

PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

2014

THE FINNISH COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

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
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2014



SUOMEN TOIMIKUNTA EUROOPAN
TURVALLISUUDEN EDISTÄMISEKSI

DEN FINLÄNDSKA KOMMITTÉN
FÖR EUROPEISK SÄKERHET

THE FINNISH COMMITTEE
FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

STETE

DEAR READER,

KATI LEPOJÄRVI, STETE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The year 2014 was a year of changes, challenges and cumulated cooperation for STETE – the Finnish Committee for European Security, as well as for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, whose work we closely follow and report on in Finland. The crisis in Ukraine has brought fighting back to our doorstep, rattling the foundations of the “European peace project”, the founding premise of European cooperation itself. A simplified image could be formulated of a frustrated, discriminated youth that seeks for a feeling of belonging and community by enlisting as a foreign fighter in an extremist organisation or grouping that wreaks havoc in Middle East or North Africa. The fighter then projects their accumulated, suppressed hatred towards everyone else, even the innocent, in the crisis area and at the same time drags the terrifying shadow of terrorism ever closer to the borders of our “Western welfare state ivory towers”. What will happen if/when they return?

The global economic downturn has raised insecurities in all levels - international, national, communal and individual - and the EU’s extreme

austerity-guillotine touched most upon the heads of many European citizens. When the resources have become scarcer, people and countries have started to turn inwards. At a time of growing distrust lurking in many societal surroundings international organisations, states, civil society organisations, politicians, experts and volunteer individuals have embarked on a quest to find and implement new trust- and confidence-building mechanisms and methods, to strengthen the proactive and cooperative capacities of actors and to lift up preventive peace-building measures as a primary means of safeguarding societal stability.

In the midst of a reform process – also known as the Helsinki +40 –process - the OSCE has come face to face with the concrete peace-building task produced by the eruption of the Ukrainian conflict that settled upon the Organization’s shoulders as the only organisation broadly considered as legitimate to manage it. Equipped with the Special Monitoring Mission, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Representative for media, determined Ambassadors and Par-

liamentary representatives, eminent panel of peace-builders, and a small team of efficient peace mediators from the Conflict Prevention Centre, among the many, the Organization has proved its capacity, role and uniqueness as a flexible, prominent and valued European Security cooperation framework. Then again, what the concentration on Ukraine means as to fulfilling the goals of the ongoing reform process foreseen to culminate by the end of 2015 – whether it be decelerating or supporting – remains to be seen.

The economic downshift has also strongly affected the activities of the civil society and NGOs. In the “golden years” of flourishing Finnish economy and welfare, the civil society received ample state support to facilitate bringing citizen’s voices to decision-making frameworks, to act as partners to state organs but also as a watchdog for companies’ and the government’s activities. In the current times of diminishing state coffers and eroding welfare however, the cooperative

cross-sectoral connections have begun to wither away due to time and budget constraints, and the recipients of state aid in competition for limited available resources have also closed their doors on cooperation. In this time STETE and our long-standing partner KATU – the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network, have decided to institutionalise the good existing cooperation by merging our activities under one network of NGOs and parliamentarians, working together towards the common goal of furthering conflict prevention and supporting other broad security activities in Finland, Europe and beyond. Our unique merger process will finalise in Autumn 2015 and we look very much forward to welcoming the parliamentarians and NGO representatives in one table to share and unite ideas and plans for re-building a safer, more stable society – and to do our share to put the European peace process back on track. We also welcome individual support members in our activities, so: welcome aboard!

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OSCE - THE LITMUS TEST OF AN EVOLVING SECURITY COMMUNITY

RECALLING THE SPIRIT OF HELSINKI

ILKKA KANERVA
PRESIDENT OF THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

It has been 40 years since the signing of the Helsinki act, and recent events have driven the OSCE community further away from its goals than ever before. The OSCE now has a major role to play in the Ukrainian crisis. The future of the crisis itself, but also the future of the OSCE depends on how these matters are tackled. Ilkka Kanerva sees the Helsinki “+40 process” as an opportunity to bring the OSCE’s participating States together to cooperatively solve the crisis in Ukraine.

When the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) will meet in Helsinki in July 2015, the theme of the Annual session will be “Recalling the spirit of Helsinki”. This theme could not be more relevant given the current political atmosphere of mutual mistrust and organizational paralysis. 40 years after signing the Helsinki Final Act and 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the need for a sincere and critical effort to reconsolidate Europe’s security architecture has been increasingly recognized on both sides of the Atlantic. Over the last two decades, the roles and relative importance of the security institutions in Europe have undergone significant changes and any evolution must therefore recognize the roles of the OSCE, EU, NATO, CoE, and other institutions as they have developed.

Even given these longer timelines, one can also note that a lot happens in just a year. At the time of writing, it has been almost exactly one year since the Russian Federation illegally annexed the Crimean peninsula. We have all witnessed what happened in eastern Ukraine in the weeks and months that followed. Although the OSCE has deployed a Special Monitoring Mission and used other available tools, we have yet to see a sustainable cease-fire and the implementation of the Minsk agreements by all parties. While there is cautious optimism concerning the implementation of steps agreed to in Minsk, the crisis has called into question the fundamental principles of Europe’s security architecture. The rules that govern European interstate relations have been grossly violated, including the Helsinki Final Act.

The OSCE has assumed a major role in the efforts to resolve the ongoing crisis through political and diplomatic means. At the same time, the Organization was unable to prevent the eruption of the crisis and the creation of new dividing lines in and around Ukraine. The future of the OSCE, however, depends on more than finding a negotiated solution to the current crisis. It strongly depends on the ability of the Organization to deal with and address the concerns of its participating States. A genuine and firm political commitment from all participating States to implement the commitments is required.



The Helsinki +40 process is an excellent opportunity for the OSCE to reaffirm the relevance of its founding principles relating to international law and the UN Charter, and to more actively encourage participating States' full and equal implementation of these principles. As a forum for parliamentarians directly elected by the people and with high democratic legitimacy and visibility, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has a unique responsibility to foster public debate and build support for the process.

COMMON CHALLENGES

Unresolved conflicts and instability in the broader European neighborhood are having increasingly detrimental effects on the security of the whole OSCE region. These factors, together with growing mistrust and erosion of confidence, are compromising the effectiveness of the OSCE and are at times making it difficult to reach agreements. It remains the task of the OSCE to provide a forum for discussion and to increase co-operation, particularly in present difficulties.

Although all OSCE participating States face the same transnational threats (terrorism, human trafficking, cyber-crime, etc.), they have not made full use of the OSCE's potential for co-operation and effective response. Yet, the very

transnational nature of these challenges, along with their complexity, demonstrates that the OSCE's participating States can benefit more from increasing co-operation than drifting further apart. The OSCE's strength – today as in the past – is that States with differing values, cultures, and historical experiences can sit together and establish, through political compromise and consensus-building, common rules for living together.

In order to become more effective in addressing transnational threats and challenges, the OSCE must adopt a more structured strategy, while at the same time, remain conscious that it is not the only international organization active in these fields. Other organizations should be considered as partners. This relates first and foremost to the UN. The OSCE should aim to develop more joint OSCE/UN initiatives and complete tasks of a genuinely regional nature. The partnership between the OSCE and the UN has worked well in Ukraine to address security challenges as well as the humanitarian situation. Co-ordination and co-operation between the OSCE and relevant UN agencies, the EU, and the Council of Europe should be strengthened and expanded, bearing in mind the comparative advantage and added value of each actor.

A more focused co-operation with OSCE Mediterranean and Asian partners is necessary in order to fulfill the particular demands of participating States bordering crisis regions outside of the OSCE area. To satisfy the needs of smaller participating States, the OSCE can provide, through OSCE field operations and other instruments, capacity-building and training through lessons learned and best practices. It can also serve as a platform for sub-regional dialogue and policy co-ordination.

In short, in the face of diverse and complex challenges, participating States would benefit from more, not less, of the OSCE.

MECHANISMS

The dramatic developments in Ukraine have once again demonstrated the relevance of cooperative crisis management tools and mechanisms of the OSCE, despite also pointing to shortcomings. Although the Organization and its activities have changed significantly in the past decades, the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security, enshrined in the Helsinki principles, remains relevant. Its relevance in today's Europe is particularly underlined by the seriousness of the ongoing discussion on compliance, non-compliance, or improper compliance with these principles and other commitments.

The crisis in Ukraine has showed that a key strength of the OSCE is the long-term presence of its representatives on the ground. This enables the Organization to monitor developments and put facts on the table. Indeed, the OSCE's field operations remain some of the most significant instruments of multilateral diplomacy in the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management. It is imperative to end the trend of budget reductions for field operations and the closure or downgrading of the OSCE's presence in areas where work and monitoring are still required.

When reflecting on what the OSCE has accomplished over the last 40 years, there is no

doubt that the Organization, by developing a unique combination of human rights, democracy, and solid security standards and agreements, has played a major role in promoting stability and security in Europe. Nevertheless, the OSCE should consider both internal and external reforms in order to remain relevant and effective.

Recent years have witnessed differences in participating States' approaches to a wide range of issues, including their views on the necessary steps to reform the Organization and adapt it to ongoing changes unfolding in Europe and the wider world. The culture of searching for consensus and compromise has nearly been abandoned, which paralyzes the Organization, while a number of countries and groups of OSCE participating States increasingly rely on unilateral action. Conventional arms control regimes have declined, and differences in each country's implementation of OSCE commitments persists.

The OSCE PA has had a profound role in facilitating inter-parliamentary dialogue on security issues and enabling open discussions on the problems the Organization faces, and of possible ways to enhance its effectiveness. The PA remains a critical player because it is independent from the consensus-based governmental side of the Organization and can take political initiative.

REFORM

In recent years, it has often been reiterated that the OSCE's ability to reform will ultimately depend on how much participating States are committed to the Organization's potential.

The Resolution on Helsinki +40 adopted at the PA Annual Session in 2012 in Monaco calls on the OSCE's participating States to further tackle important reforms, such as the question of a constituent document for the OSCE and the redefinition of the role of the presidency and the Secretary General. The Parliamentary Assembly has called for a discussion on the consensus rule and for decision-making processes to be more transparent. It has also been reiterated that if

a participating State wishes to block or delay consensus, it should do so openly and publicly defend its position.

The OSCE participating States reaching an agreement on multi-year programs and budget cycles instead of cumbersome budget discussions every year would be another positive element. Furthermore, in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management, it has been recommended that the PA be given more political initiative, such as in organizing “fact finding missions” and facilitating OSCE-led negotiations. The PA resolution on mediation from the 2014 Annual Session in Baku is an example of political initiative that needs to be followed by concrete action.

For the OSCE to gain political credibility and act effectively in all aspects of the conflict cycle, other concrete measures have been recommended by the PA. These include the establishment of a Best Practices Unit to provide the OSCE with permanent lessons-learned capabilities and the development of a civilian rapid-reaction function to be deployed in times of crisis to supplement the work of field missions.

The 2013 Istanbul Declaration underlines the PA’s support for the OSCE Ministerial Council decision in Dublin to launch a set of objectives aimed at strengthening the OSCE approaching the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Participating States were urged to make use of the Helsinki +40 process to rebuild mutual trust, to combine informal diplomatic dialogue with political engagement, and to take advantage of the process at the political level to reach concrete decisions on an action plan to achieve an indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. The declaration calls on the acting OSCE Chairmanship, in conjunction with the two successive chairmanships, to clarify the goals and purpose of the Helsinki +40 process. It also underlines the need to inform the public about the process so as to increase interest and transparency.

In order to increase transparency and bring the voices of civil society into the process, the PA has organized a series of seminars on Helsinki +40 in Moscow, Washington, and Stockholm. After the last seminar to be held in Belgrade, the final colloquium will be organized in conjunction with the PA Annual Session in Helsinki in July. The recommendations of the PA project will also be submitted to the governmental side.

RECONSOLIDATION

In 2015, the first day of August will mark the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Since the signing of this agreement, the relevance of the OSCE in the European security architecture has only increased. However, recent developments in Ukraine and new security challenges, including unresolved conflicts and instability in the larger European neighbourhood, have dramatically changed the political climate in Europe. This rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape has proved that the OSCE’s existing capacities may be inadequate to cope with new challenges.

In a time of acute crisis, in order to rebuild trust and strengthen the OSCE, we must recall and revive the spirit of Helsinki. Future security challenges must be approached from a firm foundation, and it is for this reason the Helsinki +40 process is so crucial. The OSCE PA leads the effort in its parliamentary dimensions. Together with the governmental side, the PA is committed to exploring ways to strengthen the OSCE in order to reconsolidate Europe’s security architecture. What could be a better place than Helsinki to earnestly start this process?

The author would like to thank the OSCE PA Helsinki +40 Team for their contributions.

SERBIA'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE OSCE

SLAVKO KRULJEVIĆ
AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA IN FINLAND

Serbia's 2015 Chairmanship of the OSCE comes at a difficult time for Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian relations and for global security. Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia in Finland, Slavko Kruljević, explains the priorities and goals of Serbia's Chairmanship of the OSCE.

Serbia assumed Chairmanship of the OSCE on January 1st, 2015. First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Ivica Dačić, presented Serbia's OSCE Chairmanship agenda to the Permanent Council on January 15th. The Ukrainian crisis, regional cooperation (particularly in the Western Balkans), protracted conflicts, the Panel of Eminent Persons, and the "Helsinki +40" process received deserving attention.

On Minister Dačić's initiative, the first Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE Troika, Switzerland,

Serbia, and Germany was held on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on February 7th. Secretary General of the OSCE, Lamberto Zannier, also took part in the meeting.

THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE

The crisis in and around Ukraine continues to dominate security considerations in Europe, far more so than in 2014. It is clear that seeking a solution to the Ukrainian conflict remains a focus of the Serbian Chairmanship of the OSCE. The OSCE was the first international organisation to respond to the crisis through the deployment of a Special Monitoring Mission. The OSCE's response to the current crisis demonstrates the organisation's contributions to European security.

Moreover, the activities of the Trilateral Contact Group OSCE brought crucial contributions to the Minsk agreements, which started the peace process, as did the Package of Measures for the implementation of said agreements. As the Chairman-in-Office, Serbia welcomed the results of the Summit meeting from the "Nor-



mandy Format”, held in Minsk from February 11-12, and expressed the readiness of the OSCE to enable, within its mandate, the full implementation of the measures agreed upon in Minsk.

Taking into account the role and importance of the Special Monitoring Mission, one of Serbia’s priorities is to provide the Mission with personnel and financial means, as well as to extend its mandate.

Serbia is now doing its utmost to pursue these efforts in an impartial and transparent manner, and is fully committed to working with major stakeholders in order to restore peace and security in Ukraine.

PROTRACTED CONFLICTS

Addressing protracted conflicts within the agreed upon formats is high on Serbia’s OSCE agenda. Serbia is willing to employ additional efforts to engage necessary political will and to

support the resolution of conflicts.

To that end, Minister Dačić, in his capacity as OSCE Chairperson-in-Office (CiO), plans to visit the countries in the South Caucasus region (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia), as well as Moldova.

In accordance with the joint work-plan of the consecutive and coordinated Chairmanships of Switzerland and Serbia, special representatives of the Chairperson-in-Office (for the South Caucasus and Transnistria) are appointed for two-year periods. This new, coordinated approach to protracted conflicts has been deemed successful and necessary in order to provide greater continuity to the work of the OSCE’s Special Representatives.

WESTERN BALKANS

Promotion of cooperation in the Western Balkans is a top priority for Serbia’s Chairmanship of the OSCE. The importance of this region was

emphasized by the fact that CiO Minister Dačić first visited the OSCE missions in this region (on January 29th, he visited the OSCE Mission in Serbia, then from February 17-18 he visited the missions in Podgorica and Skopje, and he is planning to visit the rest of the OSCE missions in the Western Balkans in the near future).

Considering that another Balkan state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is to take the presidency of an important regional international organization – the Council of Europe – as of May 2015, we shall try to organize joint activities during this period that are important not only for the two international organizations, but to the region itself.

We support the work of the Special Representative of the OSCE and CiO for the Western Balkans, Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann (who remains in this position since Switzerland's Chairmanship), and we are looking forward to joining our efforts in order to promote further cooperation in the region.

PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONS

Supporting the work of the Panel of Eminent Persons is one of our priorities during our OSCE Chairmanship. We expect the Panel, as part of its mandate, to contribute constructively to the debate on the impact of the crisis in Ukraine, as well as to prepare the basis for an inclusive and constructive dialogue on security throughout the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian region.

The Panel will prepare two reports: an interim report on lessons learned from the OSCE's engagement in Ukraine, and a final report on the broader issues of security in Europe in the wider area of the OSCE.

COMMEMORATION OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE "HELSINKI +40" PROCESS

This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, which will also be one of our priorities. Considering that this is the most important document in modern history after the UN Charter, it is important for this jubilee to be commemorated properly, and once again to highlight the importance of basic OSCE principles, as well as the legacy of the CSCE/OSCE.

Our Chairmanship is considering the possibility of commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act by preparing an informal high-level gathering in the summer at the place of its formation, which would aim to restore trust between Member States, and to remind participating States of the adopted principles that are at the heart of OSCE cooperation.

Serbia attaches great significance to the "Helsinki +40" process that was inaugurated at the Ministerial Meeting in Kiev. Considering that the "Helsinki +40" process and activities of the Panel of Eminent Persons can in some aspects be seen as compatible, Serbia's expectation is that the activities of the Panel will bring new energy to the "Helsinki +40" process.

OSCE PARALLEL CIVIL SOCIETY CONFERENCE BECOMING A TRADITION – CHALLENGE IS HOW TO ENGAGE CIVIL SOCIETY WEST OF VIENNA

VERA LINDMAN
STETE NORDIC FORUM PROJECT COORDINATOR

STETE's Project Coordinator, Vera Lindman, took part in the OSCE Parallel Civil Society Conference in Basel. In this short column, she recounts the events that took place and evaluates their importance in building and maintaining connections within and outside of civil society.

I represented STETE at the OSCE Parallel Civil Society Conference organised prior to the OSCE Ministerial meeting in Basel, Switzerland, from December 2-3, 2014. As I was the main organiser and responsible of the Parallel Civil Society Forum in 2008 in Helsinki, it was interesting to see how this event has developed in the years since. First of all, it is delightful that these parallel events prior to annual OSCE Ministerial meetings have become a tradition. Parallel Civil Society Conferences have been organised since 2010 by the Civic Solidarity Platform, a network of more than 60 human rights NGOs from throughout the OSCE region. The local partner organiser this past year was Swiss Peace. This time, more than 100 participants from 30 countries gathered together to discuss the crisis in Ukraine, hate crimes, how to protect human rights defenders, discrimination, combat-

ing torture, civil society restrictions, freedoms of expression, and the right to assembly. Many of the case studies and statements presented at the Conference concerned countries East of Vienna, which reflected the presence of Eastern-European NGOs, or, conversely, the absence of western NGOs. So the challenge for future organisers will be how to engage NGOs west of Vienna, since there are problems and improvements needed regarding the human dimension in western countries as well.

In the conference we learned that there are problems even in Switzerland. The participants had the possibility to familiarize themselves with some local NGOs and other human rights actors in Basel. I took part in the group that visited a women's shelter, a place where women living on the street can take a shower, get their clothes cleaned, have a cup of coffee, and talk. We also heard about the city's human trafficking problem and the existing support system in Switzerland. Some other groups visited the local refugee-centre and a special school for young people, mainly immigrants, who did not get to study after elementary school. This was an interesting way to see what Swiss NGOs and other actors do in the field and a nice way to end the first conference day, although free-form discussions and networking continued during dinner.

“ENHANCING CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORK OF THE OSCE WAS ONE OF THE MAIN PRIORITIES OF THE SWITZERLAND CHAIRMANSHIP IN 2014”

It seems that the NGOs' work and cooperation with OSCE institutions has become valuable and highly appreciated. Enhancing civil society involvement in the work of the OSCE was one of the main priorities of the Switzerland Chairmanship in 2014, and this was positively received by NGOs working in the area. Also, the incoming Serbia Chair promised to continue this work with NGOs and to especially try to activate Serbian civil society and NGOs. Serbia also promised to continue the tradition of Parallel Civil Society Conferences in Belgrad in December 2015.

At the end of the conference, the “output” of the civil society gathering, “the Basel Declaration and Recommendations”, was handed over to the outgoing and incoming chairmanships and the high level ministerial meeting. The Basel Declaration focused on topics of intolerance, discrimination, and hate crimes. The Recommendations

included all topics from the conference, as well as some other issues of concern. The Declaration comprised almost 100 pages, which, in my opinion, was too long. I have doubts that foreign ministers and their staff will read the whole “book”. I hope that, in the future, civil society actors will focus on specific areas of concern when drafting recommendations.

Overall, the event was needed in order to bring together NGOs and civil society actors from the OSCE region to discuss human rights issues. People-to-people contact is always the best way to get messages across. During the informal discussions, it became clear that both the OSCE personnel and civil society actors are expecting Finland to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 by organising an event in the “good old spirit of Helsinki”. Hopefully, this will come true!

THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

THE OSCE IN THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

KATJA PERHMAN
AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FINLAND TO THE OSCE

The Ukrainian crisis violated key OSCE principles, but at the same time, opened the door for the OSCE to show its capacity to act and react to crises in the European region. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is an example of non-military action being taken to de-escalate the crisis and implement the cease-fire and border monitoring. Katja Perhman explains and evaluates the tools that the OSCE has to use in such crisis situations and other routes that could bring a possible solution to the Ukrainian crisis.

The year 2014 was overshadowed by the crisis in and around Ukraine. It was a year of intense work and many challenges for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as its commitments and principles were seriously violated. Russia's actions – the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the destabilisation of Ukraine – are against key OSCE principles and have not been accepted.

Since the beginning of the crisis, the OSCE has nevertheless proven its capacity to act. It has effectively used various diplomatic means, dialoguing, mediation, and monitoring under the leadership of the 2014 Switzerland Chairmanship, together with the OSCE Secretariat.

EYES AND EARS ON THE GROUND: MONITORING MISSION

In March 2014, all of the 57 participating States of the OSCE unanimously agreed to establish the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine. The SMM to Ukraine is an unarmed, civilian mission and its main tasks are to observe and report in an impartial and objective way on the situation. The SMM also establishes and reports facts in response to specific incidents.

The Mission has played a key role in providing information about the security situation on the ground, looking into human rights concerns, promoting dialogue, and providing contacts. The monitors are mandated to contribute to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability, and

security. The Mission engages with Ukrainian authorities at all levels, as well as civil society, ethnic and religious groups, and local communities to facilitate dialogue on the ground. After the tragic downing of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 aircraft in July 2014, the monitors facilitated access for international investigators to the crash site.

Furthermore, the Mission was called to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire and border monitoring in eastern Ukraine under the terms of the September 2014 Minsk agreements. In order to execute these new tasks, it was agreed that the SMM needed to expand to its full mandate of 500 monitors. Unfortunately, the unstable security situation in eastern Ukraine has slowed down this process.

Finland has actively supported the valuable work of the SMM and deployed almost 20 monitors to the Mission by the end of 2014. Furthermore, Finland has contributed 2 million euros to the operating costs of the Mission.

OSCE TOOLBOX FOR DE-ESCALATING THE CRISIS

In addition to the Special Monitoring Mission, the Trilateral Contact Group has been instrumental in de-escalating the crisis. The Contact Group is comprised of senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini.

In September 2014, the Contact Group signed a Protocol in Minsk on the cease-fire and on launching a political process to resolve the crisis. Furthermore, a Memorandum outlining the parameters for the implementation of the cease-fire commitments was signed.

The Contact Group's agenda covers all issues related to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. At the end of 2014, the focus was on the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Among others, the aim of the contact group has been to release all illegally detained as well as all combatants and to prevent further illegal detentions. The Contact Group continues its work under Serbia's 2015 Chairmanship.

The OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk reports on cross-border movements. The mission commenced its work at the end of July and is composed of 22 observers, working on a 24/7 basis. It is distinct and separate from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

The Observer Mission operates impartially and transparently, monitoring and reporting on the situation at the two checkpoints, as well as on the movements across the border. By the end of 2014, Finland deployed four experts to the Mission.

The OSCE has also strong and well-functioning institutions at its disposal. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Astrid Thors, will continue to play a crucial role by monitoring inter-ethnic tensions and advising the Ukrainian government, especially in the area of language policy. She has raised concerns about the human rights abuses in Crimea. The Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatovic, has been active in reporting on the safety of journalists and the media freedom situation in and around Ukraine.

Furthermore, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has carried out human rights assessments as well as election monitoring in Ukraine. ODIHR deployed its largest election team ever, more than 1000 observ-

“SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, THE OSCE HAS NEVERTHELESS PROVEN ITS CAPACITY TO ACT. IT HAS EFFECTIVELY USED VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC MEANS, DIALOGUING, MEDIATION, AND MONITORING...”



ers, for Ukraine's presidential election in May 2014. It also observed the early parliamentary elections in October with more than 700 observers. Finland provided observers for both elections.

The OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU) works on projects covering, amongst other issues, legal reform, national dialogue, human rights education, good governance, gender equality, and the fight against human trafficking. The aim is to support Ukraine in adopting democratic legislation and structures.

National Unity Roundtables, led by the Ukrainian government, were held in May. It is important to continue Ukraine-led and owned inclusive national dialogue processes, as agreed upon in the Minsk Protocol. National dialogue processes will also be discussed within the OSCE Group of Friends of Mediation, which was established in March 2014 by Turkey, Switzerland, and Finland. This group has advocated for strengthening the mediation capacity of the OSCE.

Military verification visits and inspections have also taken place in Ukraine since March 2014 under the Vienna Document. Military inspectors look at military security aspects of the situation on the ground. Visits and inspections are based on military confidence and security building measures.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) has mandated the creation of an Interparliamentary Liaison Group in Ukraine that aims to bring together parliamentarians from Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and other participating States in an effort to promote dialogue and de-escalation of the conflict. Ilkka Kanerva, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly, will lead the Liaison Group's work. The Parliamentary Assembly has also been actively involved in election monitoring in Ukraine.

PAINSTAKING PATH TO PEACE

The role of the OSCE in de-escalating the crisis in Ukraine has been significant. Its engagement in the crisis has yet again demonstrated

the relevance of the Organization as a forum for dialogue and as an operational responder. The OSCE's comprehensive approach to security, encompassing politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects makes it possible for it to address a wide range of security-related concerns.

The previously mentioned list of OSCE activities is undeniably impressive. However, political will and the implementation of agreements are both necessary in order to continue using the Organization's toolbox in an efficient way. For instance, how can the Special Monitoring Mission continue its work unless an unconditional and sustainable cease-fire is strictly adhered to everywhere in Ukraine?

Since the adoption of the Minsk agreements, clashes with the use of heavy weapons have continued, causing additional human losses and material damage, and keeping tensions high. Therefore, it is essential for all parties to respect the Minsk agreements. An immediate cease-fire agreed upon by all sides must be adhered to. Moreover, sustainable stabilization in the zone of conflict cannot be reached if the Ukrainian-Russian border is not secured. The Minsk Protocol and Memorandum are the way to move forward and to end the violence, and all parties should fully implement these commitments.

The year 2015 marks the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Are the OSCE's participating States still fully committed to the common principles and norms that were agreed on in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975? In looking at the current conflict situation, how can we rebuild trust when principles have already been violated? Can we still refer to a common vision of a European security community that spans from "Vancouver to Vladivostok"?

It seems that we are, unfortunately, still a long way from achieving a common vision of security. The conflict in Ukraine that has caused thousands of deaths and has led to the displacement of at least 900,000 people. The war is severely

hampering the growth of Ukraine, and is affecting stability and economic development across Europe.

It has been stressed time and again that there cannot and will not be a military solution to the conflict, and that this should not even be desired. Efforts instead to de-escalate the conflict must continue, including respecting the cease-fire and taking steps towards a peaceful solution. If implemented, the Minsk agreements offer the basis for political and economic stabilization as well.

At the Basel Ministerial Council Meeting in December 2014, foreign ministers stressed that multilateral co-operation is now needed more than ever. It is easy to agree with their views: failure to resolve the crisis in Ukraine is not only a risk to European security; it is also a major obstacle to finding co-operative solutions to common problems. Therefore, diplomatic efforts to ease tensions through dialogue must continue – regardless of how difficult this may be.

LINKS:

Daily updates on the SMM's work:
<http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/daily-updates>

Minsk agreements:
<http://www.osce.org/home/123257>
<http://www.osce.org/home/123806>
(later in Russian only)

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UKRAINE CRISIS: HOW TO GET OUT OF A STRATEGIC IMPASSE

KARI MÖTTÖLÄ
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The crisis in Ukraine is one of the most serious symptoms of Russia's opposition to a rule-based international order, and is evidence of the turmoil in current world politics. The crisis itself undercuts the achievements of the European Union's common foreign policy and sets serious obstacles for the EU's neighborhood policy. The EU is at a crossroads in terms of getting closer to NATO, or taking a path of strategic rapprochement with Russia. Professor Kari Möttölä explores these issues as he searches for a solution to the strategic impasse that the EU faces with the crisis in Ukraine.

THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS AS A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE

As a sign of the turbulence of world politics, the Ukrainian crisis has become the latest and most serious reminder to the European Union of the need for reassessing the fundamental aspects of its global outlook. In spite of on-and-off debate over the years, EU member governments have not taken on the task of reviewing and revising the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003.

The problem is not whether the summit-level document corresponds to the worldview of its drafters. Aside from addressing terrorism, proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime as potential or acute threats, the ESS lists as strategic objectives the building of security and stability in the European neighbourhood, and the promotion of an international order based on effective multilateralism – both of which are fitting tasks for the EU as an international actor.

The danger is that the conflict over the status of Ukraine undercuts or rescinds the core achievement of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); where a zone of democratic market-economy states are expanding in Europe through ties of accession and association. Moreover, the game of power politics over Ukraine initiated by Russia contradicts the vision of a rule-based international order where the EU can lead based on its normative and institutional strengths.

As a whole, governing change is turning into an overwhelming task for the EU. Externally, global and regional transformation seems to make obsolete the presuppositions of the grand strategic role designed for the EU in the ESS, optimistically entitled, "A Secure Europe in a Better World". Internally, the economic and political crisis of the integration process seems to make the Union unable to develop into the increasingly active, capable, and coherent actor necessary to fulfil the objectives of the strategy.



Based on the mandate from the December 2013 European Council, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is expected, in cooperation with other executive institutions and the member states, to “assess the impact of changes in the global environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union”.

What are the implications of the crisis in Ukraine for a revision of the security strategy of the European Union?

REASSESSING THE EU-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP

The first and immediate task for the European Union is to ascertain the prospects of a strategic partnership with Russia – as a goal set in the ESS and attempted in years since through various aborted efforts. Has the crisis removed such a close and functional relationship from the realm of possibility?

Russia’s actions – based on an adventurist strategy and hybrid tactics – in the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of the rest of Ukraine seems to have left the EU unprepared. Despite several years of aiming to develop eastern policies that promote workable partnerships as the backbone of a wider European order, the EU is now faced with power and ter-

ritory – a formal seizure of part of a sovereign state and the covert and overt use of military force across borders – as factors shaping the common neighbourhood with Russia.

Preoccupied with domestic restructuring, patching up integration, and riding the storm of global competition, the EU had to witness what in the frameworks of eastern partnership was designed to promote economic and governance reform in Ukraine turn into a security dilemma with Russia.

On its part, Russia has been aiming to regulate, if not dictate, the governance of trade and integration in Ukraine in an effort to limit the expanding influence of the EU. Going beyond the issue of common economic space with the EU, Russia, witnessing Ukraine sliding westwards, aimed to redraw frontiers and shape political regimes through pressure and force, and to reclaim its great-power status.

While it is understandable that the Union would not have the competence or the capability to carry out a symmetrical response to the geopolitical tour de force by Russia, the asymmetrical response in the form of deepening and enlarging economic sanctions against Russia may be leading the parties into a strategic impasse. While the sanctions, in combination with other economic problems, are having a substantive impact on Russia’s ability to manoeuvre, they

are not likely to be effective in terms of creating a breaking point for the trajectory of the crisis.

In view of Russia's proclivity to present the Ukrainian crisis as a geopolitical conflict with the United States, and in consideration of NATO's responses and deployments for the purposes of reassuring its member states and deterring Russia's potential moves, defence and military policies have become part of the equation.

As for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, presumed to be the focus of the strategic reassessment envisioned by the 2013 summit, two paths are likely to be taken in a complementary fashion, including a closer partnership between the EU and NATO and a growing investment in defence nationally, and the pooling and sharing of resources amongst EU member states. Threat perceptions have changed as a consequence of a war in the heart of wider Europe, although revisionist tendencies have stopped short of militarizing security policies altogether.

As an across-the-board security provider, the European Union is in a critical position. While NATO's response has served to reconfirm the role of the United States as a guarantor power in Europe, it has not done away with the continued need for increasing burden sharing in transatlantic partnerships as a whole. While the EU has pursued sanction policies independently, albeit in relevant coordination with the United States, and has remained devoid of any direct military role in the conflict, it is in the nature of things that the Union will bear the main responsibility of seeking strategic rapprochement with Russia.

Consequently, in the short-term, efforts to resolve the Ukrainian crisis will be aimed at political agreements generated with due economic incentives. In the longer strategic perspective, whether in managing cooperation or dealing with competition, the EU's relationship with the Russian Federation will likely be extended to all (non-military) dimensions of power in the field of foreign, security, and defence policies.

RENOVATING THE OSCE ORDER

From the viewpoint of the European Union, the challenge seems overwhelming, substantially and operationally, with Russia competing institutionally with the Union, its self-isolation ideology from the West, and its geopolitical distancing from the core of European order, and its turning eastwards and southwards in a great-power game of multipolarity.

It has been argued that the Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated the inability of the West to enlarge NATO and the EU eastwards with the geo-strategic ambitions of Russia, which has offered partnership before without membership. Consequently, for many analysts, from a historical viewpoint, the failure of the scenario of liberal internationalism entails the end of the post-Cold War security order based on the common norms and principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Accordingly, an initiative to reform the normative and institutional arrangements in the OSCE context will be needed. It is unlikely, however, that such dramatic changes, potentially calling for renegotiating the Helsinki Final Act and redesigning the pattern of mutually reinforcing institutions, will be forthcoming. A sustainable way out of the Ukrainian crisis will have to be found within the confines of the existing OSCE order, with the EU serving in a leadership role bilaterally and multilaterally.

The most serious threat to the goal of a security community – adopted in the 2010 Astana declaration – is the dividing line being drawn in the OSCE space over and around Ukraine. The indivisibility of security, including the freedom of choice in security policies as part of sovereign equality, is the most valuable outcome of the end of the Cold War. "A Europe whole and free and at peace", which seemed to be underway, is currently at risk.

In hindsight, the sovereignty of Ukraine – though a weak state failing to bring political and eco-

conomic reform – has been a crucial piece of the post-Cold War structure of European security. Accordingly, an economic black hole, an unsettled security situation, and a blurred borderline in eastern Ukraine are formidable obstacles to the process of extended stabilization and common security building. Preventing a new frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine will also improve the prospects of the other neighbours over which Russia retains geopolitical control.

While a contest over European order is at hand, there is no alternative than the EU and Russia overcoming a looming re-division of Europe.

The employment of conditional economic sanctions against Russia, and the persistent persistence of the policy of economic and political association with Ukraine represent significant geopolitical contributions by the EU. The political will behind western commitments, however, has not seemed to equal the strategic urgency and priority driving Russia's ambition to control Ukraine.

Although the situation on the ground looks stable, albeit fragile, a search for a grand bargain is underway in chancelleries and in think-tanks. An obvious problem is that the starting points for coming to terms are not symmetrical. There are sufficient common interests to pursue economic solutions, but these are intertwined with diverging political interests regarding Ukraine and its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

An arrangement for relations between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union in the area of trade and providing a framework for Ukraine's legitimate interests should not be out of reach. Prospects regarding the security-political front, however, are not as bright. Despite the Minsk cease-fire agreement projected as a premise for political reconciliation, and the efforts of the OSCE on the ground, another protracted conflict seems inevitable, in particular with the Crimean annexation being engraved in the Russian neo-nationalist narrative.

The Ukraine issue is both a part and a reflection of the broader strategic shift underway in world politics, which is distancing Russia from partnership with the West. However, Russia may become frustrated in its presumed challenge to an international order led by the U.S. and the EU as the proclaimed adversaries. The emerging powers of the south are lending, at best, lukewarm support to Russia's European troubles, as their regional and global strategic interests lie elsewhere.

While no political breakthroughs in the Russian-Western relations are in sight, Russia's return to political and strategic Europe is not excluded in the long-term.

The course of action undertaken by the EU reflects the Union's understanding that problems of unification and security in wider Europe can be sustainably resolved only with Russia as a key contributor. At the same time, Russia has to seize this strategic opportunity. In light of the crisis in Ukraine, a security community in the OSCE region can only be achieved when the dissolution of the Soviet Union has taken place, mentally and historically, politically and legally, and by all in accordance with the common norms and principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter.

TOWARDS A REVISED AND FLEXIBLE STRATEGY

The Ukrainian crisis has brought a broader strategic challenge to the European Union. Even under increased pressure, the Union's policies regarding neighbourhood and multilateralism will retain their significance as strategic objectives, but the means of upholding them have to be revised and strengthened.

It has been said that strategy, being the art of creating power to keep and get out of harm's way, must be fluid and flexible, and not fixated on the end point when challenges emerge. The Union needs to be innovative and effective in making progress towards overcoming the Ukrainian crisis, at least as an immediate point of attention.

WHERE DOES THE WEST FIT IN UKRAINE'S WAR?

NATALIA SHAROVA
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The West's role in the Ukrainian crisis is discussed by academicians and media outlets alike. An increasingly complicated question is how the U.S. and Europe should react to Russia's offenses in Ukraine without endangering their diplomatic connections with the Kremlin. Natalia Sharova discusses the Ukrainian crisis from a U.S. perspective, including how the current situation can best be understood, and what should be done in the future.

The Ukrainian crisis is yet another result of the conflict between Russia and the West's worldviews. In mid-February 2015, Russia threatened to stop channeling natural gas to Ukraine and to other parts of Europe if Kiev failed to pay for the fuel's delivery. In light of a breached cease-fire and Washington's considerations of increased military support for the Ukrainian government, it seemed that the Ukrainian crisis escalated quickly, and that the conflict would have no foreseeable end. However, recent talks in Geneva expressed some hope regarding the resolution of the crisis, and succeeded in restoring a shaky ceasefire. Nevertheless, the vested interests of the Kremlin and Kiev's humiliated pride will unlikely allow for an easy peace. The use of force is not a solution to the Ukrainian crisis, and the European Union,

together with the United States, should continue to act as an honest broker in order to facilitate negotiations between Moscow and Kiev.

In the beginning of February, the U.S. government expressed the possibility of arming Ukraine by providing Kiev with US\$1 billion in military assistance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, together with the incoming Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, publicly argued for military support for Kiev, demonstrating Washington's impatience with Russia's President, Vladimir Putin.

Washington is full of voices arguing for a more resolute reaction to the war in Ukraine, but the actual possibility of American involvement is exceedingly inconceivable for many scholars and thinkers. Currently, American think-tanks are split into two major camps regarding the role of the West in Ukraine.

On one hand, senior scholars from think-tanks such as Brookings Institution, the Atlantic Council, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, together with other members of academia and politicians, support U.S. military aid to Ukraine, arguing that economic sanctions are not enough, and that Putin can be only stopped by the use of force. The official argument for arming Ukraine, produced by the aforementioned group of think-tanks, posits that Russia's intervention in Ukraine is "the gravest security threat to the transatlantic community and Eurasia since the end of the Cold War" and "an unacceptable challenge to the post-war European security order".



On the other hand, prominent scholars such as Stephen Walt, Jeremy Shapiro, and John Mearsheimer, among others, stress that the U.S. intervention will only escalate the conflict and further alienate Russia from the West, destroying any chance for amicable relations with the Kremlin until the end of Putin's term, if not longer. Most importantly, U.S. intervention will fail to stop Russia's support for Ukrainian separatists and will not bring an end to the conflict, since Russia's military is better trained and larger than Ukraine's.

According to opponents of the U.S.'s increased role in Ukraine, Russia's violent intervention in its neighbor's affairs is merely a reaction to Ukraine's strong push for democratization and westernization, which has been embraced by the European Union, and perceived as an ultimatum by the Kremlin. While these arguments fail to justify Russia's arming of the separatists, they attempt to help policymakers understand the nature of the Ukrainian crisis, in which arming Ukraine will have no winners, but only losers.

Any attempt by the West to support democratic ideals in post-Soviet states that are close to Russia's border will further agitate Moscow. The Kremlin still sees states like Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova and some others as being within its spheres of influence and serving as buffer zones. Historically, Russia experienced conflicts with various European states that often sought to expand and gain Russia's territories. Russia, in turn, sought to bolster its position in the "satellite" states along its borders in order to provide a sense of security. Therefore, any political aspirations in post-Soviet states to democratize and shake off Russia's control and influence are perceived by the Kremlin as acts that threaten Russia's national security, and thus require an immediate and harsh response. Western military support in such situations will only ensure Russia's resolve and make it easier for Putin to convince the general Russian public that the West is an enemy that seeks to isolate and weaken Russia, as was the case during the Cold War. Therefore, the West

should resort to serving as an honest broker, and help Moscow and Kiev find middle ground, regardless of how painstaking and frustrating such a process might be.

ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENTS

Cold War sentiments are alive and well within Putin's administration, especially for Russia's leader. Moreover, since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has consistently felt humiliated and disregarded by the international community. This humiliation was most sharply felt during the Kosovo War when Russia's position was ignored, and the West, by circumventing the United Nations Security Council, bombed Russia's ally Yugoslavia with NATO forces. For Putin and his supporters, such mistreatment of Russia was seen as a result of the Russian Federation's weakness, which starkly contrasted the power and "glory" of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Putin's goal has always been to recreate an image of a strong Russia; a superpower that needs to be reckoned with and treated as an influential player in the international arena. The memory of the West's absolute disregard of Russia's interests and security concerns after the fall of the Soviet Union is fresh in the minds of not only Russia's leadership, but also the general public, which makes it easy for Putin to portray the West as an adversary in any given situation.

For many years of his leadership, Putin worked to strengthen anti-western sentiments within the Russian population by consistently portraying the West as seeking to weaken and humiliate Russia. The amount of state-controlled newspapers and media channels skyrocketed during Putin's third presidential term, and, currently, Russians have very few resources that provide unbiased and objective information. Not surprisingly, anti-western sentiment is strongly communicated in the news regarding the Ukrainian crisis, which can be seen in the results of the polls conducted in November 2014 throughout the Russian Federation by Russia's Levada Center. The tables below demonstrate that an overwhelming majority of Russians refuse to believe

that Russian troops are involved in Ukraine, and are convinced that the West is conducting an information war against Russia.

DO YOU THINK RUSSIAN TROOPS ARE CURRENTLY IN UKRAINE?

	Sep.14	Nov.14
Yes	29	25
No	49	53
It is difficult to say	23	22

DO YOU THINK AN INFORMATION WAR AGAINST RUSSIA IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTED BY...

	Oct.14	
	Ukraine?	USA, Western countries?
Definitely yes	54	55
Mostly yes	29	33
Mostly no	5	3
Definitely not	3	1
It is difficult to say	9	9

The goal of the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the EU is to hurt the Russian economy so that the country's leadership feels the costs of their unlawful actions in Ukraine. However, Putin possesses enough resources to stay in power and to financially support his close circle of advisors. Therefore, the sanctions may have a severe impact on only the general public. It might be the expectation of the West that these long-suffering Russians will begin to protest against Putin, which could lead to an end of Russia's strong support for Ukrainian separatists. However, as the recent assassination of key opposition leader Boris Nemtsov demonstrates, democratic change is unlikely in Russia. Moreover, if public opinion numbers continue to stay similar to those listed above, opposition to Putin's actions in Ukraine will never be strong enough to cause political change.

SHOULD EUROPE FEAR RUSSIA'S GAS SUPPLY CUTS?

At the end of the turbulent February in 2015, Russia's Gazprom threatened to cut gas supplies to Ukraine and, consequently, Europe, if Kiev failed to pay Russia for the fuel. Previously, in 2006, Kiev also failed to pay for gas supplies, which resulted in Gazprom promptly cutting the gas flow to Ukraine and to European consumers of Russian blue fuel. It was then that France, Italy, Poland, and Germany experienced brief but severe fuel shortages, which encouraged many European states to invest in energy supply diversification. Today, however, Europe still imports 30 percent of its gas from Russia, providing Russia with significant leverage in the Ukrainian crisis. Despite this, at the current stage of the crisis, Russia has much more to lose from cutting gas supply to Ukraine and Europe.

Russia's economy is heavily dependent on exports of energy resources, since every other sector in the country's economy is severely neglected and weak. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), oil and gas sales account for 68 percent of Russia's total export revenues, and constitute more than 50 percent of Russia's federal budget.

During the Ukrainian crisis, Gazprom's exports to Europe have significantly declined. In the third quarter of 2014, sales to Germany, the largest buyer of Russian natural gas, declined by 14 percent in comparison to the previous year, with total sales to Europe falling by 15 percent, or \$2.2 billion. For the Russian economy that is already experiencing an economic crisis due to the low oil prices, such a decline in revenues is significant. If sales continue to fall, Russia's federal budget will be harshly depleted. Therefore, Russia might threaten to cut gas supplies to Ukraine and Europe, but is unlikely to do so since this would harm Russia's already crippled economy.

A more significant problem, however, is the importance of Russia's energy to Europe. This energy dependency prevents the EU from imposing harsher sanctions on Russia. Currently, EU economic sanctions are causing insignificant damage to the Russian economy, but instead, have harmed Russia's biggest trading partner – the Baltic States. If Russia cuts gas supplies to Ukraine and Europe in an attempt to manipulate Kiev and threaten the West, there will be no reason for the EU not to impose further sanctions and to restrict imports of Russia's fossil fuels. While this will lead to power cuts across the EU, it will kill Russia's economy and severely undermine its leadership in the long-term.

After the talks held in Brussels on March 2nd, 2015 regarding a secure energy supply, Russia and Ukraine struck a deal, according to which Russia will continue to supply gas to Ukraine and the EU until the end of March. The agreement emerged after Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, Germany's Angela Merkel, and France's Francois Hollande talked to Putin on the phone. While Russia may continue to periodically intimidate the EU and Ukraine with energy supply cuts, it will unlikely do so since Russia's position is much weaker than it was in 2006.

WHAT SHOULD THE WEST DO?

As soon as Russia stops feeling threatened by the international community, it will be more willing to negotiate and engage in a peace process for Ukraine. Proponents of increased U.S. support to Ukraine argue that Russia needs to be deterred, for if the West fails to demonstrate more support to Kiev, nothing will stop Putin from splitting Ukraine in half and attacking other "satellite" states in the future. However, Putin is not an irrational and unstable aggressor seeking to dominate the world. Putin's actions in Ukraine are not triggered by his desire to ex-

pand Russia's territory, but are an attempt to ensure Russia's national security, and to demonstrate to the West that Russia's interests cannot be neglected without consequences. Therefore, in order to succeed in establishing peace, U.S. and European policymakers should consider Russia's actions from Russia's perspective, and should stop treating Putin as an aggressor that must be deterred with the use of force.

Russia has its interests and they are in conflict with those of the new Ukrainian government. However, the two nations can benefit from being allies and supporting bilateral economic relations. No matter how much Ukraine would like to minimize Russia's influence and build a political system that is able to function independently of the Kremlin's desires, Russia will always be Ukraine's large neighbor with nuclear weapons and an abundance of natural resources. Ukraine needs to realize that the most beneficial position – from a political and economic perspective – is in-between the EU and Russia, and there is no need to side with one or the other. Russia, in turn, needs to realize that the days of the Kremlin's unrestrained influence over Kiev are over. Moreover, Moscow should focus on restoring and fostering strong economic relations with Ukraine, which will help both nations to heal after the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, the West can help Moscow and Kiev understand that they both will only lose from the Ukrainian crisis, and that continuing the war will only cause more suffering for the Ukrainian people and will severely weaken both economies. However, if the West provides military support to Ukraine or corners Russia by imposing more damaging economic sanctions, causing more suffering to the Russian people, the Ukrainian crisis will not likely end soon. Under strong pressure, Putin will dive much further into the Ukrainian crisis. But, if given the space, Putin will likely negotiate with Kiev, and the Ukrainian Crisis will end more swiftly.

BORDER CROSSING ISSUES FOR FINNISH AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

STETE BROUGHT TOGETHER EXPERTS IN THE AREA OF BORDER CONTROL AND BORDER CROSSING ISSUES FOR THEIR SEMINAR "THE BLUE AND GREY BALTIC SEA – BORDER CROSSING COOPERATION IN THE GOOD AND IN THE BAD". THE SEMINAR ENGAGED WITH TOPICS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT, FOREIGN MINISTRY, BORDER CONTROL AND CIVIL SOCIETY.

THE SPEAKERS AT THE EVENT WERE ERJA TIKKA, THE BALTIC SEA AMBASSADOR; SAMI RAKSHIT AND ILKKA HERRANEN FROM THE FINNISH BORDER CONTROL AND NATALIE GERBERT FROM THE MULTICULTURAL WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION.

SOCIETAL ASPECTS OF CONSCRIPTION IN FINLAND

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According to many in Finland, military conscription is the only credible and sufficient national military defence measure that could protect the country if it were to be attacked. Societal actors and international movements are, however, adapting new views on the current Finnish system of conscription. Arto Nokkala explores the societal, political, and economic changes that are challenging the Finnish conscription system, and analyses the potential of creating a new, perhaps better, strategy for national defence.

It is something of a miracle that the debate over compulsory military service is still ongoing in Finland. Conscription has become an established system and is one of the fundamental pillars of the country's defence. It is the only measure that would be able to provide a sizeable and sufficient national military defence if the country were to be under attack.

In other parts of Europe, the more common model of national military defence is the professional army. Finland would be able to create such

a model as well, but not in a way that would be sufficient in scenarios where vast amounts of soldiers would be needed. It is extremely unlikely that any of the political coalitions in sight would be willing to put such funds into national defence when volunteers can instead be recruited and trained. Also, sufficient wartime reserves would need to be taken into consideration when making such a decision. Thus, switching to a professional or even to a strongly selective army would mean taking a risk. The ability to prevent an attack is the key reason as to why defence mechanisms are needed. The current development strategy of the military system is training as many men and women as possible in the military service as well as improving its functionality and securing its continuity.

In looking at societal factors that might challenge the current Finnish model, both conscription and the methods of recruiting personnel change through politics. For Finland, the change could be ignited if the army itself would argue that another option would be preferable and more militarily sufficient. Conscription is not an intrinsic value, but at the moment, it is the only rational way of maintaining military personnel and having enough modern equipment and materials.

Behind policy-making is society and its changing nature, which is influenced by factors within and outside of Finland. Some of these influences have been opposed, and some have been supported and even applied to Finnish conditions. The next section will look at how some of these changed factors might affect the policy of conscription, and even change the system in the next 15-25

years. Despite these predictions, it is important to note that estimating long-term development and calculating effects remains extremely uncertain.

FACTORS INFLUENCING FINNISH SOCIETAL CHANGE

First, I will look at different challenges that might develop within Finnish society. The next section will look at how these challenges relate to Finland's wider operational environment.

(1) Of all the demographic factors, the most important ones are the number and ages of Finnish men that would then justify the current system. The number of Finnish war-time troops is being lowered to 230,000. Demographic factors suggest that there will not be any difficulties in reaching this level in the near future. In 2014, the men born in 1996 could be called to serve. Even if only half of the men born between 1996-2010 joined the army and 80 percent could be positioned in military missions, the troops would still be 180,000 strong in the early 2030s and mostly under the age of 35. If needed, there is an even greater number of military-trained personnel in reserve. Thus, potential factors of change need to be sought somewhere else than in the number of men.

(2) One of the challenges could be a societal attitude that does not support laws relative to only one of the sexes. Individualisation is one

of the macro-level processes that is closely related to changes in values and the reinforcement of individual rights and freedoms. This change challenges collective institutions and the

obligations imposed by them on a wider scale by emphasising individual choice and favouring differentiation and subcultures. Thus, it might be questioned whether or not one should take part in

certain activities asking for mutual responsibility and effort – such as military training and conscription that support the whole society. In addition, individualisation challenges the contents of military training, which is actually meant to give individuals challenges and benefits in order to maintain its appeal. It is difficult to say how far in this direction we are going, since many factors set limits to individualisation, too.

Changes in the sense of community are closely tied to individualisation. The new kind of community is diverse; often based on networks and more scattered than before. The need for military defence and soldiers can be tolerated, but at the same time, voluntarism is emphasized and the general conscription recruitment process can be questioned.

Strong willingness to defend one's nation is an expression of socio-political cohesion and a characteristic of a strong state. However, this argument is not sufficient in order to ensure the continuation of Finland's national compulsory military service.

Changes in society have also been drafted by using simplified models. For example, one can talk about information, risk, network, security, surveillance, and a 24/7 society. In many of these, individualisation and its consequences are put under a new kind of control that is also exploited by the market sector. Also, power seems to be decentralizing and becoming less trans-

“EVEN IF ONLY HALF OF THE MEN BORN BETWEEN 1996-2010 JOINED THE ARMY AND 80 PERCENT COULD BE POSITIONED IN MILITARY MISSIONS, THE TROOPS WOULD STILL BE 180,000 STRONG IN THE EARLY 2030s...”

parent. This might have an effect on the Finnish structure in which conscription is needed to defend the motherland against foreign attacks. One of the prerequisites of a defence that is based on the inclusion of as many as possible is that people in Finland feel that there is something valuable to defend, even under extreme circumstances.

In general, discontinuing the general conscription has started in post-rural and in post-industrial societies. Also, in Finland, the “golden era” of conscription was when society was not as urbanized, when the relationship between state and civil society was close, and when the state, municipalities, and corporations formed the essential organisational structures. Nowadays, this order is in many ways part of the past.

(3) The third element is that European countries are – despite the Ukrainian crisis – ever more clearly what military sociologist Charles Moskos has named “warless societies”. Personally, I would prefer calling the current European situation as being between war and peace, however, greater interdependence, a lack of major wars, the development of information technology, changes in the media environment, and everything related to changes in modern methods of warfare have brought this development. This “warless” attitude can be seen in how European nations deal with the Ukrainian crisis and how indifferent people seem to be regarding many international and local crises. Also, the fact that a state’s use of arms somewhere far away (in the name of crisis management) does not disturb citizens speaks to this kind of development. This “warless” European position poses new problems (i.e. in terms of what is seen as ordinary interpersonal or mass communication; what is considered information warfare, propaganda, ‘trollism’, or a secret plot

of different state organisations; and what is considered a credible, reliable source).

However, conscription is based on a clear understanding of how to navigate within this “warless” position. Ambiguity supports security experts who tell us what to be afraid of and how we can respond to different threats. Consensus, not ambiguity, on the type of attacks that Finnish military forces need to be able to repel would help maintain conscription’s ‘status quo’.

(4) The fourth factor of change to be underlined is the question of equality and parity; above all, the question of gender equality. Conscription applies to men only and after 45 days of service, to volunteering women as well. Will we at some point be in a situation where conscription will crumble because it is considered unequal? At the moment, this is not the case. Conscription applying to men only has not been widely considered a question of equality, but some movement in this direction can be seen. In Norway, so-called “gender-neutral conscription” has been introduced, and in many other European countries, both men and women are equally recruited to professional armies. Both groups have an equal position, even though there are no gender-quotas and a military profession still remains seen as a “men’s profession”.

Women’s conscription would have to be implemented in ways that stress selectivity and voluntarism. Even the need for personnel in times of war does not support the conscription of women, so long as there are enough able-bodied men in the future. The change would be neither politically nor financially viable.

(5) Conceptions of security have a connection to conscription, too. Security has become more of a comprehensive aspect of speech and a

“SECURITY HAS BECOME MORE OF A COMPREHENSIVE ASPECT OF SPEECH AND A WAY FOR UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ORDER. CHANGES IN MEDIA ENVIRONMENTS EMPHASIZE ITS CONTINUATION.”

way for understanding social order. Changes in media environments emphasize its continuation. Societies react easily to vulnerability and demand action accordingly. At the same time, we become more deeply aware of even the most remote current threats, risks, and uncertainties of social life. The tolerance threshold and citizens' crisis tolerance seem to decline while, at the same time, people are becoming indifferent to threats conveyed by the media. Conscription relates to defending a nation from severe, close military threats. However, conscription is not often discussed when everyday life-related security threats are of greater concern.

The transformation of conscription – with changes in security conceptions – would be more evident if the environment would change drastically from the present situation. It is possible that sometimes the widening of security and emphasis on other threats than military ones creates more extensive security service obligations. Yet, the non-military aspects of societal security tend to be in the hands of other professionals, which demands their specific knowledge. In turn, responding to different everyday security situations is learned – or at least should be learned – at home and in schools.

CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Challenges regarding Finnish conscription come from outside the borders and from the social environment as well. At the moment, one can say that the duration of the national service has been extended. Events in Ukraine and the situation's image, as well as the obvious sharpening of the East-West line of division almost into a new Cold War are likely to bring support for the continuation and development of Finland's general conscription. Despite the fact that Finland is not facing any new direct military threats, there is more willingness to develop the defence capabilities of Finland than before the crisis in Ukraine. The crucial question in the next decade regarding the development of the country's defence will be that of sourcing. It will be neces-

sary to maintain cost-effective conscription and to secure material resources.

Despite this, there are factors coming from the operational environment that are challenging Finland's long-term model. One of the topmost issues will be the potential increase in pro-NATO attitudes in Finland because of the assumption that NATO will bring the country more defence capabilities. If common public opinion were to become more pro-NATO, one of the future government coalitions might start running for NATO membership. In addition, common defence of territory seems to be making a return in NATO. A lot will depend on the situation in Ukraine.

Regarding NATO membership, I believe that there are risks that have not been sufficiently discussed. There has been a strong shift in NATO towards professional and selective armies. The risk related to Finland's national defence is that if the Finnish military security problem is considered "solved" due to the country's NATO membership, conscription will likely be reduced. Surely, outcomes will depend on whether or not NATO's Defence Forces will consider our defence as militarily viable given our current strategies.

Since defence of territory has now become more pronounced in Europe, there is hardly any chance that militaries will turn away from professionalization. When decisions are made to refrain from compulsory military service, there is normally distancing from conscription. For many countries after the Cold War, a large military was not considered a great necessity. Conscription also showed signs of disintegration before this period. It has even been argued that the relationship between the army and society has been better after creating professional armies. Experiences around Europe suggest that the majority of people quickly accept a new system if threat-perceptions related to military tasks and necessities change.

However, these international examples may not lead to change for Finland. It is true that eastern

European countries that quickly joined NATO were waived from the obligation of having a national military service, which evokes memories of these countries' socialist 'people's armies'. In Finland, nothing in particular has shaken the citizen's army, not even war or society's transition in the 1960s. Culturally, there is a lot of resistance towards norms coming from the outside. In this sense, Finland could act as a 'norm entrepreneur' and assure other countries of defence capabilities that are based on conscription.

THERE IS STILL A FUTURE FOR CONSCRIPTION

Conscription in Finland has not been as questioned as in other places. This is mainly because conscription is supported by military factors, such as the country's vast territory and the nature of the threats that the military has to be prepared for. In addition, entrenched political decision-

making habits have kept funds received for military expenditures consistently low. This kind of economic rationality is of great importance when resisting outside pressures to change. Also, it is affected by the fact that the state is in debt and cannot afford to compromise on its defence capabilities. Air force fighters need to be replaced by new ones in the near future, and the cost is estimated to be between six and ten billion euros. Also, navy equipment will need to be replaced.

There still is strong continuity in the Finnish model. It is certain that there is social "friction" and resistance, but there are also signs of social appreciation for this military rationality. Nevertheless, more research on societal prerequisites affecting the politics around conscription is needed.



CROSS-BORDER CRIME

ESKO HIRVONEN
CHIEF OF CRIME PREVENTION, FINNISH CUSTOMS

Online communication and increased mobility have not only escalated the amount of cross-border crime, but have also brought about new and dangerous forms of transgressions. Online chat forums, online currency systems, and other technological platforms are making it easier for offenders to remain anonymous. Esko Hirvonen introduces the new challenges brought on by modern technology and how cross-border crime is, and should be, fought against at national and transnational levels.

In recent decades, the increased mobility of individuals as well as the rapid growth of world trade has brought about a new market for international cross-border crime. This development owes to the fact that data communications have swiftly taken on the character of cross-border online services, with the Internet being the most significant trading venue in the world. Due to the increased mobility of goods and people, authorities face new challenges in controlling il-

legal goods and in the international trafficking of human beings. At the same time, drastic disparities in wealth between different regions of the world provide a natural resource for criminal activity.

When Finland joined the European Union almost two decades ago, it became a part of a large common market area that has continued to expand in the decades since. Along with Finland's EU membership and its subsequent Schengen status, the country was faced with the new concept of an internal border. In order to control internal borders, old rules and means were no longer viable. In general, goods, individuals, and capital started moving freely across EU borders. From the viewpoint of Finnish Customs, however, the huge increase in the popularity of the Internet as a trading forum for legal as well as illegal goods appears to present a change even greater than that brought about by internal borders. This change also involves the fact that payments are no longer made through old-fashioned banking services, but through virtual online currency systems that play an important role in, above all, the international narcotics trade.

THE EXPANSION OF TRANSGRESSIONS: DRUGS AND COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS

Currently, cross-border crime affects Customs' work in the form of increasing trade in illegal goods, as indicated by the smuggling of narcotics, medicines, counterfeit products, and weapons. Another form of cross-border crime is tax evasion connected to the import of highly taxable goods. In the past six years, the number of offences solved by Customs has more than doubled in Finland. This is mainly due to the online distribution of narcotics and medicines, including doping substances. In addition to conventional forms of smuggling, a rapidly emerging trend is the long-distance trade of designer drugs that make it possible for online users to order narcotics without involving outside parties. Underground online shops that operate beyond the legal side of the Internet supply a vast range of synthetic substances that are not on international or national lists of narcotics. The composition of these new substances is modified so that they cannot be identified. A person who orders modified substances may have to experience the drugs' effects first-hand without any knowledge of its impacts on their health. Lawmakers have also had to think of quicker ways to respond to the threat posed by designer drugs. Online currency systems make this type of trade appealing to both sellers and buyers, as anonymous payment solutions offer a solid protection for contracting parties. Correspondingly, the increase of online trade has had an impact on the illicit trade of doping substances.

Doping substances are usually discussed in the headlines as an issue concerning top-level athletes, but in terms of public health, a far greater threat involves fitness enthusiasts who usually use these substances without any medical guidance. To a great extent, doping substances are ordered and paid for through the same methods as designer drugs.

A series of international agreements have been made in order to combat trade involving counterfeit products. The history of counterfeit prod-

ucts started with the counterfeiting of well-known clothing brands and other consumer goods when renowned trademarks were used in illegal manufacturing. The same phenomenon can be seen in the illicit copying of music, films, and computer games. At the moment, however, authorities have had to focus on counterfeit products that pose a threat to life and/or health. The production of counterfeit goods has also spread from the illicit use of trademarks to, for example, counterfeit car or airplane parts and well-known medicine brands. Counterfeit goods are openly sold as "grey" products, but sometimes are brought into legally-operating store chains. In all cases, the distribution of such products poses an increasing threat to human life and health. Counterfeit products and copyright-infringing goods cause considerable fiscal damages. Industrial developers and, for example, the music industry, lose money to organised crime because of counterfeiting. In spite of international agreements, it is difficult to intervene in intellectual property crime because levels of control vary in different countries, as do the scales of punishment for offences.

CURRENT CHALLENGES IN COMBATING CROSS-BORDER CRIME

These examples illustrate how no territory is exempt from, nor situation too difficult for, modern cross-border crime. Another characteristic of cross-border crime is that perpetrators make use of the possibilities that new technologies and different political situations in the world have to offer. From this perspective, the smuggling of weapons is not a new phenomenon since conflicts have always needed weapons. Politically organised crime also knows no boundaries. For example, environmental policies or international cooperation for environmental protection do not in any way prevent organised crime from damaging the international community through the illegal trade of endangered animals or plants, or through transports of massive waste cargos from wealthy countries to poorer ones. Also, differences in taxation between countries present significant opportunities for crime, as they en-

courage the movement of goods across borders to markets with higher tax rates.

IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION: NATIONALLY AND TRANSNATIONALLY

Decision-makers and law enforcement authorities are often lagging behind because organised crime reacts very quickly to changes in circumstances and to technological developments. Cooperation between different authorities is essential when combating cross-border crime, but is not enough on its own. A strong emphasis lies on the international cooperation needed to combat cross-border crime, as some of the offences under the definition of cross-border crime would not even exist if there were no borders,

Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) projects.

In Finland, combat against cross-border crime has, for almost a century, been based on co-operation between the Police, Customs, and the Border Guard (PCB), a solution that has been regarded as exemplary even within the wider international context. PCB cooperation seeks to utilise available resources as efficiently as possible. Through this cooperation, the special knowledge of different authorities can be effectively harnessed in order to serve common goals. In addition to cooperation between law enforcement authorities, cooperation with the private sector is required. Customs has entered into almost 50 cooperation agreements with



or their societal impact would be far smaller without such borders. The European Union must establish its own protection mechanisms in a uniform way as a single economic territory, despite the fact that there are still significant differences in the criminal legislations of EU member states. However, due to common borders and interests, criminal justice needs to be harmonised in the same way as other legislation. Law enforcement cooperation in the EU has developed rapidly, and its emphasis lies on joint threat assessments by authorities and on operative activity – an example of which are European Multidisciplinary

various operators in the private sector. The aim of these agreements is to enhance Customs' activity and to ensure equal possibilities for private competing businesses. The contracts are often based on framework agreements between the World Customs Organization (WCO) and other international organizations. The prevention of cross-border crime is just as important to the private sector as it is for society as a whole, and dialogue and cooperation between law enforcement authorities and private businesses can offer completely new possibilities for combating cross-border crime.

WHO IS HELPING THE VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING IN FINLAND?

MONICA GERBERT & PIRJO SOHLO
MULTICULTURAL WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION

Human trafficking is a serious crime, and victims are too often left helpless and undefended as a result. For victims of human trafficking, help is hardly ever easy to find. Protective agencies are seen as weak, the legal system is seen as too slow and unpredictable, and victims are usually left without options. Natalie Gerbert and Pirjo Sohlo explore the challenges that victims of human trafficking face and what should be done to protect and help them.

ing since a victim might be kept in exploitative conditions against his or her will, and communication with the outside world might be impossible. Seeking help is particularly challenging if a victim is a person residing in Finland without legal status, and is lacking knowledge on who could provide help and support. In many cases the victims are also traumatized and scared, which makes it even more difficult for them to look for help.

THE HELPING PROCESS AND ITS CORNERSTONES

“Seek help from your municipality. They will find you a lawyer and provide access to social services.” This sounds easy, but is complicated in the context of providing equal services to victims who lack access to specialized social services and to therapy for recovery.

Human trafficking court cases may take several years. The unfortunate fact is that nobody can estimate the results of these cases, and it is equally difficult to predict whether a victim will be entitled to compensation for a loss of income and the suffering that can follow a victim for the rest of his or her life.

Getting help in the case of human trafficking requires a lot from a victim. He or she has to know whom to contact first for help. This is challeng-

ing since a victim might be kept in exploitative conditions against his or her will, and communication with the outside world might be impossible. Seeking help is particularly challenging if a victim is a person residing in Finland without legal status, and is lacking knowledge on who could provide help and support. In many cases the victims are also traumatized and scared, which makes it even more difficult for them to look for help.

NGOs in the field have an important role in helping victims of trafficking: a victim can talk about his or her experience without being obligated to co-operate with officials and start a legal process, which could turn out to be a long process that provides no guarantee of compensation. Despite this, many victims believe that NGOs have a connection with the authorities and, therefore, building trust is not easy. Also, some do not consider themselves primarily as victims of trafficking, but as guilty of residing and working illegally in Finland, for example.

After contacting helping organizations, a victim has to consider if she or he wants to collaborate with the authorities. An NGO's role is to support a victim's individual decision-making and to provide information regarding their alternatives. For Finland's Multicultural Women's Association (MONIKA), only 20-25% of suspected traffick-



ing cases start legal processes and co-operate with the authorities.

Some of the reasons for non-collaboration include the mistrust of the police, bad experiences working with authorities, fear of traffickers' revenge, and concern for the security of victims' families. Personal security becomes a more complicated issue when a trafficker is a family member or a part of the victim's social network. Traffickers may threaten the victim and his or her family with violence.

Many victims of trafficking have a debt to be paid to traffickers and, thus, getting rid of traffickers can become challenging. Families back home are also often dependent on the money that a victim of trafficking provides for them. Collaboration with authorities does not remove these debts and other kinds of economic stress. In particular, if preliminary investigations last for years, many victims of trafficking do not think that it is economically or socially beneficial for them to co-operate with authorities and to go through such a legal process.

Another issue that keeps victims from working with the authorities is how difficult it is to predict the outcome of the legal process. The process may end due to a lack of evidence, or the degree of the offence might change from human

trafficking to pairing, which is a crime without a victim. In a case of pairing, the victim of exploitation may become a witness in the court and will not get financial compensation. Frequently, in such cases, a victim of trafficking will try to escape to another country if she or he has the possibility to do so.

SERVICES AVAILABLE TO VICTIMS

By law it is still unclear who should provide services to victims of human trafficking in Finland. The victims who have residence in a specific municipality will be provided services from their local municipality. The National Victim Assistance System, situated in Joutseno, assists victims without residency.

The network of services varies according to the availability in different parts of the country. Approximately 50 new cases are accepted into the National Victim Assistance System annually, but victims' access to services is not equal due to the fact that service providers may encounter a trafficked person once every five years, as the victims of trafficking reside in different parts of the country. Also, one issue is that the actual number of victims of trafficking is remarkably larger than the official number, partly due to the lack of skills of authorities to identify victims of trafficking.

According to international conventions, the victims of trafficking are entitled to the specialized services that they require. For example, a support person helping with daily life and access to social and health care services can be provided to victims of trafficking depending on where a victim resides. These services are often delivered by NGOs that operate mainly in major cities. The victims who receive help from the National Victim Assistance System are sometimes in a better situation than those whose services are organized by municipalities, whose level of expertise in helping victims of trafficking will vary. This is because some municipalities do not always have, or are not able to provide, specialized services to victims of trafficking.

The legislation related to helping victims of trafficking is fragmented. There is not just one law that determines the services a victim of trafficking is entitled to, and the question of responsibilities in the service provision to a victim of trafficking is unclear, even to experts. This makes it difficult for authorities responsible for service provision to know what is required of them and what rights a victim can claim. This complexity in administration can have negative effects on victims of trafficking.

Furthermore, the authorities do not have the right to share information about individual cases. Meanwhile, a victim is expected to be active, demanding, and resilient when seeking help in order to claim the realization of their rights. Naturally, if a victim of trafficking lacks Finnish and English language skills, he or she will not be able to do this. Many different processes, such as preliminary investigations, residence permits, job-seeking opportunities, integration without residence status, and security-related and rehabilitative processes can take place simultaneously, which can be confusing. Major changes, uncertainty, and victims' traumatic backgrounds make their lives challenging to manage. It is also important to determine whether therapy that is given to victims during preliminary investigations – which last for two to three years – is efficient, given the uncertainty of their futures.

TOWARDS BETTER SERVICES FOR VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING

Human trafficking poses challenges for the safety of individuals and the realization of their human rights, as well as to society as a whole. Therefore, helping victims of trafficking should be a common issue, and everyone should be aware that human trafficking also takes place in Finland. Different authorities should receive training in their work and more specific directions on what is required of them in order to help these victims. Also, services should be provided equally all over the country.

Hopefully in the future we can better take into account the different situations of victims of trafficking. For example, giving out residence permits based on a victim of trafficking status could enable the victims to work for a different employer than where the exploitation took place. Consequently, NGOs and different authorities should find more efficient means of communicating and working with one another. A need for low-threshold service centers for victims of trafficking is urgent.

In Finland, there are already promising developments regarding better service provisions for victims of trafficking: coordination in the field is to be enhanced, a new coordination model is to be created, and the EU Directive 2012/29/EU is expected to be transposed this year so that victims of crimes in vulnerable states and their family members will get better opportunities to realize their rights in terms of information, support and protection, as well as their procedural rights when participating in criminal proceedings.

Some major questions remain for agreements between authorities and professionals. How can we ensure that a victim of trafficking who needs services will get access to them according to their own needs? Ideally, these responsibilities will be better agreed upon and understood so that victims of trafficking will be able to realize their rights, which have been mandated by international agreements.

**CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN THE
EUROPEAN
NEIGHBORHOOD**

TOWARDS THE EFFECTIVE PREVENTION OF TORTURE IN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA: THE OSCE AS A KEY ALLY

EVA CSERGÖ
ASSOCIATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE APT

There are notable regional differences in the prevention of torture, but every state should at least be aware of and prepared to act against its use. Eva Csergö explores the OSCE's current system of torture prevention and addresses the following questions: who is responsible, what mechanisms exist, and what potential lies in the OSCE being able to prevent torture in its region and elsewhere.

Torture and other forms of ill-treatment are amongst the most serious offenses against human dignity, causing profound physical and moral harm, destroying individuals, and harming their communities on the long-term. As some of the gravest human rights violations, their absolute prohibition is enshrined in core human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet torture and ill-treatment still remain prevalent worldwide, and the region that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) covers is no exception, despite the commitments of its 57 participating States – that ratified the UN Convention against Torture – to eradicate such cases under interna-

tional law. Torture and ill-treatment are repeatedly documented throughout the OSCE area; combating them is urgently needed.

The OSCE region is one of contrasts when it comes to the reality of torture and ill-treatment. For some participating States, torture and ill-treatment are systematic in nature: widespread, regular, deeply entrenched, and supported at a high level. Reports from human rights organisations give regular accounts of this alarming reality. In other cases, prevalence can be much more relative. However, no State is immune to risks of torture and ill-treatment, as continually recalled by evidence of repeated abuses throughout the OSCE area.

States have an obligation to respect the absolute prohibition of torture and to react to violations. Holding them accountable by monitoring and publically condemning countries when they fail to do so is a crucial first step. Documenting and denouncing cases of torture, fighting impunity, bringing perpetrators to justice and ensuring that their actions are effectively investigated and punished, and protecting and assisting victims by ensuring their rehabilitation: these are all essential measures to effectively combat torture and ensure that it does not occur again.



Yet beyond reaction, States also have an obligation to take positive measures to prevent torture in order to build an environment where it is not likely to occur or reoccur. Torture and ill-treatment are indeed more than isolated individual acts; they always engage the responsibility of a whole system that allows or even encourages one to torture or to ill-treat in the first place. The root-causes of torture can lie in flawed legal frameworks that do not provide effective guarantees to vulnerable individuals or groups and do not effectively balance State powers with the protection of human rights. Causes can also include the weak implementation of existing legal safeguards, sometimes due to a lack of political will and widespread impunity and sometimes to a lack of professionalism, weak checks and balances, or inefficient control mechanisms. Torture can be prevented – should its systematic, root-causes be mitigated or eliminated – by opening closed doors behind which abuses happen, introducing effective safeguards to protect the powerless, and enhancing accountability mechanisms. This, however, requires genuine political will to act and combat torture and to change structures and systems when necessary. As such, torture can be effectively prevented when violations are addressed.

The primary responsibility of preventing torture and ill-treatment lies with the States. Yet it is the complementary action of all stakeholders involved that can lead to effective results: authorities, civil society, and relevant national and international bodies all have a role to play. Intergovernmental structures are in a key position to ensure that torture prevention measures are consistently developed and effectively applied by their member States. This is due to their guidance and support functions, their monitoring roles, and their facilitation of much-needed dialogues on the issue within given societies.

The OSCE is a unique forum where 57 States from across North America, Europe, and Central Asia negotiate and achieve consensus on core political issues under the active scrutiny and with the input of civil society. Its complementarity of

approaches to security – from politico-military to human aspects, its diverse institutions – from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), and its variety of in-country operations and activities make it well-placed to create effective synergies for combating torture in the region.

The OSCE has the potential to be a catalyzer of effective torture prevention initiatives. So far, however, the organization, despite addressing and combating torture in some of its policies and activities, has not made torture prevention a strategic priority. In 2014, the Swiss Chairmanship of the OSCE placed the issue high up on the OSCE agenda, making it one of its core focuses for the “human dimension”. Initiatives supporting torture prevention were taken or encouraged throughout the year, engaging State officials, civil society representatives, and international and national bodies. Unfortunately, these achievements did not yet lead to the development of concrete mechanisms for advancing the prevention of torture at the OSCE level.

The OSCE can play a crucial role in ensuring that its participating States live up to their obligation to combat and prevent torture in the Europe and Central Asia region. It is now time to advance and achieve concrete results on the basis of existing commitments. The OSCE could contribute to effective torture prevention in Europe and Central Asia through the following core endeavors:

REAFFIRMING THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT

The OSCE as an intergovernmental forum with a focus on security has a key role to play in combating the disturbing trend of minimizing or even justifying torture and ill-treatment due to certain States’ security-focused policies. In these times, where the right to security is emphasized as a core value, sometimes to the detriment of other human rights, the OSCE should take any opportunity to reaffirm the absolute prohibition

of torture and ill-treatment in all situations, including in response to existing security threats, most notably regarding counterterrorism activities.

Throughout the years, the OSCE has repeatedly articulated its commitment to upholding the absolute prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and to eradicating the two. However, such a commitment has not been reaffirmed at an intergovernmental level since the 2009 Ministerial Declaration on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the Adoption of the UN Convention against Torture. A Ministerial Decision on torture prevention was presented by Switzerland at the 2014 OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel, but the consensus required for its adoption was not reached.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE made a key political statement in 2014 when it voted for a Resolution on Combating Torture under its Baku Declaration. It is now time for OSCE Participating States to follow up and strongly reaffirm their commitment to eradicating torture at a governmental level.

MAINSTREAMING TORTURE PREVENTION IN ALL OSCE FIELDS OF OPERATIONS

The OSCE equally relates to politico-military security as well as human rights and the rule of law under its “human dimension”. Mainstreaming torture prevention throughout its activities could bring about effective results.

The human dimension: promoting effective protection mechanisms for persons deprived of their liberty

Under its human rights and rule of law commitments, the OSCE's operational role in ensuring that the legal frameworks of its participating States are effective, duly implemented, and that procedures are fair is key for the mitigation of risks of torture and ill-treatment. Specific country systems bear specific challenges; it is the role and responsibility of the OSCE to address

them, for instance by promoting evidence-based legal systems as opposed to confession-based systems that are still in the OSCE area. Promoting effective safeguards in detention in addition to promoting effective complaints, investigation, and prosecution mechanisms that duly address abuses and violations by State officials. The OSCE also has a crucial role to play in promoting and reinforcing judiciary and legal professionals' capacities to prevent torture.

Those facing discrimination or specific vulnerabilities in society are at greater risk than others of being submitted to torture and ill-treatment when deprived of their liberty. The OSCE, with its strong expertise in the promotion of tolerance and non-discrimination, can achieve a lasting impact on the protection of groups facing specific situations of vulnerability in detention – including juveniles, women, LGBTI persons, ethnic or religious minorities, foreigners, migrants, and persons with disabilities – by mainstreaming torture prevention in its related activities. It could profitably dedicate some of its resources to mapping vulnerabilities in detention throughout the OSCE region. Its institutions and field operations could then contribute to raising awareness and facilitating exchanges of experiences on how to best protect individuals and groups in places of deprivation of liberty.

The OSCE pledges to protect human rights defenders. In accordance with its 2014 Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, it should implement all possible measures to effectively enhance their protection in detention.

More generally, the OSCE has a significant role to play in acting against reprisals in detention, and should endeavor to protect all persons facing retaliation for their activities in places of deprivation of liberty, including those having complained about abuses or shared information with detention monitors and other stakeholders whilst detained.

THE POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION: PROMOTING PROFESSIONAL CULTURES OF LAW-ENFORCEMENT

Police and other law-enforcement officials have specific powers to arrest, search, monitor, detain, interrogate, and investigate suspicions of crime. These larger powers bear greater risks of abuse. Deprivation of liberty by the police, especially in the first few hours of arrest, transportation, and custody is notably known to bear specifically high risks of torture and ill-treatment. Cases of rights violations in policing operations throughout the OSCE region – be it during the policing of public assemblies, the forced deportation of migrants and asylum-seekers, or the arrest and detention of individuals – are regularly documented. The politico-military dimension of the OSCE gives the organization the potential to promote and mainstream human rights in law-enforcement operations, making it a strong ally in building an environment where torture and ill-treatment are not likely to (re) occur.

Risks of torture and ill-treatment can be significantly mitigated if law-enforcement officials operate in an environment where torture is condemned at the highest level, human dignity is a core value, and where recruitment and training are based on, and emphasise the importance of accountability and responsibility. Working conditions also matter. The OSCE engages with law-enforcement officials and contributes to reinforcing their professionalism through training and promoting best practices on issues such as effective investigation techniques. The OSCE can play an essential role in supporting professional cultures of law-enforcement that contribute to torture prevention. This could have a significant impact on the occurrence of torture and ill-treatment in Europe and Central Asia.

PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY IN PLACES OF DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY

Torture and ill-treatment characteristically take place behind closed doors in situations of secrecy where external oversight cannot hinder potential abuses of power. It is key that places of deprivation of liberty; where persons are detained in opaque conditions, are opened to external scrutiny and regularly visited by independent monitoring bodies that can advocate for change.

26 years ago, Europe saw a breakthrough when the European Committee for Prevention of Torture (CPT) was enabled access to any place of deprivation of liberty, at any time, in the Member States of the Council of Europe. Nowadays, the Council of Europe includes 47 Member States, all of which are part of the OSCE. The CPT regularly visits these States and issues reports and recommendations.

In 2006, another milestone was achieved when the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT) entered into force, implementing an innovative system of UN visits to places of deprivation of liberty for the purposes of preventing torture by independent bodies. This system includes an international body, the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (SPT), and national institutions called National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs) that are in charge of examining the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty by regularly visiting places of detention, issuing recommendations to relevant authorities, and commenting on legislation. 41 OSCE participating States have ratified the OPCAT so far and are hence bound to open any of their places of deprivation of liberty at any time to the SPT and the independent NPM they are obligated to establish and/or designate.

38 NPMs have been designated so far in the OSCE region, which accounts for more than half of NPMs worldwide. Despite the positive impact of some of these new institutions, their effectiveness is still a major challenge. Some NPMs in the



OSCE region lack the personnel or functional independence needed to implement their mandate, which is a key area of concern. In addition, way too often, NPMs remain under-resourced and understaffed; the national mechanisms do not always receive their powers and guarantees, such as access to all places, persons, and information. Moreover, even functional NPMs do not always get the support from authorities or the wider public that they need to rely on to foster effective change.

Although some of its field operations have been actively supporting NPM effectiveness, the OSCE has not developed a consistent approach on this matter. The OSCE, however, has a key role to play in supporting these mechanisms and further consolidating the preventive monitoring systems of the region. This could partially be achieved through capacity strengthening and advocacy for NPM efficiency with OSCE par-

ticipating States. Peer-to-peer contacts and experience exchange are also essential to NPM learning, as highlighted by NPMs themselves in their 2014 recommendations to the OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on the Prevention of Torture. The OSCE could contribute to this important process by facilitating regular meetings of NPMs from the region – whether bilateral or global.

SECURING THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TORTURE PREVENTION ENDEAVOURS

State systems, decisions, and endeavors should be based on the informed consent of, and should be fully accountable to, their societies. In this regard, the role of civil society in the prevention of torture is as crucial as in all other areas of governance. Yet, in many instances in the OSCE

region, civil society's voices are not taken into account when it comes to State policies and actions on torture prevention.

Through their expertise and experiences promoting human rights, combating torture, addressing detention issues or other related topics, through their monitoring and watchdog role, through their analytical, support, or advocacy capacities, and also through their experiences working on torture and ill-treatment cases and supporting torture survivors, civil society organizations are essential actors of torture prevention at national and international levels. Such actors can push for change and help shape effective torture prevention policies and mechanisms. They can also ensure that these policies are consistently applied, and that these mechanisms are functional. They can also raise the alarm when policies and mechanisms are ineffective, harmful, and put people at risk, and can also hold authorities and institutions accountable for their actions or omissions.

The OSCE promotes accountability, encourages constructive dialogues between State authorities and their constituencies, and protects civil society representatives who raise concerns in States where a constructive dialogue is not possible. The OSCE should further contribute to bridging gaps, shedding transparency, conveying concerns, and fostering positive changes. The Organization should work to ensure that civil society is fully informed of national and international torture prevention initiatives, and promote their inclusion in transparent and consultative decision-making processes on how to prevent torture and ill-treatment.

The OSCE made an important step in this direction when it received recommendations on combating torture from a coalition of civil society organizations from the OSCE region – led by the Civic Solidarity Platform in December 2014. It is key that the OSCE follows up on these recommendations, and more generally strengthens its partnerships with civil society organisations to prevent torture and ill-treatment. It is equally important that the OSCE continues to facilitate dialogue between participating States, State authorities, institutions – including NPMs, and overall society. This would represent a milestone for effectively combating torture in Europe and Central Asia.

Torture prevention is a shared responsibility. 40 years into the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, it is hoped that the OSCE's potential to significantly contribute to combating torture in Europe and Central Asia will be durably fulfilled.

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WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS A PEACEBUILDING MEASURE IN MOROCCO

DORIS GRAY
AL AKHAWAYN UNIVERSITY

Unrest in the Middle East is not only limited to countries directly affected by war and political upheaval, but also countries like Morocco that belong to the European community and are experiencing challenges, for example with immigration. The rights of women, especially female immigrants, and the roles of men and women in society have been widely debated. Dr. Doris Gray explores the effects of radical Islam on gender identity and how collaboration between genders, as well as other approaches, can help improve women's rights and create a more stable and secure environment within the European neighborhood.

of major cities, forcing readjustments of public policies and attitudes. Unlike Jordan, Morocco receives no comparable international assistance for these refugees. Those most active in helping refugees are private initiatives, often connected to Christian Churches that receive support from the United States and Europe. Morocco is still struggling to come to terms with having to be a country of destination for migrants and refugees, rather than a country of transit to Europe, as has been the case in the past. Often, these female refugees have to resort to prostitution in order to survive. In addition to ensuing social problems, this contributes to a widespread health crisis if refugees – and their children – are stigmatized and refused basic health care.

Countries that are not currently undergoing war, upheaval, or regime change are also affected by unrest in the Middle East region. Morocco acutely feels reverberations of unrest, most visibly in the influx of refugees from Syria and Libya. While in the past the majority of refugees and migrants hailed from Sub-Saharan Africa, new Arab Muslim refugees – women in particular – can be seen begging in the streets

To reduce the possibility of a revolution, a women's rights agenda is vigorously promoted by the palace and, to a lesser degree, by the ruling Islamist government of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD). Securing international support and generating goodwill amongst young Moroccans is a vital peacekeeping strategy. In the past year, this has brought the abolition of Article 475 from Morocco's penal code, which stipulated that whoever "abducts or deceives" a minor, without using violence, threat or fraud,

can escape prosecution and imprisonment if the abductor marries the victim. This provision in the law, amended in January 2014, mostly applied to cases of rape where the girl or woman was coerced into marrying the man who violated her, thus allowing rapists to escape prison sentences. The Moroccan parliament has periodically debated introducing more comprehensive sexual harassment and domestic violence laws, which have both been notorious problems for this North African kingdom.

In Tunisia, the transitional justice process underway is reviving memories of Morocco's own Truth and Equity Commission, where women's voices were noticeably absent. Ten years later, women's grievances are being given more public attention.

In addition, a new discourse in Morocco is developing on masculinity. In the face of a highly mediated women's rights discourse, young Moroccan men are challenged to find a new identity in a society that increasingly questions age-old patriarchal norms. This vacuum is filled in certain segments of society by radical religious interpretations that provide a sense of clarity and security. From the palace, the government, and civil society, strategies of upholding a precarious peace by promoting a more gender egalitarian society can be seen.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN GENDERS

While a focus on women's rights is a welcome development, it comes with its challenges. Contemporary young Moroccan men who feel familial, cultural, and social pressure to conform to patriarchal notions of masculinity are struggling with their identities. Women's rights activism has largely focused on securing rights for women, criminalizing gender-based violence, increasing women's political representation, and enhancing their educational and employment opportunities. Islamic feminists have contributed to new religious interpretations that allow for more gender equity based on feminist readings of religious



texts. Accordingly, men are re-defined beyond patriarchal norms, but their own contributions have largely been left out of the discourse. To date, a more gender egalitarian Muslim-majority society in North Africa that includes changing masculinities has not been discussed. In the face of violent political conflict and acute social inequity in the region, advocacy for gender equity in Morocco is approached from a collaborative perspective and a – somewhat foggy – vision of mutual benefits.

Increasingly, small-scale women-focused non-governmental organisations (NGOs) recognize that only through collaboration between men and women can genuine rights be achieved and realized in day-to-day life. Some women-focused NGOs include men in their work; others are almost exclusively run by men, yet specialize in legal education for rural women, for instance.

A NEW FOCUS ON MASCULINITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD

To date, there is a dearth of research on the subject of new masculinities in North Africa; current, although rare, literature on African masculinities specializes on Africa south of the Sahara or on the Arab Middle East. There is nascent discourse within Morocco on the role of men in a changing society with Berber/Arab heritage. Interviews by the author demonstrate a sense of uncertainty amongst young men who are searching for a new role within marriage, their families, and as fathers and respected members of society. This void can readily be filled by interpretations of Islam that offer a sense of stability, clarity, and a sense of self-worth and pride.

One measure to combat the radicalization of young men was the creation of the equivalent of female imams in Morocco. Called *murchidates* (guides), these women fulfill all the responsibilities of an imam, except leading Friday prayers. In the wake of a major family law reform (*moudawana*) in Morocco in 2004, King Mohammed VI initiated this program as part of a larger vision of what he calls “Morocco’s moder-

ate Islam”. In 2014, the King opened Moroccan institutions to train imams for countries that have been facing several internal struggles, such as Mali, Senegal, and Tunisia. Having female religious leaders can be viewed as a symbol of modernity, something new in appearance, if not substance. *Murchidates* work mostly in the disenfranchised neighborhoods of big cities and the part of Morocco that has ‘produced’ terrorists; most notably those who were involved in the 2003 Casablanca attacks. The idea is that potential terrorists have mothers, sisters, and wives who can exert influence over them if they themselves are properly equipped with religious rhetoric. This model of *murchidates* has not been replicated elsewhere in Muslim majority countries, or in Muslim communities in the West.

International attention tends to be on countries that are in the midst of conflict. With more foresight, more consideration could be given to countries that have averted internal strife to investigate and strengthen their peace-preserving and peacebuilding measures, and to support their efforts to bring internal social change.

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RESHAPING COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

A TWO-WAY APPROACH TOWARDS POSITIVE PEACE AFTER ETHNIC CONFLICT

ANNI MATTILA
STUDENT OF WORLD POLITICS

Resolved ethnic conflict is often followed by what is referred to as 'negative peace', with past differences still lingering as a result of conflict. Negative peace exists in areas where conflict is seen as over, but wounds remain open, and affected populations have not healed. Anni Mattila explains how, with the use of collective identities, negative peace can in fact be turned into 'positive peace', which in turn ensures a more stable community.

For my bachelor's thesis, I researched the concept of desecuritization in post-conflict situations. Simply put, in the aftermath of many 'ethnic' conflicts, people from different sides are more or less forced to live together in an environment of 'negative peace'. As a country moves from the military and political realms of a conflict towards the social realms of peace and nation-building, getting along with one's past enemies brings issues relating to social identity to the fore. This idea of collective social identities as a key factor in post-conflict situations will be expanded upon further.

CONFLICTS AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

In an ethnic conflict, the collective identity of the "other" has been securitized. The other becomes an existential threat to a group's identity, the "us" in 'us versus them'. Often, fear of the other remains even after the war is over. So what is the relationship between these collective identities if these securitized identities remain, even after the war is over? Eventually, moving from the military realm to the post-war social realm, peace is created on a juridical level, but between the collective identities, the different kinds of "us" and "them" remain. Negative peace, therefore, exists.

The social construct associated with the collective identity is the way in which we expect the other to behave and think. It is also how we behave and think by making these assumptions about the other's behaviour. As long as peace is a negative one – meaning that there only exists the lack of threat or danger – this will remain the status quo, where there is a clear gap between different collectives. People will simply cope with the other, because this is better than being in conflict. But this kind of living is exhausting, both individually as well as at the societal level.

From my perspective, a more positive approach to peace can be accomplished if we take another look at these collective identities. Who are we, who are they, and is there a way to form a new kind of identity that somehow intertwines the two? Is it possible to create new collective identities?

In most post-conflict cases, it seems that negative peace is already enough. This at least means that the violence is over. But then again, in order to make a country prosper, a more positive approach to peace should be taken into consideration. In short, peace that is progressive and sustainable cannot merely mean the inexistence of fear and danger, but should include the existence of opportunities to grow as individuals and as human beings. Positive peace is not just about the lack of threat, but also the existence of possibilities. In the years or even the decades after a conflict, however, negative peace often remains. Thus there is a need for some kind of correlation between the successful desecuritization of identities and positive peace. A switch in the patterns formulating and reaffirming groups' identities is what needs to be changed first in order for positive peace to be possible. In many cases, however, impunity for war crimes and feelings of injustice keep people stuck in the past. In order to make this shift towards a more positive peace, changes at the individual level and the institutional, state level are needed.

IT'S NOT A CLASH OF CULTURES; IT'S A CLASH OF WHAT USED TO BE AND WHAT IS

To explain what I mean by creating new collective identities, let us think about my hometown, Helsinki. Instead of a mere clash of old ethnic identities, this city's population represents the birth of new, multicultural identities that are not in clash with past identities, but are making a new kind of sense of the world and what people's realities are. For example, children of North African Muslims and Scandinavian Lutheran parents who are born in Finland do not necessarily have an 'inner-clash' because of this mix

of cultures and/or religions. A Finnish teenager with multicultural parents is uniquely different in comparison to past generations, yet from the teenager's perspective, it is totally normal to be a part of this kind of family. This multicultural Finn, however, might be considered a threat to another Finn whose idea of the collective Finnish identity does not include people with Muslim parents or multicultural families. Thus, instead of a clash between cultures, there seems to be a clash between old and new – between what used to be and what is. In addition, we tie our identities to our memories, but we also mould our memories to fit the narrative that we are telling ourselves. In this sense, identity seems to always be historical, subjective, and in a state of flux.

The existential threat towards an identity is basically any kind of forced change in one's identity. It makes sense in that when I think about my own religious, national, gender, or family backgrounds, these have shaped my identity, and I do not like the idea of something changing because this would shake the very foundation of my being. Identity changes not only make me question my values and decisions, but also my past memories and decisions. This process is something that not everyone is willing to do, which makes it much easier to grasp why collective identities seem to be, despite their subjective and changing nature, somewhat stuck and hard to reshape.

THE TWO-WAY APPROACH: THOUGHT LEADERSHIP VS. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Speech acts are one of the key factors of securitization theory. By saying something, one makes others act and think in different ways. In politics, one can take things pertaining to everyday politics and turn them into existential threats with this securitizing speech act, for example with ethnic identities. Desecuritization on the simplest level means rewinding this process, though it is obvious that what has previously been said cannot be unsaid.

So if securitization cannot be undone, how can these securitized identities be taken back to everyday politics, and not be seen as threats?

Thought leaders, such as role models and the people we look up to, can help to recreate new collective identities. These leaders, including politicians and other influential people, can use speech acts in more subtle ways in order to desecuritize threats. They can also exemplify how to treat the “other” in a human, respectful way, thus creating positive connotations instead of negative ones.

The role of political institutions has had a great effect on the extent to which a leader can recreate identities. I have come to realize this while studying the recent history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three members: one Bosniak, one Croat elected from the Federation, and one Serb elected from the Republika Srpska. In this particular case, existing structures have forced politics to become something separational – for instance, the presidential troika is forced to maintain old, existing ethnic identities because of the voting system that puts people into boxes based on their identities. If you are Bosniak, you vote for a Bosniak, even if you would prefer the political views of Serb or Croat candidates. So for a candidate to win, one has to direct his/her speech act towards the existing and ethnically-divided voting community, and maintain the collective identities based solely on ethnicity and history, instead of moulding something that is new, more relevant, and more representative of the existing reality.

It is understandable that, when drafting the Dayton Agreement in 1995 after the Yugoslav War, the most important thing was to end the violence. This was secured with the promise of a full consensus of all three ethnicities in all levels regarding political decision-making. Unfortunately, this has also been the root of the nation’s developmental stagnation.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Structures shape politics and the ways in which individuals and groups join social debates. While this may be true, thought leaders are extremely important in showing the way, raising debates, and setting an example for people in terms of how to think and act. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, how could the presidential troika show a pioneering example of reconstructing the national collective identity, if the political structure does not support such change? In Finland, the multicultural teenager will grow up and eventually there will be another generation of even more multicultural Finns. The political structures in this country are not forcing people to take ethnic sides. People are able to choose what kind of thought leader to listen to, based on any preferences they might have. Despite the fact that someone’s identity as a Finn may be shattered because of this development, Finnish institutions are not necessarily creating these social barriers. The collective identity of Finns is something that I have only scratched the surface of in this complex topic of collective identities in post-conflict situations. Needless to say, I do not have all of the answers, but what seems obvious is that while there is an understanding of what constitutes collective identities, more concrete tools are needed in order to reshape such conceptions. Having a wider understanding of how socio-political structures and speech acts work together could help shape institutional environments, which would in turn support leaders who are working to move nations forward. Needless to say, impunity and feelings of injustice are key factors of residual collective identities that need to be tackled. Hopefully, in this way, the negative peace that defines so many post-conflict situations can be turned into a more positive one.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN GLOBAL SECURITY

STETE TOGETHER WITH VIKES AND TRANSPARENCY FINLAND RY ORGANISED THE SEMINAR “BEHIND THE BARS: TRANSPARENCY FOR OUR SOCIETY!” ON THE 5.5.2014. FINLAND IS KNOWN AS A MODEL COUNTRY OF OPENNESS AND DEMOCRACY, BUT STILL WE EXPERIENCE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CORRUPTION AND WRONGFUL USE OF POWER, FROM THE DECISION-MAKERS, COMPANIES AND EVEN THE MEDIA. THE SEMINAR DISCUSSED ISSUES OF CORRUPTION, HOW IT IS VISIBLE IN THE FINNISH SOCIETY AND IN THE EU, THE ROLE OF THE JOURNALIST AND DIFFERENT METHODS OF INCREASING TRANSPARENCY.

THE FIRST PART OF THE SEMINAR “BETTER NOT TO SAY IT OUT LOUD?” INCLUDED SPEECHES BY ARTO NIEMINEN FROM THE JOURNALIST UNION, ANSSI MIETTINEN FROM HELSINGIN SANOMAT AND SUSANNA KUPARINEN, A JOURNALIST AND THEATRE DIRECTOR. THE TOPICS RANGED FROM THE OPENNESS OF THE MEDIA: WHOSE VOICE IS HEARD AND WHOSE ISN'T, TO WIKILEAKS AND HOW IT CAN BE USED AS A TOOL TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY.

THE KEYNOTE SPEECH OF THE SEMINAR WAS HELD BY MATTI VANHANEN, WHO EXPLORED THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BEING CONNECTED, AND ACTING IN AN INNER CIRCLE. FOR HIM, OPEN COMPETITION IS THE BEST WATCHDOG FOR NETWORKING.

THE SECOND PART OF THE SEMINAR “BUSINESS AS USUAL?” BROUGHT TOGETHER THE PRODUCING INDUSTRY SPECIALIST AULI KORHONEN FROM SAK, JENNI JUSLÉN FROM THE FINNISH POLICE AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF FINLAND AND PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE OF FINLAND (NAOF), TUOMAS PÖYSTI. THE TOPICS OF DISCUSSION RANGED FROM CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, CORRUPTION IN THE EU AND EXAMPLES OF TRANSPARENCY AND GOOD ADMINISTRATION IN FINLAND AND THE EU.

TRANSPARENCY INSTEAD OF DISASTERS

AULI KORHONEN
TRADE INDUSTRY POLITICS EXPERT AT SAK

Corporate responsibility and human rights is an area of business that is generally not a high priority for Finnish companies. However, this area has astonishing deficits, and western countries are only now beginning to understand the damages of neglecting corporate responsibility. Incidents, for example, in the clothing industry, have indicated the need to improve workers' rights worldwide. In his article, Auli Korhonen analyses the current situation, addresses future implications, and proposes comprehensive improvements to Finnish companies' corporate responsibility.

Public discussion on corporate social responsibility started later in Finland than in the U.S. and other European countries. The question became a part of Finland's national agenda ten years ago, and guidebooks ever since have been published about environmental, economic, and social responsibility. Trade unions and NGOs have been useful in training people and spreading information. Even the Finnish Government has planned to make Finland one of the leading countries in corporate responsibility.

Still, we are frequently facing serious issues, mostly concerning global companies functioning in countries on the other side of the globe. One example is the recent news about the use of child labour in a Finnish paper factory overseas. Basic working law violations, ignorance of public procurements, health and safety problems as well as concerns with long working hours and low salaries are a reality for some Finnish companies overseas. Even if there have been efforts to improve corporate social responsibility, there is still a lot of work to do.

It seems that consumers react only when big disasters become public. A good example of this is from the textile and garment industry in Bangladesh. People working in this branch know very well that working conditions in Bangladesh have always been very bad – wages are low; only 30 euros per month, and health and safety measures in factories are seriously lacking.

However, 80% of Finland's Bangladesh' GNP consists of clothing exports. There are over three million workers producing clothes for companies all over the world, including for Finnish companies. Only after the big disaster in the Rana Plaza factory – where 1250 workers lost their lives, and at least as many were injured – did the international media start paying attention to this

sort of problem, even though there have been big and disastrous fires before where people lost their lives because they were locked inside the factories.

Similar stories from other industries can be found in other big producer countries. One example is in Qatar, where a football stadium is currently being built for the 2022 World Championship Games. Over 400 workers, mostly immigrants, have already lost their lives in the construction work. Many Finnish export companies have businesses in Qatar, and yet, these problems regarding human safety have not been addressed.

In many countries and in many sectors, decent work is far from reality. This is an issue that should be dealt with globally. Human rights for workers in wineries, fisheries, juice production, hospital equipment production, stonework, brick making, and football making includes several prominent industries that are too difficult for trade unions to keep an eye on alone. Support from institutions such as the EU and the UN is increasingly important.

After the catastrophe at the Rana Plaza factory, trade unions and NGOs negotiated an Accord to improve worker safety in clothing factories. According to the new agreement, companies should pay benefits to the victims of disasters. However, not all companies that have industries in problematic areas have joined the agreement. Also, the memory of our society proves itself to be rather limited. One and a half years ago, Finnish consumers decided to boycott a company that produced their merchandise in such an area. Now, however, most people and the media have completely forgotten about the incident.

The Minister for Labour, Lauri Ihalainen, has said that corporate responsibility needs global solutions. It is true that binding global solutions are urgently needed. Basic rights as stipulated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) should be respected in the entire supply chain.

All over the world, extreme violations are taking place that concern health and safety, working time, living wages, the right to organise, and the



ability to negotiate collectively. The European Union's measures aimed at developing corporate social responsibility are most welcome and should be supported. Sound corporate social responsibility prolongs employees' (working) lives, is an integral element of sustainable development, and even enhances economic growth and productivity.

On April 15th, 2014, the European Parliament adopted a Directive on the disclosure of non-financial information by certain companies. According to the Directive, all companies with more than 500 employees will be required to include a report on environmental matters and social and employee-related aspects in their annual reports. Companies are also being required to disclose information on how they have tackled anti-corruption and bribery issues. Respect for human rights is covered by this requirement. The European Council approved the Directive on September 29th.

According to the compromise between the Parliament and the Council, in 2018, the Commission should consider the possibility of introducing an obligation requiring a country-by-country report containing information on profits made, taxes paid on profits, and public subsidies received. Now it is up to the Member States themselves to decide on whether companies are required to report as part of their annual report or separately. Even if included in the audit, the report need not be audited as such. Instead, the auditor's responsibilities are simply to ensure that a report has been made.

Finnish employee organisations are planning to apply the Directive to companies with over 250 employees, since a company is large by definition if it has this number of employees.

CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Key challenges in implementing social responsibility are related to non-compliance with the EU, international treaties and recommendations,

and national legislation. Supervision is currently ineffective and insufficiently resourced. The authorities' awareness of social responsibility and communication on the issue is highly inadequate. Mere recommendations are not enough – binding legislation is required at both EU and national levels.

In terms of corporate social responsibility, Finnish employee organisations have put a special emphasis on ground rules for working life, employees' rights and human rights, as well as corporate environmental responsibility and corporate responsibility for sustainable development.

When running their businesses, enterprises should take into account the persons and population groups affected by the impact of the business, directly and/or indirectly, and at all operation stages. The organisations representing such persons and population groups, such as employee organisations, should be included in this process. Indigenous people, women, and children are in the most vulnerable positions, particularly with respect to global operations, and their representation should therefore be emphasised.

Contractors' liability to contracting partners' national and international obligations should be enhanced. In particular, a regulatory model should be established for ensuring compliance with minimum-level terms of employment.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

What are the consumers', investors', and states' responsibilities? What part of the process has the biggest impact? Are the consumers guilty when they want to buy very cheap products, and are not concerned or thinking about the living conditions of those who make the products? Are the investors and factory owners the guiltiest ones when they want to gain the most profit? Some states are also responsible for encouraging such practices with low taxes and other benefits, completely disregarding international conventions.



To tackle this problem, the OECD has published guidelines for multinational enterprises. The OECD's national contact points have the duty to spread this information, but are not expected to act as tribunals.

UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights must be enforced in all EU Member States, based on a broad concept of human rights. Basic and human rights are particularly fundamental rights to which everyone is equally entitled, including the right to security and protection in one's working life.

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, BUT HOW?

Enterprises have many different guidelines that they can choose to follow. Many Finnish clothing companies rely on the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) by which they are expected to follow their supply chain's subsidiaries' and subcontractors' working conditions in developing countries. BSCI is a company's responsibility code. Two of three suppliers must be audited as good suppliers in a five year period of joining the code. BSCI could be seen as the first step to a better functioning surveillance of workers' rights.

There are also multi-stakeholder initiatives based on organisations such as Ethical Trading Initiative, Fair Wear Foundation, the Fair Labour Association, and the Clean Clothes campaign.

In many countries, companies have the legally binding responsibility to publish certain minimum standards in their yearly reports. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) tries to guide companies to report on the social and environmental impacts of their businesses in a coherent way through established standards.

Social Accountability International has produced a SA8000-standard where social responsibility and decent working conditions are the focus points. Trade unions have been consulted in the process of developing this standard. The problem with these different standards is determining how often and who should be responsible for auditing. In order to be seen as reliable, auditing should be done frequently and conducted by independent auditors.

What is still worrying is that Finnish enterprises do not see social responsibility and human rights as the most important issues, according to a research survey completed at the beginning of 2014. Two out of three enterprises name environmental aspects to be at the top of the list when they were asked about corporate social responsibility. Human rights and consumer questions were found to be less important. This is a sad result, but reveals that information and training in these areas must be increased.

Finnwatch, the watchdog agency tracking Finnish companies' operations in developing countries, has published several useful reports about Finnish companies. For example, the Decent Work programme has investigated working conditions at company units and those of their subcontractors in developing countries that supply goods to Finnish markets.

Special attention has been paid to working hours, employees' livelihoods, and occupational safety and health. In one of its projects, Finnwatch searches for the origins of products from developing countries that are used in hospitals. The goal is not only to provide information, but also to influence companies, decision-makers, and the people responsible for public procurements to be responsible for their actions.

In order to enhance the supervision of corporate social responsibility, binding rules should be implemented for personnel and environmental information to be published in companies' annual reports. These rules will also serve to prevent companies from engaging in aggressive tax avoidance measures.

SUPERVISION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

New legislation is required for the implementation of corporate social responsibility. The right of action for trade unions and other organisations would advance the rights of employees and citizens who are in weak positions. Employers acting in compliance with such legislation would also benefit from an organisational right of action, and this would make it easier to intervene in competitors' illegal activities, which often distort competition.

More resources must be allocated to national labour protection authorities. Moreover, new methods should be considered for enhancing the efficiency of supervision, such as involving trade unions in supervision efforts. Labour protection authorities should fulfil their obligation to supervise more extensively than at present, for instance by taking a more active stance on whether companies' operations comply with EU and ILO conventions on working life.

PREVENTING A DARK AGE

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS MITIGATING THE NEGATIVE POWER OF THE SUN

ROOPE SIIRTOLA
MA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Coronal mass ejections (CMEs) are a danger to manmade infrastructure that relies on electricity. Damages following ejections would cost trillions of dollars to repair and repairs could take years to complete. To protect our planet from this gruelling aftermath, worldwide cooperation on an extremely tight schedule is needed. Roope Siirtola explains how the effects of a coronal mass ejection could be best managed in order to prevent what would in practice be the next Dark Age.

During the next century, we will face new kinds of threats that will affect us locally as well as globally. International cooperation will be pivotal in order to mitigate the negative outcomes of these emerging threats.

As our societies are becoming more technologically advanced, we are relying more and more on things like electricity for everyday functions. Not many of us would be able to live and work

without power, especially during the winter months when our homes and workplaces would become inhospitable even after a few hours without power. These are clear indications of our dependency on this critical infrastructure.

There are several causes that can render critical infrastructure, such as an electric grid, useless. Traditional causes like storm damages and technical failures are the most common reasons. Sabotage, cyberattacks, and other purposefully-executed operations can have similar effects. All of these risk factors have, more or less, local effects. However, there is one known force that can do devastating damage to our electric grid globally – the sun.

THE SUN AND CORONAL MASS EJECTIONS: THE BIGGEST POSSIBLE THREAT TO HUMAN SECURITY?

We are just starting to understand the full capacity of our neighbouring star. The sun can not only warm the planet and create the possibility for life, but it can also send devastating amounts of radiation and changed particles that are

able to interfere with our sensitive, critical infrastructure. During early September 1859, a massive cloud of charged particles, released by a coronal mass ejection (CME), collided with our planet. Luckily, electricity was not in widespread use at that time and only some telegraph infrastructure suffered damage. The National Academy of Sciences, a respected NGO from the United States, has predicted that if an event of this level were to happen now, the damages could cost trillions of dollars and repairs could take up to a decade. The effects would also be global.

It is not only these large numbers that make CMEs a challenge. Normally, charged particles take two to three days to reach earth and light up the aurora skies in the polar regions. If the conditions are right, however, or wrong for us, the charged particle cloud can collide with our magnetic field in less than a day. There are ways to observe and predict the severity of the event, but even with a prediction there will be little time to prepare for this solar storm. The whole planet needs to be able to get ready in mere hours of a prediction.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PROTECT THE WORLD FROM CMES?

Despite its damages, such an instance would not be the end of the world. Like the outcome of the 1859 Carrington event, societal disruption would not necessarily ensue. Even nowadays, mobile phones, radios, and computers would not be affected. Instead, the large transformers at the end of high voltage power lines would bear the majority of the damage. This would start an unwanted domino effect that would render these modern apparatuses useless.

There are two strategies that would be able to mitigate damage to modern society. For both strategies, international cooperation plays a key role.

The first option is a pre-emptive one. We have to make our critical infrastructure more resilient

and adaptive. In this way it would be possible to shut down vulnerable parts through controlled means. Deliberate global blackout requires intergovernmental cooperation and private sector involvement as well. Information has to be reliable and shared with all parties within minutes and hours of an early warning. In a modern, interdependent society, it is crucial to ensure that all players are involved and informed. There would be dire global consequences even if only a single region would suffer considerably.

If we look at how major global crises are currently dealt with, it does not seem promising that the whole world notices, shares information, and decides on given global issues within a few days, or even over the course of several years. This emerging threat would require unified action within hours.

The second option is not desirable, but is more probable. In the unfortunate event that we would not be able to prevent the catastrophe pre-emptively, other factors might be able to mitigate negative outcomes. After the event, we could target relief operations to the most critical areas, like transformer manufacturing facilities and repairing engineering capacities. If cities are rendered inhospitable and millions of people are affected, the hardest part will be directing the focus of relief efforts, especially across multiple countries. Identifying first priorities is close to impossible in the chaos that follows such a catastrophe, hence, some international plans should be developed beforehand.

Luckily, we have not experienced such a situation yet, however, there have been close calls. For example, we barely missed a Carrington scale event in 2012. If a CME had hit the earth, there would not have been enough knowledge about this issue. And even although we missed an eruption in 2012, it is predicted that there is a 12 percent chance that we will not be as lucky in the next ten years. If nothing is done to prepare, it will be a most daring gamble with millions of lives at stake.



THE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION

This is not a gamble that we want to take part in, hence, it is best to identify all the possible mitigating factors and implement them. A first option is to create credible institutions that can effectively share information and develop an early-warning system. Standard operation procedures at a national level and in the private sector also have to be enacted. And last but not least, we need to strengthen critical infrastructure and start creating a society that is more informed and resilient regarding this type of emerging threat. For the second option, we need

to conduct a ‘triage of transformers’. This means evaluating and listing areas, places, factories, and transformers that are the most important globally. This triage can be used to develop the best emergency response system.

Even if, for one reason or another, we do not do any of these preparations, the aurora borealis and australis would at least be seen in high latitudes, such as in Havana, Mumbai, Hong Kong, Pretoria, and Rio de Janeiro. In the worst possible scenario, billions of people would see this amazing spectacle just before civilisation would plummet into a new Dark Age.

This is the sixth yearbook published by the Finnish Committee for European Security (STETE). This yearbook compiles together articles from speakers from STETE events and other experts from their fields from around the world. Without a doubt, the largest and most sought after topic for the year 2014 was the crisis in Ukraine. This publication will take many different viewpoints on this topic, exploring it from several different angles and bringing forward important sides that some of us may not have considered. In the light of recent events and the critique different media outlets, Russian or Western, have received, it is increasingly important to bring together professionals from different backgrounds and different fields to these hot topics. Politics and media is getting more controversy seeking and populist, and this is increasing the importance of organisations such as STETE to act against this trend and bring a different source of information to those who are interested in the security of Europe.

The work of the Finnish Committee for European Security is to enhance the existing dialogue on broad security issues between politicians, civil servants, researchers, civil society actors and non-governmental organisations. For nearly 50 years, STETE has pursued this by organising seminars on various different topics together with a multitude of different actors. In addition to this STETE has published year books, bulletins and books on topical themes such as the publication on the Nordic Forum – also appearing in spring 2015.

Even though the topic of Ukraine is more than dominating in discussions on European Security, our yearbook has also explored many other aspects of security: the Mediterranean area, energy security, corporate responsibility and the prevention of torture, to name a few.

In 2014 STETE organised several seminars, the Nordic Forum in Tromsø, and attended the OSCE civil society forum in Basel in December. This publication also explores themes from this event and from experts from outside of STETE's organised seminars.