not all leadership positions in society are filled by adults.

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Children on The Front Line: The Impact of Apartheid, Destabilization and warfare on children in southern and South Africa, NewYork, USA: UNICEF, 1987, p.6.

<sup>6</sup> National Youth Development Forum, and others, Guaranteeing a future for South Africa’s Youth: A Youth Policy For South Africa, South Africa: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 1995, p.19.

Despite these suppressive cultural beliefs and tradition, there has been a proliferation of youth programmes in many countries in the region. In Zambia alone there are currently 620 youth programmes.<sup>7</sup> These youth programmes generally have the following categories of youth as their main targets:

- poor urban and rural youth
- street youth
- out-of-school and out-of-work youth
- youth with disabilities
- semi-literate and illiterate youth
- demobilised young soldiers
- young women

Even though the youth are the majority and there are many programmes for them, they are to a large extent not participating in civil society at decision-making level. This is largely due to the fact that the programmes are designed not by the youth themselves but by adult policy makers and politicians who claim they know what is best for the youth. This attitude of adults' stems partly from the African cultural beliefs mentioned above, and partly from the behaviour of oppressors from time immemorial. In order to sustain their domination, oppressors claim to be doing things for the good of all. Slave owners claim to know what was best for their slaves, men claim to know what is best for women, and similarly adults claim to know what is best for the youth.

Due to the socialisation of this structure of oppression, youth also tend to think of themselves as unimportant or incapable until a certain age. The youth are brought up to believe that they are incapable and of little use to society until adulthood. According to Paulo Freire:

“...almost always, during the initial stage of struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or sub-oppressors. The very structure of their thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped.”<sup>8</sup>

It is indeed worrying that just when one is at the crucial stage of shaping ones future one is not empowered to make life decisions. When one is handicapped to shape ones future and easily lured into situations beyond ones control that results in a crisis situation. Thus the future generation are easily pushed into situations that hinder their positive contribution to the development and growth of not only themselves but their country.

Such has been the outcome in conflict situations. The youth are pulled into conflict situations at implementation stage and are left out during peace discussions. They are used by those in power (adults) and discarded when their input changes the power relation between adults and youth. It is only logical to deduce that since the youth are used to perpetuate conflict they must be involved in actions to prevent conflict. But over the years, this has not effectively taken place! They have been sidelined, it is now time for them to be empowered.

### The Process of Empowering the Youth

If the root of the lack of participation in civil society (or suppression) lies in the adult-domination backed by cultural beliefs, we may assume that addressing the issue will be difficult

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<sup>7</sup> National Youth Development Forum, p.20.

<sup>8</sup> Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New Zealand: Penguin Books Ltd, 1982, p.30.

and meet stiff resistance. The process requires that of empowerment of the youth so that they begin to get involved at decision-making level.

The process of empowerment can be usefully understood in terms of five stages: welfare; access; conscientisation; mobilisation; and control.<sup>9</sup>

### 1. *Welfare*

The youth are easily pulled into conflict situation because of their economically disadvantaged position in society. Where there is wide spread poverty, people are easily corrupted into doing whatever possible to alleviate their position. Therefore, one should ensure that the youth refrain from participating only at implementation and not at the decision-making level of conflict situations, so that their immediate welfare needs should be met. This is not to say that when youth participate in conflict at decision-making level it is correct, but that at least conflict is more likely to be prevented if the people used to implement it are in a position to resist being involved.

When the youth are economically stable they will be able to see beyond the immediate individual benefits of conflict and focus on the societal implications. This way their participation in peace initiatives will be enhanced as it will not threaten the immediate economic benefits they enjoy when they are involved in conflict situations.

Furthermore, when the youth are not busy grappling with trying to survive economically they are more likely to be get involved in achieving peace in their country. However, one should also keep in mind the fact that in many a situation the youth are too eager to get involved in peace initiatives but they simply do not have the forum and means to do so. The youth need access to resources.

The equitable distribution of resources also prevents conflict as tension is reduced between the well off and the under-privileged. Where there is equitable development there is effective integration.

### 2. *Access*

For the youth to change their economically disadvantaged position they need to take action. Therefore the first level of action and also the first stage of empowerment is for the youth to increase their access to resources.

Once the youth have access to resources so that they are able to increase their welfare situation, they will be adequately equipped to get involved in peace initiatives and will not be forced to into conflict situations because of their economically vulnerable position. However, this is based on the assumption that the youth are conscious of the fact that they are being suppressed and manipulated into facilitating conflict situations.

### 3. *Conscientisation*

This is the second level of action. It means the recognition and analysis of the different systems of suppression and discrimination, which stand in the way of youth participation.

This recognition and analysis is to be realised by not only by the youth but the adults as well. In conflict situations, where the youth are not conscious of the fact that they are

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<sup>9</sup> This empowerment process has been adopted from 'The Women's Empowerment Framework' by Sara Longwe.

being used and manipulated then they are unlikely to resist it. Similarly in peace initiatives if the youth are not conscious of the fact that they are not adequately taking part in conflict prevention initiatives then they will not demand a voice in the initiatives. In the same way, where the adults are not conscious of the fact that they are suppressing, manipulating and discriminating against the youth, conflict prevention initiatives are unlikely to be successful.

#### 4. *Mobilisation*

The individual youth is unlikely to make much progress in challenging traditional beliefs. As a group they can collectively discuss the discriminatory practices that put them at a disadvantage.

One example is that of a Colombian group of children called the Children's Movement for Peace. In October 1996 people stopped fighting for one whole day in Colombia as 2.7 million (one third of the youth population) took over schools, parish halls, and the streets to vote. At the top of their wish was the right to peace, life, love, and protection of the family. Their impact was so powerful that a year later at the request of President Juan Elis Uribe, 10million adults followed their example by adopting their own mandate for peace. The numbers were more than double that of the previous presidential elections.<sup>10</sup>

#### 5. Control

Mobilisation is also the means towards gaining increased collective control of the decision making process, as the final stage of the empowerment process. The youth will be able to make inputs to national youth policies, legal structures, and other policies in order to improve their welfare situation.

The aim of this empowerment of the youth is not for them to take over governance, but to ensure that they are part and parcel of policy issues that directly affect them such as conflict.

#### Youth Participation and Gender

The aspect of young women always being treated as minors, even in adulthood has to be taken into consideration. There is need to ensure that there is equal participation of young men and women in the empowerment process. However, as young women grow into adults, they do not necessarily gain treatment as adults. This creates a deeper marginalisation of women in conflict situations such as rape, which is used as a weapon of war to show domination of one warring faction over another. Young women also tend to be the most affected in terms of poverty, migration, and in refugee camps as they are expected to look after their younger siblings in case of death of both parents.

There are hence gender power struggles and discrimination within the youth that are used in situations of conflict to further subordinate young women. The situation of young is further exacerbated because even in adulthood the subordination continues whereas young men (in adulthood) do eventually become empowered.

Thus in conflict prevention there is need to address the gender discrimination at family level so as to prevent the victimisation of young women in war. There is also need to facilitate the empowerment cycle for women even after attaining adulthood.

#### Tools to Facilitate Youth Participation

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<sup>10</sup>

Faris Calle, "Children of Peace and War", in Children First, UNICEF, Issue 39, 1999, p.21.

In order to increase youth participation in civil society through their empowerment facilitative mechanisms need to be put in place for each of the levels:

1. In order to facilitate the stages of welfare and access, the youth need to be equipped with the necessary skills that will enable them to access resources to improve their economic conditions. Although most government policies already have the provision of education, training, vocational skills as their objectives, there is need to ensure that the skills chosen are those in line with the needs of the youth.
2. In order to facilitate the conscientisation process there is need for both adult and youth to go through “youth sensitisation” processes so as to begin to change some of the negative aspects of culture and tradition that tend to impede on the youths effective involvement in civil society at decision making level. There is also need to put in place policies that are for the sole purpose of effectively involving the youth at the level of decision making in all sectors of society. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child can be used as the basis upon which the policies can be formulated. Maybe this will be the beginning of making the convention part of domestic structures. Once policies are put in place then the legal framework may begin to shift.
3. In order to facilitate the mobilisation process there is need to nurture youth organisations that have been started by the youth themselves. This can be done in form of capacity building, in terms of advocacy, training, organisational development and networking. The youth will be able to adequately advocate for the domestication of the CRC and the enforcement of new policies to mainstream youth issues across all sectors.
4. Once the level of control has been reached the drive of change regarding issues affecting youth will come from the youth themselves. At this stage the participation of youth in civil society will be spontaneous. However, the cycle of empowerment is a continuous process.

Civic education for the youth entails the implementation of the above tools in (1), (2), and (3). That is there is need to first assess the civic needs of the youth, and then provide conscientisation through youth sensitisation workshops so as to be able to change the negative cultures and traditions. Whereas most civic education projects end at this level, the most important is civic education that empowers the youth to be able to claim their rights in a manner that will not create conflict. The process of claiming rights can be quite volatile when the very rights being claimed are in direct opposition to the conventional structures of society laid down by culture and tradition, hence the need for capacity building in advocacy, negotiation, and organisational development.

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**Adv. Nceba Gomomo, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa**

## **YOUTH PARTNERSHIP A SINE QUA NON FOR A WORKABLE STRATEGY AGAINST CORRUPTION**

### Introduction

Since South Africa rejoined the international community it has taken up various economic, social and political issues as being part of a necessary building block required for a sustainable democratic country on eve of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This includes amongst other things to build integrated machinery to combat crime in general and corruption/commercial crime in particular. It has been accepted internationally that corruption is a threat to societal stability and therefore too human security. The fact that many economies have collapsed due to corruption demonstrates a necessity for the emerging economies to develop strategies to combat corruption. The integrated machinery requires to fight corruption must have two approaches to be effective, that is reactive machinery and preventative machinery. The former represented by the legislative and institutional framework. And the latter represented by civic and moral education programmes meant to expose the citizen to the causes, nature and the impact of corruption on democracy.

For example, South Africa has enacted legislations (Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998) and policies to combat corruption in all its forms. These efforts were not without flaws as the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1996 failed to incorporate some of internationally recognised effective control measures. Thus in 1996 the law Commission made recommendation for legislation which pay due regard to effective control measure. Furthermore, various gatherings have been convened nationally and internationally in past 12 month to tackle the corruption malady. On the other side civil society has vigorously challenged the sustainability of government's initiatives especially that they have been more reactive in nature and that they have not taken any practical steps to involve and educate citizens about this form of criminality.

Another flaw in the government initiatives is the fact that youth as a sector has not been visible, and this is a worrying situation. Youth is the hope of our continent. Their disengagement on issues of grave importance on stability and prosperity of their countries should be discouraged, especially because of the fact that youth has been in the forefront when Africa fought against imperialist and colonist tendencies. If, corruption is an antithesis to development, youth cannot therefore negate their role of enhancing and defending democracy by ensuring that corruption preventive measures are effective. Educating a society about corruption and its impact would give the state a competitive advantage over criminal. This is a necessary condition to combat

corruption effectively and the youth sector is kingpin, together with public awareness and education programme that in this respect could yield expected results.

It has been generally accepted by both jurist and social scientist that legislation does not lead to compliance. Enactment of legislations and policies would not lead to an informed, effective and collaborative strategy required to combat the cancer of corruption. Youth stand at the threshold of a workable anti-corruption strategy. Anti-Corruption strategy, to be effective, should ensure that public education on the phenomenon and the practical impact of corruption is placed at the centre. Thus the youth sector being the most educated and accessible sector would make the dissemination of information easy and well targeted.

It is within this context that I will explore why youth as an important stakeholder on issues of development, reconstruction and growth cannot stand aside on issues of corruption.

### Legal and social conceptualisation of corruption

Corruption will remain a dubious phenomenon both socially and legally if it is not correctly conceptualised. Especially when organisations like the World Bank give a simplistic interpretation of what corruption is: They define it as "the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain" or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance. This interpretation presupposes corruption in the public domain and ignores the fact that private sector and civil society are not immune to being corrupt.

The South African Corruption Act 94 of 1992 defines corruption as follows: "active corruption consist in unlawfully and intentionally giving or offering a benefit of whatever nature which is not legally due to someone else upon whom some power has been conferred or who has been charged with some duty with the intention to influence the latter to commit or omit to do some act in future in relation to such power or to reward the latter for some act or omission in the past in relation to such power.

A person commits passive corruption if he is somebody upon whom some power has been conferred or who has been charged with some duty and he unlawfully and intentionally receives a benefit of whatever nature which is not legally due with the intention that he should commit or omit to do some act in future in relation to such power, be rewarded for some act or omission by him in the past in relation to such power.

Legally the concept of corruption has been defined to constitute an act of bribery that is a general term covering the misuse of authority as result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary. John Makum Mbaku (researcher in this area) says in Africa many people see corruption as a practical problem involving the "outright theft, embezzlement of funds or other appropriation of state property, nepotism and the granting of favours to personal acquaintances, and the abuse of public authority and position to exact payment and privileges. Corruption as John Makum understands is a public sector phenomenon, but he failed to take into account other sectors, like the role private sector is playing in this regard.

To uproot this anti-social behaviour we do not need a static and intricate definition of corruption but we need workable definition, which would be conducive to drive and inform concrete and effective national and international measures. In other words we require a simple and functional definition, which would be able capture both active and passive perpetrators of this crime.

Given the pervasive nature of corruption in our country, it is imperative that the anti-corruption activists link corruption with the transformation processes, in particular its impact on redistribution of resources, in our society. Corruption hinders proper redistribution of resources and is concentrated around the elite class of our society. Furthermore, it is imperative to consider the correlation between corruption and security or lack thereof.

We have seen paradigm shift take place away from the traditional model of security that sees security as military dimensions of security. Security as we conceptualise it today encompasses conditions in which individual citizens can live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and basic necessities of life; and contributes to an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well being. Corruption needs to be understood within this context that it is impediment to the security of our country.

### The state of the nation

South Africa has enacted legislations and policies, which are necessary to control corruption/commercial crime. In the last 4 years we have see documents like Public service codes of conduct being enacted to foster a corruption free public service, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act and the National Prosecuting Authority Act being enacted into law. Furthermore, various institutions have been created to combat corruption such as the Heath Special Investigating Unit, the National Director of Public Prosecution, the Public Protector, the Auditor General's Offices, the Public Service Commission and the Anti-Corruption Unit-SAPs.

There are certain important elements that underpin the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), which is the cornerstone of government's strategy to fight crime (including corruption) in the country. The NCPS has the following objectives:

- The establishment of a comprehensive policy framework which will enable government to address crime in a co-ordinated and focused manner which draws on the resources of all government agencies, as well as civil society.
- The promotion of a shared understanding and common vision of how we, as a nation, are going to tackle crime.
- The development of a set of national programmes, which serve to kick-start and focus the efforts of various government departments in delivering quality aimed at solving the problems leading to high crime levels.
- The maximisation of civil society's participation in mobilising and sustaining crime prevention initiatives.
- Creation of a dedicated and integrated crime prevention capacity which can conduct ongoing research and evaluation of departmental and public campaigns as well as facilitating effective crime prevention programmes

The NCPS is based on a two-prong approach:

1. *Crime Control*: measures, which deploys most resources towards responding after the crimes have already been committed.
2. Emphasises more on *Crime Prevention*, which aims at preventing crimes from occurring in the first place.

This is why we have gathered here today to look at corruption prevention strategies (as conflict prevention mechanism), which will ensure that our culture of altruism and zero tolerance to corruption are restored. And the role of education (civic or moral education) in unpacking the concept of corruption and in promoting a culture of lawfulness and democracy. For example, students must learn what organised crime is, why it exists and what can be done about it. Most importantly they must play an active role in informing the society about its role in combating undemocratic behaviours like corruption. This requires school-based programmes, and existing civic education needs to be expanded and focused to concerns about corruption and its impact. Also, youth partnership and coalitions are created to effectively address the corruption malady.

Beside the legislative framework needed to fight corruption, the Lima declaration provided each country with the task of developing effective institutions. The Lima declaration was produced by international community gathered in Lima, Peru, in 1997 to develop integrated strategies to fight corruption. The declaration is said to be the landmark document agreed by the global community to articulate a broad strategy to fight corruption, at the international and national levels, in all sectors and with the participation and co-operation of all walks of life. In compliance with the Lima declaration the government, business and civil society have recently embarked on high profile National Anti-Corruption Initiatives without visible contribution of the South African youth sector.

This initiatives includes inter alia:

- In October 1998 a national moral summit was held to deal with the issue of deteriorating ethics and values. And to set out a programme of action to enhance the moral fibre in South Africa.
- The government launched the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Summit in November 1998 and will be strengthened by a National Anti-Conference Summit involving all sectors to be held at the beginning of April in Cape Town.
- On the other side business, and government are involved in an efforts to deal with commercial crime. Business Against Crime has proposed a programme of action to transform the criminal justice system to address this problem through specialised approach.
- TI-SA also has introduced the concept of Integrity Pact in South Africa.
- The 9<sup>th</sup> International Anti-Corruption Conference hosted by the justice will be held in South Africa, Durban in October 1999.
- South Africa might be the first African country to join the fight against corporate bribery, waged with the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions.

South Africa and the rest of the continent are gearing themselves to fight against corruption defined by the above events. However it should be noted that corruption is not simply the product of an inadequate or inappropriate regulatory environment, but also the product of a climate that has evolved as a result of our specific historical circumstances. Therefore enacting legislation and policies should not be seen as an end on its own.

All these facts will remain academic if people on the street do not comprehend the meaning and the impact of corruption on their daily life. Corruption in all developed and developing societies is recognised as the growing problem e.g. the reason is said to be fourfold:

- First, the economic costs of the continued diversion of public funds to personal use can be serious, undermining a country's stability, such as Mobutu had done in Zaire to the point where democratisation system became impossible.
- Second, corruption undermines the legitimacy and integrity of newly democratised systems and impedes the progress of countries in transition.
- Third, commercial crime has been identified as being a single factor, which leads to closure of many big companies, emerging companies and organs of civil society. For example, the National Small Business Council's closure is indicative of the impact corruption could have on developmental policies. Recently, there have been allegations of corruption at the University of Fort Hare where student funds were diverted to individuals needs.
- Finally it has been indicated that corruption is one of the main impediments to having multinational companies and individuals to invest in Africa.

## Defending Democracy

Uprooting corruption is one important step in creating a conflict free society. If governments develop socio-economic policies that take cognisance of material conditions of their country and people then need would be eliminated as a source of crime and corruption. People would be free from manipulation by greedy individuals who exploit their vulnerability for self-enrichment.

## Conclusion

Corruption as a legal and social problem remains an issue to be addressed through reactive and preventive measures, and the collaborative effort of society. Imaginative infrastructures could only come to existence if the members of the community have in- depth understanding of the objective of anti-corruption strategies and how does these strategies translate to public efficiency. I think youth is that missing link between quick- fix measures and sustainable strategies to combat corruption. Through youth we can develop people driven strategies because they are the most educated and accessible sector of society. For example in the 70's it was this sector which challenged our community on the use of alcohol, and this proved at that time to be successful in refocusing the adult sector to fight apartheid. And it was youth, which took the liberation struggle to every corner of our neighbourhood. It is this reason that prompted ISS and TI-SA to convene a meeting to find ways of bring youth together to form strategies against the cancer of corruption in South Africa. And we hope that this endeavour will have an impact not only on South African youth policies, but also will have an impact on the Continent as a whole.

Knowledge about corruption should not be treated as a secondary element of anti-corruption strategy, rather it should be a prerequisite for any country to engage its citizen in fighting corruption. This implies that the task ahead of us could be done if the education/public awareness campaigns in this regard are at the centre of any our strategies. In-depth understanding of corruption could be achieved through civic education (a panacea to correct ills of society), thereby effectively fight corrupt in the next millennium. Through the involvement of the youth sector, as I have indicated here above, the preventive mechanism would be realised.

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## ***Summary of Workshop: Working Document***

### **1 Introduction**

There were 72 participants representing 35 NGOs from Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Finland gathered together in Livingstone, Zambia on 11-16 April 1999 to deliberate the role of youth in conflict prevention in Southern Africa. The workshop was representative of youth: half of all participants were under the age of 30 years. In addition to this, half of the participants were women. The workshop was organised by the Citizens' Security Council – KATU, a Finnish conflict prevention network representing some 40 Finnish NGOs. The main focus of the workshop was to explore conflict prevention through strategies that aim to engage the marginalisation of youth and lay the foundations for minimising the potential for conflict situations.

Recent international cooperation in conflict prevention has been 'reactive'; responding only once the conflicts have become violent. There is a need for a 'proactive' approach seeking measures to avert conflicts from becoming violent. Pro-active conflict prevention includes; strengthening the structures of civil society; promoting democracy and human rights; empowering women and youth; and practicing good governance.

## **2 Increased marginalisation of African youth**

The post-cold war era has witnessed an escalation of armed conflicts in Africa. These conflicts, mostly intra-state, are marked by the proliferation of small arms, the militarization of society, indiscriminate violence against women and children, and the preponderance of youth as combatants. At the centre of these conflicts are alienated and marginalized youth between the ages of ten and twenty-five. Lacking formal education, with loose kinship ties in the rural and urban areas, these alienated youth can be found in war-torn societies (such as Sierra Leone and Angola), post-conflict societies (such as Mozambique and South Africa), and societies without armed conflict (such as Ivory Coast and Botswana). Their continent wide existence constitutes a potent indictment of the post-colonial development project and the on-going structural adjustment programmes. The increasing involvement of these kinds of youth in conflicts raises a fundamental question: How do we empower Africa's youth so as to prevent violent conflicts?

The youth are divided along regional, racial, class and gender lines. But central to an understanding of the youth question are the problems of exclusion, development, democracy and social justice. To empower youth, to release their enormous energies for social reconstruction and development in a continent where they constitute about half of the population, is to address the troubled issue of democracy, power re-arrangement and resource distribution.

## **3 Southern African perspectives**

With good reasons it is useful to approach these questions from a regional perspective in Southern Africa, the most integrated regional economy in the continent. The end of apartheid in South Africa meant an end to the South African destabilisation of the neighbouring countries, which caused and fuelled internal conflicts in Mozambique and Angola, and particularly Zimbabwe during the 1980s. Today one can find conflict, post-conflict and crisis situations in the region.

The South African and Mozambican peace and reconciliation process provides an example in the area of conflict resolution and prevention. In these examples, the absence of war does not necessarily mean security for the youth. The insecurity experienced by the youth has many non-military causes: unemployment, crime, small arms proliferation, HIV/AIDS and drugs; which in many cases have led to the break-up of communities. The situation is compounded by an unprofessional, under-paid and badly equipped security force. The number of street children in the big cities of these and other Southern African countries is alarming.

While the war in Mozambique had ended, the civil war in Angola continues to destabilise the entire region. The conflict, once associated with the Cold War, is now sustained by MPLA government and UNITA's continued reliance on military means to control Angola's oil and diamond resources respectively. This ties the conflict directly to external actors and international trade. Millions of land mines and the small arms flooding into the country do affect the youth: Angola has the world's highest ratio of amputees.

The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), currently involves eight African states, half of which are in the southern region. The war in Eastern Congo connects several African civil wars. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia are involved in the conflict on the side of the government of DRC. Private armies fighting in Congo on both sides employ recruits and officers from the neighbouring countries, especially South Africa. Although neither the war in Angola nor the one in DRC takes place between southern African states, they do cross over state borders. In countries experiencing serious economic problems the youth are very vulnerable to the impact of wars in the region. For instance in Zambia the presence of refugees is affecting the political economies of the areas. On the part of Zimbabwe, its involvement in the conflict is exacerbating the political tensions in the country.

#### **4 Positive examples of youth and conflict prevention**

There are numerous examples of projects and initiatives, which address the current realities of youth in conflict prevention. We cite three examples in which workshop participants are involved:

- The Rebuilding Hope Association of Mozambique runs a project to aid the re-integration of former child soldiers into their original communities. This project is aimed at facilitating the psychological rehabilitation of former child soldiers.
- The Child in Crisis Centre for Abused Children is run by the YWCA of Lusaka, Zambia, in collaboration with the police, hospitals, social welfare and other NGOs. It is aimed at providing counselling to abused children and their families; raising awareness in the community about child abuse; training other agencies working with children and families in child abuse issues.
- UMAC, U Managing Conflict, is an NGO based in Cape Town, South Africa, administers a process of demilitarisation of youth in community defence structures in the Western Cape Province. The project addresses violent conflict between these youth and state security structures through a process of negotiation and reintegration into society, eventually leading youth to renounce their military identity.

#### **5 Recommendations**

##### **A Government policies**

- Youth must be involved in the formulation of government policies/act as a pressure group.
- NGOs must be well aware of existing governmental policies and ensure that they are not conflict generating.

##### **B Role of Education and Information dissemination**

- NGOs should be involved youth education; to facilitate the development of critical thinking on issues relating to exclusionary policies, ethnic manipulation, some of which are the root causes of conflict in the region.
- NGOs should be involved in education on the dangers and prevention of HIV/AIDS and its relation to conflict.
- Educational programmes should be developed to build an understanding of the way that cultural practices have a bearing on the role that youth play in times of conflict.
- Governments should include conflict prevention and peace education in school curriculums.

##### **C Culture and Conflict Prevention**

- Cultural exchange programmes should be practiced at national and international levels in order to increase tolerance around different culture groups.
- NGOs should utilise to the full potential and creative power of the arts and sport in conflict prevention.

- Concrete steps should be taken towards the decriminalisation of certain leisure and cultural practices currently prohibited by some state Governments.

D            Women and Conflict Prevention

- Develop strategies of empowering women so that they can take an active part in decision-making at all levels particularly conflict prevention.
- Existing NGO women's organisations must be strengthened and held accountable for their actions.

E            Networking and Conflict Prevention

- Enhancing co-operation and networking amongst NGOs in Southern Africa.
- Carry out research on youth and conflict prevention.
- Coalition of efforts and strategies in the developing a common Southern African approach to conflict prevention.

KATU, assisted by KEPZA Zambia, will facilitate an interim focal point for Southern African NGOs interested and / or working in the area of conflict prevention and resolution. This focal point will facilitate the provision of, and dissemination of information, as well as establishment of contacts and linkages between African and Finnish NGOs.

Three working networks have been established as follows:

- Land access and usage
- Community police rehabilitation
- Traumatized youth

We believe that this workshop has created the need for a continental approach to youth and conflict prevention.

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# PROGRAMME FOR THE WORKSHOP ON "YOUTH FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA"

Date 11-16 April 1999

Venue The New Fairmount Hotel, Livingstone, Zambia

Participants NGO representatives from Finland and Southern African countries

## Programme

### Sunday 11 April 1999

Arrival of all participants  
Registration & Accommodation

16-18.30 Boat Cruise

19-21 Dinner

### Monday 12 April 1999

9-10.30 Opening & Introduction to themes

- Ms Anne Palm, Secretary General of KATU
- Mr Juha Eskelinen, Executive Director of Finnish UNA
- Mr Leo Olasvirta, Chargé d'Affaires, Embassy of Finland, Lusaka
- Introduction of all participants

11-13 Plenary Session: *An overview of the role of youth in conflicts in Africa*

- On-going conflicts and conflict prevention
  - \* Mr Ngande Mwanajiti, Executive Director, Afronet (Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development)
- Role of youth in conflicts
  - \* Dr Ibrahim Abdullah, University of Western Cape

13-15 Lunch

15-18 Small Groups

- Comparative analysis on youth policies in the subregion
  - \* Mr Justice Armin Basson, National Youth Council, Namibia
- Youth, access to land and social conflicts (rural-urban linkages)
  - \* Mr Sean Tait, UMAC
- Youth and ethnicity
  - \* Ms Liisa Laakso, University of Helsinki
- Youth and NGO's and civil society
  - \* Mr Joonas Pietarila, Young Federalists in Finland

18-21 Reception hosted by Mr Leo Olasvirta, Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of Finland in Lusaka

Dinner

Tuesday 13 April 1999

- 9-12 Plenary Session: *Militarised youth and child soldiers*
- Demilitarisation of youth in post-conflict situation: the case of demobilisation of youth in Mozambique
    - \* Mr Martinho Chachiuva, ISS
  - Working in the prevention and rehabilitation of traumatized people
    - \* Mr Viriato Castelo-Branco, Reconstruindo a Esperanca (Rebuilding Hope)
  - Young men / young women
    - \* Ms Petronella Mayeya, Clinical Psychologist
- 12-14 Lunch
- 14-16 Small groups
- Militarised youth and police project (South Africa)
    - \* Mr Sean Tait, UMAC, South Africa
  - Demobilization of youth soldiers (Mozambique)
    - \* Mr Salomao Mungoi, PROPAZ, Mozambique
  - Working with traumatized children
    - \* Ms Petronella Mayeya
  - HIV/AIDS, soldiers, conflicts
    - \* Ms Merab Kiremire, Mapode
- 16-18 Visit to Victoria Falls
- 19-22 Dinner and Inter-Cultural evening

Wednesday 14 April 1999

- 9-13 Plenary Session: *The cultural aspects of the African setting*
- conflict prevention
    - \* Mr Sean Tait, UMAC
  - the gender perspective
    - \* Ms Leonora Sefoor, Quaker Peace Centre
  - youth and ethnicity
    - \* Mr Michael Langa, ACCORD
- 13-14.30 Lunch
- Free time
- 18-20 Small Groups
- traditional African ways to prevent conflicts
    - \* Mr Sean Tait, UMAC
  - the role of culture in conflict prevention
    - \* Mr Markku J. Laitinen, mime-actor
  - the role of sports in conflict prevention
    - \* Mr Petteri Pietiläinen, YMCA Finland
  - the role of women in conflict prevention
    - \* Ms Merab Kiremire, Mapode
- 20-22 Dinner

## Thursday 15 April 1999

- 9-12.30 Plenary Session: *Building new community-approach on conflict prevention*
- Public awareness campaign: a tool for conflict prevention  
\* Ms Clare Hansmann, ISS
  - Youth participation in the civil society  
\* Mr Razaan Bailey, Future Links
  - Civic education programmes among young people  
\* Ms Yaliwe Clarke, Zambia Civic Education Association
  - Youth partnership is a sine qua non to effectively combat corruption  
\* Adv Nceba Gomomo, ISS
- 12.30-14 Lunch
- 14-17 Small Groups
- Civic education  
\* Ms Yaliwe Clarke, Zambia Civic Education Association
  - Peace education  
\* Mr Jyrki Ijäs, Institute for Peace Education
  - African - African cooperation  
\* Ms Kavwumbu Hakachima, YWCA
  - Africa - Finnish cooperation  
\* Mr Juha Eskelinen, Finnish UN Association
  - NGO – state authorities cooperation  
\* Mr Fred Brooker, Kepa-Zambia
- 17- Farewell Party

## Friday 16 April 1999

- 9-12 Plenary Session: *Conclusions and recommendations for further activities*
- Closing the workshop

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<sup>i</sup> See J. Cock and L Nathan (Eds), 1989, *War and Society: The militarisation of South African*, David Phillip, Cape Town, Introduction, pp 1-13.

<sup>ii</sup> See among others, I Msabah, *Negotiating an End to Mozambique's Murderous Rebellion*, IW Zartman, (Ed), *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an end to Civil Wars*, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1995, pp 204-230

<sup>iii</sup> United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Vol V, New York, 1996, pp.11-12.

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<sup>iv</sup> ( Abrahamsson, 1994:277).

<sup>v</sup> UNDP, Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique, Report prepared by Sam Barnes, Maputo, 1997, p 14.

<sup>vi</sup> H. Abrahamsson and A. Nilsson, “The Washington Consensus” e Moçambique, Padrigu Papers, Gothenburg University, 1996, p. 319.

<sup>vii</sup> In Mozambique this particularly true because crime statistics are hardly available

<sup>viii</sup> Towards Collaborative Peace, TCP Survey Type one, 96-Moz-10

<sup>ix</sup> Procuradoria Geral da Republica, Informação Annual a Assembleia da Republica, April 1998, Quadro Modelo 5.

<sup>x</sup> Policia da Republica de Moçambique, Balanço Anual- 1996, Departamento de Informacao e Planificacao, 1996, p

<sup>xi</sup> Study conducted by Refugee Study Programme cited by A. Vines, *The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique*, Basic Occasional Papers, N 25, April 1998, pp 5-6.

<sup>xii</sup> Statistics provided by UNDP, op cit , pp13-14.

<sup>xiii</sup> In an assessment report of the RSS, UNDP states that the project has been successful because it has managed to support geographical stability of the demobilised soldiers. It even gives figures of the demobilised soldiers who requested changes of the place they received the subsidies.

<sup>xiv</sup> Brito, M. & Mussanhane, Relatorio Sobre a Reintegracao de Desmobilizados (Draft para Discussao), War-Torn Society Projec, UNRISD, Maputo, Marco 1997. p. 6.

<sup>xv</sup> UNDP/RSS, Preliminary Results of the quantitative Analysis of the Data Obtained During Interviews with some 1,000 Demobilised Soldiers, Maputo, 1997. While the figure of 71% may sound in the Mozambican context, given the high expectations of demobilised soldiers population this becomes very important.

<sup>xvi</sup> I.B. Lundin, Mechanisms of Community Reception of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique, in Africa Journal of Political Science, Vol. 3:1, 1998, pp104-118.

<sup>xvii</sup> National Crime Prevention Strategy (May 1996), South African Government, page 50.

<sup>xviii</sup> National Crime Prevention Strategy (May 1996), South African Government, page 52.

<sup>xix</sup> National Crime Prevention Strategy (May 1996), South African Government, page 67.

<sup>xx</sup> National Crime Prevention Strategy (May 1996), South African Government, page 73.

<sup>xxi</sup> National Crime Prevention Strategy (May 1996), South African Government, page 77.

<sup>xxii</sup> National Crime Prevention Strategy (May 1996), South African Government, page 73-4.