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Tromsø is situated at the gateway to the Arctic region, but it is also very near the Barents region. For these reasons, Tromsø was an excellent venue for the Nordic Forum for Security Policy 2014.

The University of Tromsø provided an attractive venue for the conference and, in addition to that, lots of other support for the Nordic Forum 2014, and we organizers are very thankful of that.

The Arctic and Barents cooperation is experiencing an intensive period of attention with important implications, not least to the people living in these regions and through them to the civil society. Therefore, the theme of the Nordic Forum 2014 is extremely timely. This cooperation has a global importance beyond these regions and includes environment and climate, security and political governance, economic development and fundamental human rights for the indigenous peoples.

Against this background it was an evident task for the three organizers – including the Swedish OSCE-network, the Finnish Committee for European Security STETE together with the Norwegian Helsinki Committee as part of the civil society in the Nordic countries interested in broader security issues – to initiate and support this Nordic Forum.

Basically there are three reasons why this conference was so timely and important. First of all, the issues involved underline the importance of the concept of broader security, i.e. security beyond military security.

Second, the formats of both Arctic and Barents cooperation promote security in different ways by its inclusive, broad and bottom up approaches. Third, the issues involved touch forcibly on the civil society but they are not always profoundly discussed. Thus, we have a task to disseminate and study these issues in the Nordic Forum for security policy.

With the impressive list of excellent speakers and with a great mixture of experiences we were entitled to set ambitious aims for the conference. It is important to examine what will the improvement in the Arctic and Barents regions mean to the peoples in terms of social and economic quality of life, societal security and hard security, human rights including minority rights and in terms of people-to-people contacts and cultural interchange.

Finally, I hope the modest “tripartite” Nordic NGO-conference will lead to further discussions and other gatherings on these important issues taking a truly bottom-up perspective.

Anders Bjurner
Chairman of the Swedish OSCE Network

**FOREWORD**

**PÅBEGYNNE**

**PART I**

**COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC AND BARENTS REGIONS**

Photo: Johannes Jansson / Norden.org
Nordic and North Calotte cooperation from the late 1950s and 1960s established a common base – with contacts, shared values, and projects – which prepared Finland, Norway, and Sweden to extend their regional commitments abroad after the end of the Cold War. The arrangements for cross-border cooperation have been adopted in this new era, first with the creation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992.

A starting point for new initiatives in the far north was presented during Soviet leader Michail Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech in September 1987. In his speech, which was directed to Nordic neighbors, Gorbachev proposed four civilian and two military subjects for northern international cooperation: environment, research, utilization of natural resources, and the potential opening of the northeast sea passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific, as well as completing nuclear tests and advancing the disarmament of sea-based nuclear warheads.

The Finnish reaction came immediately after the speech and the “Rovaniemi movement” started with the setting up of an Arctic Centre. In cooperation with the University of Lapland contacts, conferences, and research initiatives (particularly in the environmental field) have been undertaken in the North Calotte, the Barents region, and the circumpolar area. Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sten Andersson recommended counties and municipalities in Northern Sweden to start twinning contacts with partners in northwest Russia.

Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Foreign Minister of Norway, suspected that new dividing lines in Europe would develop after the Cold War because of the remarkable differences in welfare standards between the East and the West. This would need to be confronted with strengthened regional cross-border cooperation, and for that reason, Stoltenberg suggested the establishment of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), which took place in Kirkenes on January 11th, 1993. Stoltenberg received a positive response from the first foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Russia, Andrej Kozyrev, who facilitated the decision. Norway, Finland, Sweden, Russia, and the European Union were the founding members of BEAR, and a number of other countries and organizations representing indigenous peoples became observers. A regional council was set up to carry out measures at the regional level in cooperation with BEAR.

Norway is a leading actor in the Barents cooperation, due in part to the country’s strategic interests in the North. Kirkenes is the center for the overall cooperation. Barents’ international and Norwegian offices, its regional councils and the Barents Institute – in close cooperation with the University of Tromsø (a more scientific-oriented university) – are located in this town.

Sweden, however, has been lagging behind due to its different foreign policy priorities and a weak national and regional structure for engaging in such efforts.

Canada took the initiative to establish the Arctic Council for Arctic Cooperation in 1997, first giving priorities to combating environmental problems. Military issues were not seen as a matter for the Council. Eight nations are members of the Council and six organizations for indigenous people are closely following its work, as are several other countries.

Norway has become an active party and currently hosts the international secretariat of the Arctic Council in Tromsø. From the start, Finland and Sweden were more cautious actors in Arctic cooperation, but have been more active after holding presidencies in the Council.
The Arctic has become a focal point of interest for actors who, for a long time, have had no or nearly no presence in the north, actors such as China and the EU. Climatic changes and technological developments have made the rich natural resources of the Arctic more accessible for human exploitation. Alas, many of the actors from outside the Arctic show little or no understanding of the challenges that these developments entail both for the humans living here, and for the vulnerable environment and wildlife. Many seem to think that the Arctic is a resource-rich area with a hostile climate that is devoid of human beings and civilization. Although the Arctic is more sparsely populated than, say, continental Europe, it is actually quite crowded in the sense that all the human activities taking place here take up large parts of the territory and put great strains on the environment.

The renewed interest in the Arctic shown by international shipping and extractive industries is but a case in point of interests that pose enormous challenges for the people living here. Increased pressures to grant mining and shipping rights to international companies are hard to fend off to governments and local authorities that are less than competent. It is an open question whether the Arctic can muster enough political talent to handle the big international actors. It is of the uppermost importance that the peoples of the Arctic retain their autonomy and dignity in the decision-making processes and do not merely become bystanders in the development of their own region.

What are needed, then, are scientific knowledge, education and political talent. As we cannot take anything with regard to these factors for granted, we need to actively engage ourselves in the development of the Arctic. UiT, the Arctic university of Norway, is aiming at doing its part, as demonstrated in the new strategy adopted in 2014. It has five strategic fields of research, among which the area called community development and democratization. This emphasis on the human factor in the Arctic is long overdue.

For a very long time, the focus in the Arctic has very much been on natural sciences and technology. The fact that traditionally huge actors in the Arctic, such as Russia, and new actors, such as China, are lacking the most pivotal element of modern governance, i.e. representative democracy, has generally been overlooked by the proponents of extractive industries. The mobilization of indigenous peoples, and the increased focus on land rights acknowledged by the UN pose new challenges to the traditional “hard” security-driven politics of the great powers. A shift from the traditional state-centered focus on military security to a concept of security more focused on humans, i.e. the so-called “human security” promoted by Canada and Norway, poses new challenges as we face the interests of the great powers. If the inhabitants of the Arctic fail to become autonomous actors in the region, the area will easily be left open to the battling interests of the great powers, who often have very limited knowledge of how life is lead here at the top of the world.

Thus, the main areas of priority are to help promote economic, cultural and social development in the north through building knowledge and human capital. Therefore it is important for the research and education in the Arctic to be at the international forefront in the following areas:

a) Energy, climate, society and environment
Understanding what happens in the Arctic is key to understanding global climate change. Thus, we need to develop cutting-edge knowledge on the causes and effects of changes in the climate and the environment, conventional and renewable energy production, and social adaptation to changes in the climate and the environment. Further, particular emphasis should be put on the indigenous peoples’ competence and the challenges indigenous peoples face due to climate change, and how their knowledge can contribute to the development of resilient and sustainable communities.

b) Technology
In a region characterized by long distances and a challenging climate, new technological solutions are needed to deliver welfare to the people living here. Therefore, we need to develop cutting-edge knowledge on technological solutions that promote broad and inclusive social development and a diverse business development in the north. These solutions have to include technology that rises to the challenges related to health, external environment and safety, and digital competence in education.

c) Health, welfare and quality of life
Attractive communities in the north depend on the best schools, health services and other services that promote people’s quality of life. Therefore we need to develop our knowledge on public health, preventing and curing diseases and improving living conditions for all age groups. Furthermore, we need to build knowledge on childhood and learning as well as technological, legal and other societal solutions for the welfare society. We need to study the role of the Sami language, culture, quality of life and art in and of themselves, and as elements in the development of society and business.

d) Community development and democratization
Society development and democratization rely on inclusion of the entire population through education, work and involvement. We need to demonstrate our global engagement through, e.g. collaboration with institutions of...
research and education in the South. Thus, knowledge of the competence requirements of the welfare state and high-quality vocational studies are required. Further, there is a dire need to develop knowledge on the societal and cultural changes stemming from globalization and from technological, demographic, social, legal, and economic changes. The basis for collaboration and potential conflicts in the High North need to be thoroughly understood in order to enhance the promotion of culture and identity through research, dissemination and art. In this work, gender equality in the context of regional, national and global developments is pivotal.

5) Sustainable use of resources

Economic growth in the north is based on the continued (and increased) use of natural resources. Thus, we need to extend our knowledge of the interaction between traditional and new industries pertaining to economics, culture and international law. The long-standing research on sustainable use of marine resources, including (but not limited to) fisheries, aquaculture and marine biotechnology, is paramount in order to identify the prerequisites for sustainable resource management and development.

A glance at the circumpolar north of the Arctic Circle reveals that Northern Norway is a hub in terms of population density and scientific research and education. Thus, it is only natural that UiT, the Arctic University of Norway, emphasizes the human presence in the High North. This means that humanities and social sciences will play an important part in the research and education in and for the Arctic. Within the natural sciences, we note an increasing understanding of the importance of humanities and social sciences, although these strands of research have often been relegated to a secondary position within the large research programs.

UIT, the Arctic University of Norway, is the northernmost university of the world. Its location on the edge of the Arctic implies a mission. The Arctic is of increasing global importance. Climate change, the exploitation of Arctic resources, and environmental threats are topics of great public concern, which the university takes special interest in. The advantage of the Arctic University of Norway is that we can explore global issues from a close-up perspective.

The university is a founding member of the University of the Arctic, an international network of 140 study and research institutions of the circumpolar region. But the university cooperates with institutions from all around the world. More than two hundred international agreements secure an active academic exchange of students and staff with partner institutions worldwide. In order to strengthen the strategic position of scientific research and education in the north, the University of Tromsø merged with the University College of Tromsø in 2009. On 1 August 2013 the University merged with the University College of Finnmark. The new university has now four campuses. They are located in Tromsø, Alta, Hammerfest and Kirkenes.

In January 2016, the university will merge with the regional University Colleges of Harstad and Narvik. The number of students and study programs increases due to this merger. The new university will hopefully become an even more important driving force for Northern Norway and international cooperation in the High North. The foundations for a successful role in the much needed building of human and social capital are laid, and it is now up to us, the inhabitants of the Arctic, with the help from friends from non-arctic regions and particularly our fellow Nordic citizens, to see to it that we are able to become autonomous actors in the development of our own region.
primary task now is to focus on maintaining the achievements of the common work, ensure the safe development of cooperation in the future, and further exploit our joint potential to promote traditions of good neighborhood, mutual trust, respect and tolerance – things beneficial to all our countries and citizens.

The policy towards stronger development of people-to-people relationships should be anchored in the long-term objectives of the intergovernmental structures and bodies like the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and other cooperation platforms in the region. The NGO cooperation should be integrated in the scope of the regional programs (cross-border and trans-regional) and international activities. We have to admit that the potential of people-to-people diplomacy is still underestimated and not fully used.

The NGOs should be strongly supported in their endeavor to continue cooperation as a channel of interaction between civil societies of the BSR. Civic organizations of the region have a long experience in cooperation in many fields such as health care and social wellbeing, environment, education, human rights and civic participation. All the favorable conditions should be provided for that cooperation. But do they really exist for the time being or do we just hear beautiful declarations about the importance of such “human dimension” in cooperation? Do we really have enough instruments and mechanisms to support them, not only morally, but also practically and financially? One still has to doubt it.

The next two to three years can be even more challenging. There are no financial instruments foreseen for the support of NGO projects and activities for any BS country, including Russia. Some of the funds have concluded the previous financial period, and haven’t launched a new one yet, and some are difficult for NGOs to access due to very complicated application procedures and tough competition, in which the preference is always given to so called “hard” projects instead of “soft” ones, which are mostly about networking, partnership-building and experience exchange – in other words the types of activities typical for NGOs. At first glance, the results of such “soft” activities seem less tangible than the “hard” ones, but when they are examined more closely they turn out to be no less essential indeed, since these are exactly what we need to promote traditions of good neighborhood, mutual trust and respect. In that context, it is important to keep in mind that NGOs normally have very limited recourses for international activities. Unlike municipalities and other public institutions; they are highly dependent on outside project funding and therefore face problems of surviving in between project cycles.

Do we really need/want NGOs to be a part of international cooperation?

If the answer is yes, we have to take into consideration the existing variety of NGOs, and consider a whole spectrum of NGO-sector specifics and needs: to be flexible in formulation of the priorities; to leave a wide range of foci to make it easier to adjust the project ideas; to motivate participation of smaller and less developed NGOs together with more advanced and sustainable ones; to encourage the cross-sectorial approach by local actors from different sectors to be in the same project team – stimulating the participation of municipalities, academia and small businesses in projects together with NGOs; to reconsider the criteria of evaluation of the NGO-projects giving the “soft” projects the similar high priority as “hard” projects; to perceive NGOs not only as a service producing force but also as creative and innovative actors.

If we intend to maintain close relations between our countries at the citizens’ level, we should really sound the alarm. The establishment of some kind of a Baltic Sea “Human Dimension” Fund available for NGOs from the eleven countries could become a good and timely solution.

Despite all of the challenges and barriers to overcome in the current situation, people of neighboring countries should join forces to find effective solutions, and make our region a safer and more comfortable place for all its citizens.

Proofreading: Tero Laurakari
Jana Datcenko, a Russian journalist in Arkhangelsk, discusses the situation of media in Russia. Although the work of a Russian journalist is difficult, there are moments that bring success. According to Datcenko, the most important moments that a journalist should highlight are often the most ordinary ones.

Journalism and Civil Society in the Arkhangelsk Region

The understanding of journalism in Russia and in the Scandinavian countries is very different. To explain, most of the media in Russia is “governmental”. For example, the founder and the owner of my newspaper is the government of the Arkhangelsk region and, in particular, the governor. The owner and the publishing house handle different documents called “contracts for information services”. Thanks to the money that we get from these contracts, we as a newspaper are able to exist. This is the way that most Russian media channels are able to survive at the moment.

Advertising Authority

We can talk a lot about how the situation with the media should be in reality. Our country is positioning itself as a democratic and legal state. You may think that this is a lie. Maybe sometimes these things look different than we want them to. But this is a reality in which we must live and work. This is essential for our existence.

I remember my first day at work after university. When I came to the newspaper, I was given a paper with the title “state order”. The topic that I was to write about was explained, including who I needed to talk to, what the amount of text needed to be, and what needed to be covered. I was shocked. After all, we were taught very different fundamental principles of journalism during my studies. Leaving the university, we all thought that we would be free and independent thinkers and writers.

Now I relate to this “order” as well as to its advertising. I write these texts under a pen name and I do not put myself in them. Yes, I understand that a journalist should not write advertisements. But if we do not do it, we would not be paid at all because the “state order” and “agreement with the regional government” must be obeyed. If we did not follow the orders, our media house might be closed, and other people would fill our roles.

Self-Censorship and the Freedoms Permissible

On the other hand, a lot depends on the journalists, the editors, and their self-censorship. I am lucky in that my editor is a well-known journalist in our city and in the Barents Press. Her name is Elena Dolinitsina. She understands that if every page of our newspaper would contain the words of the governor and his ministers, readers would not be happy, and such a newspaper would not be interesting at all.

So we all try to find interesting stories and people involved in cultural and social events. This is the second part of our work. For this part we have no limits, and we have total freedom of speech. Also, my editor believes that we are not obliged to strictly follow what the government tells us to write on the “order”. In fact, she allows us to write what we want.

Permissible Criticism

Our newspaper, for example, can also criticize the mayor and the city administration. We do this, and as it turns out, it is quite useful. Our publications often help settle some urban questions, but not always. Sometimes we need to be very ingenious in order to perform our professional duties. In critical texts I always try to offer the readers different points of view. For example, in my article, “Family for Survival”, I write about a large family with many children and the difficulties they face. I offer information from the authorities and the guardianship and custody agencies’ points of view, as well as the family’s own opinions.

Another example is my article about Eduard Broznyakov. He is a survivor of the siege of Leningrad by Nazis during World War II. The article is called “The Dream of the Veterans’ Home”, and is a story about Broznyakov, who cannot receive what is rightfully his by law. He is disabled and lives in a wooden house in poor conditions – without a shower or a bathtub, and with broken-down windows. The authorities, however, claim that such conditions are acceptable. His children do not take care of him. One of them is an alcoholic and the other is also handicapped. Broznyakov is ready to give up his city apartment and move to the veterans’ house, which is possible by Russian law, but the city government does not want him to do this. He could have access to a doctor and to better living conditions if he was allowed to move. But even after we published this article, the city administration’s decision remained unchanged. Our lawyer is still working on this topic and is trying to help this man.

Information Deficit

It is interesting that the officials of the regional government, who are on friendly terms with us, give us information quickly and with relative ease. All we need to do is call or write an e-mail. Getting information, however, from the officials of the city administration is another story. We need to write an official request on official letterhead and send it by fax, and they will answer only after seven days. Naturally, this slows down the process of our work and we are oftentimes required to publish critical articles without their comments. In these instances, we have to print texts after the facts are corrected.

The Mayor’s press office often takes advantage of our information on the occasion that we have not published it yet. For example, when we have information and we ask for a comment from the city authorities, we write a request, but instead of responding or answering us, they work to alter information on their own website.

Jana Datcenko, a Russian journalist in Arkhangelsk, talks about the challenges of journalism in her region.
An example of this is pinpointed in my text, “Paleozoic in the City Center,” which describes the conditions of urban cemeteries.  

After I called the press office to ask for comments on this, the press-secretary literally begged me not to publish anything in our newspaper without their comments. After an hour, he published the information from a positive point of view on their own website. It’s also a common fact that the mayor and other famous politicians cannot stand criticism. If we ask difficult questions, the mayor tends to say: “You were paid to criticize me”. Perhaps this is characteristic of the mentality of all Russians, that criticism is not welcomed.

**Trying to be free**

In our city, we have other media that consider themselves independent. For example, the site “29.ru” is a federal network of sites with advertisements about vacancies, cars, houses, etc. The advantage of the Internet is that journalists can express their opinions in the form of blogs. In Arkhangelsk, we also have a quality newspaper, “Business Class”, which has a specific economic approach. Unfortunately, policy issues and issues relating to elderly people are not of interest to them.

**HOW TO BE USEFUL**

It is a fact that working in the Russian media is difficult. Sometimes we are forced to write something we do not want to write. But this has not stopped me from loving my profession. Members of civil society, our readers, still perceive newspapers and television as a basic need, something that is with you every day and helps solve social problems. I am confident that we as journalists can help by delivering these reports and framing issues that affect people’s lives. So far, I see this as the goal of our work: telling the stories of ordinary people and, if possible, helping those who need it.

**REFERENCES**


**THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THE NORTH AND THE DIMENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS**

Photo: Leif Jørgensen / Norden.org
Non-governmental organizations and the Russian regime

After Putin returned to the Kremlin in 2012, the internal political agenda of the Russian Federation acquired a repressive character. The regime began a point-by-point transformation from soft authoritarianism to a totalitarian political system. Political repression and penal sanctions against opposition, human rights, the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and election liberty have become systematic, controlled, and successive.

Such internal political development cannot but affect the rights and freedoms of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the Russian North, who are an integral part of Russian civil society.

Legislation that restricts the activity of non-governmental organizations, including the famous law on “foreign agents”, limits the freedom of cooperation. Russian indigenous organizations cannot cooperate with their foreign partners, including donors and partner organizations of indigenous peoples in other countries. Some of these organizations, for example, information centres of indigenous peoples that compose a network in different Russian regions, were closed or had to limit their activities because of the authorities’ arrangements and accusations, as well as a lack of financing due to their reduced fundraising opportunities. Some of these centres received instructions from prosecutor offices that they had to sign up in the register as foreign agents.

Some pro-government mass media channels in different regions have started a campaign to discredit indigenous leaders. This includes accusations that such leaders are being funded by foreigners to lobby for the interests of foreign states. Leaders and activists of indigenous peoples have become afraid of criticizing Russian authorities in public events, including in conferences organized outside of Russia.

Russian authorities have started to control elections of the leaders of independent non-governmental organizations and indigenous peoples’ associations, including the biggest all-Russian organization, the “Association of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East”. Through blackmailing and delivering threats, the authorities endorse candidates who represent indigenous peoples but who are loyal to the government, and in this way transform non-governmental organizations of indigenous peoples into GONGOs (governmental NGOs). In some cases, the authorities have tried to shut down organizations of indigenous peoples considered not to be loyal to them.

Growing political tendencies and indigenous peoples

In 2014, the new geopolitical crisis regarding the situation in Crimea heightened tensions between Russia and the West. At the same time this crisis furthered internal political tendencies of the past years, including the tendency to limit the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens.

The obstacles that have emerged impact the indigenous peoples’ movement because their movement is considered to be a potential threat for Russian state security and territorial integrity, according to the Kremlin’s understanding. The Federal Security Service – FSB (Федеральная служба безопасности – ФСБ) – or the secret service activity promotes this view, and is responsible for state security and countering espionage. According to the FSB, organizations of indigenous peoples could be misused by Western intelligence agencies to raise ethnic tensions in Russia, to organize protests against the central authorities, and to destroy the territorial integrity of the state, including the creation of separate state entities with the help and protection of the West. This point of view is rather absurd because of the extreme scarcity and lack of organization of indigenous peoples of the Russian North. Nevertheless, this idea started to prevail in the Russian siloviks’ (representatives of Russian power ministries and the secret service) agenda.

In 2014, a key role in the development of this doctrine occurred with the forced integration of the Crimean territory into the Russian state. According to any UN definitions, the Crimean Tartars are an indigenous group. Their own sentiments, however, as well as their opposition to the referendum for unifying Crimea with Russia, were completely disregarded in this takeover. The Crimean Tartars’ unwillingness to become Russian citizens brought FSB accusations that indigenous leaders and their organizations are increasing “non-loyalty” and “insecurity”. The Kremlin’s fear of Crimean Tartars as a “threat to Russian state integrity” also impacted other national movements in Russia, including the movement of Crimean Tartars to become Russian citizens.
of small-numbered indigenous peoples of the Russian North. As a consequence, the Kremlin aimed to take complete control over indigenous peoples’ organizations.

As we have seen, this negative development was immediately supported by Russian businesses that used the particularities of the new Russian political environment to their advantage. Russian political and business representatives used emerging hysteria concerning indigenous peoples’ and their leaders’ relations with the West to identify them as “non-loyal elements” that threaten the Russian state and its economic development. For purely practical reasons, business agents started to take advantage of the political environment to push aside indigenous peoples and limit their access to natural resources. Indigenous peoples are seen as competitors from a business point of view, and the current political environment in Russia has negatively impacted indigenous groups’ abilities to operate.

**Repression of Russian indigenous peoples’ organizations**

In September 2014, Russian indigenous leaders were restricted from participating in the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples in New York. This incident showed how Russian authorities are trying to restrict alternative information from being circulated in the international arena and are seeking to limit indigenous leaders’ involvement in international public forums. The international contacts of Russian indigenous peoples, including partner organizations, are at risk. This repression of indigenous organizations continues to grow, and can be seen for other indigenous groups throughout the international community.

Indigenous peoples who live in the border area of two or more countries, for example, the Inuits, Aleuts, and Sami, are at particular risk. Events in the Murmansk region during the preparations of the regional Sami congress showed that the authorities are trying to make indigenous leaders look like “separatists” who have received funds from the West to work against Russian sovereign interests. These situations will continue to take place in the future.

**Russia’s difficult economic situation and its consequences**

The economic situation in Russia has deteriorated dramatically over the last few months. It is inevitable that, in the near future, Russian authorities will have no choice but to announce urgent economic and political liberalization of the country, which will cause the synchronized resignation of the country’s political leadership. The other option is the unexpected package of emergency legislation that would then transform Russia into a quasi-military status country. This could lead to the strengthening of state control over the economy, currency exchange, and may even bring about the abolition of elections, etc. The result of the economic crisis could be war. These last two options could unfortunately be implemented jointly.

At the same time, it is quite obvious that the financial cushion that was established due to high oil prices will give Putin the opportunity to slow down the process of economic degradation to prevent violent protests in the near future.

As a result, we have to prepare for at least three processes. First of all, the confrontation between Putin and the West will grow in the forthcoming years, as well as internal political repression against civil society — including indigenous peoples. Second, things will not change very fast regarding Russia’s political environment, including the fact that Putin’s personality cult is growing constantly, and there is a lack of alternative political leadership due in part to the repression of his opponents. Putin is obviously capable of using force to crush civil protests, as well as promote strength through his own personal motivations. The third process is about the Russian regime, which will probably survive in spite of the West’s sanctions and its activity of Russian opposition. Undoubtedly, these factors influence Putin’s political stability, and any changes that will be brought about will not necessarily take immediate effect.

**What can be done?**

In light of the above, and despite the long-term nature of this issue, even today we must consider the inevitable changes that Russia’s political environment will face after Putin’s regime. Unfortunately, we have learned from other political environments like Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia that the fall of a totalitarian regime will not necessarily improve the socio-economic situation of the country, or bring more security, democracy, and prosperity. This means that the end of Putin’s era will not automatically bring a return of democracy to Russia. How to prevent Russia from transforming into an unpredictable, aggressive environment is an important question for security experts to consider.

If we return to the problems concerning indigenous peoples, we need to remember the importance of trans-border people-to-people contacts. Culture, sports, and education in some ways have been, even in Soviet Union times, a matter of cooperation between the West and Russia. Cooperation in these fields was crucial even in the coldest of years in the Cold War. It is important to remember this experience and give such values a new modern application.

Human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights must be on the agenda of cooperation, including working with the small-numbered indigenous peoples of the Russian North. We also have to remember that in times like these, such cooperation might be dangerous for indigenous activists in Russia, so it is crucial to pay attention to security issues and to only cooperate with people who are sincerely working in this sphere.

To conclude on a more optimistic note, indigenous peoples of the Russian North were able to survive during centuries of the Russian Empire, but also for decades of assimilation and cultural pressure when the Soviet Union existed. I hope that we as well will be able to survive during the hard times of Putin’s regime. In all instances, the most important things for indigenous peoples have been their culture, traditions, songs, languages, hunting, fishing, reindeer herding, etc. If we will be able to preserve this heritage today, indigenous peoples will be able to survive in the future.

**Additional Notes**

Several indigenous leaders were not able to participate in the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples in September 2014 because of the obstacles established by Russian authorities. Two leaders, Anna Naikakhchina and Rodion Sulyandziga, were stopped in the Sheremetyevo international airport because border officers cut their passports and stopped them in the airport. In Crimea, border control is a part of the FSB secret service. One indigenous representative from Karelia, Zinaida Stragolshikova, found her apartment door blocked and ended up missing her plane. Two representatives of the Sami people from the Murmansk region, Valentina Savkina and Alexander Anvala, were stopped several times by police on their way to the airport and also missed their plane. The two, however, were able to change their tickets and traveled the next day. In Crimea, several unknowns grabbed the passport of Crimean Tartar activist Nadir Bekirov, so he was not able to cross the border in order to participate in the conference. Independent experts agree that these intimidating actions were organized by Russian authorities to stop the critiques of independent indigenous leaders during the conference. More details can be found here: https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/1687340.html (in Russian) and here: http://barentsobserver.com/en/politics/2014/09/alarming-situation-indigenous-peoples-russia-23-09 (in English).
Already in 1751 our Sami nation was acknowledged in an annex of the border treaty between two belligerent countries – the kingdom of Denmark-Norway and the kingdom of Sweden. 260 years later, the Swedish Parliament adopted the new constitution where the Sami are mentioned as a people of their own.

Today, the Sami parliament is the only legitimate representative of the Sami peoples, and it is this parliament that upholds and defends the Sami culture. Our lands and territories are at the core of our existence – we are the land and the land is us – we have a distinct spiritual and material relationship to our territories that is inextricably linked to our survival. Once our lands and territories are devastated, we risk losing our traditional culture and disappearing as an indigenous people.

The importance of the ILO Convention

The spirituality of the indigenous peoples and our close connection to nature is recognized in the ILO Convention No. 169. The convention stipulates that dominating peoples should invite indigenous peoples to begin a process of establishing methods of consultations for issues affecting their livelihoods.

This is based on two fundamental principles: respect for indigenous peoples and for our participation in decision-making processes. It is also a recognition that indigenous peoples – with their culture and traditions – are valuable to the nation-state in which they live. The respect shown for indigenous peoples and their participation in decision-making processes also makes it clear for the citizens, including the dominating peoples, that the existence of indigenous peoples is beneficial to a country.

It is very difficult for dominating groups to realize the importance of our spirituality and close connection to nature. This is something that belongs to the basic principles that lie behind ILO No. 169, and is therefore more important than human rights instruments that do not contain such an approach or attitude.

Sweden and Finland have for a long time rejected strengthening the Sami peoples’ rights, claiming that it is not in the interests of the dominating people in the republic or in the kingdom to ensure others’ rights, just as the law already grants to the Sami peoples. This was more or less informally confirmed, especially during the Swedish chairmanship of the European Union during 2009, where activities that involved indigenous people within the boundaries of EU could not be seen.

To quote the Kimberley Declaration, adopted by the indigenous peoples summit on sustainable development in Kimberley, South Africa, in 2002:

“Since 1992 the ecosystems of the earth have been compounding in change. We are in crisis. We are in an accelerating spiral of climate change that will not abide unsustainable greed. Today we reaffirm our relationship to Mother Earth and our responsibility to coming generations to uphold peace, equity and justice. We continue to pursue the commitments made at Earth Summit/in Rio 1992 as reflected in this political declaration and the accompanying plan of action. The commitments that were made to Indigenous Peoples in Agenda 21, including our full and effective participation, have not been implemented due to the lack of political will.”

The impact of the EU on living conditions in Sápmi

The situation on the Swedish side of Sápmi was quite seriously aggravated after Sweden’s admittance into the European Union in 1995. The government made the decision to focus on the production of energy, both in the form of fast-growing trees and in the production of electric energy, ready to be transferred down to the biggest cities in the European continent by the end of 2015.

Once, slow-growing trees could be found in old forests with rich diversity and with small rivers containing fresh waters, and these forests were the source for a limited production of high quality timber. These kinds of Sami forests have now been replaced with forests of fast-growing trees of low quality and with a lack of diversity. These new forests are a threat to the remainder of the old Sami culture.

The decreasing average age of forests affects the production of lichen, both in the trees as well as in the ground, and severely damages the food chain for reindeers. The possibility for a large herd of reindeer to graze in any
area is diminishing. Less numbers of reindeers, more widely-spread herds, lower production of reindeer calves and kilos of meat, as well as more work for reindeer herders is the result.

**The importance of a sustainable environment**

“Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and [is] not merely the absence of damage or infirmity”. This is the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) definition of health that has been in use for over forty years.

• The production of food that is produced locally or regionally is extremely important. Transports are kept to a reasonable level and Sweden as a country can demonstrate its accountability. In northern Sweden, more than twenty percent of our food comes from regional production, and all other food must be imported in refrigerated trucks.

• The international interest as well as the participation of Sami entrepreneurs in slow growing enterprises and with local transports are kept to a reasonable, and Sweden as a country can demonstrate its accountability. In northern Sweden, more than twenty percent of our food comes from regional production, and all other food must be imported in refrigerated trucks.

• The last years’ financial crisis has revealed that major values can also lie in small and slow-growing enterprises and with local entrepreneurs. If we can show that the Sami way of living and that our traditional knowledge is appreciated by large EU countries, this will bring satisfaction, happiness, and make us more proud of our origin and qualities.

**Millennium goals and the future of reindeer herding**

The United Nations first Millennium goal is the eradication of extreme hunger and poverty. A conscious effort to eliminate the conditions for small-scale local food production is in contravention of this goal.

In the early 1990s, nearly 112 000 reindeer were slaughtered in Sweden. On an annual basis, as has been seen in recent years, only half of this number have been slaughtered. This decline may continue.

Natural fluctuations in the number of living reindeer and slaughtered reindeer will always occur, but the so-called progress in dominating society also affects the natural world and herds’ grazing grounds. How is it possible to keep the reindeer gathered in a bigger herd while grazing if the pasture is fragmented by roads, power-lines, clear-cut areas, windmill parks, etc.? Not only will the grazing of the reindeers become affected, but the search of predators for prey will also change.

It is possible that grazing reindeer-herds will be divided into smaller flocks and predators will be selecting different opportunities to look for prey. The protection that a single reindeer has from being a part of a bigger herd will diminish.

The growth-economy also strikes hard against small-scale farming in the Barents region. It does not seem possible to combine any production of food in the Arctic region with competition from the more efficient agriculture sector in the European continent.

Figures from Patchwork Barents, the Barents data pool, show a declining trend in the number of cattle in the Barents Region. For example, in the period from 1999-2012, the number of cattle went down almost one-third in Tromsø County.

**A colonial system — but signs of change**

In Sweden, there is no general principle of law that can protect Sami rights. We have a colonial system where justice is silent.

These are the words of Christina Allard, researcher and senior lecturer at Luleå University of Technology. It sounds obvious, though there is a lot of dynamite behind these words.

The Sami have fought against this colonial Swedish justice system for the last forty years, with lengthy and costly legal processes. We mostly have lost. Thus, the Swedish legal system provides no protection because the law does not recognize that the Sami have a special status compared to other groups in society.

The Sami parliament has taken control of creating our own future. In the opening of its 6th term in August 2013, the newly elected plenary made a unanimous statement. The statement concerned mining activities in Jokkmokk municipality and was made visible to the Swedish state authorities and society.

Another court decision was recently delivered concerning hunting rights for an individual reindeer herder in Västerbotten County. On 24 September, the Court of Appeal for Northern Norrland acquitted a reindeer herder in Västerbotten County. On 24 September, the Court of Appeal for Northern Norrland acquitted a reindeer herder in northern Sweden of hunting violations. The court stated:

“It does not follow from the Hunting Act, the hunting regulation or from the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations that it has been the intention of the legislator that the County administrative Board – as part of its authority to lay down additional conditions for the hunting – to issue a condition that so clearly makes Sami hunting rights dependent on private landowners’ willingness to agree.”

**Conclusion**

I opened the Sami parliament’s 67th plenary session, quoting parts of this case’s verdict. In this session, the strong support from indigenous peoples organizations, the UN, and other agencies could be felt as we reflected on our legal battles in numerous trials in courts in Europe and around the world. We could hear the echo of the statement of Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, the renowned indigenous activist, during the UN General Assembly on September 13th, 2007:

“[This day] will be remembered as the day when the United Nations and its members, together with indigenous peoples reconciled with the painful legacy of the past, jointly decided to wander – go together to the future on a road full of Human Rights”.

Today we will benefit more with enhanced cooperation between the Sami peoples and the local municipalities in the Arctic. It is very important that polarization does not spread from the European plain to the Arctic.

With these words I wish you all good health and a long life. I will end by quoting the Sami poet Paulus Uusi:

“As long as we have water, where fish live
As long as we have land
where reindeer graze and walk
As long as we have land
where the wild hides
We have consolation on this earth

Once our homes don’t exist any longer
and our lands are destroyed,
Where shall we then live?”

The rights of indigenous peoples, such as using traditional nature, are related to self-evident things, such as birth or death, as well as living in a territory that is recognized as an area for indigenous peoples.

To explain how it works, the Sami people who live in Murmansk have no special rights, but if they were to relocate to the Lovozero district, they would immediately receive the right to use natural resources in this area.

The suggested correction of the previously mentioned law has the aim to change this mechanism and create a register of indigenous peoples, as well as elaborate on the criteria for being referred to as ‘indigenous’. A point of criteria could be determining whether a group is involved in using traditional nature resources. This, however, is subjective and will not always be understood unanimously.

The second law to be edited is the law “On fishing and preservation of fishing bio-resources”, which describes the main fishing rights of indigenous peoples. The Federal Ministry of Regional Development was recently abolished and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Culture. The federal fishing agency prepared two law drafts with the aim of changing current indigenous rights.

Both drafts suggest to:

1. Totally change the concept of “fishing for the purposes of traditional livelihood and traditional nature use of indigenous peoples” (Art.1 of Federal Law #166). According to the drafted plans, traditional fishing of indigenous peoples must include only fishing for personal or family needs;

2. Exclude indigenous communities from the list of fishing users for the purposes of traditional livelihood and traditional nature use; and

3. Deny indigenous peoples the right to have fishing areas for long-term rent for the purposes of traditional livelihood and traditional nature.

In the last years, the main activities of OOSMO have included providing public legal assistance for the Sami of the Kola Peninsula on a more systematic basis. This activity has consisted of several elements that will be further discussed.

The main areas of this work include providing legal consultation, organizing seminars in “Murmansk oblast” settlements, and forming committees that are responsible for making decisions regarding Sami activities. For example, our newsletters contain information on the Sami people, including their traditional utilization of natural resources, as well as legislative work that is taking place on regional and federal levels. Since 2013, our organization has been promoting a project called “Information Legal Center of OOSMO” with the support of the Sami Council.

**Fishing as a traditional source of livelihood**

Fishing is one of the main types of economic activities for the Sami who live in the coastal areas of the Kola Peninsula. Russian legislation grants the right to indigenous people to use the water for the purposes of traditional fishing. A detailed analysis of these concrete legal norms is beyond the scope of this statement, but nevertheless, I will provide some essential legal elements below.

The legislation on fishing has to consider the interests of those who rely on fishing for their existence, including the small-numbered indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation. These groups have to receive access to water and its resources in order to sustain their livelihoods. The priorities of indigenous peoples, such as their right to use and breed wild animals, also applies to the indigenous peoples of the North. This includes not only the priority right to choose hunting and fishing areas, but also the exclusive right to hunt and fish in such areas by following certain time schedules.

In the last few years, however, there has been a tendency to revise the legislative rights of indigenous peoples. The suggestion has been made to change the Federal Law “on guarantees of small-numbered indigenous peoples”, and to reconsider the criteria for participation in this group.

**Preserving the rights of indigenous peoples**

The rights of indigenous peoples, such as using traditional nature, are being related to self-evident things, such as birth or death, as well as living in a territory that is recognized as an area for indigenous peoples.

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3. Deny indigenous peoples the right to have fishing areas for long-term rent for the purposes of traditional livelihood and traditional nature.
Contradicting perspectives on fishing

These proposed changes reduce the legal rights of indigenous peoples to use traditional natural resources. As a legal adviser of OOSMO, I sent comments on these legal initiatives to the regional as well as to the federal authorities.

A current challenge is the right of indigenous peoples to fish for wild Atlantic salmon. The regional government and governor currently support fishing for Atlantic salmon given the region’s unique preservation system and recreational conditions that limit fishing quotas. Unfortunately, this plan excludes Sami people, even though this group is the traditional user of rivers and bio-resources. It is difficult for the Sami people to work in the fishing industry because of their limited access.

Gaining results

When our organization started to work on this issue in 2012, tourist companies appealed to the authorities to not give Atlantic salmon quotas to the Sami people. They referred to the Sami as poachers, and that if they were given access to “their” rivers, the salmon stocks would be destroyed, which would harm the tourism industry. Businesses involved went so far as to suggest “returning to the Soviet era” when the Sami people were deprived of all of their rights, including the right to access salmon rivers on the Kola Peninsula.

Our organization has the task of maintaining dialogue between state authorities and water resource users, eg. the Sami people and tourism companies. State representatives are responsible for fishing economy issues, and they have to decide how and who has the right to use the salmon rivers.

For the first time since 2004, in 2013, the Sami people were able to work with welfare beneficiaries to obtain fishing permits on several rivers for discounted prices. We now have the aim to receive such permits without the need for such payments.

Since 2014, an OOSMO representative has been taking part in the Regional Commission for Anadromous Fishing, and we now have the ability to participate in meetings concerning the preparations of decisions for this Commission.

Since 2015, the OOSMO representative will also be included in the Northern Scientific Fisheries Advisory Council. This will give our organization the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes that will influence the rights of indigenous peoples.

In 2014, for the first time in history, an official fishing spot was established on the coast of the White Sea for Sami salmon fishing. Now we are working to establish a second fishing spot.

We hope that we will be able to continue assisting in the process of defending Sami peoples’ rights to use traditional nature according to their interests, and for the preservation of their traditional ways of life.

Language revitalization in Karelia

The International Native Language Day was celebrated in an unusual way in Karelia in 2014. Local activists were spreading leaflets about indigenous Karelians, including their population size, traditional history, proverbs, customs, and dishes. It seems ironic that in the republic named after its largest ethnic minority, basic knowledge about this ethnicity is limited and requires an informational leaflet.

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Karelian context: Indigenous rights in Russia

The case of Karelia is not unique. It mirrors the general situation for Russian indigenous peoples, which includes forty ethnic communities that reside in the country’s vast territory. Though these groups are different in many aspects, they are often united due to similar experiences.

Indigenous minorities in the Russian Federation are relatively well protected “on paper”, so the problem is mostly in terms of the implementation of laws. Many legal provisions are formulated vaguely, so their implementation largely depends on the actions of regional administrations.
Another problem is the so-called "numerical ceiling". According to Russian law, an ethnicity can only be named indigenous if the group’s population does not exceed 50,000 people. The official name of this category is "numerically small indigenous people of the Russian Federation". Such a provision inevitably excludes ethnic groups that possess indigenous characteristics, but not this numerical one. This legal provision is damaging for Karelians.

**Indigenous peoples in Karelia: Same history, different status**

Article 21 of the Constitution of Karelia states that the rights of Karelians, Vepses, and Finns for revival, preservation, and free development are guaranteed. Despite these words, one of the vital issues Karelians face today is the problem of recognition.

In official regional documents both Karelians and Vepses are defined as indigenous peoples of the republic. Whereas Vepses received indigenous status at the federal level, Karelians are not eligible since their total population in the Russian Federation is 65,000 people. Such a situation influences their lifestyle since being recognized as indigenous means being given additional financing from federal budgets and other privileges, including having hunting and fishing quotas.

The historical experience of Karelians and Vepses is similar, particularly in the Soviet period when both groups experienced fifty years of ethnic and linguistic assimilation. It is unusual then that two small-numbered indigenous peoples with similar cultural backgrounds and traditional occupations have different legal statuses at the federal level.

**From assimilation to revitalization**

Karelia was granted the status of autonomous republic in 1920. The decision was based on the fact that several Finno-Ugrian peoples – Karelians, Vepses, and Finns – resided there. The initial idea was that Karelians and Vepses would be integrated into Soviet society by speaking Finnish. All the education in Karelbian and Vepsian villages at the time was conducted in Finnish.

For a short period of time in the 1930s, Karelians and Vepses were educated in their own languages. However, in 1938, the position of Soviet authorities changed again. National schools were closed, the language of education switched to Russian, and all publications in minority languages were stopped. After this period, the "assimilation" of Finno-Ugrian minorities took place rapidly. In the late 1980s, the revitalization campaign for Karelian and Vepsian languages and cultures started. This resulted in the increase of public interest regarding the situation of Finno-Ugrian minorities in Karelia. Several important milestones were reached in the 1990s, but some backward steps have been taken since.

**Indigenous rights today: Behind legal documents**

Indigenous land rights are one of the main reasons that Russia has not ratified ILO Convention 169. It is no surprise that these land rights are especially vague in Russian legislation. Karelian regional laws do not outline specific land rights for Finno-Ugrian minorities. Vepses, however, have been able to appeal to federal legislation due to their recognition at the federal level. An example is the decision of the Constitutional Court of Karelia in July 2014 to make the Karelian regional decree on hunting illegal, as it did not take into account hunting quotas for indigenous Vepses.
One current problem is the complex relations of indigenous communities with extractive businesses. As the land around several Vepsian villages has been sold to private mining companies, most of them not registered in Karelia, Vepses feel that they are losing control over their land and traditional occupations.

The cultural rights of indigenous peoples in Karelia, however, seem relatively well-protected. In the 1990s, a Finno-Ugrian school opened in Petrozavodsk and regular classes in Karelian and Vepsian were organized in several villages. Departments of Finno-Ugrian Languages were established at the two universities in Petrozavodsk. Currently, the authorities of the republic support press in Karelian and Vepsian languages, including publications and radio- and TV-broadcasts. In 2012, the Karelian ethno-cultural centre “Elämä” was opened, and a new regional program “Karjala – our common home” started in 2014, which includes special financing for ethno-cultural projects.

The main problem in this sphere is the lack of financing for educational and cultural institutions and, at the same time, a lack of specialists ready to work in the ethno-cultural sphere. Due to limited financing, there are less job opportunities for those who know Karelian and Vepsian languages, and young people are not as eager to choose this specialization. As a result, in 2011, university specialization in “Karelian and Vepsian languages and literature” was no longer offered. It is also becoming difficult to find Karelian and Vepsian teachers for village schools.

As a result, Finno-Ugrian minorities in Karelia face a series of problems today. A lack of financing leads to fewer job opportunities and career prospects, which, in turn, results in a low interest in minority languages. Also, just across the Karelian border is Finland, and many young people with a knowledge of Finno-Ugrian languages see their future there. I will outline several aspects that could possibly change the situation for better. It is also necessary to stress that the continuous support of authorities is crucial to this issue.

**Recommendations and Conclusions**

The interest in linguistic and cultural revitalization of Karelian and Vepsian languages that emerged in the 1990s is falling, slowly but steadily. To improve this situation, extra support at the local and federal levels for ethno-cultural institutions is needed. It is also important to create a well-defined program of development for Karelian and Vepsian languages.

The relations between indigenous communities and extractive businesses in Karelia should be regulated so that mining enterprises are obligated to inform the local population about their operations, and receive community approval.

The possibility of establishing a position of an ombudsman dealing with indigenous rights in Karelia has been discussed, but has not yet been appointed. Perhaps it would be useful for Finno-Ugrian minorities to have this sort of agency in order to protect their rights. Positive examples, such as the recent creation of an ethno-cultural centre, the regional program “Karjala – our common home”, and additional hunting quotas for Vepses show that the situation can be bettered, but that the systematic work of both government and civil society actors (e.g. Vepsian and Karelian activists and NGOs) is needed in order for change to happen.
WHAT DOES SECURITY MEAN TO THE PEOPLES OF THE ARCTIC?

A NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

It is difficult to provide a comprehensive vision of the concerns of the peoples of the Arctic. Most residents of the Arctic, whether they live in Russia, in North America, or in the Nordic countries, tend to adopt a sectored view of the region. They assume that their own understanding of the Far North and its needs, priorities, and possibilities extend fully around the entire area. Therefore, most discussions related to the “Arctic” tend to be reflections of one’s own distinctive sector and not a comprehensive portrayal of different circumstances and concerns found among the Arctic’s communities. What is needed today, in the case of most Arctic security discussions, is more comparative analysis, and looking at the differences and similarities between the visions of these sectors in the Far North.

This paper conducts this type of analysis by focusing on the distinctive North American visions of Arctic security, as represented by Canada and the United States. It endeavors to look at the specific features of each country’s Arctic security concerns, both at the end of the 20th century and in the new millennium. The essay seeks to highlight what the two countries have shared in their visions of security in the Arctic and how they have gone in somewhat different directions to define and act upon their security priorities in the region. These latter differences are often not seen from the other side of the circumpolar world, with the consequence that important changes in North American policies and priorities are not rapidly discerned. This research will also touch upon the specific undertakings of the two countries during their respective Arctic Council Chairmanships and the consequences of these for the future development of Arctic security priorities in the region as a whole.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH AMERICAN VISIONS OF ARCTIC SECURITY

For much of the histories of both Canada and the United States, the Arctic has occupied a distinctive, but not a prominent position. Prior to the middle of the 20th century, the Far North was seen in both countries as a remotely distant, empty, and inhospitable region, fit only for the exploits of daring adventurers and brave explorers who aimed to secure access to the mineral and fur resources of the region, and to chart possible trade and communication routes across the top of the world. For both countries, the Arctic was envisioned as part of the northern peripheral frontier of the state, fit only for possible economic exploitation and limited settlement. Ottawa and Washington exerted little influence within their Arctic domains aside from mapping and delineating their boundaries, providing limited social services to their small indigenous and settler populations, and offering rudimentary elements of law enforcement. The image of the Mounties pursuing their quarry across the vast, desolate North was part of the folk culture of both societies.

With the coming of the Second World War, however, the Arctic assumed a new strategic significance for North Americans. Suddenly both Alaska and the northern territories of Canada became possible arenas for international conflict, vital sources of war material, and important staging points for troops and supplies destined for the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. The Far North also became a component of homeland defense. Important wartime investments were made by both countries aimed at expanding Arctic transportation and port facilities – perhaps most visibly seen in the construction of the iconic Alaska Highway. For the first time in memory, the region became of vital concern to the governments of both Canada and the United States.

The military and strategic significance of the Arctic that emerged during the Second World War became increasingly evident to both Ottawa and Washington foreign policy makers during the course of the subsequent Cold War. By the late 1940s it was clear that the Circumpolar North was to become one of the potential “zones of conflict” between the major alliance systems of the day. From the vantage point of the Western Alliance, the Arctic was critical to their defense efforts. With the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, both the United States and Canada saw themselves committed to providing critical military support and assistance to one another and to their European allies through the use of their northern territories. New military bases were established there, and troops and equipment stationed in northern Canada and Alaska were to respond to any perceived military threat arising from the Soviet Union. Similarly, plans were drawn up for the quick deployment of North American personnel and supplies to Europe in the event of a crisis.

Throughout the Cold War era, both the Canadian and American governments and their publics developed similar visions of the Arctic. They saw the region as a zone of potential conflict within a deeply bifurcated international system characterized by both ideological and military confrontation. It was a region around which the Western and Eastern alliance systems deployed their most prized strategic assets and in which very little in the way of circumpolar cooperation...
or collaboration could be contemplated. The Arctic became equated with the need to provide military protection and security for society, and this became central to its image for most Canadians and Americans.

**Changing Canadian and U.S. foreign policy priorities in the Arctic**

These attitudes and perspectives continued for nearly four decades and were mirrored in large part by their Soviet rivals. It was not until the collapse of the Cold War system in the late 1980s and early 1990s that new North American understandings of the Arctic and its needs began to emerge. At that time, it was the Canadians who led the effort to re-conceptualize the region as a zone of possible collaboration and common purpose between Arctic states. The Canadians became interested in addressing the serious environmental and sustainable development challenges that had emerged in the area. They also recognized the potential of circumpolar cooperation. In the final decade of the 20th century, the Canadian government intensified its Arctic diplomacy efforts and became a stalwart advocate for the creation of the Arctic Protection Strategy (1991), the Arctic Council (1996) and the University of the Arctic (2001). This broadening of the Canadian vision of the Arctic can be seen in a thematic listing of their government’s foreign policy priorities for the region in the mid-1990s (see Table 1). Military defense continued to remain a concern at this time, but new interests in international cooperation, environmental protection, and human development took center stage. This expanded Canadian vision of the Arctic continued for a decade or so under both conservative and liberal governments.

American interests in the Arctic at the time remained focused on military security matters. Well into the 1990s, and even as late as the early years of the new millennium, American policymakers tended to retain a distinct Cold War vision of the Arctic (see Table 2). Not until the very end of the George W. Bush Administration were significant changes to this viewpoint first articulated. Only then did American policymakers begin to consider the pressing needs of climate change and international collaboration within the context of the Arctic.

Over the past decade, however, there has been a remarkable shift in both American and Canadian expressions of their priority concerns for the Arctic. With the Obama Administration, there has been a whole-scale adoption of climate change as a major concern of U.S. foreign policy. This concern has

### Table 1

**Canadian Foreign Policy Priorities in the Arctic (Mid-1990s)**

- International Cooperation
- Environmental Protection
- Human Development
- Resource Development
- Sovereignty
- Defense


### Table 2

**U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities in the Arctic (Mid-1990s)**

- Defense
- Resource Development
- Sovereignty
- Human Development
- Environmental Protection
- International Collaboration

It has been suggested by a number of observers of Canadian and American policies in the Arctic that, in fact, what has occurred over the last decade comes very close to resembling a near exchange of visions and priorities lists between the two countries. The U.S. government has broadened its perspective on the region to embrace both environmental and “soft security” concerns. The Canadian government, for its part, has narrowed its orientation toward the Far North by giving its “hard security” and economic development interests distinct and prioritized positions. These differences can be seen when one looks at a comparative listing of the identified priority concerns of the two countries (see Table 5). Placed side by side, it seems quite apparent that the United States and Canada are articulating very different visions of the Arctic in the present day by designing their respective national priorities around these different priorities.

These changes in stances have not yet been clearly perceived in the international arena. Many residents “on the other side” of the circumpolar world continue to believe that both North American states either operate from the same preexisting Cold War vantage point, or that if there are any differences between their perspectives, these are characteristic of what existed during the 1996-2006 period. However, if one closely examines these countries’ priorities for the Arctic and their undertakings in the region, one clearly sees that these arguments are no longer the case.

The Harper Government in Canada has presented a very focused and consistent vision of the Arctic that emphasizes Canadian national security and sovereignty concerns in the region. As first outlined in “Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future: Canada’s Northern Strategy” and then later refined in “Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad”, researchers and policy-makers in Ottawa have stressed the need to protect and exploit the country’s national interests in the Arctic. Under the rubric of “use it or lose it”, the Harper government has made a series of promises to upgrade and expand its security and defense capabilities in the Far North. It has also encouraged the private sector to engage itself more extensively in the rapid development of Canadian energy and mineral resources in the region.

The current Canadian Prime Minister has made annual visits to the country’s northern territories. Harper has underscored these themes and, to a lesser extent, discussed the importance of northern residents having a greater voice in planning for the future of the area. Harper has “talked tough” regarding opposing security and economic interests in Arctic. He has warned the Russian government about any incursions into Canadian waters or airspace, and he has encouraged his country to make as wide as possible claims under current international law for the offshore resources of the Arctic Ocean, including the North Pole. He has regularly reminded the international community – including the United States – that Canada claims the right to control and regulate transit through the Northwest Passage.

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**“USE IT OR LOSE IT”**

When examining the key policy statements and actions of the Obama Administration regarding the Arctic, one encounters a significantly different tone and focus of concern. As outlined in a series of recent policy pronouncements, the current U.S. government has moved considerably away from its former Cold War orientation towards the region. While national security requirements remain part of the Obama Administration’s ongoing interests in the Far North, these have become far less deterministic in characterizing the overall agenda for action in the area. Washington has suggested that addressing the regional impacts of climate change and protecting the threatened ecosystems of the...
Arctic are more reflective of the nation’s current concerns.

This reorientation of U.S. policy preferences is clearly set forth in the country’s 2013 “National Strategy for the Arctic Region” and in its 2014 “Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic”. Both documents note that “environmental security” must become a major concern regarding the Arctic, including efforts to encourage regional and international collaboration in addressing these and other U.S. Arctic interests. Both of these highlighted themes of “environmental security” and “international cooperation” have even become elements of the articulated mission of the U.S. military in the Far North. The newly appointed U.S. Arctic envoy, former U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp Jr., has argued that U.S. efforts at environmental stewardship in the Arctic must occupy a central position in all future American planning for the region.

Comparing Canadian and American Chairmanships of the Arctic Council

If one examines the recent undertakings of Canada and the United States to provide leadership and direction for the Arctic Council, one can see the differences in these countries’ priorities and preferences. Instead of offering two similar and concurrent North American chairmanship programs, each country has chosen to follow its own distinct path in charting the future economic growth of the region. Throughout its Chairmanship, Canada has regularly insisted on the right of sovereign states to determine their own priorities in the Arctic and to protect their economic, social, and political interests.

The very different orientation of the Obama Administration toward the Arctic can be seen in the announced priorities of the U.S.’ Chairmanship of the Arctic Council starting in 2015. Under its thematic title of “One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities”, the top three concerns of the U.S. Chairmanship will be: 1) addressing the impacts of climate change in the Arctic; 2) providing safety, security, and stewardship for the Arctic Ocean; and 3) improving the health and living conditions of the indigenous peoples of the Far North. While some lip service is given to “continuing the work of the Canadian Chairmanship”, no special emphasis is on the private sector’s role in natural resource development (the Arctic Economic Council is only tangentially mentioned) or of the sovereign rights of states to protect their specific interests in the region.

These rather different Canadian and American programs for action on the part of the Arctic Council suggest that attention may shift significantly when Washington takes over after Ottawa. While efforts will be made to stress programmatic continuity within the body, it is likely that the organization will present itself in a discernibly different manner over the coming two years. This detectable difference in focus and tone, however, can be seen in the growing differences that are emerging in the Arctic orientations of these two North American governments.

Concluding Thoughts

As we endeavor to examine the security requirements of “the peoples of the Arctic” we need to avoid the trap of assuming that all the communities of the circumpolar world think about and assess these matters in the same way. While certain perspectives and priorities are shared, others are not equivalent to one another and are instead reflective of differences in orientation and attitudes between and within the various regions of the Far North. We also need to be aware that perceived security concerns can and will alter over time. We should recognize the fact that the governments of these societies can and will speak differently about their security needs, even if they are geographic neighbors – as is the case with Canada and the United States.

We also must avoid assuming that a country’s evaluation of security needs in a specific portion of the Arctic can be generalized across the entire region. As is the case in other areas of Arctic knowledge, we must not engage in narrow, sector-oriented thinking. We need to become more aware of the conditions and attitudes of residents from other parts of the Far North. We also need to better understand others’ goals and objectives and their broader rationales behind them. We need to expand our comparative knowledge and study of security needs throughout the Arctic by focusing on both government and civil society perspectives. Only in this manner can our analysis become truly comprehensive.

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3. **Constructivism**

Identities, including values and norms, are deeper forces than interests because interests, including geopolitical interests, are based on identities. Identities are constructed in domestic politics and/or in intersubjective contacts between states and societies. According to constructivism, security dilemmas are solvable based on building international security communities with converging identities.

**OBSERVATIONS:**
There is a widening gap between identities of Russia and the "West"; each one seeing each other in terms of "Self" and "Other". The EU/EEA, North America, and other liberal democracies identify themselves as "We" in their relation to Russia, and the other way round. Russia, on the other hand, is constructing its "Russian world" and Eurasian identity to emphasise its great regional power. In a global context, it is looking towards a new BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) identity, as opposed to the U.S. and "the West".

**CONCLUSION:**
In the Arctic, conflicting identities are constructed between Russia and other states in the region. This means that conflict prevails.

4. **Institutionalism**

International institutions may not solve the security dilemma, but they may mitigate it with their "shadow of the future", which may lead to cooperative policies based on reciprocity and long-term win-win solutions.

**OBSERVATIONS:**
There are no general regimes efficiently regulating military and economic activities in the North. Existing international regional organisations, such as the Arctic Council, face the choice of concentrating on the shrinking area of "low politics", or being paralyzed by "high politics" disagreements.

**CONCLUSION:**
In the Arctic, international institutions are weak and cannot remarkably mitigate the security dilemma. This means that conflict prevails.
5. Liberalism

As part of liberalism, democratic peace theory argues that democracies do not fight each other. In general, liberalism claims that domestic policies are sources of foreign policies. Foreign policy and military conflicts are often used in order to increase domestic support (e.g., to “rally round the flag”).

OBSERVATIONS: Democratic peace theory does not apply here as Russia is not a democracy. It is, however, notable that in some countries in the region, especially in Finland, there are strong domestic aims to focus on diplomacy with Russia and incentivizing cooperation. In Russia, international conflict, at least in terms of the short term, enforces the leading political force.

CONCLUSION: This liberalist approach emphasizes the role of domestic politics. In this case, domestic politics work as a source of conflict rather than cooperation.

6. Political economy/Marxist theories

States’ foreign policies are sensitive to or are even directed by the interests of economic interest groups and capitalism. If those who would benefit from free markets, free movement of capital, and transnational investments have more power than those who benefit from protectionist policies, then cooperation flourishes.

OBSERVATIONS: There are great opportunities for big transnational businesses in the Arctic region. However, technology transfer from the West to Russia is necessary in order for Russia to be able to utilize its resources. Joint projects are now already endangered by sanctions and other limitations. Russia’s declared aim is to turn towards increasing, however selected, protectionism in order to become more independent from the Western economy.

CONCLUSION: The Arctic illustrates a business under security dilemma. Should there be extensive economic cooperation, it would help to mitigate the conflict and enhance cooperation. Currently the security dilemma (e.g., sanctions) hampers the development of this opportunity.

7. Transnationalism

The focus of international relations is moving from interstate relations towards subnational (regional and city) cooperation, to “low politics” and to transnational civil society cooperation.

OBSERVATIONS: There has been a huge increase in the last two decades in grassroots and civil society activities across the former dividing line. Russian anti-NGO legislation, however, seriously restricts cross-border civil society cooperation. There is a worsening attitudinal atmosphere in general towards transnational cooperation in Russia. Moreover, this transnational NGO-based approach contradicts the use of economic cooperation as the vehicle for Arctic cooperation, since an economic approach would mean exploiting natural resources in the Arctic.

CONCLUSION: Grassroots cross-border cooperation between Russia and other countries in the area exists but faces tremendous difficulties, and conflictual issues are also reflected at the civil society level.

Tuuli Ojala, Environmental Adviser of the International Barents Secretariat, discusses environmental challenges in the Barents region. Economic interests have been growing steadily in the area, which has brought different risks to the region. Barents co-operation aims to take into account the global and local viewpoints when evaluating the environmental security of the North.

Multilateral co-operation in the Barents region

Barents co-operation started in 1993 with the signing of the Kirkenes declaration between the Nordic countries, Russia, and the European Commission. Since then, multilateral Barents co-operation has been organized under the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Barents Regional Council between the thirteen northernmost counties of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and European Russia. In 2013, prime ministers and other high-level representatives of the signatories of the Kirkenes declaration reaffirmed its commitments.

The aim of the Barents co-operation is the sustainable development of the region. This goal is pursued by co-operating on “soft” issues between the ministries, regional authorities, and actors in Barents countries (including Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden). Areas of co-operation include economy, health, youth at risk, culture, tourism, transportation and logistics, and research and education. One of the most active areas of multilateral Barents co-operation is the environment.

The unique and vulnerable nature of the region has suffered from neglected environmental concerns in the past, and is facing new challenges with increasing economic activities.

The BEAC Working Group on Environment suggests improvements for major polluters and builds competence on best available technologies and best environmental practices. It also works to improve the network of nature conservation areas in the region. In 2013, BEAC adopted an Action Plan on Climate Change that includes recommendations for working groups involved in the co-operation.

Environmental security in the European High North

The European North is rich with renewable and non-renewable natural resources, such as forests, fish, minerals, and fossil fuels. The interest in using these resources grows as the region becomes more accessible and the technologies to operate in such harsh northern conditions develop. New mines, oil, and gas fields and related activities are expected to provide jobs and economic wealth for the northern regions and countries. This development intensifies the conflict between man and nature as well as the conflict between these different economic activities, e.g., traditional livelihoods and eco-tourism versus extractive industries.

A major part of the Barents region is located in the Arctic, where the climate is warming faster than in any other part of the globe.
The average surface temperature in the Arctic is predicted to rise by even 10°C by the end of this century. It is unclear how the natural systems will be able to cope with this rapid change. Extinction of northern species and the spread of pests to new areas are probable consequences of this warming. Climate change affects the environmental security of the northern areas also in another way: with a warming climate, it becomes more tempting to start new economic activities, which will cause further pressure on natural ecosystems and the people who are dependent on the functioning of these ecosystems. In addition, the increased occurrence of extreme weather events and the melting of permafrost are likely to cause new challenges to manmade infrastructures, as well as to natural systems.

**High environmental standards?**

When the use of Arctic resources is discussed at summits and conferences, politicians, scientists, and economic actors always emphasize high environmental standards. However, quite opposite examples can be easily found in reality. For example, at the Norwegian-Russian border in the towns of Nikel and Zapolyarny, nickel smelters annually produce more sulphur dioxide than all of Norway. Several attempts have been made in the bilateral and multilateral fora to modernize the industry and to reduce these harmful emissions, but so far with little success. In Northwest Russia and Arctic Russia, there are several similar “monotowns”, where the economy and employment of a whole town is highly dependent on a single industry that causes significant pollution and is unable to invest in urgently-needed environmental improvements.

There has been a mining boom in the North in recent years with several plans and projects to open or re-open metal and phosphate mineral mines. These projects have boosted recessive local economies, for instance in Finnish and Swedish Lapland. At the same time, Finland’s image as an environmentally responsible country has suffered from the case with Talvivaara, where false expectations with regards to the production capacity of a nickel mine, including miscalculated metal prices, unforeseen technical problems, and incorrect water balance estimates, led to the mine being unable to follow the environmental permit and produce nickel in a profitable way. The price of debt annulment of the bankrupted company and the reduction of environmental damages will cost hundreds of millions of euros.

**“The average surface temperature in the Arctic is predicted to rise by even 10°C by the end of this century”**

Estimating the right price for pollution is a challenging task, and political decisions have to be made with incomplete data and with differing views. For instance, environmental organizations have urged a ban on heavy fuel oil being shipped in the Arctic due to the risk of an oil spill. Air emissions and risks to human health would also be impacted. It is anticipated, however, that profit-seeking companies will choose other routes instead of the northern route, unless a global ban of heavy fuel oil is imposed. Political and economic decision-makers are estimating that the positive effect of increased Arctic shipping is higher than the costs of a probable spill, and are not eager to be at the forefront of implementing such a ban.

When considering new developments, not only should the loss of biodiversity and human health have a price tag, but it should also be considered whether there are alternative ways to use these areas in order to promote long-term environmental and economic security. In terms of possible alternatives, the potential of renewable energy resources or sustainable nature tourism as sources of employment remains to be explored. Although strict environmental regulations will need to be obeyed in the future, extractive industries will continue to negatively affect the environment. This is especially important when mineral resources are found in areas where there are special nature values, like in the Vilankioapa mine in Finnish Lapland and other places in the Barents region. As for economic concerns, employment in the mining industry is strongly influenced by market prices. In late 2014, the Kaunisvaara/Pajala mine closure at the Finnish-Swedish border left 240 people unemployed and new company projects were frozen. For the Norwegian Sydvaranger iron mine (that was re-opened some years ago), the low market price of iron in 2014 brought reduced employee salaries. These concerns and factors will need to be addressed in future years.

**Global and local**

Climate change is a global phenomenon and most of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions originate from outside of the Arctic or Barents region, where the most dramatic warming is to be expected. Persistent organic pollutants such as PCBs and dioxins can be transported to the North from long distances, but accumulate in fat-based food webs and make northern communities relying on traditional foods the most vulnerable to chemical contamination. The North should not be treated as a resource-base for other parts of the globe, or as a sink for pollutants from more densely populated areas. With that said, however, there still is room for improvement in the region itself. Some economic activities in the Barents region have outdated technological and environmental practices. In starting new resource-extracting activities, more attention should be paid to negative consequences, and to finding alternative, more sustainable uses of the area.

Though the North is sparsely populated, the Barents region houses both the biggest city above the Arctic Circle – Murmansk – as well as growing towns like Tromsø in Norway, where the Nordic Forum for Security Policy 2014 was held. The harsh climate and long travel distances cause more energy consumption and the release of emissions, but there is plenty of space for quite simple improvements in energy efficiency – from housing and heating systems to everyday traveling practices. These changes would help reduce the harmful emissions of e.g. black carbon, which is a powerful climate forcer and a significant cause of respiratory and heart diseases. Opportunities for development of cold-proof...
THE HIGH NORTH: STUCK IN MODERNITY?

NOT LONGER THE UNKNOWN LAND

Not too long ago, the High North was denoted as Terra Incognita, or an unknown land. This, however, is certainly no longer the case. The region instead is firmly on the map and is well chartered, and the area nowadays is arguably as industrialized and as developed as most other parts of the world. This claim has been put forward most notably by Iceland’s president, Ólafur Grímsson.

I accept that this is the case, and my aim is not to dispute the modern nature of the Arctic and the Barents Sea regions. I am not claiming that, in order to make it in the future, the region has to become even more modern and shed off various remnants of its initial extreme peripherality. Instead, I am arguing that the High North is too modern. It is stuck in modernity and has, as a modern dreamland, largely been unable to switch gears, catch up in terms of development, and move forward in time.

This no doubt stands out as a somewhat unusual approach, but the argument can be grounded in the document approved just a year ago in Kiruna by the Arctic Council outlining a vision for the Arctic. If there is a vision in the document, it is one of changing the often inward-oriented policies of the Arctic and Arctic countries. Rather than aspiring for change, opening up, and tapping into various opportunities provided by the development of international relations at large, policies still appear to consist of shielding the region from too much exposure to the exterior.

A review of the Arctic strategies that various actors, states, as well as non-states have formulated in recent years yields similar results. It seems as though the Arctic states’ extending of their power and thereby modernity to cover the region is the priority. Instead of taking advantage of the possibilities of opening up with the changing nature of international relations, the aim seems to be to safeguard what has already been achieved.

The approaches also appear to be distinctly nationalistic in essence, and therefore also quite competitive in nature. There is also emphasis on cooperation, but this overt emphasis tends to restrict cooperation within the region. Overall, for some of the actors, the emphasis on cooperation, but this overt emphasis tends to restrict cooperation within the region. As part of the Arctic, the aim seems to be to safeguard what has already been achieved.

THE HIGH NORTH AS A HUB

It appears, against this background, that the unfolding of international relations at large has led to increased options for change and further development. These factors seem to be external rather than internal in nature.

“The instead of being at the edge — with peripherality as the defining feature — the region is well on its way to turn into a hub”

In any case, the structural position of the High North in the field of international relations is changing profoundly. Instead of being at the edge — with peripherality as the defining feature — the region is well on its way to turn into a hub. It is on the threshold of breaking into something entirely new in aspiring to connect, instead of being isolated and aloof. Rather than keeping apart and being an obstacle to interactions, it increasingly facilitates the formation of linkages between North America, Europe, and Asia. This is due to new sea-routes, above all, the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, gradually opening up with the melting of the polar ice cap.

Other linkages are being constructed as well, including cables and centers for the storage of data that mainly links Europe and Asia.

The images that, to some extent, are still there regarding the High North as “the end of the world” are increasingly seen as false and misleading with the region now standing out as a space “in-between”. It is neither at the edge nor the margins — it is on its way to becoming a passage for several of the world’s core areas.

It would of course be erroneous to claim that the recent decline in peripherality is something entirely new. The situation changed significantly already during the Cold War, and did so at least in the military domain. However, the tension-loaded and bipolar days of the Cold War — with two superpowers and military blocs facing each other in a rather hostile manner — did not facilitate interaction and region-wide civilian cooperation. The Arctic merely stood out as a peripheral aspect of the confrontation between the two hostile blocs and remained largely void of any meaning of its own.

Now, with this polarization basically gone, the High North is facing current developments...
quite differently. It is no longer deprived as it was during the years of the Cold War — of some subjectivity of its own. It attracts interest among external actors for entirely different reasons.

The region may indeed capitalize in various ways on the more cooperative structures of international relations. The option is there for the High North to gain significance in civilian rather than military-related agendas, and to capitalize on being able to knit together the core centers of present-day international relations. The region may re-position itself structurally, and draw on the more positive aspects of modernity, or for that matter, move increasingly beyond modernity.

HOBBSIAN OR LOCKEAN DEPARTURES?

This change may indeed have quite crucial and far-reaching consequences. With the structures underlying Arctic policies turning cooperative as well as increasingly multilateral, and thereby transcending national constellations, all the major players have to reposition themselves and see themselves in a somewhat different light.

Russia is a case in point: as a key Arctic actor, it shows signs of turning into an “in-between” country. It gains significance by mediating and regulating the functioning of the hub connecting Europe and Asia. Russia’s structural position and its policies regarding this context are therefore different from those that prevailed during the years of the Cold War. They may remain competitive and perhaps be in conflict with some other aspects, but their policies are basically cooperative and are no longer divisive in nature. The conflicts that may occur pertain to the various forms and structures of cooperation, rather than any categorically oppositional constellations in a systemic sense.

However, what is crucial also for the High North and its future does not just consist of some structural changes pertaining in part to the melting of ice (with this then open up new options for the region to position itself in the sphere of international relations). The very rules undergirding and constituting international relations are changing, and this enables the option to revise current political agendas for a different future.

In short, the old Hobbesian departures premised on anarchy and mandating the up-keep of sovereignty have lost their centrality. International order is not viewed exclusively as to be the case through geopolitical lenses with national security related to questions of territorial integrity, military power, and resource access (i.e. resources needed in order to gain a high ranking in the political power struggles integrally part of international relations).

The new and more Lockean international order instead focuses on globalization and neoliberal modes of governance, with rules pertaining to competition in the international market. World politics is no longer about sovereignty and territorial integrity, but rather, national unfoldment within a global marketplace. Important, the status and meaning of new competition states is not determined by their ability and willingness to engage in state-to-state wars and their ability to accumulate the material resources needed in such endeavours. Since traditional wars have been on the decline, countries’ economic strength and their abilities to cope with the various challenges posed by market forces matter. These kinds of states are increasingly viewed as akin to firms competing for investment and market share, rather than for territory. Countries’ entrepreneurial capabilities are now more relevant than military strength and state sovereignty.

EMBRACING THE NEW WITHOUT LOVE

With this background, the question is, is the High North still firmly embedded in classical Hobbesian departures — with sovereignty and territorial integrity high on the list — or does it rather display signs of being well on its way to anchoring itself in the new and upcoming competitive, market-driven world? Quite crudely, the High North still has to focus on nationalizing discourses. Changes, however, are underway, albeit inadvertently rather than through any planned and conscious fashion. At large, the policies in the region consist chiefly of resisting change, rather than taking advantage of possibilities.

“THE HIGH NORTH CONSTITUTES SOMETHING OF A HOT SPOT, BUT AT THE SAME TIME, IS VOID OF ANY MAJOR CONFLICTS”

Thus, the High North remains rather securitized with increased, rather than reduced, emphasis on military resources. At the same time, however, the presence of military appears to be shallow and is not linked to any distinct preparedness to engage in war. There has undoubtedly been an additional emphasis on military developments, which then provides the image that the High North constitutes something of a hot spot, but at the same time, is void of any major conflicts.

In other words, there exists a strange duality in the sense that there has been an upgrading of military developments, and yet there appears to be a lack of both international as well as external developments that would account for this tendency. It has been frequently stressed that all major conflicts internal to the region — pertaining above all to boundary delimitations and ownership of natural resources — have already been settled, and the remaining ones are well on their way to being solved in a peaceful manner. In fact, there are, despite quite broadly held public views, no conflicts for natural resources underway in the High North. Similarly, the countries of the region do not foresee any new conflicts into the region that would account for the increased stress on military developments.

It therefore seems that the increased stress on military issues stands out as an integral part of efforts to stay with the traditional agendas of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and reproduction of the nation-state. There is a considerable dose of nationalism at play, and the aim might more generally be one of clinging to the modern agenda in its Hobbesian taping, i.e. by protecting and providing a safe haven for a modern way of life, at least in one part of the world.

Therefore, the preeminence of military issues in the High North stands for a play in which the galleries are responding quite favourably. The (in)famous Russian submarine stunt in 2007 – with flag-planting on the bottom of the sea close to the North Pole — might be seen as a case in point. It indicates an interest in playing military-related games in the High North, even if the playing is deprived of any real meaning (and took place by use of a civilian vessel and a semi-international crew). It also testifies to a preparedness amongst viewers to take the game rather seriously, despite certain absurd features.

THE MILITARY ON THE NEW AGENDA

It could also be argued that many of the military developments have been misinterpreted regarding their impact and meaning. These developments have been viewed against a rather traditional background, and thus positioned within a Hobbesian view while they, in many cases, pertain to the new and incoming risks and unknown dangers high on the Lockean agenda.
This is so as many of the military acquisitions that are part of the more recent developments in the High North seem to be related to soft, and not just to hard, security. For example, the new military vessels contributing the images of an arms race have been furnished with functions helpful in view of various civilian tasks that may be encountered in the Arctic or Barents areas. It also seems that military actors are increasingly cooperating with each other, although security and military developments are still absent, for example, from the agenda of the Arctic Council.

Thus, developments in the military sphere do in some cases actually detract from sovereignty and national closure, rather than the other way around. Notably, in some contexts such as rescue at sea or satellite surveillance, the impact boils down to one of internationalization rather than staying with national and sovereignty-based solutions. For example, the Stoltenberg report of 2009 advocated strongly shared measures among the Nordic countries in the field of military developments, and many of the recommendations of the report have in fact been implemented. In short, the military are no longer there merely to shield and secure closure, but instead, to protect openness and access, as well as safe transit.

In sum, the military sphere in the High North as well as elsewhere is no longer as national as it used to be. Also, the military field shows signs of caving under pressures of internationalization. By being allotted with the task of guarding the openness of the new international order, military actors impact the region in a new way. Somewhat paradoxically, it appears that military forces are obliged, in order to have a future, to position themselves increasingly in a context that is almost opposite to their traditional role and nation-based functions. They will presumably turn even more international than has been the case so far and appear as a force of change – part of a new, predominantly Lockean international agenda, rather than the old Hobbesian one.

**Increased Bottom-Up Influences**

But what then about the various bottom-up influences within civilian society that are increasingly making their mark and influencing policies? How will these actors impact the political agendas of the High North?

Obviously, the impact is far from uniform. This is partly due to the plurality of actors, and their influence also appears to vary between different parts of the High North – with the bottom-up impact being stronger in the Barents region than in the sphere of Arctic cooperation.

The impact of indigenous peoples is mixed as well. These various groups remain considerably different as to their political ambitions, although they have, in general, approached modernity among other things in order to protect their traditional ways of life. This has been accomplished by aspiring for self-rule, and in some cases, for sovereignty and the formation of nation-states. They have generally been against internationalization and multilateral forms of governance, although the aspirations to gain subjectivity as well as control over various natural resources and to use them to bolster their autonomy also implies that they are increasingly becoming actors in the international market. They may thus end up pursuing policies that radically alter the conditions for their traditional forms of life, rather than the other way around, i.e. by protecting those forms of life.

Greenland stands out as an interesting case. If the nation were to become independent, would it then turn into a classical Hobbesian state? Not necessarily. Sovereignty as well as territorial integrity would no doubt be in high esteem, and developing into a competition state with a focus on interdependency in the global market would remain a tough challenge. The nation’s aspirations to defend and safeguard its interests may, paradoxically, bring policies that contradict such aspirations.

A major factor changing images, identities, and policies is tourism. Images such as cold, ice, snow, and being primitive and therefore ‘real’, or images that traditionally have a rather negative reading are being reinterpreted to stand for positivity and are being used in the tourism industry to attract visitors. This has been successful as indicated by the rapid proliferation of ice hotels and snow castles over recent years in various parts of the High North. This success has also taken the inhabitants of the High North by surprise.
Is this who we really are and what our region is about, or are we merely cultivating artificial and romantic images for purposes of marketing and branding? In any case, the surreal and mostly pre-modern images cultivated have opened up one potential way for the High North to move beyond modernity.

On a more cautious note, tourist agendas have not yet succeeded in altering broader agendas for the region. As to the overall situation, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and perceived needs of security still seem to dictate Arctic politics. Joint structures of decision-making have gradually emerged, but the Arctic Council remains rather weak structurally and has a quite limited and protectionist agenda. External actors (such as the EU) potentially pushing for a widening of multilateral governance and an internationalization of the Arctic have been kept at the sidelines. The modern political agendas of the Arctic states and the Barents regions imply that the distinction between insiders and outsiders has remained quite firm.

Towards Increasing Co-Governance

It may nonetheless be noted that political agendas in the area are gradually changing. The regime regulating policies in the Arctic and Barents regions is already now in many ways an international one, and will in the future be increasingly so.

For example, safe passage in Arctic waters calls for a constant development of the Polar Code. Arrangements for navigation, search and rescue, spills of hazardous materials, and requirements for vessels entering the region have been implemented. The various challenges, such as those relating to climate change and global warming in the High North, call for broad international cooperation far beyond the current borderlines between insiders and outsiders. Many of the outsiders, such as China, India, and South Korea, will increasingly be among those who use the High North as a passage, and this will allow them to position themselves as influential decision-makers and actors. These nations will hardly settle for being ‘observers’, but will opt for far more inclusive positions. This also applies to the EU as a polity representing the interests of the member countries at large.

Arctic and international cooperation is needed in order to draw sustainable profits from the region’s natural resources. As has already been noted, the Arctic countries’ national strategies have focused on safeguarding their sovereignty, security, and the right to utilize their resources. At the same time, these countries have had to reach out for cooperation and accept various forms of internationalization.

The future of the High North is in essence an international issue. The region’s subjectivity will increase significantly, and it will be governed to a large degree by a multilateral regime. Arctic decision-making will no longer be steered by inwards-oriented and largely protectionist concerns (relating to Hobbesian departures and ambitions as part of a Westphalian political order). The region will situate itself amongst other nations as part of the current international order.

At large, the development of the High North will consist of catching up and joining in by changing underlying paradigms. As a consequence, the still strong features of a bastion premised on modern departures from traditional politics will decline, and the political agendas determining the future of the region will first and foremost be geared towards cooperation, interdependence, and the ability to perform as part of the global market.